Pensions Act 2011 (Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Wednesday 9th July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to this technical debate. I declare an interest as chairman of the defined benefit superannuation scheme of the General Medical Council, so unfortunately I know nothing about money purchase schemes. I did try, honestly—I took home the 36-page judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, and read it carefully until Germany scored the second goal. I still do not understand the noble and learned Lord’s reasoning, but I am sure that it is sound.

I hope that the Minister can help me. I understand that we are dealing with two sets of statutory instruments. The department deserves credit for taking on board the suggestion made by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of teasing out the negative from the affirmative. That is always good practice. However, I do not know where the transitional regulation, Regulation 1711, comes from. I assumed that it would have been sensible to have taken these together because they talk about the same thing and are all part of a piece. However, I may have missed something and the Minister might be able to put me right on the procedure that is involved.

This is a small but important issue and anyone who looks at it will be reminded of the ineffable complexity of our pensions system. I have to say that although this is the right thing to do and I am content with the regulations, they form another layer of complexity—because they have to. If money purchase is not defined in this way, it would leave a terrible amount of uncertainty. If people do not understand a valid, watertight description of money purchase, chaos will ensue. Lots of schemes could get into even greater difficulties in the future.

We always have to be careful about retrospective provision. These regulations go back to 1 January 1997. I understand perfectly why and, in the circumstances, that is justified, but, as I say, we must always be careful about retrospective provision. However, I think this is the right tactic. It is not perfect because retrospection never is, but the stated case is accepted, certainly as far as I am concerned. Clarity is the order of the day, as much as we can achieve it in pension provision.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister. Some of these things are imponderable because the data are not available in money purchase schemes to the same extent as in defined benefit schemes, but the number of affected schemes has been listed as being around 800. Is there an update on that figure and is there now a better definition? Has the number gone up or down since these matters started to be drawn up by the department? I also want to try to understand what the costs of non-compliance would amount to. What is the worst that could happen? If everything that can go wrong does go wrong, what would happen to hybrid schemes such as these which involve money purchase in a way that we have to change through these regulations?

As the chairman of a superannuation scheme myself, the key and overriding priority of a trustee is to protect the members’ benefits. Are there any circumstances where benefits afforded to members could be prejudiced by these changes? I have looked at the very helpful Explanatory Memorandum. Paragraph 19 explains the provisions of,

“transitional measures to assist affected schemes in three ways”.

The first bullet point talks about,

“retrospective protection so that schemes do not have to revisit past decisions”,

and goes on to conclude that,

“there is very likely to be no detrimental material impact on member benefits”.

That is a nuanced subordinate clause, and perhaps it has to be so. I would rather have the truth than be given a more definitive statement that was easier to understand and more reassuring. However, that is a key question for me. If I could be given some reassurance on that point, I would be even happier than I am at the moment.

Finally, I think that the consultation was exemplary. I looked at the document very carefully and the department did everything it could. The consultation was responded to well and those who did respond are experts who know the exact consequences of these changes. For me, that has lifted a great deal of concern and apprehension about the effects of these changes. These regulations reflect circumstances that no one could have foreseen and the Government have responded to them in the best way they can. The situation is still a bit fuzzy at the edges, but I hope that the Minister will give us an assurance that the appropriate officials who understand these things will monitor the position so that we can be assured in the fullness of time that the assumptions we are making of very little or no loss of benefit to individual members are found to be what happens in practice in the future.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a trustee of both the Santander and Telefónica pension schemes.

This statutory instrument has been on a rather interesting journey. In part it supersedes draft regulations published in May, which were withdrawn and subsequently divided into two in order to separate provisions required to go through affirmative procedure from those required to go through negative procedure. It has therefore been a little confusing to try to anticipate the affirmative provisions to be relaid in the form of a pared-down instrument, as this SI was not laid until last Thursday. Having said that, I appreciate that dealing with the uncertainties and complexities that flow from the Supreme Court decision in Bridge cannot have been straightforward for the Government. I compliment the drafters of the Explanatory Memoranda and the impact assessment, who tried to provide clarity as to what the Government intend and why, in what to most normal people would seem a rather dense and complex set of requirements.

The two regulations have separate Explanatory Memoranda, but they share a common impact assessment, so one can assume that certain key assumptions and conclusions underpin both orders. I refer in particular to the fact that, having considered the consultation responses, the department has changed its policy on retrospection for non-compliant schemes. Decisions taken by schemes between 1 January 1997 and the coming into force of Section 29 will be validated, except in two limited circumstances that relate to winding up and employer debt, where there is a risk to members’ benefits.

