National Citizen Service Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Rob Wilson

Committee debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 24th January 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Wilson]

I thank the hon. Member for Croydon North for his comments, and particularly for the spirit in which he has addressed the amendment. There is an enormous amount in the Bill on which we agree. The amendment would add two additional reporting requirements to the NCS Trust, and I will cover each in turn. The first relates to the involvement of young people in governance.

The NCS Trust recognises that a programme for young people needs the input of young people in its design, governance and delivery. As the hon. Gentleman has noted, the NCS Trust has a national youth board that represents the views of 19 regional youth boards. A youth board representative often attends the main board meetings of the NCS Trust. The trust also has a group of 120 NCS leaders who act as ambassadors; this group provides another sounding board for the organisation. We want to keep the reporting requirements in the Bill short and focused on the overall aims of the NCS Trust. Clause 6 requires the trust to report on the number of participants, which links to its functions to promote NCS and, critically, on the quality of the programme.

When I wrote to the trust before Christmas about the involvement of young people among other things, the trust affirmed that, and I quote, “young people are at the centre of everything that we do”. The trust will need to continue to understand young people’s perspectives to make the programme appealing, and also to make it high quality. It will not be possible to attract young people to NCS, or to make it a high-quality experience, without knowing what young people actually want. To achieve the growth and the quality seen so far, the NCS Trust has had to use its youth board extensively, its young leaders and also real-time text feedback from participants to inform its strategy, critique its marketing campaigns and support programme delivery. In the future, when the trust reports on how it has achieved quality, we would expect it to cover how it has used young people to ensure that the experience is of a high quality for them.

The royal charter requires that board members are selected by fair and open competition. The board will need a mixture of skills, including an understanding of young people’s perspectives, and we would encourage young people to apply when the time comes.

The application process will be open and transparent, so we do not think it is necessary to ask the trust to report on how it has formed its board. I do hope that young people take the message that we want them to be involved and to apply. We will have further conversations with the trust about that.

In summary, I agree it is important that the trust involves young people in all aspects of its business, including governance, but we can drive this through the existing high-level requirements already set out in the Bill.

On the second part of the amendment, we agree that NCS should encourage young people to go on to do more volunteering. There is no question about that, and there is evidence that that is already happening; the NCS Trust estimates that NCS graduates give back on average an additional six hours of volunteering every month.

Long-term volunteering is only one possible positive outcome of NCS. NCS graduates might go straight into employment, an apprenticeship, or further or higher education. We would not want to isolate long-term volunteering as the only way forward from NCS. I am sure that is not what the hon. Member for Croydon North was implying.

Reporting on that matter would also present practical difficulties for the trust. NCS might inspire a love of volunteering in participants but, owing to other commitments, they might not volunteer again for several years. We cannot expect the trust to track participants for an unlimited time as part of a statutory duty. [Interruption.] I think I will come to the point that the hon. Member for Redcar is going to raise but I will let her raise it anyway.

[Anna Turley (Redcar) (Lab/Co-op)]

I appreciate the Minister giving way, following a very small flick of my eyebrow; that was very perceptive of him. Will he take the opportunity to say a bit more about how NCS monitors results and what longitudinal studies it makes of the wider outcomes for those who participate, whether in volunteering or getting into work? We have all been very positive about the programme but it would be helpful to know what longitudinal studies the Government have to monitor success.

[Mr Wilson]

The long-term impact was also raised by the NAO in its report. No current impact studies are under way but there are annual studies of NCS’s impact. The NCS Trust is looking at how to set up the right form of longitudinal study to try to capture this work but has yet to come to any firm conclusions.

The issue about a long-term study is that this is still a relatively young scheme. It has been going since 2011 but is ramping up quickly and the numbers are becoming very significant. The matter is being looked at and is clearly something that we need to get right. It is something that the NAO highlighted and we recognise as important and for that reason we will take it forward.

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[Mr Wilson]

Clause 6 requires the NCS Trust to give the Secretary of State an annual report setting out its performance of its functions each year. The purpose of the clause, as with clauses 4 and 5, is to ensure that proper parliamentary accountability is in place. The report must cover, among other things, the extent to which the proposed strategic priorities and main activities of the NCS Trust for the year have been met and carried out. Those requirements will ensure that the report provides a rigorous means of assessing the success of the annual business plan.

The clause specifies several other areas that the report must address. Subsection (2)(c) requires the report to address the quality of programmes. The quality of young people’s experience is essential to the success of NCS. Paragraph (d) requires the report to cover the number of participants during the year. For it to be an effective rite of passage, NCS needs to reach as many young people as possible. The charter gives the NCS Trust a function to promote the programme, and the report would provide the means of assessing its success in this area. Linked to that, paragraph (e) requires the trust to report, in particular, on the number of disabled participants. We want people from all backgrounds to benefit from NCS, but young people with disabilities may need physical adjustments or additional funding and the report can provide a means of assessing whether the trust is successful in making the programme accessible.

Paragraph (f) requires the report to cover the extent to which participants from different backgrounds have worked together. Social integration is at the heart of NCS. A key strength of the programme is its ability to mix people from different backgrounds and change their perceptions of one another, and there is evidence to prove that that is the case.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the Minister’s explanation. Paragraph (f) is a really important and significant point. Could he say a bit about how different backgrounds are being monitored and what the criteria are for that?

[Mr Wilson]

An annual study reports on these things, and the studies show that in reaching black and minority ethnic communities and those on free school meals, the NCS Trust is doing extremely well in capturing more of those people on to the scheme than the national average. There is supportable evidence to show that it is doing well. We want to continue to monitor it and make sure that it continues to do well. I note the earlier comments from the hon. Member for Croydon North that the numbers have gone down, even though they are still above the national average, on free school meals. The trust will be very conscious of that and we will look at that.

Paragraph (g) requires the report to cover the number of hours that have been spent volunteering on community projects as a result of participating in NCS programmes. NCS is designed to benefit the wider community, not just the young people who are participating, so this is a key indicator of success. Parliament will be able to see, on a year-to-year basis, how the trust is performing in this area and how it has achieved meaningful social mixing across the country.

Finally, paragraph (h) requires the trust to report on the extent to which it has obtained value for money. We want a quality programme that is accessible to all, but we also want to ensure that NCS provides value for money for the taxpayer. Even though the NAO will be able to conduct external value-for-money studies, Parliament should be able to see what the trust has done in its own words. It is vital to the trust’s independence that it is able to report on its own work.

National Citizen Service Bill [Lords]

Debate between Anna Turley and Rob Wilson

2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons
Monday 16th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Anna Turley]

rose—

[Mr Wilson]

I only have a couple of minutes available, so I will push on.

