Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Harris of Haringey

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Wednesday 9th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to officials for explaining the origin of the amendment to me. They commented that the Government’s view is that we should not extend the criminal law unless there is a well-founded case for doing so. I agree with that, but I have instinctive concerns about this proposal. First, what consultation has there been with the entertainment industry? This must be a matter of widespread interest. I cannot say that I go to musical events usually held in the open air—I go to rather staider events—but a lot of people will feel that they are being targeted by the measure. What consideration has been given to, first, whether there should not be a focus on the venue organiser rather than the individual, as this seems to be a matter of crowd control? Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is there no other way than creating a new specific offence? If fireworks and flares are dangerous—I accept that they are—is this not about the misuse of fireworks rather than the place or event where they may be misused? As for it being a musical event, which is to be determined by regulations, that seems to raise all sorts of problems.

I appreciate that this comes from legislation about football matches, although the 1985 Act cited by the Minister seems a little narrower, unless I have misunderstood it, because the places where the person is found to be in possession are very closely defined, including an area,

“from which the event may be directly viewed”.

When looking up that section, I came across a petition to Parliament to legalise the use of pyrotechnics at football grounds. I could not find its date, but it was rejected on the basis that it was,

“a matter for individual Local Authorities”.

That confused me even more, but I wonder what relation that point has to the amendment.

I am sorry to throw a number of questions at the Minister, but I am sure that the Government considered them before proposing the amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am not sure whether the thrust of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was to broaden or narrow the scope—

[Baroness Hamwee]

It was to inquire.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Harris of Haringey

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - part two): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend and I have four amendments in the group. With regard to Amendment 196A, the Minister will not be surprised that we always support consultation—well, almost always. I wondered whether “persons” in the amendment, which would follow on from persons who are “law enforcement officers” as provided for in the clause, means human persons and corporate and other bodies, as I would expect. I was a bit surprised during the passage of—I think—the Investigatory Powers Bill that there had to be a definition of “person” at one point. I assume that the sweeping-up provision in Clause 82(3)(g) is to allow for, for instance, the organisation that came to my mind, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. Even if that is not intended, perhaps I can ask about it and whether it should have powers. Is that in the Government’s mind?

Our four amendments are to Clause 92. Clause 92(1) provides for the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for law enforcement officers arresting a person under the powers given by the Bill. Clause 92(2) provides that the code must provide guidance as to the information to be given to the person being arrested. We think the code should be wider than this.

Perhaps the most important amendment is the one that would add criteria to be considered by the law enforcement officers before they arrive at a decision to proceed with an arrest. Clearly, this is not something that would be done lightly, but there must be some scope, whether in this code of practice or elsewhere, as to when these very considerable powers should be thought appropriate to exercise. The amendment to Clause 92(1) is similar, in that it would require officers to think before doing, if I can put it that way, as well as thinking when doing.

Our third amendment would provide in Clause 92(8) that regulations requiring an affirmative resolution should apply in the case of a revision of the code, not just the initial code. We would also remove Clause 92(9). Those two amendments would go together and make the same point. We think that this is a sufficiently serious matter that affirmative resolutions would be appropriate.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise notionally to support my noble friend Lord Rosser and his amendment, but first I record that I have recently completed for the Mayor of London a review of London’s preparedness to withstand a major terrorist incident. As part of that review I looked at the policing of the River Thames. I became aware of a lacuna—or at least what I understood to be a lacuna—that appeared to exist in the legislation, which these clauses fill and deal with by making it possible for police to stop and search boats on the River Thames. I was therefore delighted to see it. My recommendations on that were couched in those terms.

However, it appears that it is possible for anyone to sail up the River Thames without having any licence or even permit, which seems an extraordinary gap. While we were tidying up some of these matters, I would have thought it useful to tidy up precisely that one. Given that one is expected to have a licence to drive a car, with the car being required to be of a certain standard, it is surprising that there is no such requirement for sending a boat up the Thames.

I come to the specific question that I wanted to ask the Minister—she can answer the first one if she wishes. An hour and three-quarters ago, I received an email from Nigel—I suppose that I am taking a leaf out of the book of my right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition here. Nigel said:

“I’m an old retired police officer”—

so he must have been there with Brian—

“and I may be out of date but back in 1967 when I joined The Met, one bit of legislation they kept drumming into us was Sec 66 of The Metropolitan Police Act and it read police may stop, search and detain any vehicle, vessel, boat, cart or carriage in or upon which anything stolen or unlawfully may be found”.

