Baroness Thornton
Main Page: Baroness Thornton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Thornton's debates with the Leader of the House
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as well as moving Amendment 78, I shall also speak to Amendment 79 in my name, with the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I will speak to the other amendments in this group, and I am particularly pleased to be able to support the amendments in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bertin and Lady Morgan. Both are on important issues, which we will discuss this afternoon.
The amendments in my name seek to ensure that there is a scheme to give victims of rape access to free independent legal advocates—available in every police force area in England and Wales—and that the Secretary of State must develop proposals for a scheme to give these victims access to free, independent legal advice. The idea of independent legal advice and representation for victims in these circumstances is not a new one. In 2005, the then Government announced their attention to introduce legally aided representations for victims in homicide, rape and domestic violence cases—though it was not brought in. In March 2014, the Minister of Justice in the current Government again raised the idea of independent legal representation in a review of the treatment of victims in sexual offences cases, but, again, did not implement the policy. Now it is time to make this a reality.
Independent legal advice and representation can provide an important mechanism and layer of accountability, which results in improved police and CPS policies and procedures. Independent legal advice has already been successfully piloted in Northumbria, and exists in many other jurisdictions, including most European countries, Australia, California and Ireland. Evidence clearly indicates that this legal advice and representation can operate well, alongside the rights of defendants to a fair trial. This proposal does not propose changes to the role of victims and survivors in the criminal justice process, or the rights of audience that currently exist—nor does it change the adversarial system that we have in the UK.
In 2017, the sexual violence complainants advocate scheme was piloted in Northumbria by the then PCC, Dame Vera Baird, to engage local solicitors to provide legal advice and support to local adult rape complainants. The support primarily related to complainants’ Article 8 rights to privacy, advising on digital download requests and demands for material in the hands of third parties—such as school reports, medical records and therapy notes.
The pilot scheme took 83 referrals from September 2018 until December 2019, and was evaluated. Case file analysis showed poor practice around victims’ privacy rights—some police officers believed that there was no need to seek consent from the victims. The SCVAs challenged data requests in fewer than 47% of the cases. The evaluation showed that the scheme was overwhelmingly positive. It increased complainants’ confidence in, and understanding of, the justice system—which is likely to reduce attrition. There was consensus that the project changed organisational cultures—significantly decreasing police and CPS requests for indiscriminate evidence. Police and the CPS felt the investigations were more efficient, relevant and proportionate. A judge commended the pilot as encouraging earlier consideration of disclosures and issues—making cases more efficient and proportionate. All the pilot’s participants agreed with the principle of legal support being made available for sexual offence complainants.
The CPS’s victim’s right to review, which allows a challenge to a decision not to prosecute has been broadened by the High Court to offer an opportunity for a victim to make representations. A victim who wants to use this new voice will need publicly funded, independent, legal representation, so that there can be an equality of arms with the reviewing lawyer from the CPS.
In Amendment 115, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, the
“court’s permission must be obtained for access to, service or disclosure of”
the victim’s counselling record—which is why it is linked, in a way, to the amendments I have previously spoken to.
“The court must direct that access should not be granted, or evidence should not be served or disclosed, if the court finds that this would disclose a protected confidence”.
In the Government’s own end-to-end rape review, and in debates around the digital extraction clauses in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, it has been understood that it has become almost routine for victims of rape to be subjected to credibility trawls. This is when victims are asked, sometimes without proper regard to the law, to relinquish their private and personal information for scrutiny by the police and the prosecution.
I am sure the noble Baroness will tell us about the issues this raises in more detail, but in summary: victims and survivors who have reported sexual violence to the criminal justice system are often put in an impossible position, forcing them to choose between seeking justice and accessing therapeutic support. Neither existing legislation nor guidance in this area has effectively addressed the problem of widespread inappropriate requests for this material. The law must change to introduce new higher thresholds for disclosure that is unique to counselling and therapy records to be applied through judicial scrutiny.
My Lords, with this group of amendments we arrive at a particularly sensitive and emotive set of issues, as noble Lords have so movingly described. I shall do my best to provide responses to each of the amendments in as constructive and informative a way as I can.
I start by addressing Amendment 101, in the name of my noble friend Lady Morgan and spoken to by my noble friend Lady Bertin. The amendment seeks to revise the Government’s new Clauses 44A to 44F, which place a duty on authorised persons, including the police, to request victim information only when it is necessary and proportionate in pursuit of a reasonable line of enquiry. It would instead require agreement before the police could request victim information.
To pick up a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, when we were developing this legislation we wanted to consider very carefully the desirability of aligning the provisions around requests for victim information and the extraction of information from digital devices. Where possible, we have ensured consistency between those provisions.
The new victim information clauses in this Bill do not grant new powers to authorised persons; instead, they place safeguards around requests for third-party material. This is unlike the powers governing the extraction of material from devices in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, which give new statutory powers to authorised persons to request a device and extract information from it on the basis of agreement.
My noble friend’s amendment is based on the principle of victim agreement, but there is a key point we need to remember here. Unlike the information contained on a personal device, the victim does not own the material held by a third party, and therefore cannot agree to its disclosure. That does not mean that the victim’s views are immaterial, and I will come on to that, but the decision to release this information instead lies with the third party. The third party, of course, must be able to fulfil their own obligations under the Data Protection Act 2018, which governs the processing of personal data by competent authorities.
