Social Security (Up-rating of Benefits) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Altmann
Main Page: Baroness Altmann (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Altmann's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interests as in the register. I would also like to put on record my thanks to my noble friend the Minister and her officials for the very helpful and thoughtful engagement that she has had on this topic with interested Peers.
This is the fourth time since 2014 that legislation for uprating of pensions is being changed, yet this time there is no impact assessment or explanation of the impact on pensioner poverty. We are being asked to approve this—the House of Commons already has—before knowing what the CPI figure that may well be used instead of the 2.5% figure will be. I echo concerns about this setting a dangerous precedent.
However, I would like to help my noble friend, her department and all in your Lordships’ House, including the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, to see that this legislation is based on a false premise and is unnecessary. It is simply not the case that this Bill is needed to avoid an 8%-plus increase in the state pension or the pension credit. Section 150A of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 requires the Secretary of State to consider “earnings”, but the law does not define this term.
The ONS has already very helpfully produced an adjusted figure to take account of the base effects from last year and the exceptional impact of the pandemic on average weekly earnings, which is the traditional measure that has been used for uprating. It has also estimated the composition effect. It has come up with an adjusted earnings figure in the range of 3.2% to 4.4%. My noble friend from the Front Bench has already suggested that the CPI figure that will be released next week could be around 3.3%.
Using the adjusted earnings figure could avoid this—draconian, in my view—legislation, which tears up years of protection for pensioners and breaks a manifesto commitment. I am sure that those of us on these Benches are particularly concerned about that. Using the adjusted earnings figure would still potentially allow significant cost savings of £3 billion or more relative to using the unadjusted earnings figure, which, as I have tried to explain, is not necessary.
We hear that this is for only one year and that there may well be a restoration of the earnings link. However, the triple lock—I agree with noble Lords who have already mentioned this—is not an ideal uprating mechanism in any case, especially since the new state pension. It is the 2.5% figure that is the anomaly; it has no social or economic justification. Yet we are being asked to remove the earnings link, which I am convinced from many years of working on pensions policy is the most important part of pension uprating, because the 2.5% figure was used last year.
The UK state pension is hardly a king’s ransom. It is the lowest in the OECD, as the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, explained, and still below the 1979 levels, relative to average earnings. Millions of pensioners have no or very little income other than the state pension. Indeed, the pension credit designed for the poorest pensioners has always been uprated only by average earnings; it has never been triple-locked. The triple lock was a political construct that did not properly protect the poorest pensioners, yet here we are being asked to remove the earnings protection from the pension credit.
We have been down this road before. In 1979 Mrs Thatcher removed the earnings link from the basic state pension. As others have said, at that time it was worth 26% or so of average earnings. Subsequent to that, in 2010 it was worth 16% of average earnings. At the time there was some justification for removing the earnings link because we introduced a very generous state earnings-related pension, so that could carry the earnings uprating for pensioners.
The state earnings-related pension scheme, subsequently replaced by the state second pension, did provide earnings protection for many pensioners. However, millions—particularly the poorest pensioners, the lowest earners and mostly women—do not have the earnings-related bit of the state pension because they were not credited into it, they were not in the labour force long enough, they were caring for others, and so on.
We are therefore left looking at the basic state pension, the pension credit and the new state pension in this Bill because the additional parts are uprated only by prices, which is appropriate as they are mostly earnings-linked anyway. I argue that we are setting a very dangerous precedent if we fail to recognise the importance of protecting the poorest pensioners against falling behind the rest of society in earnings.
Let me give some figures. Average earnings are £540 per week. The basic state pension, after the triple-lock increases since the 2011 changes, which I supported at the time, is now £137.60 per week. The new state pension, which was brought in to encompass and incorporate the earnings-related bit of the state pension and the basic state pension for future pensioners, is now £179.60 per week. The pension credit, which the poorest and usually oldest pensioners rely on, is £177.10. We are not talking about well-off pensioners here.