We want the NCS to be accessible to every young person. A number of Members have asked about young carers and young offenders. There is a place for all of them on this scheme; every young person who wants a place can have one. My right hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan) mentioned heritage railways. Lord Ashton has asked the Office of Rail and Road to look into that, so I hope that that reassures her.

My hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Henry Smith) asked about assistance for NCS providers to keep up the rate of participation and to promote best practice. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport is working with the trust to issue guidance to the NCS providers to help them build relationships with local authorities, schools and other local organisations. That will ensure that NCS social action projects take on the needs of communities and that young people can participate in even greater numbers than now.

There were a number of questions about the devolved Administrations of Scotland and Wales. The NCS Bill will help the NCS Trust to continue to deliver the NCS programme across England. The Government would welcome the expansion of the NCS in the future, and the devolved Administrations are considering how the programme would work for them.

Northern Ireland is supportive of the NCS. Co-operation Ireland is a separate provider of the NCS in Northern Ireland. It is a charity that supports the peace process and it has unique and long-standing expertise. The Government have licensed the NCS intellectual property rights to Northern Ireland to allow the delivery of the programme.

My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) asked about the devolved Administrations, and the Bill extends to England and Wales as they are one jurisdiction but applies only to England as this is where the NCS Trust operates. The majority of the Bill therefore relates to England only, but there are some provisions relating to reserved matters, such as the clause pertaining to HMRC, that mean that the Bill as a whole does not meet the test to be certified as England-only. Though HMRC would only write to people in England, the functions of HMRC are a wholly reserved matter.

As for the question of why the same outcomes could not be achieved by running the same programme through the scouts or cadets, the recent NAO report finds that the NCS is distinct from other programmes, particularly as regards its focus on mixing people from different backgrounds. It is available, affordable and has a distinct combination of personal development and the chance to mix with people from other backgrounds. It is designed to be a single unifying rite of passage for young people that sits alongside the many other fantastic opportunities for young people.

This is a small Bill, but it is very important. It sets the framework for the delivery of a programme that will influence hundreds of thousands of young people—indeed millions in due course. Alongside the royal charter, it will ensure that there is a body that the public can trust that provides value for money and a quality programme. Public confidence is key to the success of the NCS. The Bill will help the NCS grow and become a rite of passage for future generations. Establishing the NCS for the long term is, in a small way, part of defining what sort of nation we want to be in the future. That is a nation that invests in young people, fosters social integration and believes in the values of service. More than 300,000 young people have benefited from the NCS already. The Bill is our opportunity to secure the same life-changing experience for generations to come: a National Citizen Service for everyone and a commitment to greater social cohesion, social mobility and social engagement. I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

National Citizen Service Bill [Lords] (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the National Citizen Service Bill [Lords]:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 26 January 2017.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill (including any proceedings on consideration of any message from the Lords) may be programmed. —(Graham Stuart.)

Question agreed to.

National Citizen Service Bill [Lords] (Money)

Queen’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the National Citizen Service Bill [Lords], it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Secretary of State.—(Graham Stuart.)

Question agreed to.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Anna Turley and Rob Wilson

Tuesday 26th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Civil Society (Mr Rob Wilson)]

It might be helpful if I clarify one of points that the hon. Lady raised about the power to direct. An official warning is not the same as a direction power. I am aware of the potential confusion regarding the explanatory notes that she mentioned. If it is helpful to her, I would be happy to ensure that the explanatory notes are updated to make it absolutely clear that the warning power cannot be used to direct charities.

[Anna Turley]

That is very helpful indeed. I really appreciate the Minister being so quick and forthcoming with his clarity on that, which will give the sector a lot of reassurance.

I now move on to our new clauses 2 and 3. New clause 2 seeks to replace a clause that was put into the Bill during its passage through the other place but removed in Committee. I pay tribute to our noble Friends in the other place who successfully added the clause to the Bill. As with so much legislation at the moment, we are finding them to be great defenders of social justice and fairness.

New clause 2 would support trustees in carrying out their existing duties by ensuring that they can adhere to their charitable aims and objectives, and it would protect them from being compelled to undertake an action at odds with their charitable purposes. As we have always made clear, especially in Committee, the provision is particularly relevant to housing. It aims to protect charities and housing associations if the Government mandates them to sell their charitable property under the right-to-buy proposals.

Labour Members want those who desire to be homeowners to achieve their aspiration. While the number of homeowners has fallen by more than 200,000 under this Government, the number rose by more than 1 million under Labour between 1997 and 2010. I want to be clear that we support people’s aspiration to own their own home.

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[Mr Wilson]

I am sure the noble Lords along the corridor will have listened carefully to my right hon. Friend. I hope the Bill will not be altered further as a result of his very strong words.

[Anna Turley]

To take up that point, the right to buy affects charities, and we are debating charities legislation. The right to buy affects the ability of housing associations to control their assets, which is a fundamental change to the balance of the relationship between their role and the Government’s ability to tell them what to do. That is why we have debated it today.

[Mr Wilson]

The Opposition are obviously entitled to propose whatever amendments they want as long as they are in order, but the problem is not just that new clause 2 is completely unnecessary; it would also be damaging, although I am sure that that was not the hon. Lady’s intention.

Many of the rules that apply to charities’ investments in, and their disposal of, assets, derive from case law that has been built up over hundreds of years. Proponents of the new clause argue that it reflects the existing case law, but I simply do not accept that. A simple statutory provision such as the new clause cannot hope to reflect the accumulated detail of case law derived from many hundreds of judgments.

Case law already requires charities to use and dispose of their assets in a way that supports the delivery of their charitable purposes. That provides flexibility for certain circumstances that a statutory provision cannot provide. For example, how would the new clause affect compulsory purchase orders in relation to charity land? How would it affect the existing rights of more than 1.4 million housing association tenants under the preserved right to buy or the right to acquire? How would it affect the exercise of Charity Commission powers such as its power to direct charity property in the course of a statutory inquiry? There are simply too many questions about the measure to which we have not had satisfactory answers either this afternoon or during the course of the Bill’s proceedings.

New clause 2 would give the Charity Commission a new and very broad role in policing the use and disposal of charity assets. That is inconsistent with our current aim of helping the commission to focus on its core regulatory activities.

New clause 3, which is also in the hon. Lady’s name, is at best unnecessary and at worst damaging. Charity law already sets out clear rules on what charities can and cannot do in relation to campaigning and political activity. I explained those in detail in Committee and do not propose to do so again today. New clause 3 might seek to reflect existing law, but it does not. In a similar way to new clause 2, new clause 3 attempts to include in a statutory provision the existing case law. That seriously risks changing the boundaries of what is permitted.

