Policing and Crime Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 14th September 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

77: Clause 7, page 6, leave out lines 10 to 30

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 77 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick. We also have Amendments 78 to 80 and Amendments 82 to 86 in this group. Taken together, our amendments—with the caveat that they are subject to drafting errors—would allow the police and crime commissioner to speak at meetings but not to vote: in other words, to make his voice heard and to put arguments but not to actually be part of the decision-making process.

Earlier today, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in the debate on various earlier clauses standing part of the Bill, said—I cannot recall whether of himself or generally—“We were not elected as a fire and rescue authority”. That is what underlies this group of amendments. Clause 7 has an innocent heading about the “involvement” of the PCC in the FRA, but gives the PCC a vote. Admittedly it is limited to fire and rescue authority functions, but quite how one identifies those and limits this—even with monitoring-officer involvement, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in his amendment in this group—I am really not sure. When it comes to budgetary issues, for instance, in the real world a decision over here affects a decision over there. One always has to have regard to the knock-on effects and to the whole package. Whether it is possible to split out the issues in the way that the Bill proposes, I am unconvinced.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I have explained, in most instances, the FRA would accept a request, and it would be in the interests of good working, good faith and collaboration for it to do so. As to the process if it refused such a request, as I understand it—I will write to noble Lords if it is any different—if it refuses it, it refuses it, and there is no recourse thereon in.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, perhaps I should make it clear that the deletion in the amendments of the transparency provisions, as the Minister described them, were consequential—or possibly presequential. I am not sure about the point on voting. That was not really the thrust of our amendments. I am not comfortable about this. She described the amendments as being anti-collaboration, but collaboration by its very nature requires two parties—not merging the parties into a single authority. However, we are where we are, certainly for tonight, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 77 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

93: Clause 8, page 12, leave out lines 2 to 6 and insert—
“(1) An order under section 107EA may not be made in the absence of—”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I also have Amendments 94 to 98 in this group. I am aware that if certain of these amendments were accepted consequential amendments would be required.

I want to probe whether it should be a matter for a particular combined authority mayor to initiate the procedure with which Clause 8 deals. Should this depend on an individual? Having started on that thought, I realise that if we are to have these arrangements, somebody has to start them off, but one is well aware of how a long-lasting arrangement can come about as a result of an individual seeing a short-term advantage. In any event, should there be public consultation, not the discretion which is implicit in the wording in new subsection (2)(b), which refers to,

“a description of any public consultation which the mayor has carried out”?

Surely it should be “the” consultation.

The second subject of this group of amendments is the majority provided by what will be new subsection (3), requiring that two-thirds of the,

“members of the combined authority have indicated that they disagree with the proposal”,

to block it. Come the happy day of proportional representation for local government, it will probably be quite difficult to get two-thirds to disagree. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, will have recollections from a different perspective of getting a two-thirds majority in the Greater London Authority, where the mayor’s budget could be blocked only by a two-thirds majority. I am proposing 51%, which I suppose should be “more than 50%” if expressed properly, as that is what a majority is.

This also raises the question of why any opposition should be required to trigger what would be new subsections (4) and (5)—perhaps a more arguable point in the case of the latter—because opposition to the mayor’s proposal merely makes the Secretary of State investigate the situation fully. It does not actually block the proposal. There is a question here before one even gets to looking at the size of the majority. I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has explained, these amendments relate to the process for adopting the single employer model by a combined authority mayor. I will take each amendment in turn.

Amendment 93 removes the requirement for a mayor to request that the Home Secretary approves an order implementing the single employer model. In effect, it enables any person to make such a request of the Home Secretary. As I explained during our consideration of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill, we considered that directly elected combined authority mayors provided that strong, clear accountability necessary to exercise the wide-ranging powers that were devolved to an area. The processes in the Bill reflect this, giving the mayor the discretions and powers to be exercised locally that it is right for the mayor to have, given their own local mandate and direct accountability locally through the ballot box. Mayors should be able to take the big decisions that they are elected to make, with appropriate safeguards. Where a mayor is responsible for police and fire functions, we believe that the mayor should be the person to make such proposals to the Home Secretary about how these functions are run. Adopting this amendment would be counter to this devolutionary approach, whereby powers and duties usually exercised by Whitehall have been devolved to the mayor.

