Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2019

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Thursday 28th February 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That the draft Order laid before the House on 25 February be approved.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, your Lordships will want to be aware that on 25 February we also laid a name-change order under Section 3(6) of the Terrorism Act 2000, recognising aliases of two already proscribed organisations: the Revolutionary Peoples’ Liberation Party/Front, otherwise known as DHKP-C, and Daesh. That order came into effect on Tuesday. It will ensure that our proscription of those groups remains up to date and that they are not able to evade the consequences of proscription in the UK by operating under alternative names.

The threat level in the UK, which is set by the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, remains at severe. This means that a terrorist attack in our country is highly likely and could occur without warning. While we can never entirely eliminate the threat from terrorism, we are determined to do all that we can to minimise the threat to the UK and our interests abroad, and to disrupt those who would engage in it. We recognise that terrorism is a global threat that is best tackled in partnership, so it is also important that we demonstrate our support for other members of the international community in their efforts to tackle terrorism whenever and wherever it occurs.

Proscription is an important part of the Government’s strategy to tackle terrorist organisations and those who support them. The order before the House today would amend Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to extend the existing proscription of Hezbollah to cover the group in its entirety. It would also add two further groups to the list of proscribed terrorist organisations. The first is Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin or JNIM. This would include its aliases Nusrat al-Islam and Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen, or NIM, and its media arm az-Zallaqa. The second group is Ansaroul Islam, including its alias Ansaroul Islam Lil Irchad Wal Jihad.

This is the 23rd proscription order under the 2000 Act. Proscription sends a strong message that terrorist activity is not tolerated wherever it happens. Under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation if he believes it is concerned in terrorism. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise his discretion to proscribe the organisation. The Home Secretary takes into account a number of factors in considering whether to exercise this discretion, and these include: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activity; the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.

The effect of proscription is that a listed organisation is outlawed and is unable to operate in the UK, specifically as a result of a number of criminal offences applying to activity in support of it. It is a criminal offence for a person to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite, provide or recklessly express support for it, or to arrange a meeting in support of it. It is also an offence to wear or display in public, or to publish images of, clothing or articles such as flags in circumstances which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.

The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 recently updated these powers, adding the publication of images offence and extending extraterritorial jurisdiction, so that UK nationals and residents can be prosecuted in the UK courts for certain proscription offences committed overseas. This will ensure that we can take action where, for example, a foreign fighter located with a terrorist group in another country reaches back to individuals in the UK via the internet, seeking to build support for that organisation.

Proscription sends a strong message to deter fundraising and recruitment for proscribed organisations. The assets of a proscribed organisation can also become subject to seizure as terrorist assets. Proscription can also support other disruptions of terrorist activity—for example, the use of immigration powers such as exclusion from the UK, in a case where the excluded individual is linked to a proscribed organisation and their presence in the UK would not be in the public interest.

Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise the power to proscribe only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence. This includes information taken from both open sources and sensitive intelligence, as well as advice that reflects consultation across Government, with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as relevant Whitehall departments. The cross-government proscription review group supports the Home Secretary in this decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration of each case but, given the impact that the power can have, it is appropriate that proscriptions must be approved by both Houses before they can come into force.

Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that Hezbollah in its entirety, JNIM and Ansaroul Islam are currently concerned in terrorism. Noble Lords will appreciate that I cannot comment on specific intelligence. However, I can provide a summary of each group’s activities in turn. First, this order extends the proscription of Hezbollah’s military wing to cover the group in its entirety.

I am sure noble Lords are aware that Hezbollah was established during the Lebanese civil war, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It is committed to armed resistance to the State of Israel, and aims to seize all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from Israel. It supports terrorism in Iraq and the Palestinian territories, and has a lengthy history of involvement in terrorism elsewhere in the world including in Europe. Currently it is most active in Syria where, since 2012, it has helped to prolong the brutal conflict and the suffering of the Syrian people. In 2016, Hezbollah helped besiege Aleppo, stopping humanitarian aid reaching parts of the city for six months and putting thousands at risk of mass starvation. Its actions continue to destabilise the fragile Middle East.

Hezbollah, as a political entity in Lebanon, has won votes in legitimate elections and forms part of the Lebanese Government. It also has the largest non-state military force in the country. Successive UK Governments have long held the view that elements of Hezbollah have been involved in conducting and supporting terrorism, and, as a result, proscribed Hezbollah’s External Security Organisation in 2001. In 2008, the proscription was extended to include the whole of Hezbollah’s military apparatus—namely, the Jihad Council and all the units reporting to it. Hezbollah’s military wing is also designated in the UK under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 and by our EU partners under the EU asset freezing regime. The US, Canada, the Netherlands and many partners in the region already designate Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organisation.

