Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead
Main Page: Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead (Labour - Life peer)My Lords, I also pay tribute to the work of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, on the Bill, which has the potential to bring the UK’s export controls into line with those of all the other major arms exporters in the world. Clearly, that should be a priority for all of us.
Some years ago in Kisangani, Amnesty found ammunition cartridges from North Korea, Chinese and Russian heavy machine guns, Russian revolvers, Chinese anti-aircraft weapons and Russian, Bulgarian and Slovak automatic launchers—this when the Democratic Republic of Congo was subject to an EU and United Nations embargo. The prevention of illicit and destabilising arms transfers requires urgent and active engagement. Action on landmines and cluster munitions has proved that if the political will is there, we can ensure that we have international systems capable of making peace and security efforts work effectively. We need rigorously enforced measures and efforts to close loopholes such as those we are discussing today.
Many of us here today have worked, and will continue to work, for an end to irresponsible arms trading, for the establishment of systems that are likely and able to end illicit international transfers, and to ensure maximum respect for the highest international standards. There is clearly a need for global co-operation by manufacturers, brokers and buyers, working with Governments. Another key element will be new or amended national legislation. Already, more than 90 countries have domestic laws in place governing the illicit manufacture and possession of, and trade in, weapons. Also, the UN has reported that an estimated half of the total of more than 4 million weapons collected and disposed of during the past 10 years have been taken over the past two years. There is reason for us to be encouraged but more needs to be done, certainly—as far as the UK is concerned—on post-export transfers.
Let us agree that there is no time for protracted diplomatic processes and that the UK must continue to offer clear leadership, in both the European Union and the United Nations. The very first member of the United Nations Security Council to support the arms trade treaty was the United Kingdom. We need reassurance today that the same commitment and enthusiasm exists, especially as a draft text on that treaty is being prepared. This week the UK Working Group on Arms expressed concerns that at the July Prep Comm in New York there was a clear perception that the UK was not providing the leadership that, in the past, has been so constructive. It has claimed that the United States, France and Australia took the baton. I ask the Minister: will the UK continue to argue for a comprehensive text? Will the UK engage with states likely to present opposition? Will the Government accept that licensing should carry an export contract that specifically prevents the re-export of arms, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, to a country subject to arms embargo?
The Government should go further and ensure that the UK is in line with others who refuse to re-export without prior authorisation. This occurs in Belgium, for instance, while in Germany a clause on non-export without the agreement of the German Government is imposed in an end-user certificate. In principle, a country that breaches a no re-export clause or fails to ensure that the clause was respected would be denied future exports. Similarly, France requires certification that goods will not be re-exported without the consent of the French Government. While acknowledging that a no-export clause in an end-use certification is not a guarantee, it without doubt puts additional contractual obligations on the intended recipient. A state supplying these measures also has the potential to apply sanctions to prevent the diversion of goods.
Many countries that lack a modern defence industry such as ours can still act as sources of surplus or second-hand goods, such as small arms and light weapons, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said. Does the Minister agree that if the UK implemented a no re-export clause, it would surely increase the likelihood that the UK will achieve EU harmonisation on this issue?
NGOs also strongly support the need for controls, including re-export controls. They challenge the Government’s claims that checks before export are able to deal with the dangers posed by the situation. European Union officials from member states that use re-export clauses will argue strongly that the UK should also be in favour of them. Even if the arms trade treaty provides for an appropriate standard of control, it will take until 2012 for it to be put in place. Even then it will need to be ratified and come into force. Of course, some states may choose to remain outside the agreement. They will, in all probability, be the very same states that will need to have those post-export controls. In the mean time, why does the UK not tighten up its own export controls in this way? We could then strengthen the argument that the UK will need to make as part of a stronger European Union and UN lobby.
Every step of the way of improving arms trade controls has met with a repetition of the same old arguments: “It will cost too much”; “It cannot be enforced”; “Existing controls are enough”; “It is happening anyway”; and so on. Disappointingly, as I have said, on post-export controls the UK trails behind other major arms-exporting states. I trust that today we shall see a willingness to adapt the current UK position. That is surely justified because controls on arms trading contribute to cutting that umbilical link between conflict and systemic insecurity and poverty.