Baroness Drake
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Pensions Bill
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Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 23 and the associated amendments to Schedule 17. I declare my interests as a trustee of both the Santander and Telefónica pension schemes, and as a member of the NAPF pension quality mark board.
It is clear that the Government are right that a solution is needed for millions of dormant small pots arising under auto-enrolment because of the large number of workplace schemes and the frequency with which workers change employers. The Government are right that neither scheme members nor providers benefit from workers leaving behind small pots as they move from job to job. The Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to transfer automatically small pots to form, and keep track of, bigger, more efficient pots. The contentious issue is what the default transfer solution should be.
The Government, as my noble friend has said, has chosen pot follows member, whereby a small pension pot automatically follows a member to their new employer’s pension scheme, rather than the alternative of small pots being transferred to an aggregator scheme which consolidates all the small pots accumulated by an individual each time they change their employer. The Association of British Insurers supports this view but, as my noble friend has pointed out, many others—the Confederation of British Industry, the NAPF, the Cass Pensions Institute, Which?, EEF, Age UK, the TUC, the centre for pension studies and others—believe that pot follows member has a number of inherent risks and weaknesses.
The amendment retains the power of the Secretary of State to make regulations to transfer small pots automatically, but not the requirement that this must be through PFM. It allows time for further consideration by the Government without excluding any particular solution, as the consequences of getting this wrong are absolutely huge. PFM cannot be implemented without raising quality standards, or the Government risk transferring the savings of millions of ordinary people into many thousands of different schemes over which they have very little quality control.
Confidence that quality standards would be raised sufficiently has also been dented by the decision to defer introducing a charges cap, increasing the risk of saver detriment. PFM also increases the risks of charges and transaction costs being incurred on the whole pension pot as it moves with each job change, rather than on the incremental amount saved with the previous employers. Savings would be switched out of investment assets into cash, then reinvested with every job change, exposing workers to repeated transaction costs, extra investment risk and the risk of being switched out of low-risk lifestyle funds as they approach retirement. The more frequent the change of job, the greater the risks—risks that an aggregator could reduce.
The impact assessment acknowledges that individuals may be better or worse off, depending on the charges or the performance of the investment fund into the scheme into which they are transferred. However, the DWP expects,
“the gains and losses from differences between scheme charges and investment performance to cancel out on average”.
However, there is no consolation for individuals if their higher charges on transfer are off-set by another’s lower charges. An automatic transfer solution, using a limited number of aggregators, can require them to deliver a low-charge, high-quality standard, so mitigating the risk of saver detriment overall on transfer.
All qualifying automatic enrolment schemes should meet minimum standards, but regulating for differences in quality between schemes is impossible. There will always be a wide range between minimum standards and best practice. PFM fails to work for everyone, as it only transfers a pension pot into a workplace scheme of which an individual is an active member. It fails those who leave the workforce or become self-employed, as they are no longer active in an employer’s scheme. Their small pots are left to flounder. Employers may even default their small pot into a poorer-quality personal pension because they simply do not allow ex-employees to remain in their existing scheme. By comparison, an aggregator does not require a worker to be an active member, so it can cater for more people. PFM increases administrative burdens on employers, obliging every workplace scheme to be capable of communicating with every other scheme. Aggregators reduce this burden as there would be only a few schemes in which to transfer. Auto-enrolment was intended to carry a lighter regulatory burden on employers, especially SMEs. However, PFM rows in the opposite direction.
DWP modelling suggests that for any pot size, the aggregator will achieve slightly less consolidation with PFM, and that irrespective of pot size limit, the aggregator model would achieve at best only half of the net present value of the economic benefit of the PFM approach. DWP modelled pot follows member and aggregator over a range of pot size transfer limits, initially setting a £2,000 pot limit for aggregators while modelling PFM up to £20,000. After protests, it issued an ad hoc release, modelling the limit for aggregators up to £20,000. The Government argue that an aggregator solution would require transfers to be restricted to pots of £2,000 or less rather than the £10,000 intended for pot follows member, a figure suggested by providers to ensure that aggregators did not dominate the market and upset competition. The whole analysis underpinning auto-enrolment, the building of NEST and the need to regulate value for money is based on massive market failure and the inability to rely on fair competition. A hypothesis that dominant aggregators might emerge is not a valid argument against aggregation at higher pot levels.
