Modern Slavery Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 1st December 2014 Lords Chamber

I hope that the Minister will recognise the importance of this amendment and the new clause it proposes in seeking to achieve that objective through a duty on the courts, public authorities and the Secretary of State to have regard to the best interests and personal circumstances of a victim of slavery, trafficking and exploitation. I really do hope that he will give a favourable response and agree that either the wording in this amendment or perhaps some other, similar wording of his own should appear in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, a focus on the victims is absolutely right. At this stage, though, I want to make a point that was made by others at Second Reading: we must be careful to avoid detracting from the concept of survival. I am trying to keep in mind in the Bill the imperative of badging trafficked and enslaved persons as survivors, if this is at all possible, rather than as victims, which has a rather more negative connotation.

This Bill has raised quite extraordinary passions. I am finding it one of the most difficult that I have ever dealt with in my time as a Member of your Lordships’ House, in part because of the technicalities that we are having to look at, I hope your Lordships will forgive me if, in my comments on this amendment, I focus on the technicalities.

I am not really clear what this amendment would actually achieve—and that leaves me rather concerned. How are best interests to be assessed; what standard does one apply? We are all accustomed to the principle of best interests in relation to children because that is linked with the listed rights of the child in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; but maybe when he responds the noble Lord can explain what is engaged by the principle in the case of an adult trafficked or enslaved or exploited? For instance, would it mean an automatic referral to the national referral mechanism even if the adult does not want that? That would obviously go against the trafficked person’s right to decide for herself matters relating to her, assuming there is no lack of capacity. I am sure that it is not intended to be paternalistic, but the intention seems to be to make decisions for or on behalf of the victim in the name of best interests when she herself may disagree with what is in her best interests.

Without losing focus on the victim—or as I say, survivor—if there is a concern that particular parts of the Bill lack a victim focus, which I have to say I think is the case, that is where we should focus our changes rather than on an umbrella clause. Maybe by the end of this debate I will be clearer as to what it means, but at the moment I think that it is unclear and therefore possibly a problem.

[Lord Quirk (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to just draw attention to a very small point in this amendment, which on the whole I fully support. The amendment before us today is an amendment of an amendment in which proposed new subsection (1) ends, “slavery or trafficking”. In the amended amendment that we have in front of us this afternoon, proposed new subsection (2) ends with, “slavery, trafficking, or exploitation”. That is unchanged from the previous one. However, proposed new subsection (1) says, “slavery, trafficking and exploitation”. Surely that is not meant and this proposed new subsection (1) should end with the same wording as subsection (2)?

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 19, after “circumstances” insert “or characteristics”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I also have Amendments 3, 5, 6 and 100 in this group, all of which are directed to the best interests of the victim or survivor. I say to the noble and learned Baroness that I regard it as my job—and all our jobs—to worry. I accept that sometimes I worry a little too much but I doubt I will change that now.

As we have just been discussing, Clause 1 refers to a person’s “personal circumstances”. My amendment seeks to add “or characteristics”. The terms in parenthesis in Clause 1(4) are, in one case, a circumstance—“family relationships”—but others, such as illness, are more of a characteristic. Maybe they are circumstances as well, but I regard circumstances as being more external and characteristics as more about the person himself. I do not suppose that there is a neat or clear dividing line but I am concerned that “circumstances” may not be as broad as I would like it to be. If the Minister agrees, perhaps one can look at Clause 1(3) as well.

The list in parenthesis in Clause 1(4) is obviously not intended to be exhaustive—it starts “such as”—but it refers to “mental and physical illness” without mentioning disability. I am suggesting adding “or disability” because elsewhere in the Bill there is reference to both disability and illness. Obviously, they are not the same and inclusion here would avoid any doubt about that.

Perhaps this tips over into characteristics as well but in my view circumstances certainly include experiences, particularly a position into which a victim has been forced and has been found. Experiences go to make up the person, and if we are embarking on the sort of description that is included here, that is a term that also might be considered. To be appropriately broad, I am suggesting changing “such as” to “including”.

