Trade Bill

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 29th September 2020 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)]

I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. No? Therefore, I call the next speaker on the list, the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I intend, unusually, to part company with my noble friend Lord Alton of Liverpool and shall speak against Amendment 33. Before that, I shall spell out why I think that amendment has come about, although some of what I shall say has been covered by him.

The motivation for Amendment 33 lies in the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill, which we last debated on 29 June. We were given an assurance then that the Government would return at Third Reading with an amendment to give legislative teeth to human rights safeguards in the use of infrastructure. The Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, assured the House that, when the Bill returned for Third Reading, the Government would have drafted a suitable amendment. On that basis, we were willing not to test the opinion of the House. We are still waiting for that Bill to return, and the Government have spurned an opportunity to have a limited, reasonable amendment. As a consequence, we have this sweeping proposal before us, which I was surprised was found to be in scope of this Bill.

My first point relates to paragraph 44 of the Explanatory Notes, which has been touched on previously by the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone. Clause 2(1) refers principally to EU continuity agreements, but I cannot see how Amendment 33 is in scope. The agreements concerned would already have been scrutinised by the European Parliament, which I do not consider normally to be lax in its duty to recall human rights implications.

I also note, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, that attempts are under way for UK courts to determine whether genocide is taking place in other countries. While I know that trade with China is the object of concern of many of these amendments, they could be used much more widely. I shall turn to the unintended consequences of such amendments in a moment.

However, I oppose Amendment 33 for three principal reasons: the impossible burden of scrutiny on Parliament for such large categories of goods; the breadth of critical infrastructure included in an overly comprehensive list; and the exclusiveness of the definition of “democratic”, or “non-democratic”, thereby taking in more than half the countries of the world.

Amendment 33 is overly comprehensive, in that it seeks an interventionist role for Parliament in agreeing regulations that cover so many facets of infrastructure that it would render Parliament as an inspectorate of all commerce. If we are truly to be charged with each resolution laid before us concerned with the 11 broad areas of commercial transactions in the five years envisaged—perhaps five years more, if the proposal is rolled over—we may do little else.

Let me take the first category, which is “critical infrastructure”. Incidentally, critical infrastructure is not defined here, so I looked it up. Critical infrastructure,

“is a term used by governments to describe assets that are essential for the functioning of a society and economy”.

That is incredibly broad, and very little is not covered by it. In the UK, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure is the relevant representative body. I therefore ask the proposers of these amendments to say, when they conclude, if they have consulted that body in drawing up their sweeping list of categories, given that little would not be caught by the amendment.

My more significant concern is to do with how the movers have defined what they see as non-democratic countries. The four pre-requisites are perfectly clear, and most of us would agree with them as essential to what we might perhaps define as western-style liberal democracies. Therein lies my concern. If Parliament has to approve trade measures with all those countries we consider non-democratic, we would be in danger of becoming an autarky. For example, if we apply the definition of the noble Lord to BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—they would all come into that category, bar South Africa. Take, for example, China, which is the cause of much concern around the House. So much of what China exports to us could be caught by the definition of critical infrastructure. I am sure no noble Lord is proposing that we suspend almost all trade with China—even the Trump Administration have balked at doing that.

While China is a well-known example, what of India? This Government are ambitious to do a great deal with India. They already have partnerships on critical infrastructure with Indian companies—take OneWeb as an example, which is critical infrastructure by any category. If new opportunities for trade were to arise, India would be on the so-called watch-list as a non-democratic country for its treatment of Kashmiri Muslims—in fact, for its treatment of large swathes of its Muslim minority; some 200 million people—and its treatment of women overall, or for the caste system and the treatment of Dalits, and thus would clearly come under categories (c) and (d) on the list.

Take Brazil under President Bolsonaro. It would definitely be caught by paragraphs (c) and (d), not least for its treatment of indigenous people in the Amazon, and not to speak of the rule of law. What of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, or even Israel? I do not want to labour the point, but by no step of the imagination could most countries in the Middle East be seen as democratic.

I also remind those concerned with such broad definitions of human rights to recall Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which defines the right to economic well-being, broadly spelled out, and which might be denied to our citizens were we to agree such blanket measures against trade with other countries, or parliamentary scrutiny of trade with other countries. It is slightly disingenuous of noble Lords to claim that all they are asking for is parliamentary scrutiny. Once we open the can of worms as to what is democratic and not democratic, and once we start asking UK courts alone to rule on what is genocide or not, we are straying into an area where we are doing economic self-harm.

I know that human rights are increasingly accounted for in international trade agreements—as I said earlier, the EU is not impervious to that. However, Amendment 33 serves no useful purpose and we should rightly return to these measures in a very limited form in Amendment 68, which I will support when the time comes.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, because I think I can follow up precisely the point she made. I think that the debate we have had is an important and interesting one, but the amendments before us do not have the effect that they are intended to by those who are proposing them.

The amendments are in scope of the Bill because they relate to the regulations being made under Clause 2(1), but the regulations made under Clause 2(1), by virtue of the rest of that clause, relate to continuity trade agreements and not to future trade agreements. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, everything he said about China is, to that extent, not relevant. It is relevant to future trade issues, but it is not relevant to the Bill as it stands.

Amendments 11, 18 and 33 are in scope because they relate to continuity agreements, but I am afraid that we have to assess their impact in relation to the existing agreements with the European Union which we are rolling over. That is the hard graft which the movers of the amendments need to do. If they want to do this thing and impact on those regulations, they have to look at those agreements.

My personal view, which was reflected earlier in the debate, is that the European Union has to a large extent done that work, as will have the European Parliament. We do not necessarily need to do it. However, the breadth of the issues—for example, in Amendment 33 —is such as to beg the question: is this really what the movers of the amendment are asking for? For example, the non-democratic provisions would imply that the agreement with Egypt would not be rolled over. That job has not been done and these amendments have not been exposed to that kind of scrutiny. I do not think that the movers of the amendments, or those who spoke in support of them, realise that they do not relate to future trade agreements but only to continuity agreements and so most of the arguments presented in their support have not been justified.

However, Amendment 45 is included in this group. Whether or not it is the right way of doing it, it raises a perfectly reasonable question that we should consider. When we come to exercise the scrutiny of trade agreements under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, should we have a specific statutory requirement to assess the human rights and equalities impacts? There is a good argument for that. This may not be the way to do it at this stage, but we may need to return to that. Otherwise, I am afraid that, sympathetic as I am with all the arguments put for the other amendments, they do not do the job that is claimed for them.