New clause 3 would allow charities to undertake political campaigning or political activity, but does not define what that means.

Would it, for example, allow partisan political campaigning? If that were the case, it would represent a real shift in the law and I would strongly object to that. In particular, I think the public would be very surprised and disappointed to see charities taking part and campaigning on a party political basis. Existing case law does not allow charities to engage in political campaigning to such an extent that it calls into question whether in fact they are a charity or, rather, a political campaigning organisation. Again, it is not clear to me that new clause 3 would incorporate that crucial limitation, potentially opening up charitable status to organisations with a political purpose.

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[Mr Wilson]

The representatives for Scotland were at the fundraising summit recently. This is a devolved matter, and it is up to them what rules they set for Scotland. They do not have to follow; this is an England and Wales Bill, which does not affect Scotland. It is therefore up to the Scottish regulator how they wish to proceed.

I maintain that it is important to keep a clear division between statutory and self-regulatory powers to ensure better regulation of fundraising. The best way to achieve that is to support the new fundraising regulator and, if it should fail, make a decisive and clear move to statutory regulation. Should self-regulation fail, the Government will not hesitate to intervene, which could include tasking the Charity Commission with the regulation of fundraising. However, we think it is too soon to commit the Charity Commission to an enhanced statutory role in fundraising, so I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex will understand why I do not support his new clauses 4 and 5.

Let me turn finally to Government amendments 6 and 7. It would not be fair to ask the taxpayer to carry the cost of fundraising regulation if it is the result of a failure by charities to protect the public from their own poor practices. Government amendments 6 and 7 would therefore enable the fundraising regulator or the Charity Commission to charge fees to those it regulates for that purpose. Many of the charities signed up to and paying for the old system of self-regulation were those that followed best practice, and there was a problem of free riders. To guard against that risk, the Etherington review suggested that any charity with fundraising expenditure beyond a certain level should be subject to a levy, requiring the large and medium-sized fundraising charities to pay for regulation.

Should the Government need to compel charities to register with the charity fundraising regulator, it is important that the fundraising regulator is able to levy fees for registration. That is exactly what amendment 6 would enable. Government amendment 7 deals with fees, should the reserve power be exercised for the Charity Commission to regulate fundraising. It would ensure that regulations could provide for the Charity Commission to charge fees across the range of bodies that it would regulate as the fundraising regulator.

I hope my explanations suffice to convince hon. Members that these amendments are an important part of the backstop to self-regulation and will help to ensure the effective regulation of fundraising in future, but I would of course be happy to provide more detailed responses. The main point is that I hope that these amendments are not needed and that charities will support the new, tougher self-regulatory system being established under the leadership of my noble Friend Lord Grade of Yarmouth. I commend these Government amendments to the House.

[Anna Turley]

For the sake of colleagues, I will be brief. I thank everybody for their contributions this afternoon. There is a wealth of experience from the charity sector in the Chamber, which has added a richness to the progress of the Bill.

Let me turn straight to new clause 1. Although I do not share the Minister’s view that judicial review will be more cost-effective—that may be the case for the Charity Commission, but perhaps not for charities that are appealing, many of which will not be able to afford to go to judicial review—I am willing to work with the Charity Commission, the sector and the Government to monitor the use of warnings outside of primary legislation. Therefore, I do not wish to press new clause 1 to a vote, although I wish to test the House on new clause 3 and amendment 8, because I do not feel our concerns have been met on either issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Power to make representations

“(1) A charity may undertake political campaigning or political activity in the context of supporting the delivery of its charitable purposes.

(2) A charity may campaign to ensure support for, or to oppose, a change in the law, policy or decisions of central government, local authorities or other public bodies.”—(Anna Turley.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Rob Wilson

Thursday 7th January 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would enshrine in legislation the right of charities to undertake political campaigning activity. We are clear that this is a direct attempt to challenge the unfair and poorly applied Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014—the gagging Act, as it is commonly known.

Campaigning is an important part of democracy and civil society. One of the fundamental principles of a thriving and healthy democracy is that individuals and organisations can speak out about the issues they care about. Charities, in particular, have a long-established role in educating and informing the public, campaigning and securing positive social change throughout our history and, crucially, holding the state to account. It is the sign of a mature and confident democracy that we allow dissent and ensure that we have wide-ranging and representative public debate. Charities not only have the right to campaign, but are often best placed to provide important insights that can inform and improve policy making. They are so often the ones on the frontline seeing the gaps in provision, the duplication of services, inefficiency and waste, and indeed spotting the best ways of solving problems.

Many charities can often make a bigger impact with their limited resources through campaigning than through service delivery alone. Campaigning often saves taxpayers’ money in the long term as issues can be addressed at their roots, rather than having to address their costly aftermath. For example, is it better to care for victims of crime in the aftermath of an event or to help prevent crimes in the first place? It is good to help care for patients with long-term conditions such as cancer, but is it not better to push for more effective treatments, awareness of symptoms and support for diagnosis?

[Mr Wilson]

Will the hon. Lady explain how the legislation stops such things happening at present? I have seen nothing to suggest that that is the case.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for his intervention but, as I will say, the sector has made it clear that it feels stifled, particularly in the lead up to general elections, when there are serious debates about the future of Government policy. That is what this new clause seeks to prevent.

The lobbying rules affect charities because of their non-partisan campaigning activity. Organisations can campaign for changes to law or policy where such a change would support their charitable objectives. Although under charity law campaigning cannot be the continuing or sole activity of a charity, it is an entirely legitimate activity for charities to pursue. Under the current rules of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, some of that activity is already regulated by the Electoral Commission when an organisation has been deemed to produce election material. For many charities and voluntary organisations, raising awareness of the issues affecting the people and causes they support is a routine and important part of their work and central to their charitable objectives.

In a letter leading up to the general election last year, more than 160 signatories from the charitable sector, including Save the Children, the Salvation Army, Oxfam, Greenpeace, Age UK and Amnesty International, said that the legislation should be scrapped and that it is having a “chilling effect” on charities’ work.

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[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that suggestion. I wonder whether he would have had the same concerns had that been done for his political party. Surely consultation is a positive thing. If a charity’s aims and objectives are welcomed and taken forward by a political party, it is surely right for it to welcome that success for its charitable objectives and its efforts to have influence, shape policy and change society. That is something to be welcomed, and the hon. Gentleman is on a difficult line with that.

[Mr Wilson]

Is the hon. Lady really arguing that it is okay for a charity to email its members and ask them to attend a party political launch event? Can I just be clear on that?