When considering digital information, it is likely that information held on a device could be accessible via other sources: that is, messages between a victim and suspect could be accessible from the suspect’s device. That is unlikely to be the case for third-party material. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to mandate that a victim agree to a request before the third party can disclose the material, because that may prevent the police accessing vital information relevant to the case.
Furthermore, a suspect’s right to a fair trial is already enshrined in law as part of the Human Rights Act 1998, which new measures must not contravene. This amendment could prevent authorised persons accessing information they need to support a reasonable line of inquiry, whether it points towards or away from a suspect. Investigators should always work to balance the public interest in obtaining the material against the consequential impact on the victim’s privacy.
Of course we recognise that it is best practice for investigators to work with and consult victims, so that their views and objections can be sought and recorded. That is why we have supported police in doing so in the draft statutory code of practice that we have published alongside the Bill.
Amendment 106 seeks to revise current data protection legislation, so that victims of malicious complaints involving third parties can prevent the processing, and subsequently request the deletion, of personal data gathered during a safeguarding investigation where the complaint was not upheld.
It is of course right that people are able to flag genuinely held concerns about children whom they believe to be vulnerable. It is also right that social services fulfil their duty to treat each safeguarding case seriously and to make inquiries if they believe a child has suffered or is likely to suffer harm. However, equally, malicious reporting and false claims made to children’s social care are completely unacceptable. They not only cause harm and distress to those subject to the false claims but divert crucial time and resources from front-line services and their ability to undertake investigations into cases where there are genuine safe- guarding concerns.
Current data protection legislation sets out that data controllers must respond to any request from a data subject, including requests for erasure, and then must consider the full circumstances of a request—including the context in which the data was provided—before refusing. Where a data subject is dissatisfied with the response to their request, the current rights of appeal allow a data subject to contest a refusal and, ultimately, raise a complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office.
I assure my noble friend that, as part of its decision-making process, the ICO will take into consideration circumstances where a malicious claim has been made that may or may not amount to criminal conduct. Where a complaint to the ICO is upheld, the ICO can tell the organisation to assist with resolving the complaint, such as providing information or correcting any inaccuracies. The ICO can make recommendations to the organisation about how it can improve its information rights practices, and can take regulatory action in the most serious cases.
I hope that the process I have set out reassures my noble friend, and the Committee, that the current data protection legislation provides adequate protection. Therefore, in our view, additional provision is not needed.
Can the noble Earl clarify that he is saying that it is up to the victim to take the action?
I would be happy to write to my noble friend.
Amendment 173 seeks to extend Clause 24 to the whole of the UK. At the moment these measures apply to England and Wales, on the basis that policing is a devolved matter. This aligns with the territorial extent of the majority of measures within the Bill. We have also taken the decision to limit the scope to England and Wales as, following engagement with the devolved Governments, it is clear that there is no appetite at present for these provisions to extend further.
I assume the noble Earl is asking me to withdraw my amendment.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. The noble Earl will be able to report with some veracity to his noble friend, who we hope will be back with us next week, that there is a complete degree of unity across the Committee about the need for action on all these amendments.
I thank the noble Earl for the fact that there has been some movement; I think that at least two meetings will flow from this group of amendments. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, in place of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for her introduction and the suggestion that we should meet to discuss Amendment 106 and take that discussion forward together.
On Amendment 106, we have talked about my honourable friend Stella Creasy, who I have known since she was about 16 or 17 years old, but the briefing we got told us of many other examples of people who had been harassed. As one anonymous case said:
“Out of the blue Z received a call from their local police sharing details of a complaint made about the treatment of her children. The anonymously submitted complaint made a series of false claims accusing Z of neglect and abuse ranging from failing to feed or clothe their children correctly or take them to the dentist and GP. Social services were able to confirm that Z’s children attended school, the dentist and were registered with their local GP. Despite a lengthy investigation Z is no further in understanding who made this complaint, and their children’s record remains”.
She feels wretched about that fact. Of course, that carries forward to what happens to those children. Every time that mother has to fill in a form or a job application in public services of some sort, the fact that the report exists on the record is material.
Many noble Lords hold positions. I am a non-executive director of the Whittington Hospital and have had to go through the usual CRB checks to hold that position. If this was me, I would have to have declared that. That is what happened to Stella Creasy and all these other women who have been harassed and about whom vexatious complaints have been made. It is not just that this is unfair and a continuation of harassment; it has a material effect on those people and their children. We need to find a remedy for this issue.
I turn to the other amendments. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her introduction and for the way in which she talked to her amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, made her usual powerful and informed contribution. The words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, were very wise. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, champions some of the most vulnerable people in our society. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, was perfectly correct in saying that the effects of Amendments 78 and 79 in my name would be only beneficial, not just for the victims of rape but for all the authorities and for their conduct in dealing with these victims.
The question is: can we wait another couple of years for the Law Commission to report and for the Government to consider it and take it forward? I was interested in what the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, had to say. This issue may not fall within the scope of what the Law Commission is considering. We all need to know that, so that the discussions we might have with the Minister can be resolved in a spirit of information. I praise the noble Earl who has had to stand in for dealing with all these issues in his normal informed and courteous manner.
Finally, Amendment 115 on not delaying therapy is vital. As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, the idea that you have to choose between therapy and justice is so abhorrent that we cannot wait another couple of years to be able to sort that out.
I thank the noble Earl. I look forward to the meetings and conversations we will have between now and Report, when I suspect we will return to many of these issues. I withdraw my amendment.