Criminal Finances Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 25th April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, we want to see the Bill as strong as possible. I have a few questions on the noble Lord’s amendments but I am grateful to him for bringing these matters back to the House. Amendment 1 would require questions to be answered on oath. Like the noble Lord, I felt that the answer from the Dispatch Box at the previous stage did not take us a great deal further. The Minister said:

“It would already be a criminal offence for the respondent to knowingly or recklessly provide false or misleading information”.—[Official Report, 28/3/17; col. 496.]


Unexplained wealth orders are court orders, so my question—I am not sure whether it is to the noble Lord or the Minister—is: does contempt of court arise here? That is not to support the amendment or otherwise, but to flesh out understanding of the procedure.

On Amendment 2, has the noble Lord been more timid than necessary by referring to the respondent or others having taken the step of registration as a beneficial owner, rather than using the criterion that he is such an owner? I agree on compliance: one either complies or one does not. Surely purported compliance is not compliance. This is quite a difficult area in legislation and it should be clear, and not raise more questions about whether the criteria are fulfilled.

My final question is on government Amendment 6. Will the Minister explain why, unusually, “a person” does not include a body corporate? I was interested to see that it is apparently necessary to include a definition. The definition itself is interesting: if it is read literally, references include bodies corporate and so on, regardless of whether they hold or obtain property. Does that restrict which bodies corporate are the subject of this new provision? I gave the Minister notice of my question so I hope she will be in a position to assist the House. I reiterate our strong support for getting this Bill through. I have spoken as briefly as I can because I know the House wants to get on with it and do just that.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments. I first came across unexplained wealth orders in Inland Revenue fraud proceedings where people had been accused of not paying their income tax. One of the methods of revealing that is by demonstrating that they suddenly have more wealth than their Revenue account suggests. Therefore, there is a question about whether the assets came from taxable income. That was the presumption at that time. That was before the terrific expansion of other forms of unexplained wealth that could arise. The explanation that someone had done something unlawful would not be a particularly good answer to a tax inquiry but perhaps that was not thought of. Certainly, that was a very useful tool in the armoury of the Inland Revenue in days past and is still so today. It is a very valuable method of dealing with this trouble. I find it very hard, however, to understand what is meant by purported compliance. As has just been said, it seems to me that you either comply or you do not. I must say that the explanation given in the draft practice system does not enlighten me any further. It suggests, indeed, that purported compliance covers certain aspects of non-compliance. It is a difficult definition to put in. I would have thought the measure would be better without it.

I raise questions with regard to the register. It is required to be done within six months of the passing of the Act. However, the commencement provisions of the Act allow the Act to come into force in accordance with regulations or orders made by the Secretary of State. I assume that the passing of the Act in this amendment is intended to refer to its getting Royal Assent. Strictly speaking, however, the Act comes into force only in accordance with orders made by the Secretary of State under the commencement provisions except in relation to certain aspects of that.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Wednesday 9th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

The Minister said during the previous stage that the amendment that would insert “without reasonable excuse” would introduce considerable ambiguity and risk successful prosecutions. The amendment is down again today. We should consider it. The courts, the CPS and the police often have to assess whether something is reasonable so, as I read it, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is a matter not of ambiguity but of judgment, although I concede that if it was strict liability there would be no need of judgment.

For the reasons that the noble Lord gave, the reasonable cause—I accept that that is a more normal formula—in the government amendment is welcome, but I do not believe it goes far enough to provide a defence to someone who knows that he is illegal but who has been abused and exploited, perhaps at a lower level than is covered by the Modern Slavery Act. If it is within the Modern Slavery Act, the defence kicks in only after there has been a charge. I do not think I am alone in preferring to see a charge not even getting off the starting block.

Our Amendments 49 and 50 are in response to the Minister’s explanation in Committee that the clause is largely driven by the wish to bring it within the Proceeds of Crime Act. He assured the Committee that the Proceeds of Crime Act would not be applied to inappropriate targets:

“We are talking here about people who have on their person a significant amount of cash in excess of £1,000”.—[Official Report, 18/1/16; col 626.].

I took those words literally and our amendments are an attempt to reflect them because, if that is the policy, the legislation should say so. I accept that the CPS guidance is to prioritise the recovery of the proceeds of serious organised crime and serious economic crime and that the confiscation order must be proportionate, but to create an offence with the risks which have been referred to and which I will come to in a moment seems an inappropriate direction in which to go if there is such a clear view on the part of the Government about when it will be used.

