Helicopters (North Sea)

Anne Begg Excerpts

Wednesday 27th November 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Doran]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for those remarks—I promise I did not pay him.

There are many reasons why an inquiry is necessary, but I will focus on three principal reasons. First, the relationship between the oil industry and the helicopter industry needs to be considered in some detail. The Competition Commission carried out an inquiry into the industry in 2003 and recognised at that time:

“Oil companies are much larger and commercially stronger organisations than the helicopter operators”,

and

“oil companies had become more determined to force down their supply costs.”

That statement is accurate, but it is an understatement of the true position. The contracts reached by the oil industry with helicopter and other service companies are very one-sided. The contractor has obligations for a period. In the case of the helicopter operators, it is usually for five years, whereas the oil majors can change the contract terms at any time. When the oil price dips, oil companies look at their supply contracts. In the late 1990s, when the oil price was consistently low, many supply chain companies, including helicopter operators, had their contracted prices cut severely. In one helicopter company with which I had discussions, the cut was 20%. Something similar happened five or six years ago when the oil price dropped again. The practice is common in the North sea, but it is very difficult to see how a helicopter company, when its prices are cut without notice to that extent, can respond and at the same time maintain the maintenance and other costs that are crucial to the safety of the service.

I do not know whether the Civil Aviation Authority is aware of that practice. It should be, because significant cuts in income and elsewhere could severely restrict an operator’s ability to maintain safe standards. We should all know whether the CAA takes into account the huge imbalance between the oil industry client and the helicopter operators.

Given the importance of the transport industry in the North sea, it does not seem appropriate, at least to me, that the helicopter companies are treated in exactly the same way as any other supplier. The service is far too important. The huge imbalance between the oil and gas companies and the helicopter contractors should not be allowed to prejudice safety. The relationship should be subjected to the most intense scrutiny. Given the recent international agreement with Iran, a drop in the oil price is foreseeable when Iranian oil comes back into the market. It is worth emphasising that as a good example of how volatile the oil price can be.

The second issue to consider is the significant disparity in how different helicopter companies operate, particularly in how helicopters are maintained, the training of engineers and other staff and company cultures generally. I have spoken with a number of employees of different companies, and it is clear that training regimes, the number of flight hours and procedures vary considerably between companies. This is not the place to go into that in detail, but the available evidence suggests that the CAA should be taking a stricter line in its scrutiny of individual companies, their practices and their safety culture.

[Dame Anne Begg (Aberdeen South) (Lab)]

Is not the reason why there has to be a much more wide-ranging inquiry into helicopter safety, rather than the individual inquiries that go on when something has gone wrong, that we should look to see what is the best regime for helicopter companies to apply to both their work force and their maintenance regime?

[Mr Doran]

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. There is a huge issue about the advice and recommendations that the regulator makes and how they are implemented.

The third area of concern also relates to the companies, and it is about how the CAA regulates the industry. Individual companies have different practices for checks and maintenance during operating hours, which are usually from 7 am to 7 pm. There should be a benchmark of best practice that is rigorously enforced.

In the past, one or more helicopter operators have attempted to develop a gold standard in safety in all aspects of the operation, but those efforts usually fail because of the fear of being undercut, or because of actually being undercut, by a competitor. I understand, however, that all three of the companies currently providing a service in the North sea are meeting to see whether they can agree on improved practices that they will all share. That is a move in the right direction, but it prompts the question why the CAA did not take the initiative a long time ago and insist on a gold standard across the board.

In the correspondence that I have had with the Department, the focus of Minister’s responses has been on the most recent incident, which was the crash of 23 August 2013. Of course, that incident prompted my involvement, but I was concerned with the whole history of transport in the North sea, and in particular the experience over the past four years. It is worth looking at some of the incidents in detail.

In 1992, a helicopter crashed in the North sea from the Cormorant Alpha platform. There were 11 fatalities. The weather conditions, the fact that it was night-time, poor visibility and so on were major contributors to the accident. As a result of that disaster, the CAA introduced operating policies to improve the management of helicopter operations in adverse weather conditions.

On 27 December 2006, an Aerospatiale SA365N helicopter crashed near the North Morecambe gas platform. The investigation found:

“The co-pilot was flying an approach to the North Morecambe platform at night, in poor weather conditions, when he lost control of the helicopter”.

