Restoration and Renewal

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

They do—well, those who are paying attention do—and I am glad the right hon. Gentleman is paying such strict attention. It is important that we do accept that we may have to compromise in what we expect in this Palace.

Then there is the question of a temporary decant location, and I look forward to hearing Members’ views about what scale and requirements are thought necessary. The Prime Minister has written to the chief executive of the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority making it clear that costs should be kept to a minimum. He is quite right that putting a severe downward pressure on cost is vital in the face of phrases such as “scope creep” and “gold-plating”, which are words that should make any right thinking politician break out in a cold sweat. Our goal should be a narrow, simple one—to save the Palace of Westminster without spending more than is necessary. That is the only way we will be able to look our constituents in the eye and explain the steps being taken.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I have been listening carefully to what my right hon. Friend has been saying, and he has laid great emphasis on saving the building of the Palace of Westminster, but can he just clarify that it is the Government’s policy that it should be saved so that it should be the home of our national Parliament permanently?

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I think that my hon. Friend may be alluding to the mention of York in the Prime Minister’s letter. I would remind my hon. Friend that between 1301 and 1325 Parliament met in York 11 times, but when Edward IV tried to get it to move to York, he was unsuccessful. It will end up being a matter for parliamentarians where this House sits, though strictly speaking the meeting of Parliament is called by the sovereign to her palace at Westminster. That, I think, is something that would be highly unlikely to change without the acceptance of parliamentarians. I hope that answers my hon. Friend’s question.

I want to conclude by quoting Caroline Shenton’s book about the construction of the Palace a century and a half ago. She raised the question of the difficulty faced by Barry and Pugin when she wrote:

“But who should be given the upper hand? The government… funded by the Treasury? Parliament as an institution made up of two legislatures occupying a single building… Or—most difficult of all—over a thousand MPs and Peers”—

this must be referring to peers rather than MPs, but never mind—

“fractious, opinionated…partisan, and…with as many individual views on how the work should progress as there were members? Deciding who was the real client at any particular moment would prove to be a mind-bending task for Barry over the next four and twenty years.”

I am a great admirer of much that was achieved by our Victorian forebears, but in this instance, this one instance, I believe the 21st century may—and I sense the shock around the Chamber—have the edge over the 19th century.

--- Later in debate ---

[Valerie Vaz]

I will come on to Richmond House, but it is not my opinion—it is an opinion that this House has taken to transfer authority for doing that to the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority. As I said, we are not the experts; they are the experts, and they will be able to undertake that.

The case for a full decant is strong. The Prime Minister has written a letter about moving to York. I do not know whether that has been costed—perhaps the Leader of the House could tell us what costs are associated with moving there. The costings of the building work and moving to York or anywhere else is a matter for the Sponsor Body to look at. This House will not be able to continue with a patch-and-mend approach or a quick fix; that will not do. Any delays will exacerbate the problem, probably making it cost more as some of the systems reach the end of their shelf life.

The Northern Estate programme is for improvements to the buildings in Norman Shaw North and South and Derby Gate, and it is progressing. Plans to house a temporary Chamber were part of the programme. Concerns were expressed about the heritage of Richmond House, but in fact it is only 33 years old. I am pleased that the right hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) intervened on me, because he has been in the House for 37 years, so he will remember when Richmond House was not even there—it did not exist. We now have a strategic review, in which Members are encouraged to take part, and they have until 7 August.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Will the right hon. Lady clarify the review being conducted by the Sponsor Body? Presumably, the Sponsor Body is allowed to conclude that the full decant is no longer regarded as the most cost-effective option, or is she serving notice that because the House has voted it through by, I think, a mere 14 votes some time ago, that option is closed to it? Presumably, that option is open to it.

[Valerie Vaz]

I am a lot of things but I am not a prophet and I cannot see into the future. I cannot see into the minds of the Sponsor Body, much as I would like to, because I am sure I would be of great help to the House. I am just coming on to that in a second.