[Anna Turley]

I think that is perfectly acceptable, if people want to go to any party political event and offer their views. They may go to it and disagree with the party and challenge it. As far as I am concerned, we are in danger of separating politics from the realities of campaigning and policy making. Politics has to be open and accessible and must not exist in a vacuum. Many people are deeply involved in politics, from councillors and MPs to activists; there is not a small box for people to sit in because they are in one category but not another.

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[Mr Wilson]

My hon. Friend raises a question of enormous public interest. Only last year the Charity Commission looked at whether charities should be required to submit details of their campaigning spend as part of their annual return process, details of which would have been published on the register of charities. The commission concluded that such a requirement would create a significant amount of work for charities and decided not to include that in the annual return for 2015. However, the commission did note the huge level of public interest in the issue and said it would look at the matter again. I welcome that and encourage the commission to keep the matter under review. I hope that clearly answers my hon. Friend’s question.

Even in the unlikely event that the boundaries of law were not shifted by an attempt at statutory definition, one would still expect legal challenges to test whether the law had in fact changed, by design or otherwise. There is further risk in putting this in the Bill since it would risk politicising charities’ right to campaign. Ministers, rather than the independent regulator and the courts, would be responsible for the provision, which could leave it open to political interference over time.

I hope the Committee will agree that one advantage of case law provision is that it is in the hands of an independent regulator and the courts and is not subject to ministerial intervention. As I said, my noble Friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts is currently reviewing evidence of the impact of 2014 Act on charities and other organisations in the run-up to the election. I understand his report is expected reasonably soon, and I look forward to seeing the findings and whether there are lessons to be learned.

I also point the Committee to the Charity Commission’s recent publication of the cases it investigated in the run-up to the 2015 general election. From looking at those cases, one gets a good impression of the independent regulator properly exercising its regulatory role in this area in a very proportionate way.

I hope that I have given the reassurances that Opposition Members seek about charities’ right to speak out for their beneficiaries, while cautioning against the dangers of statutory provision, and hope they will not press the new clause.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for his explanation, although he has not convinced us—he will be surprised to hear that. We will not press the new clause to a vote now because we want to return to it on Report. I am sure hon. Members look forward, as I do, to further discussion on the Floor of the House.

I was struck by the Minister’s passionate defence of the independence of the charitable sector and his desire to protect it from the overbearing oppression of political campaigning forced on it by the new clause. I would love to know how many charities begged and pleaded with the previous Government to bring in the gagging Bill to protect them from overbearing political parties forcing them to campaign. In fact, the feeling from the sector was quite the opposite: they were asking for independence from being gagged and being told they could not. I fundamentally disagree with the Minister’s claim that he is trying to protect the sector’s independence. Its independence to speak with its true voice and commitment is what the new clause is about.

I hope I am not naïve in saying this, but for me the basis of politics is to try to make a difference and to find solutions to problems. So many of the aims and objectives that we in this room all share are completely concurrent with those of the charitable sector, so it is inevitable that on many of the issues we try to address and change, charities will feel just as strongly and passionately as we do. They will try to influence us because we are in a position of power to make decisions.

[Mr Wilson]

I would appreciate it if the hon. Lady gave me three quick evidence-based examples of charities being stopped from pursuing issues on behalf of their beneficiaries. I hope that her party has given examples to Lord Hodgson to show where that has already happened. It would help me and other Conservative Members to understand.

[Anna Turley]

I gave examples during my speech. I will be happy to resurrect them on Third reading and to submit them. Going back to the point about the independence of student unions, a university in my area cancelled a hustings because it was extremely cautious. It had sought expensive legal advice and did not proceed because it was not sure that it was sufficiently meeting its charitable status in the number of people and different parties it was inviting. That is a clear example from my constituency.

The 2014 Act is a classic incumbency piece of legislation from a political party that has gone far from its roots and become immersed and entrenched in Government, pulling up the drawbridge and becoming separate from the ideals that drive politicians and the sector. I believe that it is incumbent on all political parties, but particularly in Opposition, to listen right through to the day of a general election to the challenges that civil society sets out to us, its problems with the policies we make and how it exposes to us the challenges facing society. We do not have all the answers, but it is important that, as I said, right up to the day of a general election we continue to listen. That Act had, as the sector has identified, a clear effect on its ability to do that.

[Anna Turley]

I thank my hon. Friend because she is absolutely right. Every political party comes into Government with the best ideals—we heard from the coalition that they would be the most open, transparent and accountable Government ever. Suddenly the fear sets in, and when they start to hear from the public things they do not like it is easy to pull up the drawbridge. We are seeing that with a range of measures from the Government.

Turning briefly to badgers—we have heard a lot about them today; I am very fond of them. I have not seen the email, but despite what Government Members have said, I am still struggling to understand the issue—[Interruption.] The Minister sighs in despair. I will try to explain and perhaps he will show some tolerance for those of us who are struggling to keep up.

If a charity has aims and objectives such as saving badgers, it might write to all political parties setting out what it would like to see in their manifestos, setting out its aims, ambitions and aspirations. One of those political parties might write back saying, “Fantastic; we love badgers too. We want to put that in our manifesto and to have an event to launch it. We want it to be part of our rural ambitions.” Would it not be understandable if that charity engaged with that political party, attended events, and discussed, debated and challenged that manifesto to promote its cause?

[Mr Wilson]

indicated dissent.

[Anna Turley]

The Minister shakes his head, but I do not know why that is unacceptable. I admit that I do not know the individual case, so I cannot comment on the specifics, but judging by what has been set out, I do not have a fundamental problem with a charity that emails its members to advise them to go to a political event. It could advise them to go to three party events—if another party had accepted its views on badgers, it would have done the same thing with that party. This is about putting badgers first—badgers before politics.

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[Anna Turley]

Please do. To go back to the hon. Gentleman’s point, I am delighted for his sake—if not for ours—that so many of his constituents voted Conservative, but if many of them care passionately about badgers and see such measures in the Labour manifesto and not the Conservative manifesto, surely they can challenge that party’s views, because views can be changed. There will always be things that a political party stands for that we will disagree with—I am sure that many of us on both sides of the Committee feel that. Things are not set in stone and this measure does not seem inflexible and against the grain. I am happy to explore that case in more detail, but I remain to be convinced.

[Mr Wilson]

In the spirit of co-operation that we have had in the Committee, perhaps I can help the hon. Lady. The Charity Commission will send her a copy of its report on the Badger Trust so that she can see the details of the case. I hope that will help inform her for Third Reading and Report.

[Anna Turley]

I very much appreciate that, but, on the principle set out, I do not see an explicit problem with a charity emailing its members about attending a meeting of a political party. That is my baseline, but I look forward to hearing more about that case, because I cannot make a decision without seeing all the details.

