Localism Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sewel]

My Lords, during my period in your Lordships’ House, which now goes back far too many years, I hope I have been the personification of reasonableness, rationalism and light. Unfortunately, on the debit side, I have to confess that I was a local government leader before I came here.

Missing from this debate so far is the fact that local government in the United Kingdom is significantly influenced by party groups and party group meetings. Something may be discussed in committee. Before the council meeting the various party groups meet and reach a collective decision. That decision is then whipped at the council meeting. That is the reality of day-to-day local government in the United Kingdom. I would like to know from both the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, when he sums up, and the Minister the extent to which both the clause as it is now and the amendment strike at that practice.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, in my eyes at any rate, puts himself further on the debit side by describing his previous career as being on the debit side. Many of us regard our time in local government as a very great plus.

[Lord Sewel]

Perhaps the noble Baroness will recognise a joke and an irony when she sees them.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Unfortunately when irony appears in Hansard it appears to be totally serious.

I realise I am being bold tangling with the expertise that has been brought to bear both by the two noble Lords who have spoken and have their names to the amendment and the authorities they have cited. I do not see in the clause the problem they describe—the possible extension from predetermination to predisposition. The word “etc” in the clause heading I can see might be a little confusing and possibly in Clause 25(1)(a):

“an allegation of bias or predetermination, or otherwise”.

But I regard the “otherwise” as meaning “or not”, not as a different attitude.

I start by not being able to follow the noble Lords down that route. Are the important words not the ones that we debated at a previous stage, in Clause 25(2), “just because”? That subsection is not exclusive. It does not describe the only circumstances that might amount to predetermination but approaches from the other side. It says that if a decision-maker demonstrates or has done these two things—or has done the first thing and the matter is relevant to the decision—that does not of itself mean that he has predetermined; nor does it mean that he has not. That approach is much more effective than the one provided in the amendment, which seems to spell out all the circumstances that would amount to predetermination. I am sure that noble Lords have great imaginations, but I doubt whether any of us could imagine all the circumstances that need to be covered. I am afraid that I cannot support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, we have added our names to this amendment, for reasons which I will try to explain. As I understand the Government's position, this provision is meant not to change the current position—they may confirm or deny this—but to clarify it, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, said. The problem in seeking to clarify it, for some of us at least, is that they have unbalanced it and made it difficult. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, advanced the point that, as drafted, the “just because” was the get-out but I contend that if you have to ignore anything that the decision-maker has previously done with a view to a matter, directly or indirectly, there is not much else that that decision-maker could have done which could then be the subject of a challenge on predetermination.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was not intending to describe it as a get-out but to say that “just because” could also be read as “only because”. Although those are not words that one would normally find in legislation, they are very helpful and descriptive in this context.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I take that point but, even if it is “only because”, what else might a decision-maker do that you have to take account of if you can ignore all of the things that are described in this provision? That seems to be the fundamental problem.

My noble friend Lord Snape asked: what is predetermination? As I understand it, predetermination is having a closed mind at the point when you make a decision. Is that not important, because if people are coming to local councils seeking decisions which they expect to be rationally made—whether on planning, licensing or anything else—are they not entitled to have a case that is properly made and not fettered by somebody ignoring all of that process at the point when the decision is made? That seems to be the key difference between predetermination and predisposition.

The noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, said that people will always have their pet subjects, and there is absolutely nothing wrong with that. Predisposition means having a view that, other things being equal, this is what you support and this is what you do not, and it does not preclude you from having, for example, manifesto commitments. That is reflective of the current position. The problem with the clause, for some of us at least, is that it unbalances that decision. It may give clearer protections or guidance to councillors in respect of what they can and cannot do but it does not address the other side of that equation: the circumstances where somebody has a closed mind and would seek to exercise judgment on something when they should not. That seems very important to me.

Things are not helped by the demise of the Standards Board for England, which set out guidance on all of this, but I understand that there is also legal precedent and case law around all of this. My noble friend Lord Sewel raised the point about collective decisions. There is nothing wrong with a party group sitting around and having discussion on an issue. The key is that when you come to the point of making that decision—whether it is in the council chamber, the committee chamber or elsewhere—the mind is at least ajar. I think that was the terminology that was used.

The noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, said that councillors have long walked this difficult line, and she is absolutely right. I agree and, in our view, the line does not need to be changed. Yet the terms of this clause are potentially changing it and that is the problem we are seeking to address by this provision. Our position is as follows: we support the proposition that those who have a closed mind on an issue should not participate in decision-making and could invalidate it if they did. We understand that this is also the Government's position, from debates on previous stages of the Bill where we have had amendments around this. It may be particularly relevant to planning and to other decisions as well.

We differentiate predetermination from predisposition and understand that the Government also do that. Having clarity on the scope and protections that this gives to councillors is to be encouraged but issues of a closed mind or otherwise are properly to be assessed when formal decisions are to be taken. We understand that this is also the Government’s position. The problem is that, in framing the scope and protections for local councillors, there must not be opportunities for those with closed minds to have their actions and utterances ignored in evaluating whether they had already predetermined the matter when making decisions. These are matters of probity.

If it is right that we agree on those propositions about the difference between predisposition and predetermination—determined at the point when the decision is made—we should be focused on how we achieve the legal construct that deals with that. That is the real matter before us and the matter in this amendment. In this regard, we consider that the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lord Hart, achieves those objectives. However, we are very clear that the clause as it stands makes things worse and muddies the waters on principles and issues that I think we are not apart on.