Police (Detention and Bail) Bill

Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford Excerpts

Thursday 7th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nicola Blackwood (Oxford West and Abingdon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz). As always, I agree with much of what he says, if not quite all.

I rise, of course, to speak in support of the Bill. It has yet to be made entirely clear to me exactly how it could have been thought appropriate to put public safety at risk for the sake of a literalist interpretation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 that flies in the face not only of the intentions of Parliament in passing the Act in the first place but of a full quarter-century of practice and interpretation of it by police, defence lawyers and judges up and down the country. Surely if Hansard could not have acted as a guide, case law might have served that purpose. I accept that sections 41 to 44 of the Act may leave the point unclear on the face of it, but given that parliamentary debates show the clear original intention that a suspect should be detained and questioned for 96 hours in total, rather than for only 96 hours following arrest, not to mention the precedent of 25 years of criminal law, one would have hoped for a little common sense, especially considering the stakes at hand.

As has been stated, Mr Justice McCombe was of the opinion that the consequences of his judgment were

“not as severe as might be feared”.

I am afraid that, as has also been pointed out, that was not the view of the chief constable of Essex, who is the ACPO lead on police bail, or of Commander Steve Bloomfield of the Met, who gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee on the subject on Tuesday. They are of the opinion that not only does the ruling throw into disarray the investigation and case management of the more than 80,000 suspects in this country who are currently on police bail, but it renders any conditions attached to that bail all but unenforceable.

That has deeply worrying public protection implications for victims and witnesses of violent crimes, and particularly for victims of domestic abuse. Suspects who have been arrested for domestic violence-related offences and released on bail are likely to have conditions attached to that bail, designed to protect their victim. In the absence of those conditions, the police have lost not only part of the time needed to investigate and build solid cases against violent offenders, but a tool used to protect victims and witnesses while they do it.

I know that ACPO has issued guidance to police forces on how to protect victims and witnesses in the short time that remains until the Bill is passed, but will the Minister give the House an assurance that the Home Office is doing everything it can to offer additional support to ensure that victim and witness protection is in no way compromised by this irresponsible judgment?

It is entirely appropriate, in this case, that the Bill is retrospective. In almost every other instance retrospective legislation would be controversial, but in this case I believe the Bill is intended merely to create continuity, not to create new taxes or offences. As I understand it, the retrospective nature of the Bill is necessary to ensure that no criminal cases or convictions that have proceeded in the gap between the initial judgment and the passing of the Bill are rendered unsafe. I wonder whether, in his winding-up speech, the Minister might be able to confirm that.

From looking into this issue, the only area of the bail system that seems to me to need further consideration that will be impossible within the context of the Bill is the issue of time limits and overly onerous conditions. At the moment there are no statutory time limits on bail, and there are uncertain guidelines for magistrates as to appropriate conditions to be placed on bail. As a result, a suspect could theoretically be left on bail indefinitely. Although I am aware that the Crown Prosecution Service must charge someone suspected of a summary offence within six months, it seems to me that the current system of indefinite bail should be considered in the context of wider policing and justice reforms in future.

I will close now, so that we can make progress. Needless to say, I think it is entirely appropriate that this emergency legislation has been brought forward today, to make it absolutely clear that the detention clock may be stopped by bail. It is not just a matter of convenience for the police; it is a matter of justice and public protection.

Bailing suspects while police continue investigations ensures that police are not pressured into premature or inappropriate charging that could result in all manner of miscarriages of justice. It means that police are not tempted to try to detain people for the maximum 96 hours needlessly, when release on bail would be more proportionate to the offence and would not pose any risk to the public. Most importantly, bailing suspects with conditions means that victims, witnesses and potential victims of violent offences can be better protected by the police while the case against an offender is investigated and a conviction secured. The Bill will help the police do their job better and keep the public safer, and as such it has my full support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

The liberty of the individual should be a matter for this place first and foremost, so the fact that this is emergency legislation should not be a cause of embarrassment or shame—it should be welcomed. Judges have an important role in interpreting the law. Their role is primarily to interpret rather than to enact. That is why I am entirely content that it is this place that will make the important decision about the ambit of police bail. It is not a matter for shame, but nor is it quite a matter for celebration, bearing in mind the fact this House is a busy place and we have a lot of work to do.

It should perhaps be a matter for quiet reflection that it is the primacy of the legislature that matters when it comes to fundamental issues of liberty—that is what we are dealing with today—and the constant balance that we have to maintain between liberty and the public interest in being protected from crime and its consequences, however minor or serious. I was glad to be reminded by the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson) about the sad anniversary that we have reached today.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Gareth Johnson), in his excellent contribution drawn from years of experience as a criminal practitioner, made some important practical points about the problems that would quickly come about if the House did not take swift action. The examples that he gave—including the identification procedure problem—were well made and do not need repeating by me. However, on a more fundamental level, one aspect that perhaps we have not emphasised today is the interests of the victims and witnesses of crime. In many cases, they give the police statements and then have to wait an inordinate length of time before they know the outcome of the case or are called to court to give evidence. That is one of the main problems encountered day in, day out by courts across the land when dealing with some of the delays caused by readmission to police bail by suspects, sometimes for an inordinate length of time.

