United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness Stroud Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 19th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by adding my congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and the noble Lord, Lord Sarfraz, on their maiden speeches. I look forward to hearing further contributions from them both over many years.

The Bill, as we have heard, makes provision for the continuation of the UK’s single market when the transition period ends on 31 December. This single, unified, internal market is a key block in the constitutional foundations of the United Kingdom. It is my understanding that the 1707 Articles of Union between England and Scotland, and those between Great Britain and Ireland in 1800, abolished all customs duties between the different parts of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, free and uninterrupted commerce across all parts of the newly united kingdom were seen as one of the most important advantages of the Act of Union, particularly in Scotland and Ireland, the citizens of which could freely trade into and out of the larger English market.

When Ireland was partitioned and the separate Parliament of Northern Ireland was established, the Westminster Parliament was careful to ensure Northern Ireland and Great Britain should continue to remain a single, integrated, internal market. The devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales were created after the UK had joined the European community. Because the EU single market rules on state aid and free movement of goods and services apply to regional governments and legislatures as well as the central governments of member states, there was no need, during our EU membership, for specific UK-based rules maintaining the UK internal market against fragmentation. Now that we are approaching the end of the transition period, a vehicle is needed to maintain the free flow of trade across the nation in the post-Brexit world.

As we are all aware, though, there are two clauses in particular that will be subject to much debate and have already been subject to much debate during the passage of this Bill. These would allow the Government to restrict the so-called direct effect of two parts of the Northern Ireland protocol, which is part of the EU withdrawal agreement. These clauses have the goals of protecting the basic functioning of the United Kingdom’s internal market, as it operates between Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the event that it is not possible to reach an agreement with the EU on the UK’s future relationship with it; and allowing state aid in Great Britain to be dispensed under a framework of rules devised in this country, rather than being subject to European Commission control and European Court of Justice jurisdiction.

During the passage of this Bill, it is my intention to focus on and scrutinise, first, the degree to which, under the UK’s constitutional law, international treaties in general do not form part of the law. It is my understanding that, when an international treaty has made it necessary to make changes to the UK’s internal law in order to comply with it, the general practice has been for Parliament to pass legislation to make any necessary changes to the law. Secondly, I want to focus on the degree to which the jurisdiction clauses represent a gross departure from normal international treaty practice, under which sovereign states simply do not accept binding rulings by the courts of the other treaty party and agree only to subject themselves to mutual international courts or tribunals. Thirdly, I shall look at the degree to which, as a matter of UK constitutional law, the UK Parliament is entitled to legislate to remove direct effect from part of, or, if it so chose, the whole of, an international treaty.

I look forward to engaging in the debate on this Bill and hope that, in doing so, we can find a way through that addresses the challenge this Bill seeks to address and remember that having UK law subordinated to EU law and ECJ rulings was one of the main drivers leading to the British people’s decision to leave the EU.

[Lord Trevethin and Oaksey (CB) [V]]

My Lords, while listening to the many powerful speeches condemning part 5 of this Bill, I have wondered how the arguments in favour of these controversial provisions might be best presented. First, the phrase “breach of international law” is a loose expression, and the Minister in the Commons might well wish now that he had not used it. What is being contemplated here is better defined as a breach of an obligation arising under an international treaty, which is a better way in which to define the matter. This is a familiar contractual problem of quite a familiar sort: one party to the agreement wants to tear up certain provisions that it does not like.

Secondly, it is probably accurate to say that the contemplated breach is potential, not actual. The Constitution Committee concluded in paragraph 152 of its report that this is an open question. The actual breach may occur only if the power to disapply parts of the Northern Ireland protocol is exercised. Therefore, it can be argued that there is no current breach of a treaty obligation, only something rather less objectionable: the equivalent of a solicitor’s letter saying: “We intend to continue negotiating in good faith, but you need to know that we reserve all rights and, in particular, the right—if we have it—to tear up parts of the present agreement that we do not like, if it seems to us necessary to do so”. This is close to being what English lawyers call a “repudiatory and anticipatory breach of contract”, but it is probably on just the right side of the line.

Thirdly, Article 184 of the agreement requires both parties to use their best endeavours, acting in good faith, to negotiate the agreements referred to in the political declaration. That obligation should be read as being informed by the recitals to the Irish protocol. These repay careful reading. In particular, the parties affirm that the Good Friday agreement

“should be protected in all its parts”.

There is ample scope for argument on what may follow from that. It may be argued, as the Government have already argued, albeit faintly and without particulars, that the EU has in various ways itself been in breach of this good faith obligation. Reserving the right to disapply certain provisions of the agreement at some future point is not properly characterised as an outrageous and unlawful threat to renege. It is something different— namely, making it clear that, if the EU persists in conduct which the UK regards as a breach of Article 184, the UK reserves its right to treat the agreement, or part of it, as terminated or suspended. That, it may be argued, is a right that exists under Article 60 of the Vienna convention, which provides that a material breach of a bilateral treaty entitles the innocent party to terminate the treaty or treat it as suspended, in whole or in part.

Fourthly, to move away from the law of contract, it might be said that dealings between the EU and the UK over the last four years have shown very clearly, that in zero-sum adversarial contractual negotiations, it is sometimes necessary to play with a hard ball. The speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, displayed hard-headed pragmatism which Mr Keynes surely would have admired. The noble Lord correctly observed that the most complex treaties involve constructive ambiguity and, often, a degree of what might be called “covert bad faith”.

Those are the arguments. I do not suppose that I have persuaded the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, with whose speeches I agree, and I have not come close even to persuading myself that Part 5 of the Bill is defensible. Clause 47 is an astonishing provision. In that respect, I listened with dismay to the Lord Chancellor’s recent answers to questions put to him by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The Government seem to be largely ignoring the details of exhaustive dispute resolution provisions in the agreement—in particular, in Article 168 —which makes it mandatory to use them. Theyhave not done much more than faintly to sketch a case that the EU has acted in bad faith; if they want to rely on that, they should set it out in detail. This is a very wobbly position from which to launch a case that the counterparty is acting in bad faith. In the absence of such a case, there is no legal justification for threatening to tear up part of the agreement. Accordingly, I regret Part 5 of the Bill, and add that, while this House must act in accordance with its perception of what the rule of law requires, it should also bear in mind the admonition of the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, that we risk weakening the hand of our negotiators.