Repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011

Anne Main Excerpts

Thursday 23rd October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

That is an important point, and I endorse very much what my hon. Friend has said.

The arrangements in the Act are effectively a stitch-up, just as they were when we first considered the Bill back in 2010. I am glad to note that section 7 contains a requirement for the Prime Minister to hold a review, and only MPs can sit on the Committee that will review this Act. The fact that the Lords had to insist on that provision demonstrates that the Government would not have got the Bill through had they not made that arrangement. The whole thing is effectively in suspension anyway, and it is therefore a natural consequence of the limbo that this unfortunate and unacceptable enactment has put in place that the Act is up for repeal, subject to what is decided in 2020. I believe that it should be reviewed much sooner than that, and I am speaking in this debate because I very much endorse the proposals of my hon. Friends the Members for Gainsborough and for South Dorset (Richard Drax).

On 24 November 2010 I said—and I stand by this:

“What does such innovation say about the coalition? It certainly demonstrates its determination to stack the cards firmly in favour of the coalition and the Whips.”

I said the Act was

“not modernising, but is a reactionary measure. It is not progress, but a step backwards, along the primrose path, undermining the constitutional principles that have governed our conventions and been tested over many centuries. The proposal has been conjured out of thin air, for the ruthless purpose of maintaining power irrespective of the consequences…we are supposed to be “Working together in the national interest—”

that was the theme of the moment—

“I fear that on this Bill, on this matter, we are working together against the national interest.”—[Official Report, 24 November 2010; Vol. 519, c. 318-9.]

What are the consequences of what we are now considering? The Fixed-term Parliaments Act is still in place and it should be repealed. Clearly it will not be repealed before the end of this fixed term, but I wish to dwell on a number of points that have been raised. I freely acknowledge that some of these arguments, which have not been given general circulation, were put forward by Lord Norton of Louth. I mentioned him in an intervention on the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), Chair of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. I hope that his Committee asked Lord Norton for his views, with which I entirely agree, and I will encapsulate them.

Lord Norton makes the point that there are real problems with the 2011 Act, and that fixed-term Parliaments limit rather than enhance voter choice. That is the real problem. I tabled an amendment on the confidence motion and the 14 days—I do not need to go into that now because it was not accepted although the vote was quite close with only about 50 in it. I tabled an amendment to the arrangements that were being proposed at the time, and it certainly evoked an interesting and lively debate. My concern was that the whole parade that would take place within the 14 days, including the confidence motion and its arrangements, would be very much governed by powerful whipping to ensure that people fell into line with what the Government wanted. I was concerned that there would be a constant stream of people walking up and down Whitehall, just as we saw on television screens when the coalition was being put in place, and that the people who would make the final decision on the final wording about the holding of a confidence motion—including an affirmation after 14 days that the House had confidence in the Government—would not only be driven by the Whips, but would exclude the voters. Surely that is the real point. Why are we here? Who elects us? It is not our House of Parliament or our Government: it is the voters’. If things have gone completely awry and there is a case for an early election, as prescribed by the Act, the simple principle is that we should go back to the voters. We should not have a stitch-up within the Government, with the Whips making certain that people vote accordingly.

Fixed-term Parliaments limit rather than enhance voter choice. The outcome of one election cannot be undone until the end of the stipulated term. One Government could collapse and inter-party bargaining could produce another. In those circumstances, voters would be denied the opportunity to endorse what amounts to a new Government. That is a fatal position for us to have adopted. It is so undemocratic. Indeed, an unstable and ineffective Government may stagger on without achieving anything—we heard remarks to that effect from the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Austin Mitchell).

In 1991, the then Leader of the House of Lords, Lord Waddington put it thus:

“Is it better for a government unable to govern to go to the country to try to obtain a new mandate or for the same government to spend their time fixing up deals in which the unfortunate electorate has no say whatsoever? The people not the parties should decide who governs.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 May 1991; Vol. 529, c. 260.]

What wise words. In essence, fixed-term Parliaments rob the system of our hallowed flexibility and limit voter choice. That choice is limited by this Act.