At what point in the various reorganisations of London government and policing legislation was Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act repealed or changed? It may still be there, in which case what does this provision add to it? The Minister may not have that information immediately available in her brief, so I would be quite happy to receive a note at a later stage.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Harris of Haringey

Wednesday 14th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I will certainly be grateful to receive a letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. However, I think she has slightly missed the point—namely, that, under the current legislation, if the deputy mayor for policing and crime is not an Assembly member, he or she is politically restricted. It is just conceivable that, because of the convoluted way in which legislation is frequently drafted, the political restriction is derived from something other than those particular clauses in the Local Government Act, but I rather doubt it. Therefore, we are talking about those people who are not already Assembly members who are appointed as either deputy mayor for policing and crime or deputy mayor for fire. The Bill seeks to apply that provision to the deputy mayor for fire if they are not an Assembly member, so they are politically restricted. As I have said before, I think that is a nonsense. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will check precisely how the legislation applies to them. But it certainly has applied to the last two deputy mayors for policing and crime in London, because both of them have been obliged to resign their council seats as a consequence not of any disqualification laid down other than the fact that they have become politically restricted, so clearly the measure has applied under those circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, no doubt has encyclopaedic knowledge on this.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I absolutely do not have any encyclopaedic knowledge. However, I am very glad that the Minister has agreed to look into this in more detail because, as the noble Lord describes the situation, it is a farce. As I recall, there was a sort of evolution of thinking about deputy mayors and the use of the 10-plus-two people in the original Greater London Authority Act, and their position. Originally, they were thought of absolutely as the mayor’s creatures. Will this be borne in mind in looking at the position because I think that some of this comes from the original ideas on what the structure would be and how the mayor might structure his or her office? Perhaps things have just moved on a bit from there. I suggest that this is part of a slightly bigger jigsaw.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her remarks. I could have included in this the other deputy mayors. I thought that was probably outside the scope of the Bill, but, what the hell, I might have gone for it, because, among the crop of deputy mayors appointed by the current Mayor of London, and, indeed, by his predecessor, were people who were serving borough councillors or, in one case, a borough mayor. They had to resign their offices for those other positions. However, I have confined this amendment to the specific positions of deputy mayor for policing and crime and the deputy mayor for fire, possibly to make it easier for the noble Baroness to look at it. The situation is that, if they are not Assembly members, they are politically restricted. If they are Assembly members, obviously, they cannot be. That is a stupid anomaly which I hope the Government can remedy. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, this is a completely different point, which relates to the role of the proposed fire and emergency committee of the London Assembly. I was interested that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, moved Amendment 72 a few minutes ago, which said that police and crime panels should become the “police, fire and crime panel” outside London. In London, the parallel structure for the police and crime panel is called the Police and Crime Committee. Confusingly, London has a PCC, but it is not a commissioner. The parallel structure which is therefore created is that a committee of the London Assembly meets—unlike police and crime panels elsewhere in the country—on a very regular basis, comprising politicians who know each other from the same authority. That works better than police and crime panels elsewhere.

The parallel structure created in the Bill is that there should be a fire and emergency committee which would be set up by the London Assembly and carry out the functions of scrutiny with regard to the deputy mayor for fire. That is fine—there should be a scrutiny structure. However, the Bill specifically says that the fire and emergency committee cannot carry out any other functions of the authority. It is saying to the Assembly: “You have to create two separate committees: one to look at policing and one to look at fire”. I would not suggest merging the two committees, but everywhere else in the country the Government are saying that the same panel must do it, even though it will be much less well resourced and much less able to do an effective job. But in London you have to have two committees.

