European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Butler-Sloss
Main Page: Baroness Butler-Sloss (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Butler-Sloss's debates with the Department for Exiting the European Union
(4 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I cannot really think that that is how things will play out. Yesterday I heard that an agreement had been made, meaning that there would be no vote that evening. On the strength of that, I arranged to take my wife out for dinner at last. Then everything changed, and there was to be a vote— indeed, there were to be two votes. I slipped out before any of that happened to phone my wife and say, “Dinner’s off.” I simply make the plea that we distinguish between what is in the marriage contract and the conventions that we create for ourselves that help marriages, and other relationships, to flourish.
This is a convention; it is not a law. But in granting this convention and incorporating it in the Bill, we will improve the relationship between us and the people in the devolved Administrations. It is so simple. We have heard arguments about things being set in stone, and about the thin end of the wedge. Who remembers reading FM Cornford’s Microcosmographia Academica? One or two—these are the educated people. It was an argument about what happens in academic circles, where there is always a body of people who are resistant to change. They resist change on the grounds that it may be the thin end of the wedge, or set things in concrete, and all the other things I have been hearing in these wretched debates. Please let us realise that the softer acknowledgements of relationships, as well as the hard ones, help the debate, and the relationships, forward.
My Lords, I had not intended to speak, but over the last week I have listened to the various representatives of the devolved Administrations in this union of ours. Speaking as a totally English person, without any relationships in any of the three devolved areas—other than being married to an Ulsterman—I think that we English ought to be very careful and listen to what the devolved areas are saying to us. It was said earlier that the Government, and indeed many English people, might not really appreciate what devolution has meant. Perhaps it is time we did.
My Lords, I support the amendment, which would put in statutory form what has grown into an important convention. I would like clarification, which I failed to get in yesterday’s debate, regarding the breadth of the convention. I asked a specific question:
“will the Minister clarify and emphasise that legislative consent would normally be required for any regulation that would be brought in under this Act?”—[Official Report, 20/1/20; col. 958.]
I was referring in particular to Clause 21.
As I did not get satisfaction from the Minister’s reply, I repeated my question later, saying:
“I might be a slow learner, but, following the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I would like to know which specific points cannot be dealt with by a Section 109 order.”
A Section 109 order would be a consensual matter, as opposed to one imposed from Westminster. The Minister replied:
“I cannot give the noble and learned Lord the answer to that question, but I can give him the assurance, from speaking to my legal advisers, that in the negotiations that will unfold there will be areas that we think will be under discussion that might stand outside those areas I have touched on regarding Section 109 and the ability to direct Welsh Ministers.”—[Official Report, 20/1/20; col. 964.]
Perhaps now, after some more thought, the Front Bench can give the clarification that I required on how, from the viewpoint of Her Majesty’s Government, the convention would be implemented.
My Lords, I have put my name to this amendment. A few days ago, we discussed Clauses 21 and 26, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, which people called a constitutional outrage. This is far, far worse. As a constitutional issue, Clause 41(1) takes the Government into realms which, in the years that I have been in this House, I have never seen before.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, set out most of what I wanted to say, putting it rather better than I would have. There is not a great deal else to say, but if the Government are going to say, as I am sure they will, that they do not propose to use these powers, other than to a very limited extent, the short answer to that, speaking as a lawyer, is, “Why have them here?” Why put something so unbelievably wide, which could apply to any law enacted in the past until the end of this year, into the withdrawal Bill if they do not intend to use it?
As the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said, it is not his—or my—intention to get rid of this objectionable clause but purely to alleviate it, so that if the Government require to make such provision in consequence of the Bill, at least we can look at it. If the Commons can get over its majority of 80, it could look more critically at the legislation to see whether it is really what is wanted and look, with the affirmative resolution, at what is being offered by the Government. Therefore, I support the amendment. It needs to be brought forward to both this House and the other place, because this Clause 41 really is beyond belief.
My Lords, we have reached the final amendment. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for their comments and for setting out their positions. I understand the concern of noble Lords about the parliamentary procedure attached to the consequential power in Clause 41. We have already noted these concerns; noble Lords in other debates have raised them and we all read closely the reports of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee. I addressed many of these points last week, when I spoke to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tope. I hope today to provide similar reassurances to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. I agree with so many of his points on EU withdrawal, although perhaps not this one.
As noble Lords are aware, consequential powers are standard provisions in legislation, even legislation of great constitutional significance, such as the Scotland Act. If noble Lords look at Schedule 5 to the Bill, they will see that we have already included many of the consequential amendments required as a result of the Act. However, we also believe that we need a power to make further consequential provisions to the statute book.
I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, yesterday asked for assurance about why the consequential power in Clause 41 is subject to the negative procedure. I understand the noble Lord’s concern but reiterate that the power is limited to making amendments that are consequential to the contents of the Act. Its scope is very different from the powers discussed over the last 10 days by my noble friends Lady Williams and Lord Duncan, which will be used to implement the withdrawal agreement. It is in everyone’s interest that the statute book functions effectively. Moving the consequential provision to the affirmative procedure would frustrate the ability of departments to make the necessary consequential changes before exit day and could lead to legal uncertainty. I hope noble Lords agree with me that this is not the appropriate course of action.
This procedure is limited to giving Ministers the power to make regulations that are in consequence of the Act, like consequential powers in many other pieces of primary legislation. This power will be construed strictly by the courts. It can be used only to make amendments that are appropriate to legislation in consequence of something that the Act does. I am sure noble Lords agree that the use of the negative procedure does not prevent parliamentary scrutiny taking place. Members of this House will still have the opportunity to pray against regulations, should they consider them inappropriate, as is usual for regulations of this kind. I hope I have provided the necessary reassurances to the noble Lord and that, as a consequence, he is able to withdraw his amendment.