Localism Bill

Baroness Parminter Excerpts

Wednesday 20th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee has put a very convincing case. Like others, when I received a flood of representations from a number of environmental and other bodies that the clause opened the door to buying planning permission, I thought to myself that that cannot be right. I looked into it and, of course, I found that the provision is really intended to be a restatement and clarification of existing provisions. I shall not repeat what my noble friend has said about the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and her reference to any other material considerations.

In his absence, I say to my noble friend Lord Greaves, who has taken a great deal of time during the passage of the Bill to put his views to the House, that I think this is a brilliant amendment. It exactly meets what we want to say. We need a restatement of the law and it would not surprise me at all if my noble friend indicated that that was the legal advice which the Government have had. However, it is right to say that finance is no more material than any other consideration that a planning authority has to take into account. I would be perfectly happy with the clause if amended in this way.

My noble friend Lady Parminter’s opposition to Clause 124 standing part forms part of the first grouping on the list and I thought, “Gosh, this must be important”. I think this matter has been blown out of proportion. Nothing in this suggests that planning permission can be bought and sold. Other provisions, which we discussed earlier, such as the community infrastructure levy, the whole question of Section 108 and various other measures, are all important planning considerations. As I understand it, this clause with the amendment is exactly what the House should want. I very much support it.

[Baroness Parminter]

My Lords, I oppose that Clause 124 stand part of the Bill. My noble friend Lord Jenkin was kind enough to reflect on the fact that I gave notice of this matter only because I think it is important, and it remains an important issue. This clause outlines the fact that financial considerations can be material to a planning application and it was added on Report in the Commons. The Minister then said that,

“it is an incidental measure for clarification”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/5/11; col. 271.]

Frankly, why is such clarification needed in statute?

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has stated, the test for establishing what considerations are material in planning have developed from case law, not statute, since 1947. The classic statement is found in the 1970 case of Stringer v Minister for Housing and Local Government, which makes it clear that any consideration which relates to the development of land is capable of being a planning consideration. Accordingly, there is no legal or policy restriction in place that forbids financial considerations from being taken into account in relation to judicial decisions on planning applications. Indeed, over time, the courts have asserted that a range of particular financial considerations can be taken into account.

However, as this clause stands, it threatens the probity of planning. It sends a message out to developers that under this new planning system, which relies heavily on incentives—not top-down targets—to secure development, such planning permissions can be bought and sold. This concern has a long history. In 1997, the Nolan committee’s report on the standards of conduct in local government made it clear that the Government should consider whether the present legislation on planning obligations is sufficiently tightly worded to prevent planning permissions from being bought and sold. A key principle of planning has been that applications are decided on their planning merits, which can already include financial considerations, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said. Many of us who are or have been councillors will be only too familiar with Section 106 and other planning obligations where funding is used to make an otherwise unacceptable planning application acceptable in planning terms.

However, this clause elevates financial considerations above all other legitimate planning considerations, which are not mentioned here or anywhere else in statute, and it can be read as meaning that financial inducements that are irrelevant to the merits of a particular development proposal can be material in determining planning applications. As such, it is a fundamental and deeply damaging change to the planning system.

If further clarification is needed on the relationship between financial considerations and considering planning applications, then the way to achieve this is by drawing up guidance for local authorities, not through primary legislation. The probity of the planning system is crucial, and is indeed vital if we are to achieve community buy-in to sustainable development, and meet the housing needs that we know are out there in our communities.