The assertion that the aggregator model would achieve only half of the net present value of the PFM approach assumes a one-off cost of £105 to transfer a pot and a PFM, and a saving of £20 each year from not having to administer annually a transferred pot. However, if that saving and assumption, an uncertainty in itself, turns out to be lower, the economic advantage of PFM also falls.
The DWP assumes that an aggregator cannot hold live pots, but if employers were also allowed to use a good-quality aggregator as their scheme, it could provide pension portability to many members, removing the need for transfers at all when they change jobs, and the costs that would go with it. The Government impact assessment accepts that it would be more efficient to use existing schemes as aggregators because,
“active members would be saving in the scheme that also holds their dormant pots”,
but they fail to reflect this concession in their own modelling.
As my noble friend said, there are significant delivery challenges with PFM. The Government believe that in the long term PFM will deliver low charges for savers due to efficiency savings made by the industry having to manage fewer small pots. However, those savings are by no means assured. The impact assessment acknowledges that,
“there is a risk that some providers will not experience the resource savings projected”,
that,
“trying to estimate the cost of administrative processes many years ahead is fraught with difficulties and is a key uncertainty over the estimated cost savings”,
and that the,
“wide range of estimates provided … in discussions with stakeholders suggests there may be some genuine variation across providers”.
To be successful and to be delivered, PFM requires pan-industry collaboration. There are significant technical challenges for it to be delivered. The DWP is working with providers to find an industry-led IT solution. However, what happens if the direction of travel gets too tough and they disagree with the Government or with each other—not an infrequent occurrence? Do we get another deferral?
The unresolved weaknesses in the pot follows member solution are apparent in the inherent risks, the uncertainties in key assumptions and the delivery challenges. The transfer solution chosen by the Government must give greater confidence to mitigating saver detriment. This amendment reflects the very real concerns that not only I but many others have expressed, but it retains the power of the Secretary of State to make regulations automatically to transfer small pots while allowing him to give more time to detailed consideration on the model of the solution.
Lord Freud
Those figures are pretty detailed and I will write to the noble Lord with them if I do not get a detailed breakdown in the next minute or two—which I might. It is a huge amount of money, which the noble Lord will appreciate as well as anyone else, and it is a lot of money to have in a complacent and stagnant market. If, as the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, suggested, employers could choose the aggregators, and these aggregators were to become open to active members, this market dominance would be complete.
Baroness Drake
I do not think I said that the employer could choose the aggregator. I said that if the aggregator was able to have active members as well as aggregated members, that would enhance portability, particularly in some industries, which would reduce the need for transfers and the consequential costs. I do not think I actually said that the operating model would mean the employer chose the aggregator—I left that to the departmental assessment.
Lord Freud
Well, if they started moving to active members as well, whatever the route, it would give this group of organisations an enormous market position. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, that I will have to write to him.
It seems strange that, in response to the OFT’s conclusion that there is a lack of competition in the pensions market, the Opposition are calling for the creation of a market dominated by a few big master trusts. We need only to look at other industries, such as the energy market or banking sector, to see that dominance by a few powerful players can result in real concerns for consumers. If we were to press on regardless with enabling these large aggregators to come into being, we would need to be clear that there would be no turning back. It would be extremely difficult to reverse the process if we found that an aggregator model was not sustainable, and to tackle the vested interests if consumers were getting a poor deal.
We have heard—for example, from the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock—that the Government are alone in supporting pot follows member. It is not true that few people support it but I agree that there is a powerful lobby supporting the aggregator model. It is hardly surprising that those who are shouting the loudest are those who are lobbying on behalf of master trusts that could come to dominate the market under an aggregator model.
The ABI itself supports pot follows member, as do many groups within it—Aviva, Fidelity, Friends Life, HSBC, Origo, Scottish Life and Scottish Widows—as well as non-members of the ABI such as Alexander Forbes, Altus, Buck, Foster Denovo, the Investment Management Association, JLT and the National Federation of Occupational Pensioners.
This Government’s starting point is the consumer—and it is the individual who wants to see their pension follow them to their new employer, as the research from NOW: Pensions, which we have already touched on, underlines. The ABI’s consumer research showed that 58% of individuals said that the pot should follow them automatically to the new job; 10% were in favour of a new central scheme, the aggregator; 15% said the pot should stay where it is and it is up to you to move it; and 17% said it should be visible with all other pension pots at a central place online. That is the sentiment among consumers.
