Protection of Freedoms Bill

Debate between Ben Gummer and Paul Goggins

Tuesday 11th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Ben Gummer (Ipswich) (Con)]

In the example that the right hon. Gentleman has just used, we do not know, of course, whether the police could have charged before 14 days. That they charged on the 14th day does not mean that they did not have the evidence to charge on the seventh day.

[Paul Goggins]

I respect the hon. Gentleman and he and I have had exchanges on this issue, but I contest strongly his assertion. When an ongoing investigation requires detention to be extended beyond seven days for any further period up to 14 days, there is very close scrutiny by the courts. It would be impossible for the police to detain a suspect beyond seven days—for 10, 13 or 14 days—without the court’s explicit approval. A court would certainly not approve the detention of somebody who could have been charged earlier, so I completely refute his argument.

The Committee had a number of specific concerns about the primary legislation route. First—others have touched on this important point—parliamentary scrutiny of such primary legislation would be so limited as to be rendered completely unsatisfactory and ineffective. By definition, such a Bill would be fast-tracked through the House, with very little time for debate. The circumstances in which the legislation would be introduced would dramatically limit what Ministers could say without jeopardising the suspect’s right to a fair trial, or without compromising national security.

I am sure that the Minister would come to the House very well briefed on what he could and could not say—he usually does, and any such future debate would not be an exception—but neither he nor anyone could guarantee that a Member of the House would not say something that could lead to a subsequent trial being compromised. I ask hon. Members present to put themselves in this position: what if 50 or 100 of their constituents had just been blown up and they had to participate in a debate on a request that the suspect who is potentially responsible for those explosions is held for longer than 14 days? We would all be exercised in that situation and might be prone to say something out of place, which would be reported in the media and lead to further speculation that, in turn, could compromise a trial. Both Lord Carlile, the former independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, and Keir Starmer, the current Director of Public Prosecution, told the Committee that putting too much information into the public domain could prejudice a fair trial. Alternatively, so little information might be given by the Minister in the context of the debate that the whole process would be completely meaningless.

The Home Secretary is right to draw a distinction between a debate and a decision on the principle of extending the powers beyond 14 days and the practical application of those powers in each individual case. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Alun Michael) reminded the House earlier, the application is a matter entirely for the courts and not for Parliament. However, in practice, particularly in relation to the third scenario that the Home Secretary gave, the debate on the principle and the debate on the practical application in an individual case would become very blurred. There is a real danger of confusion between the role of Parliament and the responsibilities of the court. Parliament could be asked to vote on legislation, and within days, the court has to decide whether that legislation can be applied in a specific case in specific circumstances. In paragraph 84 of its report, the Constitution Committee concluded:

“It is ill-advised to create a decision-making process that requires Parliament and the judiciary to ask and answer similar questions within a short space of time—or at all. Far from being a system of checks and balances, this is a recipe for confusion that places on Parliament tasks that it cannot effectively fulfil and arguably risks undermining the rights of fair trial for the individuals concerned.”

That is an important point. The close proximity of the parliamentary debate and decision, and the application in an individual case, is fraught with difficulties.

Then, of course, there is the practicality of emergency legislation, which others have touched on. Normal business could be set aside if Parliament was sitting, but there is the question of what happens if it is not sitting but in recess. The Clerks advise us that a minimum of 48 hours would be required to recall Parliament during a recess. Of course, it was recalled very speedily this summer in the aftermath of the riots, but that was for a statement and debate, not to pass legislation. My right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), a former Home Secretary, advised the Committee that after the worst atrocity in the history of the troubles in Northern Ireland, when 29 people were killed and more than 200 were injured, it took nine days to reconvene Parliament. In the context of an ongoing investigation into particular suspects in a particularly urgent inquiry, that would make the whole process of primary legislation completely impractical.