Amendments 94, 95 and 98 require a mayor seeking to put in place the single employer model to carry out a public consultation on the proposal. The Bill already requires the Home Secretary to consider whether a proposal for the mayor to put in place the single employer model is in the interests of economy, effectiveness and efficiency or public safety before approving it. These provisions do not prohibit a mayor from consulting locally on a proposal. Should the mayor wish to do so, the Home Secretary would be required to have regard to any responses to the consultation when considering whether to give effect to the proposal. Where powers have been devolved to an area, it is for the directly elected mayor to decide how particular proposals, be they for creating a single employer model or any other exercise of powers, should be taken forward. It is important that any proposals brought forward by a mayor are properly scrutinised. Noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate them, as orders to implement the single employer model under a mayor will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 97 seeks to lower the threshold for triggering an independent assessment of a proposal to implement the single employer model under a mayor, while Amendment 96 takes the further step of requiring the Home Secretary to order an independent assessment of a proposal, regardless of whether there is local agreement. The amendment would also require a mayor to submit to the Home Secretary any representations made by elected members of the combined authority about the proposal and the mayor’s response to those representations.

It would not be proportionate to lower the threshold or strike out the limiting provisions for ordering an independent assessment of a proposal. The approach we have taken mirrors that of devolution deals agreed to date, whereby members are able to reject specific proposals brought forward by the mayor where there is agreement from at least two-thirds of members of the combined authority. Given that the combined authority mayor will have been directly elected with a strong democratic mandate, we consider that two-thirds threshold entirely appropriate. Not to bore noble Lords too much about Greater Manchester but, as I explained, my position was as one of 10—the only Conservative—and that was the situation that faced me year on year, quite often frustratingly. But the two-thirds majority worked. Lowering the threshold would give room for more regular mischief-making, should members of local authorities see fit. In my experience—noble Lords may disagree—it is an entirely appropriate threshold, and I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am sure the Minister, even as only one of 10, was quite capable of making enough mischief. I was never going to win an argument against the strong mayor model and the implications of that—but I do not think having a strong mayor means that there should not be consultation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 93 withdrawn.

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[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I will certainly be grateful to receive a letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. However, I think she has slightly missed the point—namely, that, under the current legislation, if the deputy mayor for policing and crime is not an Assembly member, he or she is politically restricted. It is just conceivable that, because of the convoluted way in which legislation is frequently drafted, the political restriction is derived from something other than those particular clauses in the Local Government Act, but I rather doubt it. Therefore, we are talking about those people who are not already Assembly members who are appointed as either deputy mayor for policing and crime or deputy mayor for fire. The Bill seeks to apply that provision to the deputy mayor for fire if they are not an Assembly member, so they are politically restricted. As I have said before, I think that is a nonsense. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will check precisely how the legislation applies to them. But it certainly has applied to the last two deputy mayors for policing and crime in London, because both of them have been obliged to resign their council seats as a consequence not of any disqualification laid down other than the fact that they have become politically restricted, so clearly the measure has applied under those circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, no doubt has encyclopaedic knowledge on this.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I absolutely do not have any encyclopaedic knowledge. However, I am very glad that the Minister has agreed to look into this in more detail because, as the noble Lord describes the situation, it is a farce. As I recall, there was a sort of evolution of thinking about deputy mayors and the use of the 10-plus-two people in the original Greater London Authority Act, and their position. Originally, they were thought of absolutely as the mayor’s creatures. Will this be borne in mind in looking at the position because I think that some of this comes from the original ideas on what the structure would be and how the mayor might structure his or her office? Perhaps things have just moved on a bit from there. I suggest that this is part of a slightly bigger jigsaw.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her remarks. I could have included in this the other deputy mayors. I thought that was probably outside the scope of the Bill, but, what the hell, I might have gone for it, because, among the crop of deputy mayors appointed by the current Mayor of London, and, indeed, by his predecessor, were people who were serving borough councillors or, in one case, a borough mayor. They had to resign their offices for those other positions. However, I have confined this amendment to the specific positions of deputy mayor for policing and crime and the deputy mayor for fire, possibly to make it easier for the noble Baroness to look at it. The situation is that, if they are not Assembly members, they are politically restricted. If they are Assembly members, obviously, they cannot be. That is a stupid anomaly which I hope the Government can remedy. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, this is a completely different point, which relates to the role of the proposed fire and emergency committee of the London Assembly. I was interested that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, moved Amendment 72 a few minutes ago, which said that police and crime panels should become the “police, fire and crime panel” outside London. In London, the parallel structure for the police and crime panel is called the Police and Crime Committee. Confusingly, London has a PCC, but it is not a commissioner. The parallel structure which is therefore created is that a committee of the London Assembly meets—unlike police and crime panels elsewhere in the country—on a very regular basis, comprising politicians who know each other from the same authority. That works better than police and crime panels elsewhere.

