Baroness Williams of Trafford
Main Page: Baroness Williams of Trafford (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Williams of Trafford's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat this House do not insist on its Amendment 5D, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 5E.
My Lords, I beg to move Motion A that this House do not insist on its Amendment 5D, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 5E. With the leave of the House, I will also speak to Motions B and C.
We return again to consider the Nationality and Borders Bill, and I am grateful to noble Lords on both sides of the House for the careful consideration they have given to the issues at hand and the care with which they have scrutinised this Bill. We must now make progress to pass this on to the statute book.
I turn first to Motion A and Amendment 5F, which would require that the provisions of Part 2
“must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Refugee Convention”.
The Government’s position remains that the provisions of this Bill are compliant with the refugee convention. The other place has consistently accepted this position. Ultimately, though, I cannot support this amendment as it is an attempt to copy Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the effect of which on the interpretation of the legislation is unique and far outside the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation. The amendment goes on to provide a mechanism for the courts to declare that certain provisions may be incompatible. Again, I must take issue with this for the same reasons, because we absolutely assert that the interpretations of the refugee convention which we are taking in this Bill are fully compliant. I will explain to the House why it is open to us to take this view.
The refugee convention leaves certain terms and concepts open to a degree of interpretation by contracting states. This ensures that it can stand the test of time and be applied across many jurisdictions with different legal systems. Necessarily, therefore, there is a need to define and apply such terms in domestic legislation in accordance with the principles of the Vienna convention —the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, made that point yesterday —taking a good-faith interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the language of the convention.
The provisions in Part 2 are in line with this. They are clear and unambiguous, and are a good-faith interpretation of the refugee convention. The plain fact is that there may be differences in interpretation in different contracting states—that is how international law necessarily must work to allow it to remain relevant and applicable across a range of jurisdictions—but this does not mean that the interpretation we are taking here, to which we ask Parliament to agree, is not a good-faith interpretation. We have considered carefully the compatibility of these provisions with the refugee convention, and a great deal of the Government’s position was comprehensively set out in the all-Peers letter sent by my noble friend Lord Wolfson.
We need to consider one of the primary purposes of Part 2: to provide a clear interpretation of key components of the refugee convention. This will benefit all those who interact with the asylum system, be they Home Office decision-makers, the courts, legal representatives or, most importantly, asylum seekers themselves. We have talked at length about how people seeking protection deserve a clearer, quicker and more just system. Let us not take away from the gains made by this Bill by casting doubt on what Parliament has agreed are fair interpretations of the convention.
The new amendment is not only unnecessary because the contents of Part 2 are fully compliant with our international obligation; it is also contrary to a fundamental purpose of this Bill, which is, where possible, to tightly define the nature of our obligations under the refugee convention while remaining compliant with those obligations to support consistent and accurate decision-making.
Yesterday, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said that her Amendment 5D, to which this amendment is similar in effect, was intended to do
“no more, but no less, than that already provided for in law by the ECHR”.—[Official Report, 26/4/22; col. 148.]
The ECHR has been given effect in domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998 and is constitutionally different, as the ECHR has a supranational body whose judgments relating to interpretation are binding. The Human Rights Act therefore gives courts the authority, so far as it is possible to do so, to read and give effect to primary legislation and subordinate legislation in a way that is compatible with the convention rights.
However, the Act goes further and recognises the primacy of Parliament, as a declaration of incompatibility does not invalidate either the primary legislation or subordinate legislation where primary legislation prevents removal of incompatibility. The refugee convention has no supernatural court—I mean supranational court; things are getting spooky—and is not incorporated into domestic law. It is no different to other international instruments beyond the ECHR, and there is no rational reason to treat it or Part 2 of this Bill differently to other parts of the Bill in this regard. The amendment would have wider cross-government implications.
The amendment now includes a requirement for the Secretary of State to be notified when the court or tribunal is considering whether to make a declaration of incompatibility with the refugee convention, and allows the Secretary of State to join proceedings. Unfortunately, that does nothing to alleviate our objections to the amendment, as I have just outlined. Our position remains that the provisions in Part 2 are fully compliant with our international obligations, in particular those under the refugee convention.
Turning to Motion B and Amendments 6H and 6J, I must again insist that we cannot accept anything that goes against one of the absolutely fundamental aspects of this Bill: deterring people from making dangerous and unnecessary journeys. The status of Clause 11 as a deterrent is closely tied to the “first safe country” principle. Although the inadmissibility policy encourages asylum seekers to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, it might not always result in an asylum seeker being removed to a safe third country; for example, due to some documentation or logistical issue. Consequently, the differentiation policy is required to add an extra layer of deterrent to the asylum policy framework, and we have a moral obligation to act to prevent such dangerous and unnecessary journeys. I cannot, therefore, accept this amendment.
