United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Brevity demands bluntness, for which I hope the Government will forgive me. I support the motion, but I think that we need to be honest about the consequences of what we are taking on. First, we have crossed a threshold, and by approving this motion, the House is crossing it with our political leaders. Hon. Members should have no illusions: there is no such thing as limited war, in all its bloody terror and dirt. Secondly, I remind the House that

“no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”

So wrote Karl von Clausewitz.

The Government must admit that on that there is some doubt and the potential for confusion and indecision. The Prime Minister set that out again today when he outlined the limited aims of the UN Security Council resolution alongside our aspiration to remove Gaddafi. The former Chief of the General Staff, General Lord Dannatt, wrote at the weekend:

“Unless the military planners are crystal clear about the strategic objective to be achieved then the focusing of effort is going to be misaligned from the outset.”

That is a danger we face today. He talked of how military planners are

“trained to work out the implied tasks as well, to ensure that the campaign plan fulfils entirely what the higher authority's intentions are. In this case, the specified task is the protection of civilians, but the implied task—and the end-state to be achieved—must be the removal of Colonel Gaddafi and his regime”.

At times, the Prime Minister seemed to be talking as though we could just implement a no-fly zone and go home. Of course, we will have to maintain a no-fly zone until the political situation is resolved. How else is the stalemate to be resolved?

We have a duty to be clear. Either the removal of Gaddafi is the legitimate military aim, or I put it to the Foreign Secretary that we must drop it from our public statements and focus our words on the more limited task we are setting our military. We cannot do both. Clausewitz again:

“The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes.”

The UK has to balance the will to obtain a preferred outcome—Gaddafi’s removal—with the wider issue of security and stability.

This action derives its political credibility because of support from Libya’s fellow Arab nations. Can we afford to risk losing their support or that of the United States, which acts as underwriter for the military effort? I submit not. We can succeed in preventing the atrocity in Benghazi, but should the Arab League walk away from the confrontation with Gaddafi, why should it be our fight? We had better fix our goal and military strategy accordingly rather than invite mission creep by over-extending that rhetoric.

In the meantime we must settle the other vital questions that the Prime Minister started to address. Who is in command of this operation? I would like NATO to be in charge. Who is in command of the communications strategy? Where is the Jamie Shea—he was so effective in the Balkans—of this operation? Finally, how are these matters being considered by the Government? The Public Administration Committee, which I chair, conducted an inquiry into how Government strategy is decided. Strategy is not about setting certain policies in stone; it is about the ability to adapt plans to changing circumstances. To that extent, it is not about whether we reopen the strategic defence and security review; it is about how the SDSR should be adapted to changing circumstances. We have already had six strategic shocks since the SDSR.