Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th July 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to speak after the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. I support Amendment 18, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and Amendment 25, which is also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton.

These amendments propose a pathway forward that would ensure we are well equipped to handle the challenges that will inevitably come our way in the next decade. Amendment 18 places a requirement on the Secretary of State to create a body designed to analyse and consider existing and emergent threats in the telecommunications sector, incorporating representatives from the major bodies of our national security matrix. This body would then be required to lay an annual report before all Members of Parliament, ensuring adequate parliamentary scrutiny and oversight. Indeed, if not for Back-Bench agitation, we might still be aimlessly integrating Huawei into our critical infrastructure, lagging behind our Five Eyes allies in recognising the security threat that such high-risk vendors pose.

Amendment 25, building on the horizon scanning outlined in Amendment 18, requires the Secretary of State to publish a long-term telecommunications strategy in partnership with the aims and outcomes of our closest Five Eyes and NATO allies. In alignment with the integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, this strategy would ensure that long-termism is built into our thinking across both our economic and strategic aims in the coming decade.

We have one of the most sophisticated and advanced intelligence-gathering apparatuses in the world. We are a significant asset to our Five Eyes and NATO allies and a crucial linchpin in ensuring the international order. Yet we have been slow to respond to the rapidly changing digital landscape that we find ourselves in.

An obvious example of this is the much-discussed high-risk vendor, Huawei. It is extraordinary to think that all the way back in 2013 a report from the Intelligence and Security Committee concluded that Huawei posed a risk to national security and that private providers were responsible for ensuring the security of the UK telecoms network. Yet now, according to Ofcom, Huawei accounts for about 44% of the equipment used in providing superfast full-fibre connections directly to homes, offices and other businesses in the UK.

In a Statement to Parliament last year, the Foreign Secretary made the welcome announcement that

“high-risk vendors should be excluded from all safety- related and safety-critical networks in critical national infrastructure”—[Official Report, Commons, 28/1/20; cols. 710-11.]

and yet, due to how embedded this vendor has become in our critical infrastructure and the lack of competition, Huawei, as we have heard, is not set to be removed as a provider until 2027. It should never have reached this point. A horizon-scanning body and deeper parliamentary oversight would ensure that we are not left sleeping at the wheel again. How was it that our Five Eyes allies were significantly more alert to this risk than we were?

Furthermore, without cross-body co-ordination, the rapid advances in technology we are set to witness over the coming years will make it even more difficult to adapt to threats as they manifest themselves. GCHQ Director Jeremy Fleming suggests that the UK needs to prioritise the advances in quantum computing, as well as working with allies to build better cyber defences and shape international standards and laws in cyberspace. With quantum computing becoming more mainstream, there is a risk that a sudden increase in processing power could render existing encryption methods useless.

These are just some of the challenges we face. The future of our security and sovereignty will depend on the steps we take in this Bill. According to MI5, at least 20 foreign intelligence services are actively operating against UK interests. We have a remarkable security and intelligence community but, as we enter this new era, we must accept that our ability to adapt to emerging challenges will be the defining feature that drives us forward and keeps us ahead of other nations that would challenge our national interests.

We have seen how easy it is for a digital attack to break down our critical systems. Just last month, a ransomware attack in the US took down the entire Colonial Pipeline infrastructure, which transmits nearly half the east coast’s fuel supplies. Analysts have suggested that hackers could have been inside Colonial’s IT network for weeks or even months before launching their ransomware attack.

This issue extends into the digital space. A 2018 report commissioned by the US Senate intelligence committee, The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency—a Russian propaganda unit—revealed that there was:

“A sweeping and sustained social influence operation consisting of various coordinated disinformation tactics aimed directly at US citizens, designed to exert political influence and exacerbate social divisions in US culture”.


I posit that we may not even be aware of the scope of the disinformation and destabilisation occurring online that is challenging our sovereignty and internal security.

I support these amendments in light of the fact that it has taken considerable Back-Bench activity to alert us to the security issues posed by high-risk vendors; that we are still not thinking clearly on China; and that we need systems and structures to ensure that long-termism is built into our thinking across both our economic and strategic aims in the coming decade.

[Baroness Northover (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 18 would require the Secretary of State to

“establish a body … to consider emerging and future developments for the telecommunications sector for the purposes of identifying current and emerging security threats.”

Amendment 25 would require the Secretary of State to

“publish a long-term strategy on telecommunications security and resilience.”

These are very sensible proposals, and the speakers have made a cogent case. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his wide-ranging and positive introduction to these amendments.

This is an extremely complex area, as we have heard, not only within our discussions of the Bill but beyond. We know from bitter experience that something can be flagged as a risk and then, without proper focus on it—given all that Governments have to focus on —follow-through is less than systematic. Think of pandemics, flagged, not least in the 2015 strategic review, yet followed through with little or no preparation. This picks up a theme that the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, emphasised in relation to Huawei: awareness but lack of action. Therefore, the case for a body that looks at this area in the widest sense is compelling.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Northover (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have added my name in support of Amendment 22, which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, explained so comprehensively and so well. He has picked up an ongoing theme that has been so agitating noble Lords—especially, I note, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—about the Executive increasingly and simply bypassing Parliament. I think that the noble and learned Lord will be very interested in this matter when we come to Report in the Chamber.

In this regard, I can do no better than refer the Minister to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord West, at Second Reading. He is the Lords representative on the Intelligence and Security Committee. He pointed out that this is exactly what that committee is for. It is clearly vital that Parliament has a role in what is covered under the Bill, but we also understand the potential security sensitivities here. This is where that committee can play a vital role on behalf of Parliament, but under the strict security rules under which it operates. If there are matters that the Secretary of State is withholding from publication in the interests of national security and in related areas, these must be reported to the ISC. I therefore urge the Minister to accept this amendment.