The debate comes at an opportune moment because it gives us a chance to look at the whole ambit or spectrum of police bail, not only from the point of view of the suspect or the defence lawyer, but from the point of view of the victim of crime, the complainant or witness, waiting anxiously. In many cases, I have seen the frustration of judges when they hear that decisions about charge have been put off time and again, causing witnesses to lose heart or to lose interest. Sometimes cases fail at that final stage in court, and that is unforgiveable from a variety of perspectives, but most of all from the public interest perspective. That is why the points made today about limits on police bail were well made and deserve serious consideration as we proceed.

The challenge facing the court in Salford was one that the learned judge himself described in paragraphs 18 and 19 of his judgment as being of “limited application”. That was the view of the learned High Court judge, and it was a view that, on examination by Professor Zander, was challenged. A debate then began. Professor Zander is an eminent academic and has enjoyed a peon of praise today from hon. Members on both sides of the House—I am sure that he is enjoying every minute of it. It is thoroughly deserved, but I think that he would agree that to elevate his article to advice status would overplay it. In my view, he opened a welcome debate on the effects of the judgment. It is a debate that Mr Justice McCombe put himself on the other side of by dint of his remarks in paragraph 18 and 19. With respect to the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), it is a little trite to suggest that the consequences of the decision were set in stone some weeks ago. The position only became clear when that debate was initiated, and I think that the Government are to be congratulated on taking effective action.

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was seminal legislation. It was not drafted on the hoof, but put together after many months of careful work and input from all sections of those interested in the criminal justice system. It was a game-changer in so many important ways. It was progressive legislation that, at a stroke, made clear and transparent certain procedures that had often seemed in the police station obscure and frankly worrying not only to suspects but to police officers themselves. It was a Conservative Government—the noble Lord Brittan was Home Secretary and his Minister of State was the noble Lord Hurd—who steered that excellent legislation through the House. It has stood the test of time admirably.

As with all legislation scrutinised by the House, however, the 1984 Act might be found to be only human. I am reminded of the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood). She was right to say that the Act was silent on the effect of section 44. We all have to concede that. After Royal Assent, however, practitioners and everybody concerned with the process came to the assumption—the right assumption, I think—that the clock would stop and start as long as the suspect was in police detention, and that the concept of time was not absolute but relative to the time spent in detention. That was well understood by everybody in the system. For 25 years that assumption will have been made by practitioners from the humblest junior solicitor to the highest of High Court judges. They need make no apology for having done so.

[Nicola Blackwood]

To be clear, is it not the case that that assumption arose not out of thin air or a desire for convenience, but out of the fact that that was the intention made clear in parliamentary debates at the time?

[Mr Buckland]

That is indeed the case, as was helpfully set out in Professor Zander’s article, where he took the trouble to remind himself of the case of Pepper v. Hart, which allows judges to look at Hansard if there is any ambiguity about the intention of the legislature. Unlike the judge in the decision in question, he examined Hansard and found buried in the debates in what were then called Standing Committees—the predecessor title, as it were, of Public Bill Committees—a clear understanding on the part of all parties. It was the former Member for Birmingham, Ladywood, Miss Short, who tabled an amendment designed to ensure that the suspect would be detained for no more than 96 hours, and the then Minister of State, now the noble Lord Hurd, who responded. It was quite clear from that debate that there was an understanding that time would stop and start according to when the suspect was in detention.

With respect to the learned High Court judge, that debate would have assisted him in his deliberations and given him great comfort and support in coming to what we would all have regarded as a purposive decision—that is, a decision that would have given purpose to the intention of the legislators and reinforced a quarter of a century of practice. Sadly, we know that that was not the case, although we should hesitate before rushing to criticism of our judges. They have a tough job to do. They have to make decisions day in, day out. They are presented with a range of different scenarios and cases. I do not think that anyone should rush to criticise the judiciary in that respect because of one difficult case. However, I return to the point that I made at the beginning of my speech. I am glad that it is this place—this House—that is reinforcing and reiterating the law as we have all understood it to be, and which will now, in my submission, be put beyond any doubt whatever.

I know that voices outside this place have urged caution on us in rushing this legislation through, although a lot of their concerns have been addressed in the remarks made by other Members today, which I will not repeat. I have made some suggestions about the potential limitations on police bail—for example, in cases that do not involve a large amount of documentation or serious fraud—but I want to return to straightforward examples of cases involving violence or assault, where far too often, over-cautious lawyers have waited before charge for all the evidence to be gathered, including medical evidence. Frankly, my suggestion to them is to remember how we used to do it. We would charge and then gather the evidence as quickly as possible, to ensure that we did not lose the interest, enthusiasm and participation of prosecution witnesses along the way.

The coalition Government quite rightly restored the decision-making power for certain offences to the police. That was a wise decision, which I believe will allow minds to be focused in the police station when dealing with a range of less serious offences. That will leave more serious offences to be dealt with by the Crown Prosecution Service as part of the advice-before-charge procedure. At that stage, everybody needs to remember what we have said today in this House and elsewhere about the need for expedition and the need for good judgment to be exercised, even though all the evidence might not have been gathered.

I will draw my remarks to a close. I support giving the Bill its Second Reading, and I think that we as a House should be glad that such decisions are falling to us.