Windsor Framework (Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland) Regulations 2024

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Lords Chamber

The fundamental conundrum is that Brexit meant a stark choice for English Conservatives and unionists. The harder the Brexit—and both the Tories and the DUP chose a very hard Brexit—the harder the trade border in the Irish Sea and the greater the discomfort for unionists and those Conservatives who trumpet their support for the union but—notably like Boris Johnson and the noble Lord, Lord Frost, did with their Brexit deal—in fact often betray it. None of us knows how all this will play out over the next decade or so, but we can be sure that Brexit will continue to poison the shallow well of peace and stability on the island of Ireland, and that is a cause of continuing concern.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I endorse the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hain, in relation to the wind-down of the inquests as a consequence of the legacy Act. What is happening in Northern Ireland is outrageous at the moment and causes huge distress to victims.

These instruments derive from the Command Paper Safeguarding the Union, which was stated to be the product of detailed discussions with the Democratic Unionist Party. Paragraph 2 of the paper refers to these discussions being conducted alongside

“engagement with other Northern Ireland political parties and the business community”.

Could the Minister tell the House with whom that engagement took place, since other parties were apparently not sighted of the content of this Command Paper? Can the Minister tell your Lordships’ House why the agreed processes of the Good Friday agreement, which are intended to ensure inclusivity and all-party engagement in order to make change or develop matters, and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which was passed to make provision for the Government of Northern Ireland for the purpose of implementing the agreement reached at the multi-party talks in Northern Ireland, did not operate in this case?

It may have been predicated on enabling the DUP to return to government in the Northern Ireland Assembly—and I am glad to see the Assembly back and running. However, exclusion of all but one party at this critical time, and the failure to follow the principles established in the Northern Ireland Act in the creation of government policy affecting Northern Ireland, are unlikely to generate trust among the political parties or in the UK Government.

In the multiparty document recommending the Good Friday agreement to the people of Northern Ireland, the signatories said:

“We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations … we will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements … we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and every one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement. It is accepted that all of the institutional and constitutional arrangements—an Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and any amendments to British Acts of Parliament and the Constitution of Ireland—are interlocking and interdependent and that in particular the functioning of the Assembly and the North/South Council are so closely inter-related that the success of each depends on … the other”.


In that context, there is a regrettable tone to parts of the Command Paper Safeguarding the Union. The agreements made seem to have been totally ignored, as the Government state in paragraph 14 of the executive summary of the Command Paper:

“Overall, this package of measures reflects the outcome of the negotiations with the Democratic Unionist Party; builds upon the progress secured by the Windsor Framework while securing further changes to its operation; looks forward with a broad range of significant further protections for the UK internal market, including in statute; and establishes the structures that will preserve these protections for the long-term”.


The Government say that there needs

“to be ongoing reflection … The Government is fully committed to that ongoing engagement and work, so that all agreed arrangements operate fully consistently with Northern Ireland’s place in the UK and its internal market, now and in the future”.

Much of what is of substance and contained in the Command Paper is not new; it derives from work done more than a year ago with the EU. Notwithstanding that, given the importance of trust to the functioning of the Northern Ireland Assembly, can the Minister assure the House that future reflection, negotiation and legislative activity will be the product of discussion with all the parties and that there will be no further situation in which the Government negotiate and then legislate on the basis of a document agreed with one party only?

Regulation 2(3) of the Windsor Framework (Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland) Regulations prohibits the UK ratifying a Northern Ireland-related agreement with the EU that would give rise to a “regulatory border”. Apart from the fact that no Parliament can bind its successor, that provision lacks clarity and could result, given the significant economic consequences involved in future EU-NI agreements, in complex and lengthy litigation between parties seeking to assert that a particular measure does or does not involve a regulatory border.

Much good work has been done between the EU and the UK, and there are now vastly simplified procedures applicable in a range of areas such as medicines, customs, the transportation of goods, agri-food, the movement of pets and the entry of plants, shrubs, trees and seeds to Northern Ireland. All that indicates good and constructive work between the UK and the EU, but it is most important that this constructive working relationship is not damaged by unilateral action on the part of the UK.

Many issues remain to be agreed between the EU and the UK. For example, while UK public health standards will apply to goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain, EU requirements for animal health and plant health remain fully in place to prevent any risk of transmissible diseases on the island of Ireland and such diseases spreading to other parts of the EU single market. There is also a significant outstanding problem with veterinary medicines, which requires urgent action to prevent significant problems for the agri-food industry in Northern Ireland.

Complex new arrangements have been introduced through the Command Paper for internal market assessments, which will require consideration of whether a new regulation may result in increased red tape or barriers for trade between the constituent parts of the UK and within our internal market. The Government have committed themselves in the Command Paper and the SI to

“an enforceable means for the economic rights of Northern Ireland to be upheld in accordance with the Windsor Framework”.

The amendment of Section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, to provide a new transparency obligation, is to be welcomed. But as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said, in the absence of a definition of the term “significant adverse effect”, it is not clear how that provision will be interpreted and to what extent it will be effective. Can the Minister provide any more information than that provided to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that this will be a matter for government departments to assess?

The second SI seeks to ensure unfettered access for Northern Ireland goods to the UK internal market—that is to be welcomed. Some very burdensome processes resulted from the Northern Ireland protocol. The evidence received by the Northern Ireland protocol committee—now the Windsor Framework committee, on which I serve—was extensive and indicative of significant additional costs being imposed on businesses seeking to import goods from GB, which might pass through that part of the EU internal market in goods that exists in Northern Ireland to EU states such as the Republic of Ireland. It articulates a number of provisions for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to issue guidance to assist business and authorities operating in what can be a complex environment. However, the Command Paper refers to the fact that two separate regulatory systems will continue to apply in Northern Ireland: that of the UK and that of the EU in so far as goods are affected.

Today’s disclosure that the financial settlement that accompanied the return of the Northern Ireland Assembly is to be accompanied by conditions to be detailed “in due course” does not encourage hope. Northern Ireland is the lowest-earning region of the UK. It has 130,000 long-term sick people and has economic inactivity rates of 26.8%, including those who care for the long-term sick and injured, many of whom suffered and continue to suffer as a result of the Troubles. If the whole of the UK suffered from those levels of long-term sickness, some 4.5 million people would be long-term sick, rather than the current 1.1 million. Can the Minister assure the House that the conditions to be imposed will not make life even harder for the Northern Ireland population, in effect stealth taxing them further and thus reducing the existing very low incomes of so many people in Northern Ireland?

These instruments will be passed by your Lordships today. What is important is that future government legislative activity is the product of consultation and discussion with all the parties in Northern Ireland, so that trust in the Government develops, and that it takes into account the knowledge and experience of those who do business in and with Northern Ireland, so as to ensure maximum future prosperity in the whole United Kingdom.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and to take part in the debate. There are two aspects to the package that the Government have brought forward. One is the Command Paper itself, which contains much in the way of the presentation, justification, pledges and promises of new bodies and so on. I hope that there will be an opportunity, at some time in the near future, to debate in full the Command Paper, because what we are also dealing with tonight is the second aspect of the package: the legal instruments and provision. They are what really matter, because it is only legal change—by legislation—that can alter the current arrangements under the protocol/Windsor Framework.

What do these statutory instruments actually do? In essence, the critical question for many unionists in Northern Ireland, from various parties and none, is: do they remove the Irish Sea border and its cause—the subjection of Northern Ireland to foreign jurisdiction regarding the production of goods and agri-food, a large part of our economy?