Children and Families Bill

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Tuesday 11th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Neil Carmichael]

My hon. Friend is making an outstanding speech on a critical issue. I want to reinforce the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman) on the importance of access to national facilities, because we must not localise provision at the expense of national organisations. Ruskin Mill in my constituency, and the National Star College in my county, provide expertise that we do not necessarily find elsewhere that is critical to young people’s futures. I want to put down a strong marker that we should ensure that national facilities are not put at risk through the funding—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. We are drifting now. Interventions are supposed to be short points that are relevant to the speech at the time they are made. If Members want to contribute, they can. The hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) has had the floor for some time, and other hon. Members wish to speak in this important debate. Despite his generosity in giving way, I am sure he is probably coming towards the end of what he wishes to say in this part of the debate.

[Mr Buckland]

I am extremely grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Your exhortation allows me to move on to the other amendments in my name, which I will deal with as expeditiously as I can.

Amendments 40 to 43 deal with young people over 18. The extension of legal protections for young people with SEN up to 25, which is at the heart of the Bill, is warmly welcome. However, the Bill states a number of times that local authorities “must have regard to” a young person’s age when making decisions on the support they receive after they are 18. We understand that the extension of provision to 25 does not create a blanket right to education for all young people with SEN, but we are concerned that the current drafting could give another get-out to local authorities, which could use the fact that a young person was over 18 to deny them support. Therefore, I suggest the removal of the phrase

“must have regard to his or her age”

to avoid that unintentional consequence.

Amendment 44 relates to the duty of health commissioners. As I have said, I welcome that extension, which is a significant improvement, and which breaks the problem of the silo effect on education and health care plans. However, in the amendment, I am asking whether the provision goes far enough. Clause 37(2)(d) places a duty on local authorities to include in the plans health provision that is “reasonably required” by a child or young person. With clever lawyers, arguments could arise over the meaning of “reasonably”. We should therefore delete that word.

Clause 37(2)(d) also states that health services that must be included in the EHC plan must be linked to the

“learning difficulties and disabilities which result in”

the special educational needs of

“the child or young person.”

In other words, the health provision must be linked to the specific impairment that has resulted in the child or young person being considered to have SEN. If the health need is not specifically linked, it does not need to be included. The danger is that limiting the requirement could result in confusion and, bluntly, injustice. For example, if a child with Down’s syndrome has a related heart condition, health provision needed to support their medical needs would need to be included in the EHC plan. However, if a child with Down’s syndrome has chronic asthma, which is unrelated to their Down’s and does not result in the SEN, there is no requirement to include the medical need in the plan. Such a distinction works against the Government’s intention to create a co-ordinated system. Once again, energy is being wasted on arguments about what is related to the special need. Let us try to cut the Gordian knot and deal with the issue in a straightforward way that does not create confusion and the potential for litigation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. Before the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) gets to his feet again I have to say that he has now been speaking for 32 minutes. Other Members wish to speak, so I hope he will draw his remarks to a conclusion soon—in the next 60 seconds—so we can move on to other contributions to this important debate.

[Mr Buckland]

I bear your strictures seriously, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I pray in aid remarks I have made in the past on the importance of the accountability of the local offer, and echo the comments made by the hon. Member for Washington and Sunderland West on clause 69. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to redouble his efforts with the Ministry of Justice, so that clause 69 is expunged from the Bill when it returns to this House.

May I very briefly mention new clause 21, which is part of this group? It relates to the duty to ensure that there is inclusion for children and young people. That must not just be a comfortable word that we in this place all use—it has to mean something. In transforming local services, we must stop making an assumption, even for children and young people in special schools, that there will not be times when they will want to access mainstream services. I should add that a large number of children with special needs currently enjoy mainstream education with appropriate support. We need to underpin the spectrum of provision, whether in the form of education or other local provisions, which is why I commend new clause 21, which was tabled with my colleagues on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the hon. Members for Aberavon (Dr Francis) and for Ealing, Southall (Mr Sharma).

