Port Examination Codes of Practice and National Security Determinations Guidance Regulations 2020 Debate

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Department: Home Office

Port Examination Codes of Practice and National Security Determinations Guidance Regulations 2020

Baroness Ludford Excerpts
Friday 10th July 2020

(4 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD) [V]
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My Lords, the Schedule 7 power is enormously controversial in conferring extensive powers to stop, examine and search persons at ports without any need for evidence or reasonable suspicion. A 2012 review and the work of successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, including the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who is speaking today, and his successor, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has led to the introduction of some reforms.

The new code introduces further welcome improvements to the training of officers and the rights of persons stopped. One of these, which reflects fears of a threat to journalism such as that highlighted in the David Miranda case in 2013, is the ban on compelling a person to disclose the identity of a source of journalistic information without judicial authorisation, although that can be after the event.

Race, ethnicity and religion are barred as criteria for selection,

“except to the extent that they are used in association with considerations that relate to the threat from terrorism”,

which is a troubling criterion. There are fears that Schedule 7 stops are based on religious and racial profiling. Can the Government publish statistics on the religious affiliation of those stopped under Schedule 7, to address the accusation that it is being used predominantly and deliberately against the Muslim community?

I realise that Schedule 3 powers are not terrorism-related, but it is unfortunate that, while the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation oversees Schedule 7, it is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner who oversees Schedule 3. Is there scope for co-ordinating the reviewing? That would be helpful.

Lastly, the conditions for retention of biometrics under an NSD are too wide. The revised guidance says that chief officers should consider making an NSD for less than the maximum period of five years if they are not satisfied that retention for the full period would be necessary and proportionate. A cynic would doubt how often that will happen. Will the Government report back on the relevant statistics?