Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

Baroness Anelay of St Johns Excerpts

Thursday 22nd April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the International Relations and Defence Committee, which I chair, has discussed the proposals in the integrated review. My comments today reflect the views expressed on just three issues.

We welcome the drive to achieve better co-ordination and consistency between Britain’s international departments. Foreign policy should balance the interests and values of the UK. That objective is evident in the Government’s overall approach—[Inaudible]— prosperity, security and democracy. We feel, however, that the review itself is too broad-brush, failing sufficiently to prioritise and give a clear indication of where and when the UK will expend both time and resources. That is even more vital at a time when the Government have decided to break the UK’s statutory commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA. The review states:

“We will continue to support stability in Afghanistan, as part of a wider coalition”


and:

“Under persistent engagement, our armed forces will continue to … provide support to the Government of Afghanistan”.


In the light of the announcement that UK troops will leave Afghanistan in September, plus the reduction in ODA spend, what are the consequences for the Government’s commitments in the review? What priority will the Government give to support for the Afghan Government?

We are also concerned by a lack of consistency in sections of the report. The tilt to the Indo-Pacific was heavily briefed before publication, but the review identifies Russia, not China, as

“the most acute direct threat to the UK”.

There are some standard lines on support for NATO and European partners, but the review offers little on the importance of working alongside like-minded countries with which we share a neighbourhood. As economic pressures build, of course we understand why the Government are rushing towards an Indo-Pacific focus and new partners further afield. However, it is essential to nurture our alliances with nearer friends too.

There is also a lack of consistency in the approach to relations with countries in Africa. The regions of Africa prioritised in the review are not consistent with the Government’s evidence given to our committee about their strategic approach focusing on security in the Sahel. There is a glancing reference to the Sahel in half a sentence and two brief mentions of Mali, but that is it. We are not given reasons for the change in focus. It is east Africa which is prioritised; this is new. The case for closer engagement in east Africa would not be difficult to make, but the Government simply do not do so.

A final matter of concern is the decision to increase the UK’s nuclear stockpile. There could hardly be a worse time to do so, just months before the RevCon of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. If there is a plausible rationale for that significant policy change, perhaps based on maintaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, the Government should make that case. They have not. Their decision undermines Britain’s leverage to encourage other nuclear weapon states to exercise restraint in their modernisation programmes.

I hope that the more detailed plans which should surely flow from the review will focus better on prioritisation and resourcing to deliver the Government’s ambitions for a global Britain. We all need that to happen.