The parallel structure created in the Bill is that there should be a fire and emergency committee which would be set up by the London Assembly and carry out the functions of scrutiny with regard to the deputy mayor for fire. That is fine—there should be a scrutiny structure. However, the Bill specifically says that the fire and emergency committee cannot carry out any other functions of the authority. It is saying to the Assembly: “You have to create two separate committees: one to look at policing and one to look at fire”. I would not suggest merging the two committees, but everywhere else in the country the Government are saying that the same panel must do it, even though it will be much less well resourced and much less able to do an effective job. But in London you have to have two committees.

Why can it not be left, in the spirit of devolution and localism, which the Government so espouse, to the London Assembly to decide how it wants to organise these functions? If it wants to have one, two or even three committees, as long as it carries out the functions set out of scrutiny of the respective deputy mayors, surely it should be allowed to decide how it organises to do that. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Harris, on this. I remember quite clearly, during the passage of the Greater London Authority Act, the then Minister—or the government representative at the Dispatch Box; I think it was a Whip at the time—saying firmly, on the basis of notes coming to her from the Box, that the London Assembly should be allowed to sort out its own procedure. I think we were debating an issue around a quorum. The same applies here, probably in spades. It is also interesting that the Government, who are concerned about efficiency, effectiveness and economy, should insist on procedures that must have the potential to be less efficient and more expensive.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, explained, the amendment would delete the provision which prevents the assembly arranging for any of its non-fire and emergency committee functions to be discharged by that committee. The role of the fire and emergency committee will be to review how the London Fire Commissioner exercises his or her functions and to investigate and prepare reports on the commissioner’s actions and decisions. The committee will also review draft documents presented to it by the London Fire Commissioner and make a report or recommendations to the mayor. The committee will also undertake confirmation hearings in respect of the appointment of the London Fire Commissioner and the deputy mayor for fire. In addition, it will have the power to require the deputy mayor for fire, the London Fire Commissioner and any officer of the London Fire Commissioner to attend proceedings of the committee to give evidence.

The functions are set out in the Bill so that it is clear that the fire and emergency committee has a specific fire-related purpose. It follows that the committee should not be used for any non-fire-related business of the assembly. This is clearly different from everywhere else in the country, as the noble Lord said—and I am sure that other places in the country will argue for what London has. The position in London is different. There will be two separate functional bodies and no move to a single-employer model, so in that sense it is not the same as elsewhere. I apologise for doing it again, but I compare Greater London to Greater Manchester—it is four times the size.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

114: Schedule 2, page 212, line 1, at beginning insert—
“(za) any actions and decisions of the Deputy Mayor for Fire,”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, new Section 327I gives the Assembly the power to investigate and prepare reports on certain matters. My amendment would add,

“any actions and decisions of the Deputy Mayor for Fire”,

and,

“any other matters which the Assembly considers to be of importance to fire and rescue services in Greater London”.

Those are taken directly from the powers of the London Assembly in respect of policing—of its police and crime panel. It is called a panel; it runs as a committee. It has the power to investigate and prepare reports about any actions and decisions of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and matters which the Assembly considers to be of importance to policing and crime reduction in the Metropolitan Police district. I ask why there is no equivalent for fire.

I note that new subsection (5) will give the Assembly the power to summons the deputy mayor for fire to attend and to produce documents. It seems odd that it should have no power to report and investigate the items and person that it has the power to summons. I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would extend the powers of the assembly fire and emergency committee to investigate and prepare reports about the deputy mayor for fire and any other matters which the assembly considers to be of importance to fire and rescue services in Greater London.

With regard to Amendment 114, the noble Baroness makes a valid point about the need for scrutiny of the actions and decisions of the deputy mayor for fire. I am happy to consider this amendment further in advance of Report. On Amendment 115, any other matters which the assembly considers to be of importance to fire and rescue services will inevitably have already been considered by the London Fire Commissioner in the exercise of his or her functions, and consequently will be subject to scrutiny by the fire and emergency committee. We are not therefore persuaded that this catch-all provision is needed. On the basis that I will consider further Amendment 114, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw it at this stage.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for offering to look at Amendment 114. However, I wonder whether before Report she could look also at Amendment 115 in the light of Section 33(3)(f) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Section 33(3) of that Act gives powers that cover,

“actions and decisions of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime”.

That is the equivalent, in policing terms, of the deputy mayor for policing. It also gives powers that cover,

“actions and decisions of the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime”.

Quite separately, in paragraph (f), are the,

“matters which the Assembly considers to be of importance to policing and crime reduction in the metropolitan police district”.

This is the exact equivalent, I would have thought, of my Amendment 115. They really do go together—it is a package of scrutiny.

If there is a difference between the provisions relating to policing and the provisions relating to fire and rescue in terms of the assembly’s powers, somebody is going to make the distinction and say, “No, you can’t go there”—when actually, they should go there. However, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 114.

Amendment 114 withdrawn.