Higher Education and Research Bill

Baroness Deech Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, with the agreement of the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, and in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, I will speak to this group. We understand that their Amendment 135, which we support, has been overtaken by events. It may be subject to an announcement that would remove the requirement for it, which I am sure we would all be grateful for. I have read through the Regulators’ Code and looked in detail at what it does. It can do nothing but good for the sector. It is an effective and useful guide. It will be extremely helpful to all those who will have to deal with the OfS as it moves into its new role. It is to be welcomed that the Government have seen the sense of the amendment we tabled in Committee and have decided to move forward in this way.

Amendment 136 is a slightly different beast. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, who always seems to get stuck at the end of debates and has to hang here to make her very valuable contribution. That situation will change when we next discuss amendments that have her name to them. This one concerns an issue that has been growing in impact as we have been discussing and thinking about the issues raised in the Bill.

There is not, as might be implied by the drafting of Amendment 136, any sense in which we would resile the authority of the CMA regarding the work that will be done by the OfS and its associated committees and structures. The CMA has statutory rights to engage with anything consumers do in the public and private realms. Therefore, it will from time to time no doubt take an issue and respond to complaints. All these things are set out in statute in the ERR Act and the Consumer Rights Act 2015. However, there clearly are operations under the whole umbrella of the CMA that will have a resonance and possibly an ability to be dealt with by the Office for Students. It would be more appropriate for it to do these as part of its regulatory functions.

This is a question we have asked before and have not had a satisfactory answer to, which is why we are bringing it back tonight: what exactly is the boundary between the Office for Students in its regulatory mode and the CMA? At the moment the CMA has taken quite a serious first step into discussions with higher education providers. It has carried out a survey of the way they treat their consumers: students. It has drawn certain conclusions from that and is currently obtaining undertakings from a range of providers, many of which are well-known household names. This is a dog that barks and bites. We have to be very careful where it might go. We would not in any sense wish to constrain it, but it will introduce a completely new sense of engagement between those who respond to offers from higher education institutions to go to them and study, the results they obtain, and their attitudes to and relationships with such institutions.

However, the detailed work of that will necessarily fall to the Office for Students, so there really are questions. Where does the boundary lie? What are the parallel powers that the Government are setting up in this area? Will the OfS have the same powers that the CMA has, as defined in the two Acts that I have already mentioned? Are there new and additional powers that are not being mentioned? If so, could we have a note about these? Where exactly are we on this? I think there is a danger that this ground will be rather trampled over. I have said this was a dog that not only barked but bit, but I think there are other worries that there may be some sort of competitive urge between the two bodies to be more regulatory than the other, and I hope there will be powers available to make sure that that does not happen. We do not want too many dogs, and we certainly do not want them biting. We want to make sure at the end of the day that the true interests here, which are the interests of the students, are not curtailed or in any sense hampered by the fact that regulators are exercising functions in a lot of different ways. I am speaking to this amendment but there is a previous one in the group, and I will respond to mine once the noble Baroness has responded. I beg to move.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak about Amendments 135 and 136. It was a bit of a shock to many people to find that the Competition and Markets Authority had entered this rather competitive field of regulation. The CMA’s job is to promote competition and make markets work. I think much of the debate we have had over the past few weeks is precisely about how universities are not really about competition and markets; they are about collaboration, scholarship and research.

The OfS is replacing HEFCE, which was the lead regulator, but the OfS is not taking over the Office of the Independent Adjudicator. I declare my interest as the first holder of that office, a few years ago. The OfS is intended to be a single, student-focused regulator. I think the Government might be seen to be undermining their own scheme if they allow the CMA to meddle in affairs which really are not suitable for it. There is already far too much compliance and legalism for universities to deal with—human rights, health and safety, data protection, freedom of information, judicial review, Prevent guidance and much more, including the common law. There is a crowded enforcement field as well—the CMA, other higher education bodies, consumer protection legislation, the Office of the Independent Adjudicator, Scottish and Northern Irish ombudsmen, government departments, the Advertising Standards Authority and the Quality Assurance Agency. The CMA admits how fragile its own guidance is because everything depends on how the courts would interpret consumer law applied to universities’ functions.

I would argue that the CMA is also an inappropriate regulator because it shows little experience of how universities work. It is insistent on clear information being given about course variation before a student signs up. This is an example of how it is inappropriate. The prospectus for a student goes to print four or five years before the potential student who has read it graduates some years further on. It is impossible, therefore, in a prospectus to lock in lecturers for five years because of sabbaticals, fluctuating demand and finances, and even building works. How can a university predict what its fees will be five years from now, especially with new mechanisms being introduced right now? The CMA has recently opined that it thinks that it is unfair for universities to withhold formal qualifications from a student who is in debt. Does it have any idea how difficult it is to chase a student through debt collection procedures or failure to provide campus accommodation the following year—which it suggests as a sanction—when a student has left with no forwarding address or gone abroad, as frequently happens?