I appreciate that some consumer groups have concerns. I say to them that we are listening to those concerns and that low charges and scheme quality are top of our agenda, not just for automatic transfers but for all schemes. We want these groups to work with us and the industry now to deliver pot follows member in the simplest, safest way for consumers.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Drake and Lady Sherlock, raised concerns about consumer detriment. I remind the House about the work the Government are doing to ensure that all schemes are good schemes. Uniformity is not good for consumers, but only if all aggregators had identical charges and standards would we completely remove the risk of an individual moving to a worse scheme. The noble Lord, Lord Turner, made the point about the interconnectedness of these issues. The Minister for Pensions has confirmed that he remains “strongly minded”—I think that is fairly parliamentary language —to introduce a charge cap. My noble friend asked about the DWP response to the OFT and the consultation on charges. That response is coming soon and we will be discussing that later this afternoon.
Lord Turner of Ecchinswell
Obviously, it is possible that with higher charges there might be a higher return, but many of the variations that we see in charges in the industry are for things that clearly will not produce a different return. One sees, for instance, a wide spread of charges for index funds, where one knows that there will be no difference. We also know that, on average, active management does not add a return above index funds: that is a very strong empirical result from a lot of analysis. While it is possible that with higher charges come higher return, in a great many cases that is not so. One thing pension savers would be wise to concentrate on is the charges they face, because that is one of the few things that they can definitively influence, whereas the gross return is a promise that may or may not be delivered.
Those are the reasons that led the Pensions Commission to focus very strongly on the issue of cost and the variation of cost. We noted, for instance, that many people employed in the UK are in large trust-based schemes and already enjoy, on defined contribution schemes, total fund management charges of 20 basis points, 0.2%, or less. For those 20 basis points, they get fund management at the gross level quite as good as people paying 1.5%. If you pay 0.2%, by the end of your savings life, you would have given up only around 4% or 5% of your savings in the charges, which is probably about as low as we can get it, given the fundamental things that have to be done. Again, that is confirmed in the Government’s own consultation paper on charging, which illustrates that 10% of trust-based firms have annual management charges of 0.19% or less. That is possible, provided we get economies of scale, without giving up a significant choice of range of funds. However, at the other end of the scale, we noticed many SMEs were paying 1.5% and therefore, as per the Government’s consultation paper, losing 34%; or 1%, at which point you lose 24%.
That is why, as I said earlier, the recommendations of the Pensions Commission covered not just auto-enrolment, to use the inertia power to get people to save, but the design of the scheme, to ensure that access at the sort of low costs already enjoyed by employees of large firms can be enjoyed by employees of small firms. That was the reason for the design of NEST, which was designed by looking at detailed cost analysis and working out at what level it ought to be possible to deliver a default fund and also at models from elsewhere, such as Sweden. We became convinced that it ought to be possible to deliver to all people the opportunity to invest in a default fund—probably an index fund—with all explicit end costs of 0.3%. A set of decisions were subsequently made that the cost would have to be 0.5%, which is what it went forward as in the NEST environment. That at least establishes a benchmark and means that people who invest in NEST are only giving up 13% of their end-of-life savings pot in charges.
It is important that that should be the benchmark and that we have a charge cap. We know from the OFT’s and other analysis that this is simply not a market where the operation of individual customer choice is effective in driving cost-efficient competition. If that were the case, we would never have had to have the recommendations of the Pensions Commission and the auto-enrolment to which we are now committed. If we do not impose a charge cap, we will leave many savers, in particular lower-income people working for SMEs, facing unnecessarily high costs. I think they are unnecessary if, for a default fund, we are above 50 basis points, or 0.5%. I am therefore concerned that the two options the Government were looking at in their consultation paper on charging were 0.75% and 1%. If we come forward with a cap of 1%, we are giving to the ordinary saver the extraordinary promise that, on their behalf, we have made sure that their loss of pot at the end of their life is only 24%. I do not think that is a very compelling promise to give to people. I therefore strongly believe that we should make a clear commitment, by a clear date, to get on with this and have a charge cap in place, and that 0.5% is the appropriate figure.
Although a price cap on explicit costs is important, it is not sufficient. That is why I strongly support the sentiment of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, which seeks to cover all the other costs which are not covered in explicit fund management charges. The issue of these other costs was also one with which the Pensions Commission was concerned. We were concerned that, beyond what you can see in an annual management charge for a fund, there are lots of other costs involved. These are precisely the sort of costs described in Amendment 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, which inlcude,
“fees and performance fees paid to investment managers … commissions and bid-offer spreads paid … fees, revenue splits and bid-offer spreads paid to custodian banks”.
