Foreign Policy Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Falkner of Margravine
Main Page: Baroness Falkner of Margravine (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Falkner of Margravine's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, thank my noble and learned friend Lord Howe of Aberavon for initiating this debate. It is particularly timely given the need for the coalition to set out more fully its vision of the UK’s foreign policy and security. I also welcome my noble friend Lord Maples and look forward to his joining us in the foreign affairs community of this House, which is numerous, as he will discover.
We talk about this period as an age of austerity. It is also an age of insecurity and uncertainty. The Chatham House paper, Organising for Influence, has described this period as the “long crisis” facing globalisation. Ergo, we face an extended period of volatility as the world attempts to reconcile its demographic, economic and security challenges within the constraints of scarce natural resources. Reports therefore of the Foreign Secretary’s speech today as a first move to define his strategic vision are most welcome.
This debate takes place a few months after the general election, when the global financial crisis and, closer to home, the EU’s sovereign debt crisis was almost not discussed at all, yet it affects all public policy in the domestic context. The economy, employment, energy, welfare and well-being are all impacted by their reach. Although voters were not presented with a vision of the different parties’ positions on our foreign policy, the time has come for this discussion. There needs to be a concerted effort to define how effectively the UK can project its influence in the world and what ground its strategic reach must cover.
The formation of the National Security Council is an important first step in this direction and we await, with interest, the publication of a new national security strategy. There is now little doubt that national security is ultimately and intimately bound up with the international—as with financial markets, so too with international terrorism: globalisation has rendered borders more permeable. But the challenge for our NSC will be for us to improve interdepartmental co-ordination with better input and analysis from the intelligence community, while retaining a limited view of national security. One of the frequent criticisms of the US National Security Council is that its remit is too wide, with extensive duplication of analysis. We should seek to redefine national security to deal mainly with risks to the UK and its citizens.
To explain, we should not aim to see longer-term, transboundary threats, such as economic issues or climate change or indeed state failure elsewhere, as a direct risk to the security of UK citizens. The previous national security strategy set out its approach as providing security for the nation, safeguarding our citizens and our way of life. Safeguarding our way of life is far too broad a vision. A more focused view of national security should concentrate on direct threats to UK citizens, which have severe and longer-term consequences for their welfare. Thus terrorist attacks, organised or cyber crime on infrastructure, as well as hard threats such as military action would come under this remit, but climate change, resource scarcity or economic imbalances would not. That is not to say that these longer-term sources of instability would not be on our horizon—they certainly would—but they should be undertaken on a whole-of-government basis and given priority in the Cabinet Office or in a separate Cabinet committee.
I turn to the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s renewed emphasis on its role and his intention to expand its reach anew. But at a time when its budget is being constricted, it should take the opportunities offered by the EU’s External Action Service to reduce its bilateral diplomatic focus outside its strategic interest areas. It should engage actively through leading within the EAS, not from outside. The question arises of course, of what we mean by its bilateral strategic choices.
There is much excitement about the BRICs. The Prime Minster has indicated his interest in a special relationship with India, and today the Foreign Secretary has spoken about Latin America. Instead of chasing new special relationships with those with whom we are not equally matched, as a mid-sized European power, we would be better rewarded by placing our trust in the myriad multilateral forums where we have real clout. The task of building a more stable global economy through reregulating financial institutions or protecting the open global trading system is one to which we are well suited to work through the Bretton Woods institutions and emerging forums, such as the G20 and G8. Tackling climate change and managing resource scarcity are serious challenges, but our diplomatic reach there is best served through the EU and appropriate UN forums. So our focus should be to do a limited number of things extremely well, rather than do everything with varying degrees of success.
In conclusion, we need to focus on limited objectives, on an improved policy coherence, and on prioritising our influence in relation to our capabilities and our power. If a new strategy can achieve that, we will have moved in the right direction.