(9 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI thank my noble friend for his clarification. He is right to say that the draft rules were constructed by a specialist working group. They will be subject to full public consultation in order to ensure that they strike the right balance, and that will obviously be undertaken well before these provisions come into effect on 1 October next year. Perhaps I may also say at this point that I have talked to the CBI and corresponded with the Law Society, with which I am extremely happy to have a meeting, as I think my noble friend suggested, so that we can go through some of the points that I am making in more detail.
A key safeguard in the Bill is that the CAT must certify that a representative is suitable to bring a collective action. This means, as has been said, a law firm, a claims management firm or a special purpose vehicle. These will not automatically be able to bring a claim, and the draft CAT rules provide for even more scrutiny of a proposed representative. It is appropriate for these requirements to be in the CAT rules so that they can be modified more easily or be made even more stringent if that is necessary. This will ensure an effective regime which promotes the interests of consumers. The Government also believe that the CAT, a specialist competition court which I know from my own experience, has a strong track record in dealing with consumer detriment in competition law, and is well placed to scrutinise each and every body that seeks to act as a representative. I do not share my noble friend’s concern, given my knowledge of the court and its specialist nature.
Perhaps I may intervene on my noble friend on that one point. As I understand it, the CAT does not normally carry out this function, so as I have said, while I have the greatest respect for the work of the CAT and what it does in relation to competition law, I do not think that it has experience of establishing whether or not particular claimants for the action are representative. We are going into uncharted territory here, and that is why it is so important to get this absolutely right.
I thank my noble friend. She is absolutely right to say that we need to get this right. We will reflect further on the point, and of course we do have a fair amount of time to ensure that the right mix of expertise is in place. However, the Government have decided, I think for the right reasons, that the CAT is the place to house this function. The rules and regulations surrounding that are clearly important and will be, as I have just said, subject to public consultation.
The point has been made that it would be better to put all the eligibility requirements into the primary legislation, but of course no two cases will be the same. We are concerned that companies might seek out loopholes to avoid the restrictions, and therefore it feels appropriate for the CAT to have the discretion to consider each representative on a case-by-case basis. But, again, we can discuss this further.
These amendments would also prohibit the use of third-party litigation in collective action cases. It is appropriate for the CAT to scrutinise any funding arrangements that exist in a case to ensure that the claimant has sufficient funds to meet the defendant’s costs.
My noble friend Lady Noakes talked about the approach of the European Union to this subject. I believe that it has issued a recommendation for opt-in in collective redress. The recommendation suggested the adoption of an opt-in regime, but it accepted that for reasons of sound administration of justice, member states might want to introduce a different regime. Following our consultation and the evidence that we gathered, the Government believe that the present opt-in regime is—as I have said a number of times—not delivering effective redress. We therefore propose in the Bill to introduce an opt-out regime with safeguards.
My noble friend raised many understandable concerns. We have thought carefully about this. The Bill already contains restrictions on the financing of claims as it prohibits damages-based agreements and does not provide for a claimant to be able to recover any uplift in a conditional fee agreement. Therefore there is a need for claimants to have the option of accessing third-party funding so as to allow those who do not have a large reserve of funds or those who cannot persuade a law firm to act pro bono to be able to bring a collective action case in order to ensure redress for consumers.
Blocking access to such funding would result in a collective actions regime that is less effective. This would bar many organisations, including reputable consumer organisations such as Which?, from bringing cases as Parliament hoped in 2002. Restricting finance could also create a regime which was only accessible to large businesses. This would weaken private enforcement in competition law, which is of course not the Government’s wish or intention.
To return to the point made by my noble friend Lady Noakes on the CAT, its staff obviously includes High Court judges, who are used to dealing with a range of representatives and complex case management. However, I take the points she made and look forward perhaps to discussing those with the Law Society or with any others who wish to be involved in a meeting between now and Report.
I hope that my noble friend is reassured that we are aware of the concerns around introducing an opt-out regime. I look forward to further discussions, but I also ask that my noble friend withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this brief debate on these very important provisions in the Bill. I am thankful in particular for the support that I received from my noble friends Lord Eccles and Lord Hunt on the amendments that I moved.
I say in passing that I find it curious that having an opt-in provision which resulted in only one action should be grounds for more legislation. It seems to me that there is very little consumer demand for that, although there may well be demand from representative bodies. I worry about whether we get the right balance in the law when we make law for representative bodies rather than ultimate consumers.
The issue comes down to what should be in the Bill. I understand what the Minister is saying about needing to have flexibility in due course and to leave discretion. My noble friend Lord Hodgson’s amendments did not change that; they merely proscribed certain categories of people from being authorised as representatives. It would still leave discretion with the tribunal, but would say, “In these circumstances you cannot do it”—so if you are a law firm involved in it, you cannot do it—rather than leave it to the discretion of the tribunal to work its way through whatever rules exist at the time. The draft rules, as my noble friend Lord Eccles said, are not very clear on that. They have rules about conflict of interest, but they are not absolutely clear what they are directing themselves at. They may well end up with precisely the right answers, but, equally, they could build their own precedence system which will end up with the wrong answer. That is the concern: that unless we are quite clear about prohibiting what we have observed elsewhere and do not wish to come here, we may end up with what we do not want.
However, I will not take up more of the Committee’s time today. Obviously, I need to revert to my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, who will certainly be looking forward to reading Hansard when he returns from abroad. I thank the Minister in particular for agreeing to a meeting with the Law Society and others who might be interested. There are genuine concerns about the nature of the provisions that are being introduced under Schedule 8, and we owe it to all to get those right. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.