There is the challenge panel, which is interesting. I have a list of the hon. Members and various people on the challenge panel, but I cannot see on there a single member from the Opposition parties. We have a strategic adviser to the Prime Minister and various other people, but I cannot see where Opposition Members—any of the Opposition—can have their view heard on the challenge panel. It is good that Sir David Higgins is on there, because he ran a very successful campaign to deliver the Olympics. I had the privilege of interviewing him when I was on the House Governance Committee and I know that he is very conscious of how to have an end to a project. He talked about Gantt charts and proper schedules. It was different with the Olympic Delivery Authority because there was an end date, but I am sure the Sponsor Body can come to some conclusion on how we come to the end of the project.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who speaks with great passion about this building and great knowledge about the challenges we face. All I plead for is realism. We have a clear objective: that this great building should remain the home of our national democracy. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House did not quite say that in his response to my remarks. It may be so obvious as to be implied, but it would be good if it was explicitly the policy of the Government that they envisage staying permanently in this building—even if we decant for a period, and even if the House of Commons chooses to meet in different parts of the country at different times, with this remaining our national home.

I mentioned the need for realism. The NAO report published in April highlights an enormous number of problems with this great project, not least a confusion of boundaries about who is responsible for what. In some respects, the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority have been put in charge of a project they do not control, because of us, because of the quirks of public opinion, because of the press and because of all kinds of added political risks.

I was unambiguously in favour of decant until I went around the basement and learned that, when we took the decision to vote for decant, we did not know nearly enough. I remain open-minded about the question of decant. While we are still learning, the cost of alternative arrangements and security has risen and risen. The opportunities for modularising on an incremental basis are quite apparent, particularly in respect of mechanical services. Sometimes we get a little carried away. We should not conflate the outside of the building with the inside of the building. The outside of the building is capable of being repaired while we are in it—the roof and parts of the walls are being repaired as we speak. It is perfectly possible to deal with the external fabric.

The problem of capacity is important, and it is the capacity of the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority that we should be most concerned about. They need to develop the capacity, expertise and skill to manage a very large project, and perhaps they should cut their teeth on a series of smaller projects, to build up their track record and expertise.

I come back to the question of risk. We all want best value for money. When large projects overrun, people often say that it must be due to the incompetence of either the contractor or the people who let or manage the contract. The bigger the contract and the project, the more complexities, the bigger the budget, the more people involved and the more risk. We see that in the procurement of new buildings and of large bits of defence kit. The risks compound and concatenate, and that is what will happen with this project.

As the NAO report makes clear, there are still so many known unknowns and unknown unknowns. The lesson from many of the cost overruns on the Queen Elizabeth Tower was not just on what could have been known—for example, somebody should have worked out what the scaffolding requirement was and costed it properly, which was a very big component of the cost overrun; there were also a whole lot of unknown unknowns that inflated the cost.

We have to accept that if this is to be a single big project, it is bound to overrun on cost and time because there are so many unknown unknowns. The question is whether the Sponsor Body should be charged with doing a single great project, or whether we should let it do it in bite-size pieces and learn incrementally; whether we decant is a secondary consideration. I hear strong arguments in favour of decanting, and I remain open-minded about them, but I spent 10 years looking at major projects, as Chair of the Public Administration Select Committee and then the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and everything we learnt about major projects told us one thing: the bigger the project, the more unpredictable it is. If there is one absolute certainty, that is it; it is the law of major projects.

I will finish with one final thought. Great emphasis is placed on what is known as “the requirement”. What is the requirement? Is it simply to preserve the building as it is, with a new set of mechanical services, new windows, a proper roof and without bits of masonry falling off? Or is there a very different requirement, to make this a major statement about what our national democracy is, what it should mean and how it should engage with the British people? One thinks of what the German people did with the rebuilding of the Reichstag after the reunification of Germany.

Is the country in the mood for a huge national statement about this building and our Parliament, or will that simply add to the risk? I think the British public want us to do a job that makes this building much more relevant to them. I had many differences with the previous Speaker, but the construction of the Education Centre was an act of genius. It has brought tens of thousands of children through here every month and has been a tremendous exercise in the education of our people about the value of our democracy, anchored in this building, which communicates so much about the values of our democracy and its permanence.

If we want this refurbishment to make that kind of statement, how is that conversation to be conducted? Will there be a competition for different proposals to see what attracts us as parliamentarians? There is a great deal about engagement with parliamentarians; there needs also to be engagement with the people. The danger is that we decide on something and then there is a great national controversy, and one party or another is driven off course as it tries to win an election, and the whole project is thrown into disarray as somebody says they will save some money by cancelling it. We have to engage with parliamentarians and the people and develop a proper vision for this building before we ask the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority to embark on what is an almost impossible job—to manage the risks of this great project.