Employment Rights Bill

Baroness Lawlor Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, my main concern with the changes to statutory sick pay in this Bill is the impact on smaller businesses, which is why I support the amendments in this group in the names of my noble friend Lady Coffey and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which provide for rebates for SMEs. Of the two amendments, I prefer that of my noble friend Lady Coffey because it clearly undoes the harms that Clause 10 will cause.

I could not find much data on how much businesses actually pay in statutory sick pay, but I suspect that, unless an employer is unlucky enough to get an employee who has long-duration sickness, most will be paying relatively little at present, because absences are mainly for less than four days. What the data does show is that most sickness absences are for minor illnesses, which are unlikely to exceed three days. The average days lost per worker per year in 2023, which is the most recent data I could find, is just short of eight days. Among smaller and micro-businesses, that falls to around five days.

Extending the days for which payment is made is likely to increase the number of days lost to sickness, as the current incentive to work if the illness is mild will simply disappear. The Government say they have no idea what the behavioural impact of the changes will be—whether positive or negative—but I am prepared to bet that there will be far more short-duration absences, which will qualify for statutory sick pay, than there were before.

If I am right that most SMEs do not currently pay much in the way of statutory sick pay, the changes in the Bill will straightforwardly increase their costs. An average small business of between 10 and 49 employees has about 20 employees, which means that the average for a small business will be to pay for at least 100 days of sickness that they do not currently have, which would amount to around £2,000 in additional costs each year, even if no additional sick days were taken, which I doubt. That is not a huge amount per business, but it adds up to many billions of pounds across the whole economy. It also, of course, comes on top of the jobs tax and the very significant increases in the national minimum wage, which leads me to the likely real consequences of this change on top of the others. Put simply, SMEs will not hire workers unless they absolutely have to. We can already see evidence of that from the surveys of smaller businesses and in the weakening labour market—my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom gave us an up-to-date view on that. It is only going to get worse.

Furthermore, all those groups that we as a nation want to get back into work, in particular those who are long-term sick, will simply not be attractive to employers. Any hint of an illness record in a job applicant’s background will count against them, because no employer would want to take on the additional costs that would automatically come with that employee.

I am sure that I do not need to remind the Committee that SMEs employ nearly half the private sector work- force. A reluctance to hire among SMEs will kill growth and opportunities for many of the groups that we need to be employed in this country. There is a simple way to solve this problem, set out in Amendments 73 and 74. The Government would be wise to go down that route.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 71A and 71B in the name of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, Amendment 73 in the name of my noble friend Lady Coffey, and Amendment 74 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for a rebate scheme.

Amendments 71A and 71B propose a sensible modification to Clause 11 and strike a more affordable approach for a business paying the employee for time not worked, as well as for the compliance and record-keeping involved. I say “more affordable” rather than “fair” because many businesses—particularly small and micro-businesses, as we continue to hear in Committee —will struggle to stay afloat and in business, given the juggernaut of additional costs, burdens and increased obligations imposed by this Bill. That includes those in this clause and those in previous clauses that we have discussed.

In Clause 11, such costs are to be imposed for those below the lower earnings limit, as we have heard, which will add to the extra costs paid by employers. They will potentially open further problems raised in the impact assessment, the modelling for which suggests a rosier picture for business than the available evidence warrants but also raises questions of behavioural response. Indeed, that consideration was a fundamental principle addressed in the welfare state proposals by Sir William Beveridge in his blueprint Social Insurance and Allied Services in 1942. The original National Insurance Act was framed as a contributory scheme with strict conditions on benefit to avoid creating perverse incentives.

The impact assessment for this measure—which models outcomes on the basis of a variety of factors, including some unproven assumptions—contends that there is evidence suggesting that overall sickness absence may be reduced but, on the basis of evidence considered from other countries, says that it is

“possible that regulation changes induce a behavioural response”

and that

“studies from other countries have found that the incidences of sickness absences are higher when sick pay is more generous. There could be an increased number of sickness absence days taken due to improved financial protection”.

We can read that in whatever way we like, and we have heard different interpretations of more generous statutory sick pay, but it is incumbent on the Government to return to some of the original principles in the national insurance system in this country and to think further about not creating perverse incentives. There will now be days for which the employer will pay for which there is absolutely no productivity gain.