Perhaps I could take this opportunity to ask my noble friend whether in Clause 1(3), where it says:

“In determining whether a person is being held in slavery … regard may be had to all the circumstances”,

“may” means “shall”. What is the extent of the court’s discretion here? In particular, after having regard to all the circumstances, could the court determine that, despite other evidence, a case is not so extreme that it could be described as slavery? In adding these provisions to what is in the current legislation in Section 71 of the 2009 Act, I am not really clear what we are gaining. I suppose that, once the question about “may” or “shall” in Clause 1(3) has been answered, the same issue or something similar arises in Clause 1(4). Perhaps another way of putting this is to ask whether there have been difficulties in prosecuting under Section 71 that would have been addressed by having these two provisions, although my noble friend may not know the answer to this given the small number of prosecutions, to which he has referred.

This group also includes Amendment 100, which was tabled in my name. This amendment is rather different. It looks at a new offence of exploitation, and really does no more than just consider it. This amendment was also tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey. I will not have been the only one who, in seeking to get to grips with these issues, has become interested in the ill treatment of labour in a much wider sense than we are dealing with in the Bill. There is a spectrum—or, as it has been termed, a continuum—from direct, decent work to slavery. This is very much a probing amendment. It would obviously not be appropriate to jump straight into a new offence without careful consideration and, indeed, without wide consultation.

The concept of a continuum is not mine. I was interested to read a report from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation by Klara Skrivankova, which talks about a continuum reflecting the real life experiences of workers whose employment relationships are not static. It discusses the variability in their working conditions resulting from the circumstances, their personal vulnerabilities and external pressures. The model of the continuum also considers the spectrum of substandard working conditions that might not constitute forced labour but are identified as underlying causes, and perhaps are on the way to forced labour. Putting it another way, such an offence would apply the convention according to modern standards.

This was particularly put into my head in conversations with Focus On Labour Exploitation—or FLEX—which is a small charity with a very big agenda. I discussed this very recently with a counsel who has undertaken many prosecutions in this area. Indeed, I recognise one of the case studies referred to in the strategy that was recently published. The first thing the counsel said was that to have such as offence, which was not as severe as forced labour, would make things easier for the Crown. There would be more guilty pleas. He immediately followed that by saying that it would take the heat off the victim. The jury would naturally think that a victim must be vulnerable, and the jury would not succumb to the tendency, which he has observed, to assume that forced labour requires violence.

The counsel also said that the maximum sentence of life imprisonment—although I am not arguing with that being provided for here—can be something of a deterrent to a jury, in his view. He compared this with rape. That carries high maximum penalties, but he believes that a jury has been unwilling to convict because it is worried about the penalty that might be imposed, which it thinks would be inappropriate.

In the same conversation, a psychologist said that there being a maximum sentence of life can be an enormous burden on a victim, who, in the very complex relationships that are created in such situations, may feel quite a responsibility to the slave master. The counsel with whom I discussed this even said that he thought that there would be no need to define exploitation because the best assessors of whether somebody had been exploited would be a jury. He compared it with affray, where a jury does not have a difficulty in assessing whether a reasonable person would fear for their safety on the streets.

I am suggesting in this amendment the instigation of a review, including of the legislation establishing the public authorities that I have listed—they are regulators but not only regulators, and are in a position to get a very good handle on what may be going on; for instance, on a construction site—and very wide consultation working towards a report. This may not be the way to word the amendment—I am sure that it is not—but, crucially, the Minister could tell us, even if not today, that the Government will consider this and take it on, and that it does not actually need to be in legislation. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thought that I would have to find about seven minutes’ worth of response so that we did not get on to the next group of amendments before 4.45 pm. However, I will take possibly more than one minute to respond. I am grateful to noble Lords for their comments.

As regards the 12 months, I had it in mind that a review should have taken place within 12 months, not that one should postpone it, but that is in a sense a detail as against the principle of whether there should be an offence that is less than slavery. The Minister said that the Government have been looking to see whether anything has slipped through the gaps, and he talked about—as I understood it; obviously I will read what he said—not criminalising lesser actions. My point is that we should look to see what lesser actions should be criminalised, and seek to consider a new offence.

On the Minister’s answer on “may” or “shall”—some noble Lords will go to their graves with “may”, “shall” and “must” written on their hearts, will they not?—am I therefore to understand that the court must consider the person before considering whether an offence has been committed? His answer seemed to indicate that, although again, one must read it properly. However, if that is so, and if the resilience of some people is such that the behaviour meted out to them could be considered not to be slavery, forced labour or servitude, is that consistent with the convention? I said that the Bill raises a lot of technical issues, and that is one of them.