The CMA will also come into conflict and overlap with the Office of the Independent Adjudicator. The latter has been in existence for about 13 years and has decided thousands of cases, many of which have a consumer flavour. It has given a wide range of advice to universities about the same issues that the CMA has involved itself in. The OIA’s task, however, is to decide what is fair and reasonable. This is not the same as the CMA’s perspective, which is about deciding a dispute on the precise terms of the contract.

The Office of the Independent Adjudicator offers alternative dispute resolution, which is far better than resort to litigation. Unlike the CMA, the OIA can be flexible and offer resolution tailored to the needs of the wronged student—not money but a chance, for example, to retake a year or have extra tuition. The OIA should prevail over the CMA because it was based on a statute designed to provide that one specialised service for students; namely, the settlement of complaints according to what is fair.

There is something wrong in theory about letting the CMA drive issues of university information and practices. Its perspective would cement the student as a paying customer expecting to reach an acceptable outcome. But we are dealing in this Bill with a participatory process—education, not training; knowledge, not skills; and teaching, not rote learning—in a situation that involves a relationship of give and take between students and lecturers, parents and universities, and employers and government. We do not want the commercialisation of this relationship, as if it were the purchase of a car. We want value placed on stimulation, career guidance and intellectual growth, not just the path to a paper qualification.

The consumer model that the CMA applies results in a totally one-sided set of contractual details. It seems to think that there are no obligations on students to pull their weight and no enforcement mechanisms against students’ own shortcomings. There is no mention by it, or in the TEF, of students’ efforts and their responsibility to learn. This one-sided market approach is more likely to lead to complaints about poor teaching after an unacceptable result has been handed down. We expect collaboration and not competition.

Higher education is not like a consumer transaction. The education relationship is unique. There is no fixed outcome which can be measured by organisations such as the CMA because the quality of the experience is determined by the aptitude and hard work of the student, as well as the facilities and teaching offered by the university.

Higher education is one of a class of major events in life which do not readily lend themselves to government by contract. Such situations are too emotional and personal, with no clear goal and perhaps an imbalance of power. The issue may be too important for the rest of society to be left to the narrow issue of a contract between the individual parties. Only overall regulation focused on the goals of higher education and the student will do, not intervention from an unrelated and unrepresentative body such as the CMA.

The CMA focuses on choice, price and competition. It assumes that satisfying the consumer-student is all that matters. Its view of contracts is about the provision of education, but it is no help when it comes to what education should achieve. Its interventions will not only overlap and conflict with the Office of the Independent Adjudicator but will lead to more micromanagement, box-ticking, checking and inspection, and not to greater quality or public benefit. It has no place in this new system.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I have a lot sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said. Where I disagree with her is on university admissions. That seems to me to be a pure consumer transaction. The consumers are provided with information on which they are asked to make a decision. This is an area where I like the idea of there being common standards across the consumer realm rather than some cosy deal that, in the case of higher education, makes it unnecessary to provide the consumers with the level of information and reassurance that they have elsewhere. I think that it is even more necessary. It is probably the second or third biggest single transaction that most people will make in the course of their lives: their commitment to the amount of student loan they will end up with at the end of three years and their commitment to a direction in life which may require a lot of effort and sacrifice to change if they have taken one particular way down.

At the moment I think that it should be very much open to question by the CMA whether what is being provided to students is true, accurate and as much as they should have. Yes, I agree that the Office for Students should have a role in this, but the standards, the bar which we are aiming at, should be set in accordance with our national standards—and at the top of the range of national standards. I think that the CMA has a role in that. So I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, about what happens when you are in a university: all those sorts of relationships, the outcomes and the need for students to contribute, it being a partnership and so forth. It is very hard to read that as a consumer contract. But that first moment of decision—or that rather strung-out moment of decision—seems to me to be very much CMA territory.

--- Later in debate ---

Tabled by

[Baroness Deech]

136: After Clause 71, insert the following new Clause—
“Transfer of regulatory functions relating to higher education providers and students from Competition and Markets Authority to Office for Students
On the establishment of the OfS—(a) the OfS assumes responsibility for the regulatory functions in respect of higher education providers and students enrolled on higher education courses hitherto performed by the Competition and Markets Authority; and(b) the Competition and Markets Authority ceases to have responsibility for those regulatory functions.”

[Baroness Deech]

I may not have made myself clear enough. I thoroughly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that the solution is probably a memorandum of understanding. I was trying not to talk about the clash between the CMA and the OfS, if there is one, but there is definitely a clash because two bodies, the CMA and the Office of the Independent Adjudicator, are right on the same field. The Office of the Independent Adjudicator has been handing out hundreds of decisions every year about prospectuses, facilities and the consumer rights of students. I have already come across one case where it seems that the CMA has been contradicting the OIA. There is definitely confusion and a clash there, albeit a well-meaning one. They are coming at it from different perspectives and it seems quite unnecessary to have the CMA going in over the same territory. There has to be a solution. The OIA is not a regulator but a complaints handler and it is deeply involved in what one would call consumer transactions. But if the Minister will be happy to consider an MoU in some solution, then I am content not to move the amendment.

Amendment 136 not moved.