We are now debating not increasing the state pension, their pension or the pension credit in line with average earnings, as adjusted by the ONS. This breaks a triple promise to pensioners. Breaking the triple lock, as proposed in the Bill, breaks only one of those promises. From the triple lock it retains the prices commitment and the 2.5% commitment—although I find that figure difficult to justify—but it breaks three promises: first, the triple-lock manifesto commitment, a political promise; secondly, the legal commitment to increase pensions at least in line with earnings; and thirdly, the legal commitment to increase pension credit at least in line with earnings.
We could still honour all these promises without the risks that this legislation entails if we used the adjusted figure. I urge my noble friend on the Front Bench, her department and noble Lords in this House to see what the CPI figure is when it is released next week. If, as expected, it is around the 3.3% level, I urge them to bear it in mind and to recognise that using the adjusted earnings figure would be a better way to amend legislation. It could, perhaps, be explicitly stated in primary legislation that the earnings index used should be at the discretion of the Secretary of State and could be adjusted in exceptional circumstances. I also urge my noble friend to consider the dangers of taking this protection away from pension credit.
Finally, I echo the call for a formal, comprehensive review of pensioner benefits and uprating to assess the triple lock, including the retention of the minimum 2.5%, and for rolling tax-free benefits such as winter fuel payments into a higher state pension which would then be taxable. This would allow us to avoid this constant round of having to amend legislation because previous commitments to uprating had caused problems.
I hope that we will be able to improve this Bill. I am very much looking forward to hearing the words of my noble friends Lady Stroud and Lord Freud on the issue of the uprating to universal credit.
I thank the noble Baroness for pointing out the clarification on her previous colleague, Steve Webb. I will certainly write to her and, later, I will come on to the issue of gaining Royal Assent by November.
Let me turn to my noble friends Lord Freud and Lady Stroud. I thank my noble friend Lord Freud for the passion and knowledge with which he speaks. I pay tribute to his achievements as Minister for Welfare Reform. I must, however, reiterate that the Bill does not concern benefits linked to prices, such as universal credit—but thank God we had universal credit when the pandemic came. We will be for ever in the noble Lord’s debt for making that happen. If I may say so, we will also be for ever in the debt of Baroness Hollis for the challenge that she provided in that; we all miss her.
In answer to my noble friend’s question, making the uplift payment permanent would cost £6 billion; this is the equivalent of adding 1p to the basic rate of income tax, in addition to an increase of 3p in fuel duty.
I have been really pleased to engage with my noble friend Lady Stroud. We have worked together on many projects, and I have found our conversations really useful and helpful. I know that she has strong views on the universal credit uplift, and that dialogue will continue. As I said, the Bill is very short and not concerned with benefits—I do not say that to annoy people—so the Government would not encourage her to try to draw a false link between the two separate matters. Again, the universal credit uplift was always intended to be temporary.
Lastly, I remind noble Lords of the need for Royal Assent by 22 November. This will allow the Secretary of State to conduct a statutory review using the new powers in time for the DWP to meet its hard deadline of 26 November for reprogramming its computer systems, to ensure that the new rates of benefit and pensions are payable from April 2022. Any delay to this Royal Assent deadline will result in the review being completed under existing legislation committing the Government to uprate by at least 8.3%, which would not be fair to the current and future generations of taxpayers.
Can my noble friend clarify that the existing legislation permits the use of an alternative measure to 8.3%, and that the Secretary of State has discretion to choose to use a figure from the ONS that reflects the adjustment to earnings that the Bill is trying to ex out?
My noble friend has made this point on a number of occasions; other noble Baronesses and noble Lords have too. Before I bang a nail in, I think it is best that I write to noble Lords about that to make sure it is absolutely clear on that basis. I hope they will accept that.
My noble friends Lord Shinkwin and Lady Stroud raised the issue of a UC uplift impact assessment. The legislation enacting the temporary uplift, including its eventual removal, was approved by both Houses. No impact assessment was conducted when the uplift was introduced, as it was by law a temporary measure, as I have already said. No assessment was conducted on the reversion to the underlying rates of universal credit.
Do I have only 20 minutes for this? No? Okay, I am in charge. We will not be here for another half an hour. I want to pay respect to everybody, but I certainly do not want to abuse the House’s good will.
I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, will take this in the spirit in which it is meant: I thank him for the master class in economics. I hope the Chancellor will read Hansard, and I am sure he will be in touch if he wants to take it further.