I want to make another comparison. Many charities attend political party conferences to lobby, influence and try to shape political thinking. Many of them will say, “Actually, we can’t afford to go to every party conference,” so they may go to only one, whether that of the party in government or in opposition or the party that most shares its views on whatever its issue of the day is—I will not say badgers again. Is it at odds with its political neutrality if it attends just one party conference to try to influence and shape thinking? Those are difficult issues for charities to think about.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I am sure that Members will be sick of my voice today, not the Minister’s! I rise to speak in support of new clause 3 and, for ease, I will also speak to all the new clauses in the group. New clause 3 would ensure that independent schools that wish to benefit from charitable status engage actively with local communities and state schools with a view to sharing resources and facilities. Again, I must pay tribute to the noble lords in the other place who supported the new clauses, particularly Lord Moynihan, sports Minister under Margaret Thatcher and chairman of the British Olympic Association between 2005 and 2012. For that reason, I was surprised to hear the new clauses criticised as “prejudiced and outdated” by the Secretary of State for Education in the media last night.

The vast majority of independent schools in this country—more than 2,000—benefit from charitable status, meaning that independent schools are effectively publicly subsidised by taxpayers whose children do not attend such schools to the tune of £700 million a year in the form of charitable rate relief. Charitable status for private schools may have made sense when many were established prior to the introduction of compulsory education. Many of them were set up to educate “poor and indigent boys”. Harrow, for example, was set up as a grammar school by instinct of charity to educate the needy, but the world has changed.

Seventy years ago, after the Education Act 1944, Conservative Education Minister Rab Butler reflected:

“The public schools are saved and must now be made to do their bit.”

I argue that that bit has not been sufficiently done. Sadly, despite the fantastic work taking place in many of our state schools and the strong investment and reform programme put in place under the previous Labour Government, which transformed state school achievement, the reality is that the gap is still too broad.

Independent schools remain one of the most significant bulwarks of social inequality in this country and continue to entrench privilege and hamper social mobility. Young people from independent schools, who make up 7% of their age group, take up nearly 50% of the places at Oxford and Cambridge, with the subsequent statistical likelihood of earning more and being more likely to be in professional employment within six months. Within the professions, 71% of senior judges, 62% of our senior armed forces and 55% of civil service departmental heads attended independent schools, compared with just 7% of the population.

[Mr Wilson]

I want to be clear about the case that the hon. Lady is making. It is certainly not in the new clause, but is she saying that she is an opponent of independent schools and that they should be abolished? It would be helpful to understand that.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the Minister’s intervention. I am a realist and a pragmatist in all things. I recognise the huge contribution made to this country by many independent schools, faith schools and other schools that would not necessarily be my first choice for my children. I am not advocating their abolition, but rather that they should deliver over and above what they currently do and justify taxpayers’ money supporting them through their charitable status.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

On the point about setting a precedent, the difference is that independent schools provide a service over and above state provision. There is statutory universal provision, but people choose to go in over and above that and send their children to independent schools. We should question the right of those schools to receive taxpayers’ money. It is a unique situation in education, so we cannot simply say that it would set a precedent.

[Mr Wilson]

As I said, parents pay for education at independent schools, which relieves a huge burden on the state. It is very easy to dismiss the fact that private schools provide more than 500,000 places, but as I said to the hon. Lady earlier in our proceedings, abolishing independent schools would immediately create the huge problem for the state of how to educate those children.

[Anna Turley]

There is a short-sighted financial view about the cost of educating children and the saving to the state sector of educating children in the independent sector. We are dismissing some of the value that those children, their parents and families would put back into the state system, were they to be educated there. One should not see children simply as a financial burden on the state; they will contribute greatly to the state system.

[Mr Wilson]

I worry that the hon. Lady, along with a number of Opposition Members, has a mindset that the independent sector is better than the state sector. That might have been true under a previous Labour Government, but state schools have improved enormously under this Government. It is important to make the point that independent schools do not necessarily offer a better, more advantageous education for our young people than state schools any more. That view is being degraded year by year by the reforms and protected investment that we have put into our education system. It is very sad that the Opposition do not recognise or welcome that.

[Anna Turley]

May I take the Minister up on that point? He has made a sweeping statement that is not the case. He does a disservice to the reforms made by the Labour Government under the Building Schools for the Future programme—since cancelled—following 18 years of neglect that left many schools with leaking roofs. He does a disservice to our record. Why does the Minister think people send their children to independent schools, if there is no difference from the state sector? What is it that they are paying for?

[Mr Wilson]

There are many different reasons why people send their children to independent schools. I would not like to intrude on the decisions that families make up and down the country for the good of their children. Some may base the decision on distance, if they live in a rural area and the school is close.

[Anna Turley]

They do it for advantage.

[Mr Wilson]

If the hon. Lady is painting the situation as simply one of privilege, she is straying into territory she should not stray into. Many independent schools offer bursaries and many other ways to ensure that people who cannot afford to send their children are able to do so. We might want to pick up on that debate outside the Committee.

What is currently meant by public benefit has been determined by the courts over several hundred years. While not perfect, the current case law definition has served us well and we start interfering with it at our peril. In addition to our principled objection to these proposed changes, there are practical reasons why we do not support them. Over recent years, many independent schools have embarked on successful partnership projects with local state schools. Those have arisen from local needs and reflect good relationships between head teachers in the state and independent sectors. Forcing schools into particular types of partnership will not work in the long term and could undermine much of the good work that has already been done.

Legislation is not needed to make those partnerships happen. They are already happening and are growing in number. In answer to the earlier question from the hon. Member for Hove, according to the Independent Schools Council, 93% of its member schools—1,073—are already involved in partnerships with state schools. Of those, more than 900 are involved in sporting partnerships, more than 600 in music partnerships, almost 600 in academic partnerships, about 400 in drama partnerships and more than 200 in governance partnerships.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds said, when people think of independent schools they often think of the largest and most well known, but the reality is very different. More than half have fewer than 300 pupils, and in many cases they might have more limited resources than the local state school. For example, some may not have any sports facilities to share with local state schools. It would seem odd to legislate for something that some schools simply might not meaningfully be able to do. The measures proposed focus on sports, music, drama, arts and careers and higher education advice. They omit perhaps the most important category of partnership between independent and state sectors: academic partnerships.

Let me give an award-winning example. King Edward’s School in Birmingham aims to improve teaching and learning for pupils in local state junior schools across the city. Its outreach programme has doubled in size in each of the past three years so that the school is now in contact with more than 11,000 state-educated children and more than 450 teachers from 130 different junior schools. More than 50 members of staff and 300 pupils from the school are involved, and activities have included a city-wide maths competition entered by teams from 110 state primaries, which has proved so successful that it now hopes to run annually.

