Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Mistreatment Debate

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Department: Cabinet Office

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Mistreatment

Baroness Kramer Excerpts
Thursday 27th June 2019

(5 years, 1 month ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Kramer Portrait Baroness Kramer (LD)
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My Lords, RBS’s inappropriate handling of its SME customers predates the period examined by Promontory and goes back to at least 2005. We know this because there have been whistleblowers, key among them Mark Wright, who gives me permission to use his name in this debate and who alerted senior management at RBS—up to CEO level as early as 2005 and chair level as early as 2006—and followed up with successor CEOs and chairs. When he got nowhere he alerted the FSA and its successor body, the FCA. I became involved in 2016, when the whistleblower’s Member of Parliament, Norman Lamb, was reduced to utter frustration after years of attempting to get the evidence of abuse of customers properly heard and to obtain fair treatment for Mr Wright. None of this is discussed by the FCA in its report on senior management. Nor did the regulator ever act to prevent retaliation against the whistleblower; indeed, it seems it even shopped him to RBS. Needless to say, much of the whistleblower’s life has been seriously damaged.

The FCA commissioned the Promontory report not out the goodness of its heart but because of charges laid in the Tomlinson and Large reports commissioned by my good friend Vince Cable, then Secretary of State at BIS, who had heard so many stories from SMEs. Further pressure came from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, on which I served. The FCA chose not to publish Promontory and produced its own summary, which—I am being polite—watered down and undermined every criticism and applauded RBS for its tepid and inadequate voluntary compensation scheme. That was whitewash number one. We know what Promontory found thanks only to a leak to an Irish website in 2018, which triggered a demand for publication by the Treasury Select Committee. Instead of allowing Promontory to complete its work with a follow-up report on senior management and its involvement, as originally envisaged, the FCA decided to carry out that second step itself: this report. Surprise, surprise: whitewash number two.

It matters. Promontory made many key findings: one in six SMEs put into the GRG was deemed “potentially viable” but was “caused material financial distress”—in other words, driven to liquidation—as a result of serious,

“failings in GRG’s governance and oversight … and of the priorities GRG pursued”.

That included failings in “second” and “third line oversight”—compliance and audit, to you and me. The report identifies that the notorious Just Hit Budget document instructing staff,

“to get a customer to agree chunky fees and upsides”,

was not an isolated document. The West Register model—West Register was the property arm of RBS, as we have heard—

“was inappropriate and severely flawed”.

Are governance, oversight and priorities the responsibility of junior or senior management? If they fail, is there any possibility other than culpability or incompetence? While Promontory, as I have explained, was specifically required to avoid investigating senior management, it could not help identifying its collusion in this overweening focus on the bank’s interests and lack of concern for SMEs and their owners. The report again and again highlights the conflict between the “commercial interests” of the bank and its duty to its customers. Commercial interest won hands down; I could cite page after page.

That leads me to my concern with the regulator. I fully share my colleagues’ frustration at the inadequate powers of the regulator. This concept of a regulatory perimeter over which the regulator dare not step is indeed a limit, but the regulator also uses it as an excuse, enabling it to avoid rocking the established big banks, no matter where justice lies. I believe that the regulator’s motive for not cracking down is embedded in a belief that the system must not be shaken; financial stability means that SME abuse must, to a significant degree, be tolerated. In the case of RBS, propping up the share price as government seeks to sell off public ownership probably plays a role.

The FCA has never vigorously used the “fit and proper” determination. In the three years it has had the senior management regime, it has used it only once—and then to give a fine of less than 3% of his pay package to Jes Staley of Barclays for using both internal staff and private investigators to hunt down a whistleblower. The industry expected him to be fired. Rather than seize on information from whistleblowers, the FCA prevaricates and leaves them to hang. Nathan Bostock, head of risk and restructuring at RBS from 2009 to 2013, with direct oversight of GRG, has been not black-marked but rewarded, becoming chief executive of Santander UK, and his £1.8 million bonus from RBS was not withdrawn but protected.

New players are changing the landscape of SME lending, but the FCA has just taken steps to discourage people from investing in peer-to-peer platforms, even if low-risk and diverse, by requiring that investors must declare themselves to be sophisticated and experienced to put in more than 10% of their assets. Word on the street is that banks lobbied hard to get these constraints on these upstarts, who are now finally poaching their most attractive SME customers and the savers to whom the big banks never offer more than a pittance.

Will the Minister agree that we need changes? We need a change in culture in the regulator to aggressively pursue wrongdoing and the senior management on whose watch it takes place, using every power to the limit and demanding more if necessary; removal of the regulatory perimeter for all SMEs, and potentially altogether; positive encouragement to whistleblowers, including granting the FCA powers that made its US equivalent, the CFTC, a driver of global clean-up; compensation and the right of the regulator to sue any company that retaliates against a whistleblower; and finally, a rebalancing of regulation to support alternate lenders, even as they grow big and threaten the establishment, rather than to protect the established, large players.