We remain extremely concerned about Clause 32 as a whole, and my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have our names to Amendment 52 to leave it out because of the danger of an increase, not a reduction, in exploitation. As we discussed on the previous group, the Bill is about more than immigration. If you fear prosecution and imprisonment, is that not a greater deterrent to standing up for your rights? Someone working without the right to do so should not be exploited any more than someone with the right, but we think that the new offence may carry far more risks than it solves problems.

I suspect that the new offence, or at least casting it in this way, is probably quite totemic for the Government but, given the risks of applying the Proceeds of Crime Act, surely there are other ways to deal with the issue, such as the existing offences that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has referred to, rather than by giving abusers and exploiters even more ammunition and ways that they can say to workers, “We can really cause trouble for you. You are in a situation that you can’t get out of, and you are in terrible trouble if you try to go to the police, squeal on us or whatever”. Given that existing offences could be used to prosecute everyone who would fall within the new section, we remain unpersuaded that it is appropriate to include the clause in the Bill.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, as against the clause as introduced, the virtue of the clause as amended by the government amendment is that the prosecutor would have to prove that the person in question knew or had reasonable cause to believe that he was disqualified, whereas in Amendment 46, which was proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, the onus would be the other way: in other words, the defence would have to prove that the matter was done without reasonable cause. I think that that is the nature of the law in this matter. So in a sense the government amendment has greater protection for the person alleged to have committed the offence than Amendment 46 would have done.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Tuesday 30th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 31, 32, 33 and 34. In view of the debate on the previous amendment, I should declare that some of my friends say that, when doctors ask the question, “Does anyone ever comment on your drinking?”, I should say yes because I drink so little. On the other hand, coffee and chocolate—now, there you are talking.

I am concerned about the definitions in Schedule 1. For example,

“‘caffeine products’ means any product which … contains caffeine, and … does not contain any psychoactive substance”.

I am bemused by this. It must mean “does not contain any other psychoactive substance”, in which case we should say so. We have heard that the Government will be responding to the Constitution Committee. I will not say that the committee was also bemused—that would be very disrespectful—but it pointed out some issues with the relationships between exemptions and so on. We await the response.

The first three amendments are all the same and the fourth one is, in essence, the same as the first three. The last amendment in this group refers to instruments relating to food. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, talked about the amount of EU regulation on this issue. I am interested in the words,

“the use of which in or on food is not authorised by an EU instrument”.

Should it not be “an EU or other applicable instrument”, which is what I am suggesting?

Even if there is no secondary legislation or any ruling which applies to this, perhaps we should future-proof it in case there is. I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, the “other” must be implied and I see no reason why it should not be expressed. I think the amendment carries itself fairly easily.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I support both sets of amendments, on prisons and vulnerable children. It strikes me that these are quite clearly aggravating factors and we should do everything we can to prevent these drugs being introduced to prisons and to vulnerable children.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Clause 6, I believe, replicates almost exactly the provision in the Misuse of Drugs Act. Without commenting on either of the areas of concern, although I quite understand the concern, my question to the Minister is: have the Government had any advice about extending the list of aggravating factors generally? Right at the start of Committee we raised the issue of a review of the Misuse of Drugs Act. This is the sort of thing that could well come within the scope of a review.

The Minister will explain to the Committee in a moment the one word which would be different from Section 4A of the Misuse of Drugs Act and that is in his Amendment 43 to Clause 6(6). The MDA talks about delivering a controlled drug to a third person. Like the original drafter of this provision, I would have thought that referring to a psychoactive substance is logical and if we take out the word “psychoactive”—unless we are going to be told that that is what we have to read into it—it would seem to mean that if someone under 18 delivering anything to another person in connection with an offence falls within this. But I had better not further anticipate what we will be told about this.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Tuesday 23rd June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, when we talk about “banning”, we mean the substance being used to commit an offence under the Bill. There are two ways of reaching that conclusion. If you see someone taking a tablet or a substance and suddenly his mental state has been altered, cause and effect is likely to be demonstrated. The second way is that if you know the nature and qualities of substances, when you analyse the substance you may be able to do it that way too.

The important thing, however, is that it is not a question of the substance not being banned until you discover it: the definition applies right from the beginning. As the Minister said, when the Bill becomes law, substances with that character become the possible ways of committing the offence. The question of whether a particular substance is of that character can, I think, be approached in these two different ways, according to what is convenient in the circumstances of the individual case.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before the noble Baroness responds, may I ask a question? It will display the depths of my ignorance, which will gratify the noble Lord, Lord Harris, who can never resist teasing me. If one has a herbal product and it is genetically modified, does that make the outcome synthetic, or does it remain herbal?