Sri Lanka

Baroness Berridge Excerpts

Thursday 12th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Naseby for securing this debate—and I declare an interest as project director for the Commonwealth Initiative for Freedom of Religion and Belief.

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Sri Lanka in 2013 helped to focus international attention on the human rights failures of previous Sri Lankan Governments, and the decision of the then Prime Minister David Cameron to attend was, I submit, correct as this international spotlight helped to form part of the driving forces that secured a peaceful transition of power in January and August 2015. Resolution 30/1 of the Human Rights Council came after this democratic transition of power, which saw an alliance of moderates from within the two largest parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United National Party, form a ruling coalition. The resolution stresses the importance of protecting the human rights of all Sri Lankans, regardless of ethnic and religious identity. That of course includes the right to freedom of religion and belief, as outlined in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN Sri Lankan Peacebuilding Priority Plan also stresses the importance of promoting and protecting the human rights of vulnerable peoples.

It is important to recognise the often underappreciated significance of religion to the conflict and the peace process in Sri Lanka. As Dr Rajesh Venugopal of the London School of Economics argues, both Tamil and Sinhalese national identities are bound to Hinduism and Buddhism respectively. Sri Lanka is one of only seven Buddhist majority countries in the world, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Bhutan, Laos and Mongolia, being the other six. Around 70% of the population identify as Buddhist. However, the country has sizeable religious minorities, with 12.6% identifying as Hindu, 9.7% as Muslim and 7.6% as Christian. Although Tamils are largely Hindu, it is less well known that Muslims and Christians are often seen as outsiders by both the Government and the Tamil militants, thereby suffering at the hands of both. As the Asia Foundation’s Sri Lanka Strategic Assessment 2016 argues, religious violence and hatred serves as a major barrier to securing a long-term peaceful Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan constitution currently protects freedom of religion or belief, in Article 10 of Chapter III, and the right to worship individually or as a group, in Article 14(1)(e) of Chapter III. However, under the previous Government, freedom of religion and belief was eroded because of the tacit acceptance by the state of extreme Buddhist sects which propagate an exclusive image of Sri Lankan identity as solely Buddhist, with non- Buddhists as “others”, whose loyalty and citizenship should be in question. Ultra-nationalist Sinhalese Buddhist organisations, such as Bodu Bala Sena, were able to spread hatred towards both Muslims and Christians with impunity. In April 2014, BBS raided an interfaith press conference and no action was taken by the authorities. Also in 2014, there was a nationwide BBS anti-halal campaign, which contributed to the toxic environment of religious hatred and, arguably, to the anti-Muslim Aluthgama riots, during which at least four people were killed, 80 injured and 10,000 displaced. The then Government responded by ordering a media blackout and, at the Human Rights Council in June that year, blamed Muslims for the riots.

There is evidence, however, of a change in the response to such events. On 26 September—less than a month ago—a mob of hard-line nationalists led by Buddhist monks attacked a UN shelter for Rohingya Muslim refugees in Colombo. The Cabinet spokesman, Rajitha Senaratne, was unequivocal in his condemnation the following day, saying:

“As a Buddhist I am ashamed at what happened … this is not what Buddha taught”.


The refugees were quickly moved to a safe location and the Government have now arrested nine people. It is so good—but all too unusual—to hear of such prompt action by a Government that had previously stood by and watched. I am grateful to Dr Rajesh Venugopal from LSE for bringing this to my attention.

Secondly, the change in government has shown a marked decrease in violence towards Christians. A report published by Verité in 2015 highlighted that the average number of attacks carried out against Christians had declined from one every week between 1994 and 2014 to roughly one every two weeks since 2015. This is, again, a change to be commended. But Sri Lanka has also faced challenges over the practice of conversion, with many religious groups complaining of Buddhists and Hindus being converted to Christianity through alleged material and spiritual inducements. In 2015, the opposition JHU put forward a Bill that would have contravened international standards on the right of people to convert. It is another encouraging sign that Sri Lanka was able to protect the individual’s right to freedom of religion and belief and to change religion by resisting such draconian legislation.

Can the Minister confirm whether Her Majesty’s Government have taken this opportunity to make positive representations to the Sri Lankan Government, commending their response to this most recent attack on Rohingya refugees, and confirm if they have considered whether this example beginning to be set by Sri Lanka of a Buddhist majority Government working to protect religious minorities could become best practice to promote? Such encouragement is crucial because the Sri Lankan Government still have much ground to cover to tackle the remaining significant structural and societal challenges to sustained religious harmony in Sri Lanka. A Minority Rights Group report in 2016 sadly found that harassment and intimidation of both Muslims and Christians, although decreasing—as I have outlined—was still commonplace. While the new Government restricted the space for groups such as BBS, it has continued to spread vicious hatred towards Muslims online. Between November 2015 and September 2016, there were 14 incidents in which Christian establishments were forced to close by local officials using the unconstitutional 2008 government circular, which stipulated that new places of worship must be approved by the then Ministry of Religious Affairs. The MRG report has also shown that local police and local officials still often refuse to record the complaints of or assist Christian pastors and communities who have been harassed by Buddhist extremists.

The excellent work begun by the Sri Lankan Government to foster religious unity, freedom and tolerance, although incomplete, should be supported. At present, outside of disaster relief, DfID has only one active programme in Sri Lanka, which is of course focused on removing landmines. This is clearly important, but there is a need to support the Sri Lankan Government’s effort to confront these elements of Buddhist extremism. I would be grateful to know from my noble friend whether looking at this Buddhist extremism is part of Her Majesty’s Government’s counterextremism work within the FCO. Sadly, such erroneous theology is part of the backdrop to the recent plight of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and urgently needs addressing.

As Jonathan Goodhand of SOAS argues, religious leaders in Sri Lanka are ideally placed to cross political, ethnic and religious boundaries to promote a culture of inclusivity and tolerance. Successful interfaith projects, such as Equitas supported by the Canadian Government, reach over 3,000 people and conduct vital research into the issues faced by religious minorities in Sri Lanka. Similarly, the Karuna Centre for Peacebuilding, with US government support, brings together over 80 Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim and Christian religious leaders in Sri Lanka’s troubled eastern province to build trust and common ground as peacebuilders. I am not naive: there are still grave problems and much needs to be done. However, I know that my noble friend the Minister is passionate about freedom of religion and belief, and it is encouraging to report the emergence of some rare good news in that country. Therefore, I hope my noble friend can outline whether staff from DfID or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Magna Carta Fund for Human Rights and Democracy will visit these projects to see whether we can establish programmes using best practice. As I say, perhaps such best practice programmes are transferable or useful in the context of what we are seeing in Myanmar and other countries.