Pensions Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my interests in the register and mention that I am a trustee of both the Santander and Telefónica/O2 pension schemes. These state reforms accelerate the direction of travel set, with political consensus, under the Labour Government. The single tier is intended to be fairer, reduce reliance on means-tested benefits, provide a firm foundation for private savings and assist ordinary people to achieve a reasonable income in retirement. To achieve those intentions, it depends in part on the starting value of that single-tier pension and the uprating of its value over time.

The Government’s impact assessment assumes uprating will be by the triple lock but assumptions about pensions’ adequacy could be significantly different if it is not. I also note that the extent to which the single-tier pension is set above the guarantee credit is lower in the White Paper than in the Green Paper. I hope that we can explore these matters further in Committee because it is very important to understand where the consensus is settling on the value and uprating of the single tier.

The state pension age needs to rise in the face of increasing life expectancy. Five-yearly reviews by government will be informed by reports from the Government Actuary but it is less clear how much importance will be given to the report of the independent panel which will consider other relevant factors specified by the Secretary of State. Hopefully, these will include geographical, occupational and socioeconomic differences in morbidity and mortality. There is a need for greater clarity about the process and for clear public evidence to inform the debate.

The Bill also provides for the statutory override to allow private employers with contracted-out schemes to adjust members’ future pension accruals or contributions to recoup the employer’s loss of national insurance contribution rebates consequent on the abolition of contracting out. However, employers should not be able to make disproportionate adjustments. Will the actuarial advice of the trustee take precedence over that of the employer? What if adjustments disproportionately impact on one group of members compared to the other? What are the protections to be?

Many of the provisions on private pensions are to be welcomed: the abolition of incentives to induce a member to transfer their rights out of a salary-related scheme; the abolition of short-service refunds; the protection to workers’ pension contributions from the national insurance fund in the event of employer insolvency; and the granting of powers to the Secretary of State to impose requirements on work-based pension schemes on administration, governance and charges.

However, the question is whether the Government will be sufficiently bold in exercising these powers. Auto-enrolment utilises inertia, not active engagement, to get people saving. The employer chooses the pension product while employee choice is largely restricted to joining or not joining the employer’s scheme. The state harnessing inertia—together with the OFT finding that the demand side, the buyer, of the DC workplace pensions market is one of the weakest that it has analysed in years—raises the bar inexorably on governance requirements, especially as auto-enrolment drives a level of demand that the industry would not achieve under a voluntary system. Poor governance, a lack of transparency or scrutiny and conflicts of interest are to be found abundantly on the supply side. To quote the OFT,

“we have concluded that … competition cannot be relied upon to ensure value for money for savers in the DC workplace pensions market”.

Ordinary people are embracing auto-enrolment. Relatively few have opted out so far, and employers are fulfilling their duty. However, this places a reciprocal responsibility on the Government to protect ordinary people against poor standards and conflicts of interest. The challenge that the Minister is grappling with is apparent from the plethora of consultations and investigations: the FCA on annuity markets and asset management charges; the OFT on the workplace pensions market; the DWP on quality standards, governance and charges; the Law Commission on how the law of fiduciary duties applies to investment intermediaries, using pensions as an exemplar; and TPR on codes of practice. The imbalance between the buyer and the supplier sides of the pensions market, and the systemic inequalities of knowledge and understanding between saver and provider, mean that seeking an alignment of interests is not sufficient—the interests of the saver must come first. There must be a duty to act in the saver’s best interests and, where there is a conflict of interest, priority must go to the saver. No shareholder has a right to gain a dividend from selling or managing a pension product that fails to meet the interests of the saver. The product proposition cannot be designed with sub-optimal features simply to facilitate a profit.

I was therefore anxious to read that in investigating the workplace pensions market, the OFT had reached agreement with the industry to introduce independent governance committees to address the governance challenge, but before a wider community had had the chance to comment on that solution. As the Law Commission says:

“There are many difficult questions about how these committees will work”.

They,

“will not have the power to change investment strategies or investment managers … Furthermore, it is not clear whether … the committees will be under explicit legal duties to act in the interests of”,

the savers. Achieving low charges and good quality in pensions must be inseparable. Sound governance will ensure their delivery. Complexity and lack of transparency put employers and savers at a disadvantage. The OFT identified no fewer than 18 different charges. Full transparency is essential to those who are to be the guardians of the consumer’s interest.

The Secretary of State’s new powers must also be applied retrospectively to cover legacy pension savings. MoneyMarketing, in reporting that the Association of British Insurers has missed the deadline for the pension charge cap consultation, suggested that it was because providers cannot agree on whether existing pension arrangements should be included and quotes Adrian Boulding, Legal and General’s pension strategy director, saying:

“This is all about legacy and the L&G view that existing pension schemes should be able to enjoy the 0.5 per cent charge level that is widely available for new pension schemes. We are morally uncomfortable with the concept that an employer buying new in the market gets one price but an employer that has already bought and is a loyal customer is getting a worse deal for their staff … a charge cap … should apply to new schemes and existing schemes”.

Even if Legal and General has its own competitive considerations for saying those words, they still capture the issue well. We will have to see in the ABI’s crafted response where the common denominator comes to rest.

The Bill addresses the real problem of small, dormant pension pots by giving the Secretary of State power to provide for the automatic transfer of a worker’s pension savings to their new employer’s scheme up to a pot value of £10,000. “Pot follows member” cannot be implemented without raising quality standards or the Government risk transferring the savings of millions of ordinary people into myriad schemes over which they currently have little quality control. Generally, transfers take weeks, if not months. Lots of paperwork, bureaucracy, poor data and lack of standardisation combine to slow the process and increase costs.

All pension savers should easily be able to transfer and consolidate their pension savings, but some savers will never make an active decision, so an effective private pension system requires a series of efficient default arrangements over the life cycle of the saver. I have real concerns about pot follows member as the automatic default arrangement for small pots rather than the alternative of a scheme that can aggregate people’s savings.

I fear pot follows member does not accommodate people who leave the labour force or become self-employed as they have no employer to transfer to, but their ex-employer may nevertheless default them into a poorer personal pension because they do not want to provide for ex-employees in their existing scheme. PFM increases the regulatory burden to oversee the myriad workplace schemes into which automatic transfers would be made rather than focusing on leveraging extremely high quality in a few aggregator schemes. Pot follows member may prove complex for the industry to implement and increase risks to savers. Pot follows member increases risks of charges and transaction costs being incurred on the whole pension pot each time a worker changes their job and transfers rather than on the incremental amount of savings accrued with the previous employer. An efficient pot consolidation mechanism is needed, but I fear that PFM may not best meet this need.

Furthermore, many pots above £10,000 will be defaulted into a personal pension on which there is little quality control because employers increasingly will not let ex-employees stay in their workplaces scheme. The Government argue that significant sums accumulating in aggregator schemes will potentially disrupt the market, but in a dysfunctional market where competition cannot be relied upon to deliver value for money—the words of the OFT, not mine—the driver, as my noble friend said, should be the interests of the saver.