Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Gill Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Gill (Lab)]

My Lords, as many have already highlighted, the financial services sector remains an absolute engine of the British economy. It contributes roughly £290 billion, or roughly 11% of the total UK economic output, with productivity at 2.6 times the national average. To maintain this competitive edge, our regulatory framework must prioritise nimble execution while reinforcing structural accountability. The Financial Services and Markets Bill is therefore a necessary modernisation of our economic architecture.

Like my noble friend Lady Hodge, I welcome this legislation directly addressing critical pressure points in economic crime and market efficiency. First, it combats financial crime. The expansion of FCA oversight across the legal and accountancy sectors tackles a severe risk channel. Financial institutions currently spend an estimated £38.3 billion annually on financial crime compliance. Unifying oversight directly addresses the structural fragmentation noted by His Majesty’s Treasury, where 25 separate supervisors have historically led to inconsistent enforcement across sectors.

Secondly, the Bill protects the infrastructure. Statutory protection for cash access secures vital banking functions for millions of people who depend on cash and face-to-face banking. Thirdly, it streamlines regulations. Merging the Payment Systems Regulator into the FCA eliminates costly institutional overlap and accelerates decision-making.

I particularly welcome that the Bill is empowering credit unions by reforming the historic “common bond” members’ requirement. This Bill allows credit unions to sustainably scale up and expand their services. Under the old 1979 limits, these rules became a restrictive postcode lottery. For example, a credit union was banned from growing if the population in its geographic area exceeded 3 million—that is most of London. Relatives who did not live under the exact same roof were also barred from joining. By reforming this historic constraint, the Bill drags these rules into the 21st century by raising the membership cap from 3 million to 10 million, by allowing credit unions to expand, merge and scale up, by adding students to the local criteria so younger people can access affordable community borrowing, and by updating family rules so relatives can join, even if they live in different households. As the Government state, the Bill provides a major boost to affordable community finance and directly supports the national goal to double the size of the mutual and co-operative sector.

We have already heard that the Bill also modernises the Financial Ombudsman Service, and I believe that disputes will be resolved faster with much greater operational certainty.

Again, as we have heard from various Members of your Lordships’ House, the proposals will unlock billions of potential lending to small businesses across the country through raising the primary deposit threshold from £25 billion to £35 billion, which would free retail-focused banking groups from overly restrictive ring-fencing rules.

The majority of financial organisations have welcomed this Bill, but there are some concerns. I have been contacted, like others, by UK Finance and TheCityUK, and Parliament’s own Treasury Committee has highlighted that Clauses 16, 17 and 18 are of concern as the balance of power shifts away from necessary democratic checks. It is good to see my friend the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, in his place because he and I, as he alluded to, served on the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee together. During the major post-crisis reforms, particularly when we were building the single rulebook, ECON faced these exact structural pressures. We learned the hard way that, when you delegate sweeping powers to independent regulators, you need to hardwire accountability into their operations. We had to fight to ensure that principles like proportionality were not pushed into vague, multi-year strategies but were applied to everyday policy-making. It is that specific, practical experience of balancing regulatory independence with democratic scrutiny that has informed my analysis today.

Referring to some of the clauses, I note that Clause 16 introduces a statutory requirement for the FCA and PRA to introduce long-term strategies at least once every five years. I accept that a long-term road map is incredibly useful for business planning, but markets move fast. A five-year plan can easily become outdated if there is not a required check-in point to adjust the strategy to new economic realities. Can my noble friend the Minister clarify how the Government will guarantee that the regulators formally consult with consumer, business and commercial panels during the development phase? Would a review at the three-year mark overcome this and prevent these road maps from stagnating if no new remit letters are issued?

Clause 17 removes the operational requirement for regulators to consider core statutory principles such as proportionality, transparency and risk-based regulation in their day-to-day functions, moving them exclusively into the five-year strategic loop. However, in March 2025 the Regulation Action Plan explicitly committed to introducing a streamlined, consolidated list of “have regards” via secondary legislation. Can the Minister confirm that the Government will use secondary legislation to establish a rationalised, daily checklist for regulators, ensuring that day-to-day policy-making remains structurally bounded by proportionality?

Finally, Clause 18 removes the obligation for regulators to consult on guidance and minor rule changes, while lifting the requirement to explain routine standard setting of their core objectives. In the financial sector, regulatory guidance serves as de facto rules. Firms alter compliance frameworks and deploy significant capital based on it. Without a statutory duty to consult on guidance, what mechanisms will protect market participants from unvetted, sudden shifts in regulatory expectations?