This clause threatens to bring the planning system into disrepute, and should be withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Parminter]

170CC: After Clause 124, insert the following new Clause—
“Community right of appeal
(1) The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 70 (determination of applications: general considerations)—
(a) in subsection (1)(a), after the first “subject to” insert “subsection (2A) and”,(b) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) Where the planning authority decides under this section to grant a permission for an application which falls within one of the categories, and meets any of the conditions specified in section 78(2A)—(a) in case where no appeal is lodged against the decision, it shall make the grant as soon as may be specified in a development order after the expiration of the period for the lodging of an appeal;(b) in case where an appeal or appeals is or are lodged against the decision, it shall not make the grant unless, as regards the appeal or, as may be appropriate, each of the appeals—(i) are withdrawn, or(ii) are dismissed by the Secretary of State.”(3) In section 78 (appeals to the Secretary of State against planning decisions and failure to take such decisions) after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) Where a planning authority grants an application for planning permission, and—
(a) the authority has publicised the application as not according with the development plan in force in the area in which the land to which the application relates is situated; or(b) the application is one in which the authority has an interest as defined in section 316;certain persons as specified in subsection (2B) below may by notice appeal to the Secretary of State, provided any one of the conditions in subsection (2C) below are met.(2B) Persons who may by notice appeal to the Secretary of State against the approval of planning permission in the circumstances specified in subsection (2A) above are—
(a) a ward councillor for the area;(b) any parish council covering or adjoining the area of land to which the application relates; or(c) any overview and scrutiny committee for the area.(2C) The conditions are—
(a) section 61W(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 applies to the application;(b) the application is accompanied by an environmental impact assessment;(c) the planning officer has recommended refusal of planning permission.”(4) In section 78, after subsection (4D) insert—
“(4E) For appeals lodged under subsection (2A), a notice must be served no later than 28 days from the date of notification of the decision.”
(5) Section 79 is amended as follows—
(a) in subsection (2), omit “either” and the words after “planning authority” and insert “or the applicant (where different from the appellant)”;(b) in subsection (6), after “the determination”, insert “except for appeals as defined in section 78(2A) and where the appellant is as defined in section 79(2B)).””

[Baroness Parminter]

My Lords, Amendment 170CC introduces a community right of appeal, which delivers two things that this Government are committed to. The first is devolving powers to local communities. In this Bill, the Government are right to create greater opportunities for local neighbourhood planning. However, if the Government accept the importance of local people having a direct say in the planning of their communities in their environment, how can it be right for local people to have no redress when a planning application is approved that drives a coach and horses through everything that has been agreed?

The second objective is enhancing the primacy of the local plan. The Minister in another place has made statements about the importance of enshrining the primacy of the local plan. On Report, he confirmed that the reforms were all geared towards making the plan prominent and indeed sovereign. Granting a limited community right of appeal, which was triggered where a decision to grant planning permission was not in line with the adopted local plan, would be a powerful support to that approach. To be clear, it is a limited right of appeal for the community that I am proposing. It is limited as to the conditions under which it can appeal, principally if it is not in line with the agreed local plan, although also if an authority grants an application in which it has a financial or other interest. It is also limited as to who can apply—that is, members of the local community through their elected representatives—and limited in time, with 28 days to lodge an appeal to minimise delay and uncertainty.

Critics have argued that granting a right of appeal to communities will slow down the planning process, but limiting the right of appeal minimises any delay. Recent government figures make it clear that the number of so-called departure applications are extremely small—8,000 out of more than 6 million planning applications in the past decade, or 0.15 per cent. It could also help to ensure that local councils put sufficient weight on policies in the democratically agreed plan and strengthen mandatory pre-application discussions for major developments introduced by the Bill. Indeed, in New Zealand, where such an appeal right exists, it acts as a powerful incentive on all parties to focus on pre-application discussions.

A limited third-party right of appeal was a manifesto commitment of both coalition parties. Introducing one would help to make a reality of the goals of this Government to build public faith in decision-making and encourage participation in the planning process. It would also help to make the local plan sovereign. I beg to move.

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Amendment 170CCA (to Amendment 170CC) withdrawn.

[Baroness Parminter]

I thank my noble friends for making powerful contributions in support of the case for a community right of appeal. I take some comfort from the words of the Front Bench and I will over the summer use all the endeavours that I have at my disposal, and those of my colleagues, to press the case for delivering what the Government want to achieve in terms of helping people to have a powerful say in local planning and decisions that affect their lives. In view of the time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 170CC withdrawn.