I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for allowing me to address the House at some length. I apologise for that, but this is an important Bill. We have got to get it right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. Before I call the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), may I remind him that we have a very short period left and that I need to leave a few minutes for the Minister?

[Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

I would like to speak briefly to amendments Nos 5, 6, 7 and 8, which seek to introduce greater flexibility and understanding of the 26-week target for care proceedings. Nobody in this place would deny that that target is very helpful and we hope that, in most cases, we will be able to meet it. But we know—for example from the Norgrove report—that, on average, cases take up to 61 weeks: 48 weeks in family court proceedings. The Justice Committee, of which I am a member, held an inquiry into the operation of family courts. In its evidence to us, Barnardo’s made the point:

“Two months of delay in making decisions in the best interest of a child equates to 1% of childhood that cannot be restored.”

For this reason, both the all-party group on child protection and the Justice Committee welcomed the Government’s aim of reducing unnecessary delay in the care system.

Care must be taken with regard to the target as well. Clause 14 provides the starting point for courts in setting a time for cases; proceedings should come to an end within 26 weeks, as I mentioned. But there is some ambiguity as to when courts should deem an extension appropriate. As the College of Social Work and the Family Rights Group have argued, there is a genuine risk that the proposed 26-week limit could result in too much focus on procedure and not enough on the welfare of the child.

The vast majority of cases will be concluded within six months, but deciding on permanent options can take longer for some children, not always due to problems with the court process or unnecessary delay. Social workers will attest that situations can change in the course of proceedings; for example, when relatives present themselves as possible carers late in the process. The Family Rights Group has pointed out that, under the new limit, if family members are late in offering themselves as carers there may well not be enough time for the relevant assessments to be carried out.

Equally, placing a child with grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins or other siblings can reinforce aspects of a child’s identity. In many cases, however, relatives will be reluctant to offer this option if they think that there is still a chance that the child will be able to be returned to his or her parents.

I anticipate that Government Members will point out that the safeguard for granting extensions to cases is robust enough to allow for complications to be ironed out. Sadly, I have it on good evidence that judges are, in some cases, already imposing a 26-week deadline on proceedings even before the limit has been introduced. It is crucial that time considerations do not supersede the welfare of the child concerned. What is more, some intervention programmes take longer than 26 weeks due to parents undergoing treatment for substance misuse issues and similar problems. The pilot boroughs—Hammersmith and Fulham, Westminster, and Kensington and Chelsea—have estimated that 25 to 30 per cent. of all cases will take longer than the 26-week limit.

Intensive family programmes, such as the NSPCC’s infant and family team, are another example. The programme was developed in the United States and is now being piloted in the United Kingdom. A four-year evaluation of the programme in the US showed improved outcomes for children and adults in all groups that undertook the programme. I will be unable to address that point as fully as I should like in the time allotted, but one of the motivations behind the amendments I am speaking to—by the way, I am hugely indebted to the NSPCC for its assistance in this matter—is that some cases should be exempted from the limit from the outset. Although the Bill as drafted would allow for incremental eight-week extensions, practitioners in the field have warned that they would need to know at the beginning of proceedings how much time they have to work with the family, in order to secure the best possible outcome.

Equally worryingly, practitioners warn that social workers could be deterred from seeking extensions other than in highly exceptional circumstances, as the “specific justification” test in clause 14(7) may be perceived as a barrier in borderline cases. That is why amendment 5 would allow courts to exempt certain cases from the 26-week limit from the very start of proceedings if evidence relating to a planned intervention or programme requiring a longer period was presented to the court, or if the court considered it necessary to permit additional time to safeguard the child’s welfare.

Amendments 7 and 8 relate to clause 17, which introduces significant reforms to the way in which courts scrutinise care plans. I do not have time to go into the context; all I would say is that I, too, am disappointed that our time is limited today. These are very important matters. I have skimmed through what I was going to say—I am grateful that I was able to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker—and I know that the NSPCC and many other organisations will be bitterly disappointed that we have had to truncate such important debates in this way.