National Resilience and Preparedness

Ben Maguire Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2025 Westminster Hall

[Richard Foord]

My hon. Friend is spot on. A report produced last October by the University of Exeter and Chatham House highlighted the fact that climate change and environmental degradation are a real weakness in the UK’s national security strategy. Authors Tim Lenton and James Dyke from the University of Exeter contributed to that report, and talked about the national security strategy having a glaring blind spot for climate threats. The report specifically identified risks to the food supply chain as a critical concern, no doubt exacerbated by some of the challenges we have seen lately from Government policy around agricultural property relief and the proposed changes to inheritance tax.

By contrast, Finland is a shining example, not just on food security but in many respects in relation to resilience. Finland has strategic food reserves, whereas the UK very much depends on real-time logistics, which poses severe risks when we see severe weather events, fuel shortages, or conflict.

Another factor is the UK’s departure from the European Union. Until 2021 a significant portion of our imports came from the EU, and trade disruptions following the UK’s departure from that bloc have heightened the risks. Between 2018 and 2023, import volumes from the EU decreased by 6%, and it is not yet evident how the UK is compensating for the lost relationships with our European partners in terms of food supply resilience.

The UK’s self-sufficiency in fresh vegetables—key in supporting the health of our nation—is at its lowest since records began. We are at just 53% for vegetable self-sufficiency. I have been involved in a campaign to have sections of British supermarkets that illustrate where products are grown in Britain or sourced in the UK, because at the moment it is easy in supermarkets not to know where food comes from. People are able to buy food from all around the globe, all year round. While that may be good in times of peace, we have seen during recent threats to global security that it may not persist.

Threats to food security have reminded us of what we could see in the future for our national security, so let me move finally to the issue of defence and hybrid threats. Defence is no longer just about protecting against armed attacks. Over the Christmas period I read Keir Giles’s book “Who Will Defend Europe?” The chapter on hybrid threats is excellent at illustrating how such threats range from cyber-attacks to disinformation. Those forms of aggression from states such as Russia mean that when we think about defence, we must think so much more broadly than just bullets and bombs.

[Ben Maguire (North Cornwall) (LD)]

On the subject of defence, and particularly technology, does my hon. Friend agree that mandating battery back-ups for all mobile phone masts, both existing and newly installed, would provide a simple, robust solution to ensure uninterrupted communication access, particularly in rural areas such as mine in North Cornwall?

[Richard Foord]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. I have not considered battery back-ups for mobile phone masts, but it strikes me as an example of a kind of psychology that we need to get into in this country—a way of thinking about our critical national infrastructure and how we might support it, rather than just supposing that everything is going to be all right on the night.

Just last week, NATO’s deputy assistant secretary-general for innovation, hybrid and cyber warned that Russian hybrid attacks are now at a level that would have been absolutely unacceptable five years ago. We must not underestimate the damage that Russia can inflict on the UK without firing a bullet. The UK’s relaxed approach to security has left some of our critical national infrastructure vulnerable. A stark example is the Loch Striven oil fuel depot in Scotland, which stores fuel for NATO warships and aircraft but was reported late last year to be now surrounded by land brought into Russian ownership.

The UK’s lack of preparedness is evident in many areas. A damning report by the Royal United Services Institute on the NHS’s wartime capabilities reveals that it has no capacity to manage either military or civilian casualties during conflict. I have seen this eroded and undermined in my Honiton and Sidmouth constituency. In east Devon, we have five community hospitals from which beds were stripped out under the last Government. We have seen about 150 beds removed; if that trend is scaled up across the country, it is little wonder that we see shortages of hospital beds during a spike in flu cases, let alone thinking about our preparedness for any sort of national emergency. Hospitals beds are one factor, but we need to think about blood supplies, transport and train personnel, shortages of which would mean the system would be overwhelmed in no time.

A couple of months ago, my researcher Fraser Johnson went to Finland. The Finnish Government showed him that they have taken a long-term approach to resilience and preparedness. They require their people to have a whole-of-society approach to these things. Defence is not solely the responsibility of state authorities: it involves citizens, charities, non-governmental organisations, businesses and schools. The schools teach children how to analyse sources and combat disinformation. Finland has regional security committees that conduct local defence exercises twice a year. The concept of citizens as security actors ensures that resilience is embedded throughout society. Helsinki’s emergency preparedness is a model of comprehensive planning. It has underground shelters equipped with oxygen supplies, water reserves and beds for 800,000 people to be used in staggered eight-hour shifts.

Of course, Finland is not the UK; it has some fairly unique challenges, such as being desperately cold and having a very long border with Russia, but we need to take some lessons from our north European neighbours. Finland’s broadcaster operates a secondary news desk 30 metres underground with its own energy supply, ensuring uninterrupted communication during emergencies. The Finnish National Emergency Supply Agency maintains a network of 1,000 public and private partners to ensure stockpiles of six months of fuel. We saw during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 not only that the UK had become dependent on gas exports from Russia, but that we did not even have sufficient gas reserves in the UK, with the result that the price here spiked considerably.

Despite its proximity to Russia, Finland achieves all that with a defence budget of 2.4% of GDP, so it is partly about how we use the funding that we have. Our geographical distance from Russia should not lull us into complacency. By their nature, hybrid threats are difficult to detect and combat, and their impact will only escalate without decisive action. In January 2024, the Chief of the General Staff called for a shift in mindset to prepare for the possibility of war. The journalist David Parsley broke a story months later about how the Ministry of Defence is sketching out plans for a so-called citizen army of perhaps 200,000 volunteers, trained by reservists.

The UK should adopt a total defence approach focusing on stockpiling, training and central co-ordination to enhance resilience against hybrid threats and other challenges. We must move beyond our piecemeal responses and develop a proactive plan to safeguard our nation and its future. Will the Minister commit to implementing the UK covid-19 inquiry’s recommendations to strengthen our emergency preparedness? Will she prioritise a national food security plan to ensure resilience against climate change and supply chain disruptions? Will she outline the steps the Government will take to develop a comprehensive strategy to counter hybrid threats and protect our national infrastructure?