The department has been persuaded that it would therefore be unduly burdensome to require schemes to revisit past decisions, which could give rise to expensive administrative costs that could deplete scheme assets and therefore the ability to fund members’ benefits—that is the argument put by the Government—and that the impact of members’ benefits of revisiting past decisions since July 2011 would be negligible. In summary, the Government are persuaded that with two exceptions, Section 29 will come into force only with prospective effect; there will be retrospective protection for schemes and past decisions will be validated.

However, in coming to that view and giving that retrospective protection to decisions made, the department is unable to quantify the impact of the regulations on schemes likely to be affected. There are no data available at an industry-wide level. The consultation did not elicit sufficient data at scheme level to allow the department to produce reliable estimates of the impacts on schemes and on members—and indeed, on employers. The department engaged further through the pensions regulator’s annual survey and the wider pensions industry to enable some quantification of costs and benefit. However, insufficient information was forthcoming.

A question must be, therefore: are the Government right to be persuaded, and indeed confident, that except in the defined limited circumstances that they have identified, there is negligible risk to members’ benefits in validating decisions taken by schemes before the coming into force of Section 29? Should there be more exceptions to the retrospective validation? How do the Government give themselves the level of confidence they need to give that retrospective validation? I will illustrate my concern with reference to a couple of examples.

The very important rules which govern any attempts to change pension rights or entitlements are detailed in Section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995, popularly referred to as “Section 67 rights”—an often quoted phrase because of its protected nature. During the course of the consultation on the regulations arising from the Pensions Act 2011, stakeholders advised the department that there could be schemes which had inadvertently changed their benefits from non-money purchase to money purchase; for example, by removing a guarantee from a cash balance scheme because of their interpretation of the law in force at the time. In doing so they may not have secured the members’ consent as is required.

The department has taken the view that schemes should not be required to revisit these decisions and that it would deem that the requirements of Section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995 had been satisfied where the actuarial equivalence requirements were met before such a scheme modification took effect. But those actuarial equivalence assumptions may not hold good over the longer term, and the issue remains that a guarantee or some other right has been removed without consent. The Section 67 requirements have not been met and the beneficiaries may be worse off.

--- Later in debate ---

These draft regulations make modifications to the existing primary legislation to provide supplementary and consequential measures—

[Baroness Drake]

My Lords, this may be an appropriate moment to intervene because I want to push the Minister on a couple of points. I have been trying to anticipate when he would be coming to the end of his remarks.

Perhaps I may go back to two points. First, Section 67 rights under the 1995 Act are pretty important rights that get people rather excited. The concern I was trying to express was that this seems to set the precedent that you can provide retrospective protection for schemes that have breached Section 67 rights and obligations. What level of assurance can the Minister give that this is not a precedent that could be used for undermining the strength of Section 67 in the future by giving retrospective protection?

Secondly, in terms of how this retrospective protection applies where schemes have breached Section 67, I should point out that the Government do not know which schemes have done this. They have just heard about this from the industry, so they are giving a sort of blanket assurance without knowing the number and type of breaches of Sections 67. If they do not meet the actuarial equivalence terms, it is not clear whether they will have to go back and redo it.

Thirdly, if they did it inadvertently, they probably did not do any actuarial equivalence exercise at the time. Is it therefore being said that they can do one with hindsight now, and can look back and say, “Had that been applied at the time”? It is quite important to get clarity on this Section 67 point, because there are lots of disputes and case law around it. It tends to get people who are interested in members’ benefits quite excited if there is an attempt to compromise it in some way.

On the flipping schemes, which are not protected in terms of access to the PPF until April 2015, I note that, as was said, if you have not paid the levy then the liability if your employer goes insolvent should not go to other levy payers. However, the issue is that it is a government responsibility, because the Government are obliged under the EU directive. I was looking for as firm an assurance as possible that, if an employer with a scheme that has to flip from DC to DB goes into insolvency before or up to April 2015, the Government will not walk away from giving some kind of protection to those schemes with DB benefits the members of which may now be caught outside the protection regime; hopefully there are none or, if there are, they are very tiny.

[Lord Bates]

I am grateful for those additional points. Let me try to answer them as best I can. It might be helpful if I wrote to the noble Baroness and shared those responses with the Committee. I realise that they are important issues.

To respond to the specific issue of Section 67 rights, the appropriate regulation is Regulation 8(3)(b). The Government believe that the protection is not undermined, because there must have been an actuarial equivalence. If they do not meet the actuarial equivalence requirements, they will have to go back and unpick them. In fact, the regulations introduce a new protection for members, which underpins the benefits. However, as I said, I shall seek further guidance on that and write to the noble Baroness and other Members of the Committee.

These draft regulations make modifications to existing primary legislation to provide supplementary and consequential measures to support the coming into force of the clarified definition of money purchase benefits in Section 29 of the Pensions Act 2011. I hope that I have set out for the Committee the rationale for these regulations and have responded to the matters raised. I commend these regulations to the Committee.