The air accidents investigation branch recommended that the CAA ensure that personnel who are required to conduct weather observations from offshore installations are suitably trained, qualified and provided with equipment that can accurately measure the cloud base and visibility.

On 18 February 2009, a Eurocopter EC 225 LP Super Puma crashed into the North sea close to the ETAP—eastern trough area project—platform. Again, the major findings of the AAIB inquiry included the impact of reduced visibility in the immediate vicinity of the ETAP platform as a major contributory factor. The safety recommendation that it made to the CAA was that the guidance in the CAA’s relevant publication should be re-emphasised—I underline that—implying that it was not being followed properly in the industry.

On 23 August 2013, a helicopter crashed into the North sea off Sumburgh. We do not have the full AAIB report on the incident, but it is clear that the weather conditions and visibility were very poor. I cannot say for certain that this latest incident was linked to the others that I have mentioned. However, I and the pilots I have spoken to believe that all four incidents, from the Cormorant Alpha through to the incident this year, are linked by the impact of poor weather and visibility.

As I have mentioned, since 1992 there has been a specific recommendation drawing attention to the need for suitably trained and qualified staff, with appropriate equipment to measure the cloud base and visibility. That was repeated by the AAIB in more detail in 2006. Since 1992, there have been at least two failures and perhaps three in the implementation of that recommendation. That raises again the question of how the CAA ensures that its recommendations are being properly implemented. It does not seem that it operates with a hands-on approach.

I have deliberately focused on major areas of concern, and my approach may seem unfair, particularly to the oil industry and to the CAA. There are many positives that I could have raised in both cases, but my objective is fairly simple. The Government, in the shape of the Department for Transport, have a responsibility. There are serious issues to be addressed in the North sea transport system. They cannot be properly addressed with the piecemeal approach that is being adopted at the moment. In particular, the role of the regulator needs to be considered. The CAA should not and cannot be expected to review its own performance. The situation demands a full public inquiry.

The Secretary of State for Scotland, in a recent press interview, said that the Government’s approach would be faster and better, particularly for the families of victims. I do not think that the families of the victims of the 2009 crash, who have waited nearly five years for their fatal accident inquiry, would agree. The Secretary of State also said that a public inquiry would be too expensive. The Piper Alpha inquiry looked into the whole safety regime on offshore installations and produced a comprehensive report that is now the benchmark for safety in the oil and gas industry around the world. The value of that is incalculable.

I asked the Department of Energy and Climate Change what the Piper Alpha inquiry cost. To say the least, I was a little disappointed in the reply:

“The Department has checked internal records and with The National Archives, but we have been unable to locate any documents relating to the cost of the inquiry.”—[Official Report, 25 November 2013; Vol. 571, c. 14W.]

That came as a bit of a surprise to me, because it was a very high-profile inquiry.

However, I did manage to dig out, again with the help of the Library, a question asked by the late Donald Dewar of the then Secretary of State for Scotland, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). According to the answer, the cost of the inquiry was estimated to be—this was before the inquiry had completely finished—about £3 million. That is fairly cheap, given the scope and length of the inquiry. The Library tells me that in today’s money it is about £5.7 million. I checked the cost of a Super Puma helicopter, which I thought would be of some interest. It is $18 million, which is roughly £11 million, so for the price of one Super Puma, we could have two Cullen inquiries.

I understand why Ministers may have some inhibitions about the costs of a public inquiry, particularly in these austere times, but also because one or two have swallowed up a lot of public money. However, the issues in this case are fairly straightforward and focused. I would expect the inquiry to be shorter than the Piper Alpha one and, in relative terms, cheaper.

A number of inquiries have been set up, including one by the CAA working with the Norwegian CAA and the European Aviation Safety Agency. There is also the likely oil industry independent inquiry. The fatal accident inquiry into the 2009 crash, which I have mentioned, is due to commence on 6 January next year. I repeat: it is a disgrace that the families have had to wait for nearly five years for that. At some future date, an August 2013 fatal accident inquiry will be required, and of course the Select Committee on Transport has announced an inquiry.

Although I am sure that each of those inquiries will be useful, they are not the inquiry that is necessary. I strongly believe that what the industry needs is a full inquiry into every aspect of the offshore transport industry, similar to the Piper Alpha inquiry. I believe that nothing else will restore the confidence of the work force, root out the problems in the industry and provide us with the essential blueprint to operate offshore helicopter transport safely in the future.