(6 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes, there is certainly merit in that idea. It is true that some of the amendments take some of the specific actions that may be taken a little further than is suggested in amendment 7. However, whichever of the amendments one wishes to pin the first-place rosette on to, the key point is that vulnerable customers need to have proper protection as the tariff cap comes forward.
It is in the Government’s interests, I think, to clarify exactly what they intend the Bill to do regarding that protection. That can easily be done by the Minister clearly stating today, as I hope she will, that vulnerable customers will not lose the current safeguard tariff as the overall tariff cap comes in. Indeed, if the overall price cap consumes the safeguard tariff, vulnerable customers could see their prices could go up by more than £30 as a result of the difference between the safeguard and the absolute tariff. That would, as I am sure she will agree, be a perverse outcome that she would be anxious to disavow.
The Minister will have to clarify for us that the Bill means that Ofgem can bring forward the extended safeguard tariff at the same time as the standard variable tariff cap; that the extended safeguard tariff can continue after the absolute cap has ended; and that she will bring forward the necessary secondary legislation before the summer to enable the data sharing needed to extend the safeguard tariff. I am sure that she will be able to reassure us on these points. I look forward to what she has to say about all the amendments before us.
Amendment 8 seeks to introduce to the Bill the symmetry in architecture that appears to be missing from what Ofgem must consider in introducing the cap. As hon. Members can see, the Bill lists a number of matters to which Ofgem should have regard in setting the cap, which relate to
“protecting existing and future domestic customers who pay standard variable and default rates”.
However, when we cast our eyes forward in the Bill, we see that those conditions are wholly absent from the matters that Often is required to consider when it reports to Government on whether circumstances exist that allow the cap to be terminated, as it is required to do by clauses 7 and 8.
Indeed, there is no guidance in the Bill at all on what Ofgem will have to take into account, except, alarmingly, for one consideration: the extent to which progress has been made in installing smart meters, a provision that, if taken too literally, might mean that the cap will be with us until the end of 2023. Our amendment essentially seeks to place in the outbox—the point at which Ofgem reviews the expiry of the cap—the same considerations that it is required to pay attention to in its inbox when it sets the cap.
Finally, we seek in new clause 1 to start the process of introducing what needs to be in place to ensure that the market works well for customers and does not recreate the anomalies that have led us to where we are today. I have no doubt that there will be a number of such provisions, but in our view one of them should be that the arrangement of tariffs by energy companies should not continue as it is.
That is also the substance of amendment 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), whom I salute for his unflagging work in bringing the idea of a price cap to this point. He introduces in his amendment the suggestion that tariffs should have a piece of elastic on them for each company, to prevent companies from introducing customers to apparently low tariffs initially, only to place them on much higher tariffs when the first offer expires and relying on their loyalty to gain a lot of profit and cause an unfair outcome for customers. That is essentially the instrument that his amendment would introduce, but it is cast as a relative price cap. We do not think it is a satisfactory mechanism for a price cap, but he will no doubt argue his corner. The relative nature of a tariff range restriction means that it can be introduced at any price and is not therefore a cap as such. It is, however, a vital means of keeping prices and fair dealings with customers on a steady trajectory.
The Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee heard an overwhelming amount of evidence opposed to a relative price cap. Can the hon. Gentleman explain why he rejects that evidence and has tabled this new clause?
The hon. Lady is, I think, under the impression that the new clause seeks to introduce a relative price cap. It does not seek to do that at all, or indeed during the period when an absolute price cap is in place. When the absolute price cap has come to an end, which could happen on various dates, there should be a mechanism in place to ensure that tariff differentiation is within certain bounds—I mentioned having a piece of elastic on tariffs—so that companies cannot return to the practice that unfortunately exists today whereby they can take people on board on one particular tariff, and even introduce a discount tariff for a certain period to entice people on to it, and then place people on one of their highest tariffs when that one comes to an end. It is a long piece of elastic in that case. That disadvantages the customer and is not what they thought would happen when they first went on to that tariff, and it seems thoroughly laudable to prevent that.
We need to ensure that market mechanisms are in place to prevent us from returning to where we are at present and to the situation that got us into this position in the first place. We believe that the mechanism for a relative tariff differential has a different function entirely from the relative price cap being suggested in some quarters. I think we would all agree that a relative tariff differential is not a price cap in its own right, as the Select Committee concluded strongly, but a strong mechanism for ensuring that the market works better in future.