Afghanistan

Baroness Jolly Excerpts

Wednesday 18th August 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, I echo the gratitude of noble Lords for the efforts and sacrifices of our Armed Forces over many years in Afghanistan.

Yesterday we watched, with alarm, the return of the Taliban, taking front of stage in Kabul, projecting a new, softer public image. There is no doubt that many fear the Taliban. They have seen them at work and are alarmed for their personal safety, and particularly that of women and girls.

I want to talk about the NATO occupation. Clearly there has been a catastrophic failure in the performance of the regular Afghan army during the last month. The reasons, as opposed to journalists’ speculation, are likely to be many and complex. However, we cannot ignore the fact that, for at least the last decade or more, the US and UK have been heavily involved in equipping and training that army. In any inquiry into this debacle—and there must be an inquiry, which should be independent and not internal—it is important that the implications of the Afghan army’s collapse to a much smaller and less well-equipped force are properly analysed and that changes are implemented.

I also raise a concern that either the rapid collapse was recognised as a significant risk factor in the contingency planning for the timely and safe evacuation of people we are responsible for, or the possibility of rapid collapse was not recognised, which would indicate a serious failure of intelligence. As my noble friend Lord Dholakia said, our cultures are different; we do not always think in the same way. We continually underestimate the ability of our foes and overestimate our own and that of our allies.

One real concern for the future is immediate: the impact of this military and political defeat on the refugee crisis which will arise in the next few months and years—not just directly from Afghanistan and neighbouring countries but from the effect on other regimes emboldened by the failure of western democracies’ collective foreign policy, for example in sub-Saharan Africa. Our current government strategy of creating a hostile environment to refugees to discourage crossings of the English Channel is as effective as a Woodentop army battle plan. The Dover Strait is not the place to conduct an exercise in “comfort persuasion”, when refugees have already demonstrated their determination to escape brutal regimes by clinging to the undercarriages of aircraft about to get airborne or walking across a continent—or two—to get to Calais.

Working with our allies, we need to create a safe conduit so that refugees are welcome and their asylum applications rapidly assessed, and they are then supported properly into our communities. This will not be cheap either in monetary terms or, I suspect, in electoral popularity—but it is the price to be paid for political and military failure.