Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 10th October 2013 Grand Committee

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Luce, for the opportunity to have a debate on the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council, and the United Kingdom’s relationship with them. This is not a frequently debated topic in our House: we spend a lot of time on the Middle East, but not so much on this particular part of the Middle East, which is, as the noble Lord pointed out, one of the most interesting, particularly during its current transformations.

I begin with some personal reflections. This morning I was involved in a seminar with a group of young Arab PhD scholars, because I sit on an advisory board which is facilitating higher education from these regions into the UK. It is led by President Martti Ahtisaari, the Nobel prizewinner and former President of Finland. When we started on this venture a few years ago, at the time of the Arab awakenings, we wanted to build capacity for leadership. The need for that was evident in the countries we were looking at in the MENA region—Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Egypt—rather than in the Gulf, where we thought that state finances were such that they did not need help. In this area we were looking to instil leadership through education, by opening mindsets.

This morning, as we were talking to the 20-strong group of scholars from universities across the UK—though principally London ones—what came home to us was that two and a half years ago, when we started this venture, these countries were in transition to democracy. Today they are all in a state of actual or impending conflict. I share that observation because it leads me to the three things I want to say about the Gulf Co-operation Council region.

The UK’s relationship with countries in this region, following our colonial past, has been seen through the prism of three substantive issues. One is energy: our energy needs, and their economic productivity through the output of oil wells and so on. The second is the region’s economics and in particular trade. The third is its security needs, and that comes back to our trade with them in terms of defence co-operation and so on.

That is all very good, although there are problems lurking in all three areas, which I will touch on briefly. However, it is because we have these narrow silos in our approach to the region that we fail to see the need for strategic depth in the most important and overarching issue in this region, which is political and constitutional governance and the requirement for reform in those areas.

In energy, particularly after its early, and I would say easy, phase of development—when infrastructure, roads, airports and so on were built—the region has failed to invest its enormous oil wealth in strategic development. Yes, you have glittering towers, but the substantive development of social and economic capital—investing in people—has not happened in the way that it might have done, given that the region has had 40 years of the enormous largesse of oil coming out of the ground.

The region is incredibly hungry in terms of its own consumption of hydrocarbons. People’s lifestyles are predicated on many gas-guzzling cars, air-conditioned public buildings and private homes, and so on. According to a House of Lords research paper, the UAE and Qatar have the highest per capita energy consumption in the world.

If Saudi Arabia continues with its current hydrocarbon needs, given the developing energy self-sufficiency of the United States—which, through fracking and further oil exploration, is moving closer than we expected—there will be a real budgetary crisis in the region. All countries reacted to the Arab spring or awakening—whatever word you use to describe it—by hugely increasing public subsidies and public expenditure. If one were to be kind, one would say that it was an attempt to ensure that their populations did not become restive. Some might say, more cynically, that it was an attempt to buy off unrest. The result of the dramatic increase in public expenditure is that by 2030 Saudi Arabia will require an oil price of $320 a barrel. Bahrain, which has far more significant problems—as the noble Lord, Lord Luce, mentioned—would require an oil price of $112 per barrel to break even. The oil price over the past six months has been in the range of $100 to $105 a barrel. Therefore, this is clearly not a sustainable method of continuing to evaluate development.

On the economic needs of the region, the demographics suggest an emerging crisis—an iceberg, if you will—with 50% of the population between 25 and 30 years old. Those in the 50% are far better educated than their predecessors, are accustomed to modernity and have access to information in a different way to the old, hierarchical systems that existed in the region. Coupled with this demographic time bomb is the budgetary problem of the lack of an income tax base in the region, and the problem of citizens’ employability in the private sector, which is fairly low, for a less than entirely obvious reason. It is low because it is easier to hire in the experts you need than to grow your own. Productivity in both the public and private sectors is significantly lower than in private sectors where non-nationals are employed.

There is also the issue of ghost jobs, where quotas are put in place by some of these countries to ensure that employers have to hire a certain number of nationals. That is done in terms of bookkeeping, but the nationals are not really hired; they are paid money to stay at home. The incentives are focused on numbers, which tends to distort the results. A good example was given in a Chatham House paper of a Saudi student who chose to read philosophy in order to sit on a waiting list for a public sector job. He could show that as a philosopher he could not get a private sector job but would wait for a public sector job, which would give him a better lifestyle: one-third more generous in terms of salary, and with far more time off, security of tenure, and so on. Moreover, the legal system, which requires nationals to act as agents for international companies, results in pure rentier behaviour in economic terms. Why would you engage in productive employment if family connections enabled you to get the contract to allow a foreign firm to be based in that country?

The final issue is the prism through which we see the region as a security dilemma. Iran has been mentioned but I wonder if too much weather has not been made of the threat from Iran. My own view is that Iran has been used as a means of ever greater defence purchases rather than as a real attempt to find peace. Surely if we do get a de-escalation of the crisis in Iran the peace dividend should result in these countries being able to look towards improving some of the other things I have mentioned.

In conclusion, I would argue that the region appears superficially to have a veneer of stability, indeed a gloss of prosperity and well-being, but a clearly defined path of economic and social development is critical. I accept the need for incremental moves and I understand that Arab society is evolutionary and not revolutionary. Unless we have moves towards better governance, greater constitutionalism and, above all, the rule of law and a respect for human rights—again, I am not asking for something revolutionary—alongside the things that these countries have pledged through the Arab charter on human rights, we will not see a stable future in the region.