There have long been calls in this country to proscribe the whole of the group, and it has been argued that the distinction between the political and military wings is an artificial one. Indeed, the group itself has laughed off the suggestion that there is such a distinction. The Government have continued to call on Hezbollah to end its status as an armed group, in line with our commitment to strengthening Lebanon’s stability, security and prosperity. However, it has not listened, and indeed its behaviour has escalated.

In the light of Hezbollah’s increasingly destabilising behaviour in the region over recent years and the links between its political and military wings, we have concluded that the distinction between the two is now untenable. We assess that the group in its entirety is concerned in terrorism, and we now believe that it is right to proscribe the entire organisation.

The second group that this order proscribes is Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, also known as Nusrat al-Islam and Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen. This includes its media arm, az-Zallaqa. JNIM, as it is called, was established in March 2017 as a federation of al-Qaeda-aligned groups in Mali, including the AQ-Maghreb Sahel branch, Ansar al-Dine, the Macina Liberation Front and al-Murabitun. JNIM’s area of operations includes northern and central Mali, northern Burkina Faso and western Niger. JNIM aims to eradicate state and western presence from these areas and to institute governance in accordance with a strict Salafist interpretation of sharia law.

The group has been responsible for attacks on western interests in the region and across wider west Africa, as well as the kidnap of western nationals for ransom. It is also designated by the US and the UN. JNIM attacks are typically claimed via az-Zallaqa, the group’s media foundation. Examples of attacks include, on 18 June 2017, a firearms and improvised explosive device, otherwise known as an IED, attack on Le Campement resort in Bamako, in which three civilians and two military personnel were killed; on 2 March 2018, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, otherwise known as a VBIED, and firearms attacks on the French embassy and the Burkinabe Chief of Defence HQ in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso; on 14 April 2018, a VBIED and firearms attack on the Timbuktu camp of the French-led counter-insurgency operation in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. On 22 April 2018, there was a further indirect fire attack on the Timbuktu campi; on 28 June 2018, a VBIED attack on the G5 Sahel force HQ at Sévaré, in the Mopti region of the Sahel; and on 29 July 2018, a VBIED attack on a Malian army and Operation Barkhane convoy in the Gao region in Mali.

The final group to be proscribed, Ansaroul Islam, is also known as Ansaroul Islam Lil Irchad Wal Jihad. Its overarching aim is to establish dominance over the historic Fulani kingdom of Djelgoodji, situated in northern Burkina Faso and central Mali, and to implement its own strict interpretation of sharia. The group announced its existence on 16 December 2016 and claimed responsibility for an attack on an army outpost in Nassoumbou in Burkina Faso, which killed at least 12 soldiers. The group seeks to eradicate Burkinabe state presence from the country’s northern regions. It does so through attacks on government institutions and civilians linked to them, including police stations, schools and civic officials. Typical methodologies include small arms fire and IEDs. Further, the predominantly ethnic Fulani organisation will frequently target other ethnic groups, leading to substantial internal displacement of persons. Ansaroul Islam is highly likely supported by the federation of al-Qaeda groups in Mali, JNIM.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I start with Brexit, which for once is irrelevant to this debate. Matters of national security and intelligence-sharing were in place between states before the EU ever existed, and I know they will continue after it.

One of the major questions asked was: why now? Why did we resist proscription 13 months ago and what has changed? Proscription is a very significant step to take and, as my noble friend Lord Pickles says, it is a decision by the Home Secretary. We keep our response to terrorism under review and it is entirely appropriate that we take all available opportunities to strengthen the UK’s response to both domestic and international threats. Proscribing organisations is just part of that response.

The UK has continued to call on Hezbollah to end its armed status. It has not listened and in fact, contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, says, its behaviour has escalated. The links between the senior leaders of the political and military wings and the group’s destabilising role in the region mean that the distinction between the wings is now simply untenable, as noble Lords have said. As the noble Lord, Lord Turnberg, my noble friend Lord Polak and the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, said, Hezbollah has itself publicly denied a distinction between its military and political wings. To answer noble Lords’ point, the UK has had a no-contact policy with any part of the organisation for a number of years.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)]

I have been listening to this debate quite closely. What happens in the event that a Member of the Lebanese Parliament—Lebanon is a member of the IPU—comes to the United Kingdom as part of a delegation? Would there be any difficulties for that person in entering the UK?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