Why can it not be left, in the spirit of devolution and localism, which the Government so espouse, to the London Assembly to decide how it wants to organise these functions? If it wants to have one, two or even three committees, as long as it carries out the functions set out of scrutiny of the respective deputy mayors, surely it should be allowed to decide how it organises to do that. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Harris, on this. I remember quite clearly, during the passage of the Greater London Authority Act, the then Minister—or the government representative at the Dispatch Box; I think it was a Whip at the time—saying firmly, on the basis of notes coming to her from the Box, that the London Assembly should be allowed to sort out its own procedure. I think we were debating an issue around a quorum. The same applies here, probably in spades. It is also interesting that the Government, who are concerned about efficiency, effectiveness and economy, should insist on procedures that must have the potential to be less efficient and more expensive.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Harris of Haringey

Wednesday 14th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 1 is an amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Paddick and myself, as are Amendments 2, 3 and 7 in this group. The clause provides for duties in relation to collaboration agreements between the emergency services which are the subject of this part of the Bill. Clause 2 refers in two places to the interests of the “efficiency or effectiveness” of the relevant service and of other services. My first two amendments would insert the term “economy”, which those of us of a certain generation from local government are accustomed to hearing alongside efficiency and effectiveness. My question is in two parts: first, is “economy” now considered to be covered by the terms “efficiency” and “effectiveness”—I can see an argument that it might be—and, secondly, why is there no reference to all three of these attributes? They are all referenced in Schedule 1 to the Bill, which comprises the new Schedule A1 to the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.

Amendment 3 provides for consultation. I have listed a rather unambitious group of people to enable me to ask whether consultation is provided for elsewhere. If it is not, it should be. Even leaving aside Sir Ken Knight’s recommendation of trialling such agreements before their wholesale application, collaboration must, in our view, be on a case-by-case basis, best fitting the needs of the local community, hence the reference to the local community in our amendment, as well as to the employees of the proposed parties to the collaboration agreement. It needs no expansion that the views of employees should be important in the decision-making. A formal public consultation is required, not least because of the risk of politicising the process. Transferring responsibilities to police and crime commissioners is a political decision in terms of the service, and perhaps of how it is dealt with in each area. I am not making any pejorative comments about whether particular police and crime commissioners act with politics at the forefront of their minds, so I hope the noble Lord, Lord Bach, will forgive this comment. We now have far more politically aligned police and crime commissioners than we did after the first set of elections, when many independents were elected. We also believe that organisations such as the NHS, the Environment Agency and other emergency responders should be involved.

Amendment 7 probes the strength of the consultation, and would require that the chief officer of police be satisfied that there is no operational problem in the arrangement—a point made by my noble friend Lord Paddick, who will join us soon, after rowing for Queen and country, or at least this House. When the office of police and crime commissioner was created, there was great emphasis on the commissioner not interfering in operational matters. It is a continuation of that thought.

Government Amendment 4 apparently innocently substitutes “or” for “and”. However, the amendment is quite significant. In the relevant wording, the term “its” is used. It is not entirely clear to me whether the “its” in subsection (4)(b) refers to the “proposed party” referred to in subsection (4)(a) or the “other proposed party” referred to in subsection (4)(b). I read it as the original party, but I suggest that that bit might stand some tweaking at the next stage to make it completely clear, so that the casual reader does not go down the wrong route. The more important point is that I would need a lot of convincing that a party should be frogmarched into a so-called agreement, which is the effect of this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

This is a surprisingly interesting group of amendments, although not obviously so at first sight. It immediately brings us to the question of the purpose of these clauses. Are the Government asserting that there is a failure to collaborate between emergency services around the country—and, if so, that this is the mechanism to fix it? I am not sure that evidence exists of a failure to collaborate; in my experience, the emergency services work extremely well together and go out of their way to do so. So what is the problem the Government are trying to fix? If the problem is to be fixed by a collaboration agreement as set out, we will need a bit more clarity, which I assume is the purpose of Amendment 3, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on the proposed consultation. What process do the Government envisage will be followed? Presumably, a failure to collaborate will have been identified in a particular area. Who will have identified that, and what is the process? By implication, it looks as though an agreement to collaborate will be imposed not as an agreement, but because one side rather wants it to happen. There has to be more a lot more clarity.

Then, there is the attempt to correct the drafting error—“or” versus “and”. What is envisaged in that respect? For example, when would it be “efficient” but not “effective” to do this, and when it would be “effective” but not “efficient”? If you are making a big point of changing “and” to “or”, you are implying that there will be circumstances when it is a good thing to have one of these agreements because it is efficient, but actually it is not effective—so why are we doing something that will not be effective? Alternatively, you might be saying that it is a good thing to have a collaboration agreement because it is effective but, unfortunately, not very efficient. Again, I am not quite clear why it is in the interests of anybody to do that. What is the purpose of the Government’s amendment? Can the Minister explain to us in precisely what circumstances she envisages it would be possible to be efficient but not effective, or effective but not efficient?