Afghanistan

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 14th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I begin by thanking my noble friend Lady Warsi for introducing this debate in a thoroughly rounded and comprehensive manner, well illustrating the challenges that this subject raises.

A British Prime Minister declares that now is the time for everyone to participate in a peaceful political process in Afghanistan. One might legitimately ask whether this is the late 18th century, the 1920s, or perhaps last month at Chequers. It could easily be any of all three. That Afghanistan has the capacity to destabilise its neighbourhood is uncontested, but it is also a country that finds itself in a particularly unsavoury neighbourhood, surrounded by, in the north, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, et al, acknowledged to be some of the most authoritarian, poorly governed and dysfunctional states of the former Soviet Union. Iran, its western neighbour, has continued on its post-1979 project to be the guardian of Shia interests around the world, irrespective of the force of international law, as we have seen demonstrated in the Middle East but also in western Afghanistan itself. Here, apart from a short window of co-operation in 2002, Iran has seen its role as a spoiler, resisting US-Afghan strategic co-operation, profiting, it is alleged, from the narcotics trade, funding armed shipments and training the Taliban. That is hardly a recipe for neighbourly relations.

The most difficult relationship between Afghanistan and its neighbours is that with Pakistan, and it is primarily on that relationship that I shall focus my remarks today. There was a time of cordial relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but it was a relatively brief window and is easily forgotten: the period between the 1950s and the late 1970s, when trade was undertaken, people-to-people contact was strong, and both Kabul and Peshawar were interdependent. The intervening 35 years from then to today have resulted first in Afghanistan becoming a near failed state, and now Pakistan, mainly due to its own internal dynamics, is also deeply unstable.

While the trajectory of decline in Afghanistan from the time of the Soviet invasion is well known, it is difficult to see how we can, in the words of the Prime Minister at Chequers last month,

“see a strong relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan built on greater trust”.

Let me turn to the aims of the Chequers six-month push for peace, as it is described, the principle of which is a peace and reconciliation programme. There are three fundamental issues at stake. The first is the Karzai Government’s ability to attain peace with their Taliban, given that the Taliban office intended for Qatar nearly two years ago has still not arrived, although, as the noble Baroness has told us, the new initiative will be a Doha-based political office, and talks are likely to go ahead shortly. However, the history of peace initiatives with the Taliban is not likely to deliver results, particularly when the US is not actively involved—and to my mind, six months is not nearly long enough to see delivery.

If the Chequers summit had been more broadly based to include at least the United States as financial guarantor, we might have given this a greater push. But without wishing for a replication of the Bonn II meeting, which was very wide indeed, it would be illuminating to assess what discussions might have been conducted with the Saudi Government about their support for the most radical elements in the Taliban, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have been historical and, some say, ongoing.

My noble friend said that Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan have a deep and lasting friendship, but given the history of its destabilisation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, I wonder whether players on either side would subscribe unanimously to that remark. Moreover, the role of the UAE as the principal recipient of the proceeds of corruption, as the destination of choice for Afghans depositing their ill gotten gains, is also to be scrutinised. What attempts in this six-month period are Her Majesty's Government likely to make with the United States in seeking to assess how much terrorist funding is channelled through the UAE, and what steps will be taken to curb that?

The second fundamental in bringing about peace is the role of Pakistan, which may not actively seek to destabilise Afghanistan any longer but certainly does not play as constructive a role as it might, given the shared challenges of the terrorist factions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and their activities on both sides of the border. The role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency’s operations in Afghanistan is probably the best documented record of a deep and concerted policy of destabilisation by one state on another. This is down to Pakistan’s long sought doctrine of strategic depth, discussed earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, which is based on the idea that its influence over Afghanistan—some might even say its control of Afghanistan—represents some sort of strategic depth against India. The perversity of this thinking in Pakistan is that if your attempts at control do not work, you end up with enemies on both your eastern and western flanks. I am aware that the US and the United Kingdom are hopeful that the rapprochement between Kabul and Islamabad will work this time, but I have to say I have my doubts.

I was told by an Afghan Minister only last week that the agreement from the Chequers summit that the Pakistan army would be involved in training the Afghan National Security Forces is now under threat. His explanation was that since Chequers, Islamabad has sought to exert greater pressure on Kabul for Afghan foreign policy to be somehow approved by Pakistan. This is clearly unacceptable to Kabul, and I understand that talks have now recommenced with India to see if India can fill the gap in that training for the Afghan National Security Forces. It undoubtedly can, and since it has a strategic partnership agreement with Pakistan, which gives it a formal role in guaranteeing Afghan security, it would be entirely in keeping with India’s strategic goal of denying Pakistan any strategic advantage in that country. I have to say that I cannot see the extremely benign role that the noble Lord, Lord Parekh, ascribes to India. It has historically always worked to manipulate Pakistan-Afghanistan discord. If my Afghan interlocutor was correct, this is another illustration of how very challenging the task of maintaining regional security will be.

However, the final fundamental that was not addressed at Chequers was the ability and inclination of Pakistan to bring its own house in order. I refer to the various Taliban and other terrorist groups operating across the border. It has long been acknowledged that the main elements of al-Qaeda’s leadership reside in Pakistan. Since the capture of Osama bin Laden, it is also widely believed that Ayman al-Zawahiri is not in the tribal areas but resides in the so-called “settled” areas of Pakistan; in other words, he lives in comfort in some city. We know that the Haqqani network continues to launch attacks and control myriad insurgency groups. Its interests in the drugs trade, arms trade, kidnappings, murders and terrorist bombings make it the most difficult of the terrorist groups with a stake in this conflict. Given that its interests are so deeply entrenched, and that it is so financially dependent on this ongoing conflict and on keeping it going, I cannot see how it will be demobilised. Its listing in the US as a terrorist organisation is long overdue, but I do not see Pakistan bringing it to any kind of negotiation. It simply does not have that in its power.

Finally, there is the influence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the umbrella group of the various Salafi, Deobandi and Wahhabi groups, which were created by ISI initially to counter the Soviet invasion as well as the Shia threat after the Iranian revolution of 1979. They are distinct from the anti-Indian terrorist grouping so well established in Pakistan, too. The Pakistanis have discovered that while the main aim of these groups was to “repulse the invader”, as it is called, be he an Indian, Iranian, Soviet or American, their ideology has now evolved.

With levels of violence in all parts of Pakistan up—by some 300% in Karachi to some 40% in Lahore—the Pakistani public justifiably ask what these groups now want. With the restoration of a civilian Government for some years, it is instructive that they are themselves subject to attacks from these groups. Their aim seems to be to build a fully theocratic state within Pakistan, subscribing to their vision of a true Islam. One of their means of doing this is to form electoral pacts with the mainstream political parties in order to be able to enter the Pakistani parliament, and to wield the influence and power that that brings. As this process of Islamisation of Pakistan continues through the use of violence, and now political entryism, I cannot see much progress in a stable Pakistan emerging as a strong and constructive partner for Afghanistan.

However, in order to support Pakistan in its attempts to recalibrate its policy towards Afghanistan, I know that Her Majesty’s Government seek an orderly transition to a new civilian Government in Pakistan. Indeed, my noble friend has spoken of the UK’s engagement in bringing about a robust and transparent electoral process. I wonder whether she will be able to tell the House what steps we are taking to monitor the elections in Pakistan. A stable Afghanistan will be a prize that will reinvigorate the region and enhance development, trade and the overall economies of the entire region. We know that development is a factor in reducing conflict, and the absence of conflict is a precondition for freedom. Achieving that across Afghanistan, Pakistan and India would be a prize indeed.