Although the policy of the Liberal Democrats was for four-year Parliaments—I concede that—agreement was reached quickly in May 2010 for a five-year term, and the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr Laws), who has written about that period, indicated that the object of the Act was to allow time to implement plans before worrying about the timing of the electoral cycle. But five-year terms mean that the voters have fewer opportunities than before to go to the polls, and most post-war Parliaments have not gone their maximum length—now a five-year term is an absolute requirement.

[Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that by having a maximum length—which is not the norm, as most Parliaments lasted slightly under four years—the voters are denied the right to say what they think about policies and perhaps change their mind sooner rather than later?

[Sir William Cash]

As ever, my hon. Friend makes huge sense. These are simple questions. It is not an abstract, theoretical argument: it is about the simple question of whether, if the Government are ineffective or have gone badly wrong, they should be kept together with Sellotape because they satisfy the requirements to stay in a coalition—which is itself a stitch-up—under a provision in an Act of Parliament. As I wrote to the Prime Minister in my letter of 10 May 2010, that will work against the interests of voters and, effectively, the national interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I do not accept that proposition, but we do not have time to go through all the implications. I also completely repudiate his suggestion of a written constitution, and I suspect what the hon. Gentleman has just said has something to do with that.

The revelations by the right hon. Member for Yeovil about the coalition negotiations also implicitly accepted the argument that fixed-term Parliaments facilitate long election campaigns. That is where we are now. We are in an election campaign already, and questions arise about the amount of money that is being generated for financing purposes. That is a practical objection, the realities of which we are seeing as I speak. MPs are not expected to be very visible in Westminster during this Session, and I need only look at the Opposition Benches to see that only two Opposition Members are listening to this debate.

As was made clear in evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, knowing well in advance when the next election will take place encourages Governments to manipulate the economic cycle to their maximum advantage. That is a not unknown characteristic of Chancellors of the Exchequer, and we will have the autumn statement soon. But that substantial question has to be addressed.

The Act was a consequence of the need to build trust between coalition partners, and that is clear from all the books that have been written about the stitching up of the coalition. There was no agreement by the Conservative party that I would regard as proper agreement. As my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough said, we had a meeting at which we were told certain things about what was going on between the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats, and there was some doubt about that, if I may put it that way.

[Mrs Main]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the public made no mention of their desire for a fixed-term Parliament when we were out campaigning?

[Sir William Cash]

That is true. There was no consultation or any attempt to discuss the implications for the voters. The negotiators were not particularly well versed in constitutional arrangements and the Act did not do what its short title suggests. In fact, the Act provides for semi-fixed terms. It includes provisions that allow early elections in certain circumstances, so to call it a fixed-term Parliament is a misnomer. Certain procedures would allow an early election. It is just that the circumstances that would enable that early election would be stitched up—as was the original coalition. They would enable early elections, but to what extent would the voters be involved? That is essentially undemocratic, and it also gives false hope that voter choice may not be as limited as under strict fixed-term provisions.

An election can be triggered if a vote of no confidence is carried against the Government and, within 14 days, a new Government is unable to carry a vote of confidence, or if two thirds of all MPs vote for an early election. It can also be triggered if everyone agrees on the need for an early election, but that seems extremely improbable. It is difficult to imagine when the idea of two-thirds of all MPs voting for an early election could ever be employed. Parties are hardly likely to vote for an early election if the opinion polls are not propitious. A Government could seek an early election by engineering a vote of no confidence in themselves, but, for heaven’s sake, if that were to be the case—I have had that put forward as quite a serious proposal—it is hardly likely to promote the reputation of, and confidence in, the parliamentary system.

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act says nothing about what happens where a Government implode and then resign but the provisions in the Act are not triggered. We would then be in what has been described as the Belgian situation—Parliament continuing without a Government being in existence. I believe profoundly that the Act is an aberration. I think it is wrong. I think it is undemocratic. I think it requires repeal. I am aware that there is provision for it potentially to be repealed in 2020 under section 7, but it should happen much sooner, and as soon as possible.