These are very significant but are not well understood.
On the Pensions Commission, we sought to see whether research had been done on how big these were. Interestingly, there was one piece of research, which was sponsored by the FSA back in 2000 and written, after a lot of research, by a man called Kevin James. It tried to work out just how large these other costs were in the UK and in the US. We called them implicit costs in addition to explicit costs. There is a box in the first Pensions Commission report which explains that piece of analysis and how big they are. His analysis, which we interpreted, suggested that some of these costs might be as high as 90 basis points, on top of the overt, explicit costs. We ended up, for the purposes of modelling, believing that if we were to try to understand what got lost between the gross return on equities that you see by looking at the FTSE All-Share Index every year and what the saver gets, we had to allow, in addition to the explicit asset management costs, for 65 basis points on average going in these implicit costs—more for actively managed funds, less for index funds.
It is possible that those costs have come down since that analysis was done and since we looked at it—there has, for instance, been some compression of bid-offer spreads—but they are sufficiently large that it is incredibly important to focus on them, pay attention to them and, as it were, bring the disinfectant of transparency to bear on this bit of the cost base. Let us suppose that they were 65 basis points. That means that if somebody thought that they were paying 0.85% on an explicit annual management charge, between the gross return on equities in the market and what they actually get, they would be paying 85 basis points plus 65 basis points, which takes us back to the 1.5% per annum, which is 34% of their pot disappearing.
The noble Lord, Lord Lawson, has put an immensely important issue on the table. I would encourage the Government to widen their focus even beyond pensions, because it is important not only in the pensions arena but for the other ways that people save, for instance with ISAs. When people save in ISAs, they are looking at an overt, explicit asset management charge, but sitting behind that is a set of other hidden costs. This is an issue where more information will help. It will not transform the situation—we are deluding ourselves if we believe that lots of individual savers are themselves, individually, going to pay attention to this—but as the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, has said, the press, including the specialist press, will pay attention to it and a wider debate about just how large these charges are is very important. It would, for instance, be very interesting to start seeing how much higher these hidden costs are for actively managed funds versus index-linked funds, because that is a piece of information that people ought to bear in mind when they make those decisions between different classes of assets.
I urge the Government, as they go forward with this idea, to look at whether that disclosure should in future apply not just to pensions but to a wider class of investments—to cast it, as the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, said, as widely as possible so that we capture all costs—and to see this as a start point of an extremely important debate in which we get a better handle on the total costs that are being imposed by the asset management and investment fund management industries.
I do not think that transparency is an alternative to a charge cap, which is why I have also put my name to Amendment 29, but it is a very valuable additional tool.
Baroness Drake
I do not intend to make my contribution because I do not think there is anything I can add to what the noble Lord, Lord Turner, has said. However, as I have never been a Minister I am not familiar with the dark art of crafting ministerial syntax, so perhaps I could take this opportunity to ask the Minister a question before he responds.
I have before me the Written Ministerial Statement, which says:
“Last year, we consulted on whether to cap charges in the default funds of schemes used for automatic enrolment, and the Government remains committed to seeing this policy through during the life of this Parliament”.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/2/14; col. 11WS.]
My simple question is: does the phrase,
“seeing this policy through during the life of this Parliament”,
mean that the Government will introduce a charge cap before the election in 2015? A simple yes or no answer would be helpful.
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, I had not really intended to intervene. I have not played any part in this Bill since Second Reading, but I just want to draw attention to the fact that there is a difference, in my opinion, between price control and transparency.
I am 100% in favour of transparency. Perhaps I should declare that I have a very complicated pension situation. I have been in defined benefit schemes and money purchase schemes and I have a SIPP. I have also been the trustee of probably half a dozen pension schemes. I have done transfers of people under TUPE in the Local Government Pension Scheme. So I have had a lot of reasons to worry about the amount of somebody’s pension fund that is absorbed by costs. I am totally on board with complete transparency on that issue.
However, that is a different matter from price control. The problems in this market, which I fully agree has very considerable aspects of dysfunctionality, are created, in part at least, by the incredibly complicated structure of pensions that we have created, in both the public and private sectors, over many years. It is a very complicated subject and of course there are people who take advantage of that complexity, I completely agree. There are also people who are so frightened by the complexity that they do not know when they are getting value for money and when they are not.
That is my point: there is a great difference between a market which by its transparency enables people to see whether or not they are getting value for money and a market in which there is price control. Picking a figure for the price control would be a very foolish thing for any Government to do.