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[Mr Wilson]

My hon. Friend makes her case powerfully. I would not seek to add anything because I agree with her. She is absolutely correct.

It is not just the largest schools with the most resources that are engaging in such partnerships. Belmont Preparatory School near Dorking has, for over a decade, provided facilities and resources for a local community pre-school music education group to meet twice a week, enabling early years children and their parents to enjoy music making and to form links between the local community and the school.

In order to show that strong partnerships already exist, the Independent Schools Council has created and is managing a “Schools Together” website that launches this month. I hope that everyone will have the chance to look at it. As well as showcasing existing examples of best practice, the website will act as a vehicle for the development of new partnerships between the independent and state sectors, enabling schools to register their interest in developing a partnership. So far, more than 175 schools have registered and reported on more than 400 partnership projects. I encourage the Committee, particularly Opposition Members, to review the growing number of projects on the website and support the development of new partnerships in their constituencies.

The ISC will undertake a census of all partnership activities and will promote partnerships among its member schools. The Charity Commission has updated its guidance on ways that trustees of charitable independent schools can ensure they run their charities for public benefit.

[Anna Turley]

We discussed earlier today what happens when self-regulation fails. Does the Minister have in mind a framework of what improvement he would like from the sector? At what point will he intervene or look for some kind of back-up powers, as we discussed today, to try to ensure that further activity is made?

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[Mr Wilson]

As the hon. Lady knows from the contributions made in the Lords, an agreement was reached on what independent schools will be doing. That agreement will need time to bed in, to ensure that it can progress in an orderly way. We have no intention of introducing any back-up powers, for the reasons I have stated; in principle and in practice, the hon. Lady’s proposals simply would not work. I expect independent schools to do more through partnerships, as I said at the start of my speech.

The updated guidance encourages trustees of charitable schools to comment on their individual approaches to public benefit in sport, drama, music and other arts in their annual report, and the guidance includes new examples of sharing sporting facilities. The commission also gives new examples relating to the sharing of sports, arts and music facilities in its example of a good trustees’ annual report. The ISC has disseminated new guidance to its member schools.

The commission has committed to follow up with a research project that will begin in 2017, when enough time will have elapsed to assess the impact of the new “Schools Together” initiative and the updated guidance provided by the commission. That research will draw upon data from charitable schools’ annual reports, as well as aggregated data that the ISC collects through its annual report. The terms of reference will be developed by the commission with input from the ISC, and a report of the research will be published in 2017, which will enable us to get a much clearer picture of the extent of existing and new partnership activities between the independent and state sectors.

I have been encouraged by the willingness of the ISC and its member schools to engage constructively in this debate, and I expect that many people will be surprised by the volume of partnership activity that is already taking place between the independent and state sectors but that has perhaps gone unreported in the past. The ISC is keen to showcase best practice and to encourage more such partnerships, and it has shown its commitment through its actions. An inflexible legislative solution is the wrong approach and could damage the good will that exists in the independent sector. The best partnerships are not forced but evolve through local needs and provide mutual benefits. We should welcome the ongoing work to nudge and encourage such partnerships, but we should not make them a legal requirement.

To recap, there are several good arguments, both in principle and in practice, for not pursuing these new clauses. I therefore hope that hon. Members will decide not to press the new clause further.

[Anna Turley]

The Minister has been extremely generous with his time in responding to all our interventions, so I will not delay the Committee much further. I will just make a small point in conclusion. I appreciate that there are many examples of good partnership, which is to be encouraged, but words such as “nudge” and “encourage” are a little disappointing. Given that schools receive a financial rebate from the taxpayer, taxpayers have a right to expect some benefit from those schools. The pace has been positively glacial, so I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments. However, we will not press the new clause to a vote today, but we may well reconsider it on Third Reading. We are not convinced that there has been sufficient progress that anything other than a statutory power will do anything to compel independent schools to justify the money they get back from the British taxpayer.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Rob Wilson

Tuesday 5th January 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Civil Society (Mr Rob Wilson)]

I wish you, Mrs Main, and all members of the Committee a happy and prosperous new year. I hope hon. Members did well from Father Christmas during the recess and that everyone has returned in good spirits.

After the conciliatory nature of the previous Committee sittings, it is a little sad to begin the new year on a slightly more divisive note. Clause 9 was an Opposition amendment inserted into the Bill in the other place. It was an undisguised attempt to undermine or even block the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend the right to buy to tenants of housing associations. At the very least it was to be a marker of concerns in the other place about that manifesto commitment. For several reasons, the Government believe that the clause is neither necessary nor desirable. It is now time to remove the provision from the Bill. It is important to note that the Charity Law Association agrees that the clause should be taken out.

Let me explain why the provision is not necessary. The clause was designed to attack and to frustrate the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend the right to buy to tenants of housing associations, most of which are charities. It was introduced into the Bill in the other place when there was concern about charitable housing associations being forced to implement the right to buy. Since then, however, we have reached a voluntary agreement with housing associations that renders the clause unnecessary, because there is no question of them being forced to dispose of their assets.

The Government believe that anyone who works hard and wants to get on the property ladder should have the chance to do so. The right to buy has already helped 2 million families to realise their dream of owning a home, but until now the discounts available under the right to buy have only been available to tenants in local authority properties and some former council properties. Extending the discounts to housing association tenants in England will end that unfairness and means that up to 1.3 million more families get a realistic chance to own their own home. At the same time, replacement of the housing stock will be ensured.

The National Housing Federation has worked with its housing association members to secure a voluntary deal that will give housing association tenants the opportunity to buy their home with an equivalent discount to the right to buy. The Government accepted the voluntary deal proposed by the housing associations, which will deliver the manifesto commitment to extend the benefits of the right to buy to 1.3 million tenants. Homes sold to tenants under the deal will be replaced one for one using the proceeds from the sale of the property. That will provide a significant increase to the overall supply of new housing.

So far, 93% of the total housing association stock is covered by those associations that have said yes to the deal. We want as many associations as possible to sign up to it, so that their tenants may access the same home ownership opportunities as other tenants, and the opportunity remains for more housing associations to do so. The deal includes examples of types of property that housing associations may decide that they do not want to sell to a tenant—for example, particular properties in supported housing, historic charity legacy stock or rural housing. In such circumstances, the tenant will be offered an alternative housing association property.

