Conflict, Stability and Security Fund

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, for securing this debate. He has great expertise in this area, not least given his role in the Labour Government and, more recently, with PWC, which plays its part in assisting fragile states.

The argument for joining up development, defence, security and foreign affairs across government—in DfID, the MoD and the FCO—became clear in the wake of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, the Chilcot report highlighted that little thought had been given to the reconstruction of Iraq once Saddam had been removed and the Baath Party dismantled.

Even as we speak tonight, we see some of the possible consequences of that with the rise of ISIS, which may now be being reversed in Iraq, although whether with a plan for reconstruction and development thereafter is less clear. It was Hilary Benn, then Secretary of State for International Development, who sought to join up DfID, the MoD and the FCO to help support fragile and conflict states.

That has been taken further forward over the years, including with the Conflict Pool, which preceded the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. The FCO led our response when the Arab spring ignited in Egypt. DfID led when the conflict engulfed Libya. Attempts were made there not to repeat the mistakes of Iraq—avoiding, for example, the smashing of infrastructure—but that conflict did not have the necessary follow-through, even though the principles of building stability overseas were supposed to be applied. However, that does not mean that such joining up is not a good idea.

There are risks. The three departments have different cultures and often different aims. Add in the Home Office and the security services and you have a different mix again. Of course, all should be concerned to avoid conflict. Fragile states are the most likely to descend into conflict, and the poor suffer the most. And we may all be affected—for example, as now with Syrian and Iraqi refugees seeking their escape.

Of course, we secured the UK commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on aid through the Private Member’s Bill put through in the last days of the coalition, with wide support in this House, by my colleagues Michael Moore in the Commons and my noble friend Lord Purvis in the Lords. Other departments, including the Treasury, are rumoured to eye that budget with envy. Tackling fragile states counts as ODA, but we need to be absolutely sure exactly how and why the funds are used. Transparency is of the essence here, and I note with concern some of the comments made in evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.

What research underpins the fund? The International Crisis Group thinks it is insufficient. How do you improve early warning? The Arab spring took us all by surprise, yet the same seeds—youth unemployment, for example—can be seen elsewhere. How is that being thoroughly assessed?

DAI Europe notes that “framing support to countering violent extremism as a solely security-related matter runs the risk of overlooking the benefits of a community- or economic development-based approach to which beneficiaries and stakeholders may be more receptive”. It also sees confusion in the decisions as to whether projects should come under the heading of the fund and which department should lead.

Conciliation Resources rightly points out that it is better to address the underlying causes rather than the manifestations of conflict. It also notes the greater difficulty of accessing information than was the case under the Conflict Poo1, and that the language and processes are geared towards the commercial sector. That might seem to neglect the role that civil society organisations, which have long experience in this field, can play.

Mercy Corps rightly identifies “injustice, weak governance, political exclusivity, abuses by security forces” as “prevailing drivers of violence, instability, and displacement” that need a long-term approach. Yet it sees more of a “securitisation” approach, which does not square with that long-term approach. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson, pointed out, women are especially vulnerable in conflict, with the undermining of society that results. Saferworld identifies the involvement of the Home Office and intelligence services as indicating that this redirection is likely to increase. It and others note that decision-making power lies largely in London, moving away from the countries in question, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson, also mentioned. That seems short-sighted and is unlikely to address the real causes of fragility. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, is quite right: we should be achieving security in order to enable development.

ICAI noted the greater need for strategic direction than the Conflict Pool had manifested. But is this what we are seeing, or is it a short-sighted immediate security approach? The noble Lord, Lord McConnell, pointed to a lack of tackling upstream fragility and a lack of transparency. What comes across from the reports to the Joint Committee is that the fund—under the National Security Council and interpreting this area in the light of UK security needs—may well undermine a long-term approach and understanding in the areas in question.

Clearly it is vital to address fragile states before they collapse. I look forward to the noble Baroness’s response, but I share many of the concerns expressed by other noble Lords. I also think that there will need to be a further debate when the Joint Committee draws up its report. It needs to be recognised that stability and the reduction of conflict are indeed in everyone’s interests, but a limited view of what UK security requires may, in the end, undermine the wider and deeper need for development, which is far more likely to underpin stability.