On my smaller, and certainly shorter, amendments to Clause 1, and in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, my term “experiences” aimed to cover exactly the sort of experience he mentioned. However, of all those amendments, I would be concerned not to lose the one on “characteristics”, and if I had to pick one to come back to in order to pursue it further between now and Report, and possibly on Report, it would be that one. We will of course look at the question of an offence of exploitation later in our debate today as well. Whatever we end up with, I would certainly not wish to lose sight of that one. However, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 2.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Howarth of Breckland]

My Lords, I would ask for some clarification. I am becoming very confused about the difference between the idea of slavery and trafficking and that of child neglect and exploitation, which we have been dealing with for many years through general children’s legislation. Listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, describe her cases, as an ex-director of social services and a social worker, I am appalled that action was not taken. However, I know that it is difficult to work between the criminal and the civil law. Under civil law, social services will act to remove a child and protect it, while at the same time trying to act through the criminal law against the perpetrators. There may be a gap there. Others have worked for years trying to ensure that those things hold together, but that is different from having a new piece of law about exploitation that then overrides the existing provisions in children’s legislation. Is the Minister prepared to look at this, maybe with lawyers, to see whether there is a gap in children’s legislation which this could plug and whether we are not being firm enough about practice and training?

We have seen what happened in Rotherham. In talking to the police this morning at a round-table meeting following the work that the all-party parliamentary group did on children and the police, it was quite clear that they have learnt a great deal and are moving in their practices and procedures. We will see change there. I would like to ensure that similar change happens in local authorities because, although there is good practice, as a former local authority worker I am sometimes appalled and ashamed at what we do about poor practice. I have two questions for the Minister. First, is there a gap? Secondly, what are the Government doing to ensure that everyone is encouraged to practise within the existing law to the highest possible standards?

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, “cautionary” strikes the right note. I am glad that the noble and learned Baroness added to my lexicon. I was searching for the right term and I share her caution.

The EU Rights of Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings, which was published last year, makes it clear that:

“The child’s best interest shall be a primary consideration and shall be assessed on an individual basis”.

That reflects the directive, which refers to a child-sensitive approach but does not provide for a separate offence relating to children. It deals with penalties and special treatment but makes it quite clear that children are within the overall offence. The noble and learned Baroness also referred to the issue of consent, with which we have just dealt.

The forms of exploitation that are listed in the amendments and about which we have heard today are absolutely abhorrent, but I am one of those who are concerned that we do not inadvertently weaken the position in looking after children. In its pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights refers to,

“the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child”,

and says what a shame it is, in effect, that the Government have not responded to that in time for the detail of the response to feed into the Bill. Having made that criticism and referred to that more up-to-date piece of work, the committee goes on to say that although it is “sympathetic”, it recognises that,

“there is considerable evidence to support the Government’s view that there is likely to be a serious practical problem in prosecuting child-specific exploitation and trafficking offences”,

for the reasons that it sets out in the report. I, too, take the Government’s—and indeed the DPP’s—point about proof of age. Age may be an aggravating factor that will go to sentence, which is how I think it should be dealt with.

Reference has been made to article 2 of the directive. Indeed, as has been said, the amendment quotes from article 2. However, as I read it, those words are there not as a stand-alone offence but, in effect, to define exploitation in the context of trafficking for exploitation. Those words are in article 2.3, although the offence is in article 2.1. We will come on to this, and I am prepared to at least be persuaded that we have not got the definition of trafficking wrong. There is a lot of concern that trafficking, as it is dealt with in Clause 2, is not spelt out sufficiently extensively. Article 2 of the directive uses terms including “harbouring” and “reception”, which might answer at least one of the examples that we have heard about. The description of exploitation in article 2 is not there, as I read it, as a separate stand-alone offence.

I cannot let this go without echoing the points that have been made about both practice and training. They are not central to these amendments but, my goodness, they are central to the whole way in which, as a society, we respond through a number of different agencies—and indeed as individuals—to the abhorrence of slavery and trafficking.