I turn now to Amendment 6H, which again seeks to shift the burden of proof in applying Clause 11 on to the Secretary of State and seems to intend to make it more difficult for the Government to apply one of their core principles. First, I assure noble Lords that my officials are developing detailed guidance for decision-makers to assess whether the claimant qualifies for refugee status and, where they do, whether they are a group 1 or group 2 refugee. As is currently the case, we will continue to support claimants throughout the asylum process to ensure that they are able to present all evidence substantiating their asylum claim, including in relation to whether they are group 1 or group 2 refugees, for example via a substantive asylum interview with a Home Office official. As I explained, while Home Office officials will continue to provide this support, it remains necessary for the claimant, not the Secretary of State, to demonstrate whether they are group 1 or group 2. I therefore cannot accept this amendment.
I turn now to Amendment 6J, which, to be clear from the outset, is completely unnecessary. The Government, as I and my colleagues in the other place have said many times, are fully committed to complying with our international obligations. All the clauses in this Bill, the changes to the Immigration Rules which will be required to implement them, and the New Plan for Immigration more broadly will be compliant with all our international obligations. This includes our obligations under the refugee convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
In fact, there is already legislation which ensures compatibility between the Immigration Rules and our obligations under the refugee convention. Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 already sets out the primacy of the refugee convention in the Immigration Rules. It states:
“Nothing in the immigration rules (within the meaning of the 1971 Act) shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the Convention.”
I remind noble Lords that it is our unwavering position that all provisions in the Bill, including Clause 11, are compliant with our obligations under the refugee convention. I also assure noble Lords that Section 2 of the 1993 Act will continue to act as an additional safeguard for policies covered in the Immigration Rules, which will include differential treatment of refugees. As such, I cannot support the amendment.
Turning lastly to Motion C, Amendments 7F and 7G would effectively create an amnesty to allow people who have claimed asylum prior to the commencement of the Bill, along with their adult dependants, the right to work after six months rather than the current 12 months, as well as removing the condition restricting jobs for people who are allowed to work to those on the shortage occupation list. The amendment would not only reward people who have in many cases arrived illegally in an attempt to undermine our economic migration system, but it would create enormous operational burdens for the Home Office to implement, very likely—as per the findings of the Government’s review into the policy —leading to a net yearly loss to the department in running costs.
I reassure noble Lords that the Government want to see all claims being settled within six months, so that people can get on with rebuilding their lives, including working. We are making every effort to ensure this is a reality under the New Plan for Immigration. I therefore advise the House that we cannot accept this amendment. I conclude my remarks there and beg to move.
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I made the point yesterday about the time we have spent on this; I do not think your Lordships have ever felt that we in any way have tried to rush this or any other legislation. We have gone many days in Committee, for 12 hours or more, discussing at length all the concerns and issues at hand. Many of the points have been remade today in a very articulate way.
I think my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay feels that he has been slightly misrepresented by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I wonder if he might check Hansard and come back to my noble and learned friend.
In response to the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, this has been clearly set out, as I have said before. These provisions are clear and unambiguous and a good faith interpretation of the refugee convention. The courts of course have an important role in ensuring that legislation is applied correctly, but it is for Parliament to make that legislation. That is the rule of law and is the result of our dualist system.
Turning to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, we maintain that the general rule of interpretation in Article 31(1) of the Vienna convention requires a treaty to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. On that basis, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick has quoted, we have taken a wide-reaching exercise to understand this and considered relevant factors, such as the law in other jurisdictions, case law and the words of academics. We believe that all provisions reflect a good faith, compatible interpretation of the refugee convention.
With those words, and echoing the words of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I think that it is time to pass this Bill.
I thank all noble Lords once more. It is often a huge privilege to hear debates from all sides in this Chamber, but sometimes that privilege comes with an awesome burden, as the Minister knows all too well. I am referring not just to this Chamber but to noble Lords in other places in this building where they beaver away at their work.
I have had the privilege in recent months to serve on the new and important Justice and Home Affairs Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which had the privilege of hearing not so long ago from the Home Secretary. While I will repeat my admiration for the Minister and the way in which we can disagree well, this is not the case with everyone.
I want to say a word about good faith, which has been cited a few times. Before that committee, the Home Secretary gave evidence about the pushback policy. The committee has members far more august than me, including my noble friend Lord Blunkett, who quizzed the Home Secretary about the legal basis for pushing back boats in the channel and the controversy that had raged. She assured us that there was a legal basis and that the purpose of the policy was to deter refugees and the evil trade. The purpose was to deter asylum seekers and we were assured that there was a legal basis, as was Parliament and the public. When that policy was judicially reviewed, the Home Office sought public interest immunity over provisions in the policy document that revealed that the Home Office knew that it would be contrary to the refugee convention to ever repel a boat with a person who said, “I need asylum. I am a refugee”. It was only because the courts were able to say no to the public interest immunity that the Government and the Home Secretary were exposed and that policy is now over. That is how important the rule of law is.
I have been torn in making my mind up about this Division right now. I have been so grateful for the support of my noble friends—my noble friend Lord Coaker in particular— but when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood says he will go to the stake for the rule of law, I will go with him. I have moved the Motion and would like your Lordships’ House to agree it.
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 6D, 6E and 6F, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 6G.
My Lords, I have already spoken to this Motion, so I beg to move.
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 7F and 7G, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 7H.
My Lords, I have already spoken to this Motion and I beg to move.
Motion C agreed.