There might well be. As a member of a proscribed organisation, they may well have great difficulty in getting into this country. I will come to the point about democratic elections shortly. We now assess that the group in its entirety is concerned in terrorism, although I know that noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on the Front Bench, will understand that I cannot go into the details of current intelligence.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked if this action was to stop the intimidation of Jews—for example, by the flying of flags on London streets on al-Quds Day. Actually, it is not; the Government keep our response to terrorism under review, and we believe that now is the time to proscribe the entire organisation due to its increasingly destabilising behaviour over recent years. As for what happens on the next al-Quds Day, clearly the order will provide the police with an additional tool—it will be a criminal offence for a person to display a Hezbollah flag in circumstances that arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of Hezbollah—but the operational approach taken to the management of such public demonstrations will of course be a matter for the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Glasman, made a point about Hezbollah now having democratic seats in the Government. I acknowledged that in my opening statement. I could provide a long reel of its historical activity, but more recently it was involved in the siege of eastern Aleppo and, therefore, was partly responsible for preventing the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city’s approximately 275,000 people between 7 July 2016 and the end of the siege in December 2016. During that time, the UN reported there was a risk of mass starvation—noble Lords will have seen the pictures on television—if that humanitarian aid did not reach eastern Aleppo. The subsequent evacuation from those areas of civilians and fighters was also hindered by Hezbollah. That is very recent.

We remain steadfast in our commitment to Lebanon’s stability, security and prosperity, and we will continue to work with the Lebanese Government. Much of that may seem to contradict what I have just said, but it is important to state these things. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the impact of DfID delivery in Lebanon as a result of proscription. We absolutely remain committed to the stability of Lebanon. It is important to say that DfID does not provide any direct assistance to Hezbollah, or to any of the ministries or the institutions that it leads. We ended support to Hezbollah-majority municipalities following the elections in May 2016. DfID requires all its partners to abide by strict UK counterterrorism legislation, and we recently undertook a comprehensive review of all UK government programmes in Lebanon to ensure that we were compliant. As a result of this process, we have strengthened some of our checks and controls, and the majority of our programmes in Lebanon will be unaffected.

I have said that there has been a policy of no contact with any part of Hezbollah since 2010. The proscription clearly will not change that but, in any event, it is not illegal to hold a meeting with a proscribed organisation that is benign or for a legitimate purpose. It is only attending or organising a meeting intended to support or further the activities of the organisation that, as noble Lords would expect, is unlawful.

A number of noble Lords asked about the proscription review group. It is a cross-government group that supports the Home Secretary in his or her decision-making. It makes recommendations and provides advice to the Home Secretary on issues relating to the implementation of the proscription regime, including the case for proscription, name-change orders and consideration of deproscription applications. Membership of that group may vary in accordance with what is being decided, but noble Lords understand that.

The noble Baroness asked about FCO influence on a proscription decision. Clearly the decision-making process of the proscription review group will bring together relevant departments and agencies to come together a collective recommendation.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked if the proscription review group has changed its assessment of Hezbollah’s involvement in terrorism. The Government are clear that Hezbollah has had a long-standing involvement in terrorism. Proscription is a two-stage test; if an organisation is concerned in terrorism, the Home Secretary has discretion to proscribe it. As I have said, we have continued to call on Hezbollah to disarm, but it has continued its destabilising activities in the region. The Home Secretary has now decided to exercise his discretion to proscribe the entire organisation, which we are clear is involved in terrorism.

I thought I would comment on the remarks of my noble friend Lord Pickles, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, who I do not think is in her place, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, as what they said about the intentions of Hezbollah was very powerful. The comments about gathering in Israel so as effectively to get them all at once are disgusting and have no place in our society. Hezbollah do not just want to destroy Israel; it wants to destroy all Jews, and we have to do something about that.

The noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, made a point about free speech. We are very lucky that we have free speech in this country, and we recognise that proscription will have an impact on it. However, although inviting support for any proscribed group is unlawful, the Government fully support the right of community groups or anyone in the UK to debate and discuss issues pertinent to them and the right to protest, as long as those activities are within the law. We have a long tradition of freedom of speech and assembly, and we will not restrict anyone’s freedom of speech as long as they act within the law and do not promote hatred and division.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about points that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, had made about deproscription reviews being an affront to the rule of law. I reiterate that organisations are proscribed because they are concerned with terrorism. We think that we exercise the proscription power proportionately, but we consider it right to take a cautious approach when considering removing groups from the list of proscribed terrorist organisations. We have made it clear, as I did during the passage of the counter-terrorism Bill, that the Government will seriously consider any information that casts doubt on any proscription, including in the absence of an application.

I conclude by referring to the comments of the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, about informing other EU countries of the proscription and encouraging them to engage in similar action. We consult member states that have a direct interest in whatever group is at issue. We inform them of the proscription and a parliamentary agreement is secured in this House and the other place. We always consider whether to pursue EU listings of the groups concerned, although obviously different processes and tests apply.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

On the EU side of things, can the Minister tell us what the attitude of the French Government is towards these questions? France is our closest security partner and it would be very relevant to know its views.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sure the noble Lord will understand that I cannot talk about intelligence discussions with other states at the Dispatch Box. Of course, we have very close security ties with France. We have assisted it when it has had terrorist attacks, and I have no doubt that discussions with France will be ongoing.

Motion agreed.