Housing associations are voluntary organisations and we strongly believe that they should continue to be independent of the Government. That belief is reflected in our decision to extend the right to buy to housing association tenants by accepting the voluntary offer from the sector, rather than implementing the policy through legislation. We have, however, included provisions in the Housing and Planning Bill to make the voluntary deal work, including financial powers to pay the housing associations for the cost of the discount and powers for the regulator to monitor and report on the terms of the deal.

Ahead of full implementation, a six-month pilot scheme is taking place with five housing associations, which will enable the new system and the voluntary deal to be road-tested properly in advance of full implementation. Tenants of those housing associations can already register their interest. This voluntary deal was achieved by working together with the housing association sector, resulting in a better outcome for landlords and tenants while delivering the Government’s manifesto commitment.

Of particular importance for the Committee today is that, under the voluntary deal agreed with housing associations, charities could not be compelled to dispose of their assets in a way that is incompatible with their charitable purposes. Under the deal, charities’ independence is preserved, and they continue to have their freedom to dispose of their assets in the way that they see fit and that is compatible with their charitable purpose. I would strongly argue, therefore, that the historic voluntary deal between housing associations and the Government renders clause 9 unnecessary.

I now turn to why clause 9 could have damaging unintended consequences for charities. When the clause was inserted into the Bill, it was argued that it effectively just stated the existing legal position. I disagree—it does not. Clause 9 is not a simple restatement of the existing law on the use and disposal of charitable assets.

As we have already said, charity law is a mixture of statute law and case law. Many of the rules that apply to charities’ investment in, and disposal of, assets derive from case law rather than statute law. Attempting to create a simple statutory provision for a large area of case law is fraught with danger. The problem is that a simple statutory provision will invariably fail to cover the many different circumstances and complexities that case law can provide for. It would be exceptionally difficult to find a satisfactory expression to properly cover the explanation and nuanced analysis that is often afforded in judgments in case law. As a result, there is a real danger that the clause will give rise to damaging unintended consequences, which I am sure all hon. Members would wish to avoid.

Charity Commission guidance on the disposal of land makes it clear that any disposal must be

“in the interests of the charity”

rather than “consistent with charitable purposes”. Those concepts have different legal meanings, with the latter being much wider in its potential application.

Clause 9 casts doubt on the power of the courts to direct charities to dispose of property—for example, under compulsory purchase legislation. It could also prove problematic to the Charity Commission in the exercise of its powers—for example, its powers to direct charities to take specified action, or to direct the use of property, in the course of a statutory inquiry. The commission can currently routinely use those powers under the appropriate safeguards, but the clause may mean that it would be unable to do so, and its compliance work may be frustrated. I am sure that that is not something the clause was intended to do when it was added to the Bill in the other place.

There will be some circumstances where what is in the charity’s long-term interests does not align with the application or use of assets for a particular charitable purpose—for example, where a charity must pay a contractual debt that puts its solvency at risk or where the charity’s purposes can no longer be met.

Furthermore, the clause covers all charity assets, which includes property other than land, such as investments. That raises the separate issue of the duties that apply in that context. For example, the clause could mean that trustees would be able to make an investment only where that investment was consistent with the purposes of the charity. Although that is sometimes the case, trustees can, and often do, make investments solely for the purpose of obtaining the maximum financial return consistent with commercial prudence. In that scenario, the charity’s purposes are furthered by the way in which the income from the investment is subsequently applied. Clause 9 as it stands could hamper trustees’ discretion to make such investments.

The clause also gives the Charity Commission a new and wide-ranging role in policing the use and disposal of charity assets that is inconsistent with our aim of helping the commission to focus on its core regulatory responsibilities. Requiring the commission to ensure that charities are not required to use or dispose of assets would be more than just an unwelcome distraction for the regulator at a time of very limited resources.

There is also the preserved right to buy in relation to housing associations, which 630,000 tenants already enjoy, and the right to acquire, which 800,000 tenants currently have. Those rights, when exercised, would compel the charity to sell its assets. Those pre-existing rights, which are set out in legislation, could be undermined by clause 9.

I hope I have been able to make a compelling case to the Committee for why we should remove the clause. As my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General said on Second Reading, it is regrettable that a Bill with widespread support was used

“in a narrow attempt by the other place to undermine the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend the right to buy”.—[Official Report, 3 December 2015; Vol. 603, c. 561.]

For that reason, and because of the damaging unintended consequences clause 9 would have for charities, we cannot allow it to stand, and oppose its inclusion in the Bill.

[Anna Turley (Redcar) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main. I would like to echo felicitations for a happy new year for everyone on the Committee. I would also like to thank everybody across the community and voluntary sector who spent time over Christmas and the new year, as we know they will have done, in their communities undertaking many hours of community and voluntary service, helping those who are most vulnerable and in need at what for most of us should be a happy time.

I appreciate the Minister’s words on clause 9, to which I listened with interest, particularly about the amendments to the Housing and Planning Bill. We believe the clause is extremely important and we will try to maintain it in the Bill.

I pay tribute to our noble Friends in the other place who added the clause to the Bill, where we believe it should remain. It simply and effectively states the existing legal position and supports trustees in their existing duties by ensuring that they are able to adhere to their charitable aims and objectives, and it protects them from being compelled to undertake an action that is at odds with their charitable purposes.

The clause is particularly relevant to housing, as the Minister mentioned, and aims to protect charities and housing associations when the Government later mandates them to sell their charitable property under the right-to-buy proposals. I will come back to his point about it being a voluntary proposal.

The debate in the other place saw Tories, Lib Dems and Cross Benchers line up to condemn the Government’s proposal. I am surprised they are persisting in trying to remove the clause. As the Minister knows, the Opposition are not against the right to buy. Indeed, we want those who desire to be homeowners to achieve that. While the number of homeowners has fallen under this Government by more than 200,000, under Labour from 1997 to 2010, the number of homeowners rose by more than 1 million. We support people’s aspiration to own their own home.

However, the problem is compulsion. We want to limit the power of the Government to direct a charity against its independent will, and contrary to its charitable purposes, to dispose of its assets according to the Government’s latest whim. That is an infringement of the independence of charity, community and voluntary sector organisations. For many housing associations, it will go against the grain of their aims and objectives.

The Minister mentioned the voluntary agreement, but it was not unanimous and many housing associations do not sign up to that principle. He also said that the amendments in the Housing and Planning Bill will protect charities’ right to dispose of assets as they wish. That may be the case for that individual policy in the Housing and Planning Bill, but the clause goes wider—it is about all assets, not just about housing and planning. We believe clause 9 is still required.

