Critical Benchmarks (References and Administrators’ Liability) Bill [HL]

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 13th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as recorded in the register and, in particular, my holdings in financial services companies, which could be affected by the Bill.

I welcome the Bill and thank the Government for responding to the very real issues that are raised by tough legacy contracts. I also thank the Minister and my honourable friend the Economic Secretary for arranging two very helpful briefing meetings for Peers. Before getting into my speech, I must say how much I am looking forward to the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Altrincham, and I welcome him to the select group of noble Lords who speak on financial services matters.

When we considered the Financial Services Act 2021 earlier this year, I argued that we needed provisions beyond those contained in that Act to deal with tough legacy contracts. I tabled some amendments in Committee and on Report, none of which found favour with the Government. It was plain to me that legislation was needed to avoid disruption in financial markets, and I warned about the clock ticking down towards 31 December this year, when Libor ceases. I therefore rejoice that the Government have now seen the light, and I hope that this Bill can be speedily dealt with both here and in the other place.

In the previous Bill, I argued for two measures to deal with the tough legacy problem: a contract continuity provision and a safe harbour provision, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. This is what the financial services industry said that it needed and what the responses to the Treasury’s consultation showed. The Bill provides for contract continuity but not safe harbour. If nothing else, that is regrettable for being out of line with the approach already taken under New York law, where a safe harbour has been provided.

As I understand it, the Government believe that they have drafted the continuity provisions in such a way that a safe harbour is not needed. The theory is that the continuity provided by the Bill should be watertight against any actions that arise from transition to synthetic Libor. There are concerns about this. Experience shows that legal challenges can and do emerge to legal drafting, even if that drafting is initially believed to be bombproof—whether in contract or statute law. No self-respecting lawyer would claim otherwise.

There is clearly a risk of litigation by parties who think that they have suffered from the transition to synthetic Libor or who could gain from being released from a contract. The risk of successful litigation may not be high, but there is a risk. This could be disruptive and costly. I hope that my noble friend agrees that it is important to avoid this.

The scale of the risk may well be difficult to quantify and will, of course, depend on the number and type of contracts that actually transition to synthetic Libor at the end of this year. There will, however, be clear winners and losers. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, the new, synthetic rate will probably be higher than Libor—possibly by about 10 basis points. I spent some of our recent Recess acquiring new knowledge about the overnight interest swap rate and the ISDA five-year historic median credit adjustment spread. If nothing else, this shows that your Lordships’ House is a wonderful place for lifelong learning. Ten basis points may not be much on a retail mortgage but, on a large nominal in a commercial transaction, it could be a pretty big deal.

Last week, the Financial Conduct Authority provided us with a very helpful note on synthetic Libor. I fully accept that the FCA has consulted extensively and that there is general market acceptance that the methodology is the best that could be achieved for Libor-like rates. Nevertheless, there has not been a debate about the quantum of the difference between Libor and synthetic Libor and its impact on litigation risk. A question about quantum was tabled last week at a webinar arranged for the financial services industry together with the Treasury and the FCA, but that question was not selected for answer. This will be in the public domain at some stage and I believe it could increase the likelihood of litigation.

An important risk mitigant will be the clarity of the government messaging in relation to the impact of this Bill. I hope that my noble friend the Minister can be crystal clear on three points. First, the Government need to intend for the drafting of Clause 1 to have the same substantive effect as the New York legislation. In other words, the Government’s clear intention should be that the continuity drafting must be watertight in relation to litigation targeting the transition to the use of synthetic Libor.

Secondly, the Government need to be very clear that the ISDA credit adjustment spread—the main source of the difference between Libor and synthetic Libor—is set by the FCA, that it may well result in higher rates, and that it is out of the control of the parties to the contract.

Thirdly, with the strong encouragement of the Treasury, the FCA and the PRA, the industry has been actively transitioning contracts by agreement, generally using SONIA—with or without a credit adjustment spread or base rate. The FCA briefing note to which I referred said that they regarded these formulations as fair. Do the Government agree that these rates are fair, given that they may not be the same as the synthetic rates to be used for tough legacy contracts? It is just as important to avoid litigation on contracts transitioned by agreement as it is on those designated tough legacy contracts, especially as the draft scope from the FCA will potentially put a very large number of outstanding contracts into synthetic Libor for 2022 at least.

I will touch briefly on the fallback provisions in new Article 23FB. It is certainly welcome that contractually agreed fallbacks can continue, particularly where they have been negotiated in the clear knowledge that Libor would be ceasing. However, many contracts and other documents have fallback language which would be problematic if they were saved by Article 23FB. The risk-free rate working group, which has done splendid work on Libor during the last couple of years, highlighted formulations which used “cost of funds” as being problematic. The term sounds more straightforward than it is. There is no agreed method of computation for standard market practice. It is thus a rich source of potential disagreement between parties and, hence, of lengthy and costly litigation, which I am sure the Government will want to avoid. Can my noble friend say whether any contracts with cost of funds fallbacks are likely to stand, or is it expected that they will all be transitioned to synthetic Libor? The latter is clearly preferable, given the difficulty of applying that particular fallback.

Lastly, I want to raise the 10-year time limit on the use of synthetic Libor under the 2021 Act. The New York legislation does not have a time limit. I understand that it is widely believed that there will be a rump of contracts which will go beyond this period. Do the Government accept that some contracts will need a solution beyond 2031? If so, when do they expect to deal with these? I hope that we can avoid the brinkmanship that has characterised the timing of this Bill and some of the FCA decisions in the run-up to the deadline at the end of this year.

In conclusion, despite the concerns I have outlined, I am a big supporter of this Bill. I hope that it will become law as soon as possible and give the market the certainty it needs.