What after housing might be next on the Government’s list in requiring charities to purge themselves of their assets? The principle is broader than simply housing, although housing is the focus. Housing associations, most of which are charities, provide 2.5 million homes for 5 million people on affordable rents. They are rented privately and many enable vulnerable people, or those with disabilities or care needs, to live independently. Other properties are for shared ownership to help those on lower incomes buy their homes.

Housing associations build 45,000 homes a year and would ideally like to build 120,000, matching what private developers are able to do. That aim could be undermined if they are forced to sell off their stock.

At the same time as the Committee is sitting, the House will debate the Housing and Planning Bill on Report and Third Reading. We believe that the Bill will lead to a huge loss of affordable housing. The Office for Budget Responsibility confirmed in its November economic and fiscal outlook that Government policies since the election could lead to 34,000 fewer housing association homes being built over the next five years.

We believe that, at every opportunity, the Housing and Planning Bill restricts the ability and obligation of the public and private sectors to provide genuinely affordable homes, and that it will intensify the spiral of ever-higher housing costs. The right-to-buy proposals will contribute to that, which is why we seek to protect charities from being obliged or compelled to be part of that.

The Opposition have always said that the extension of the right to buy to housing associations through the Bill is unworkable and wrong. It will lead to a severe and irreversible loss of affordable homes at a time when they have never been more needed, because there is no genuine plan for a one-to-one, like-for-like replacement.

Moreover, the right-to-buy proposals are expected to cost a staggering £5 billion or even more. We know that civil servants have warned Ministers about the costs and the difficulties of replacing the homes sold, leading to a shortage of affordable homes. Shelter predicts that the right-to-buy proposals could lead to the loss of 180,000 affordable homes over the next five years, when we already have a well known crisis in our housing supply.

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[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 11, page 10, line 5, after “person” add “or persons”.

This amendment aims to ensure that, where there has been a collective failure to act, a whole trustee board should be held accountable.

We support clause 11 in principle, but we seek to make some amendments to it. At present, the Charity Commission has no general power to disqualify a person from being a charity trustee on the basis of unsuitable conduct. It can remove a trustee only if it has instituted a statutory inquiry into the charity, it is satisfied of both misconduct and mismanagement in relation to the charity, and there is a need to protect the charity’s property or secure the proper application of that property. In those circumstances, the trustee who is removed is automatically disqualified. Clause 11 will provide the Charity Commission with a new power to disqualify a person from a charity trusteeship in relation to all charities, specified charities or classes of charity.

Amendment 7 would provide that the Charity Commission could take such action in regard to more than one trustee. If the conditions applied to more than one trustee—they could not be ascribed to one individual but were part of a collective failure—the amendment would allow the Charity Commission to act, particularly under conditions D, E and F. The amendment would enable action to be taken where there had been a collective failure on the part of the board to take any reasonable step to oppose misconduct or mismanagement of which the trustees were collectively aware. In the case of a serious child protection issue, for example, if a board is collectively aware of allegations of misconduct, or of misconduct itself, there is an argument for holding the board collectively responsible rather than singling out individuals. We believe that that could be important in situations where a conspiracy of silence may have led to behaviour being tolerated for fear of challenging it. That is why we have tabled the amendment, which would broaden out the clause so that it applied collectively to trustees rather than to specific individuals.

[Mr Wilson]

I hope it will help the Committee if I explain the purpose of clause 11 before I respond to amendment 7. The clause gives the Charity Commission a new power to disqualify a person from being a charity trustee or senior manager on a case by case basis. Most unfit individuals will be caught by the existing automatic disqualification criteria, which will be extended by the Bill, but the commission needs a power to act in cases where individuals are not excluded by automatic disqualification. The new power in clause 11 will enable the Charity Commission to disqualify an individual whose conduct clearly makes them unfit to be a charity trustee or senior manager, where, if the commission were not to act, there would be a real risk to charities or to public trust and confidence in charities.

There is no doubt that that is a tough new power for the regulator, but we made several changes to the provision as a result of pre-legislative scrutiny. More detail about the operation of the provision has been included in the Bill, and the commission must now apply a three-limbed test under the proposed power. First, one of conditions A to F must be satisfied. Secondly, the commission must consider that the person’s conduct makes them unfit to be a charity trustee. The commission has published draft guidance alongside the Bill on how it would operate that test, and it will formally consult on its guidance before the relevant provisions are commenced. Thirdly, it must consider that exercising the power is in the public interest to protect public trust and confidence in charities.

Although the power may be drawn relatively widely, its use would be targeted, and there are several safeguards. The commission has said that it expects to exercise the power on a relatively small number of occasions each year. In addition to meeting the three-limbed test, the commission will have to give notice of its intention to disqualify and give a period for representations to be made, which it must take into account before any decision is made. If a decision is made to disqualify, disqualification will take effect only after a period of 42 days has elapsed, during which the individual will be able to lodge an appeal with the tribunal. If the decision is appealed to the tribunal, the tribunal will determine the outcome. In making its decision it will consider the case entirely afresh, on the basis of all the evidence before it. It will not simply review the Charity Commission’s original decision. As I will not tire of reminding the Committee, in all its actions in the process the Charity Commission will have to abide by section 16 of the Charities Act 2011, which requires it to act proportionately.

A real case provides an example of when the disqualification power might be used. The police investigated concerns that a trustee had falsified charity invoices to claim public funding for their own personal use. The trustee accepted two police cautions for offences involving dishonesty or deception. The criteria for automatic disqualification refer only to convictions for such offences. Cautions are not considered to be convictions, so they do not result in disqualification. In the case in question the person resigned as a trustee but was free to take up trustee roles in other charities, and the commission is currently powerless to stop that. The disqualification power would enable the Charity Commission to consider disqualification of the individual on the ground that their conduct made them unfit to be a trustee.

Another example would be if a person had no relevant unspent conviction but had undergone a serious event such as being disqualified from a professional organisation while they were a trustee of a related charity, or if they had been subject to a judgment in the employment tribunal for repeated bullying of or racism towards staff members. That might mean that the person was unfit to be a trustee. Individuals often use the charity brand to reinforce their public status at the expense of the charity’s interest.

Amendment 7 would empower the Charity Commission to disqualify an entire trustee board if it was guilty of a collective failure. The commission already has the power to act and has done so, in cases of collective failure by trustees and systemic governance issues. The powers in sections 79 and 80 of the Charities Act 2011 to remove trustees do not explicitly or implicitly contain any restriction on removing trustees where that would leave one or none in place, nor does the proposed disqualification power in clause 11. There is therefore no reason why the commission would not take action against all of a charity’s trustees where that would be appropriate and proportionate and in accordance with the principles of best regulatory practice.

In most cases, however—I think the hon. Member for Redcar recognised this in her comments—the commission is likely to focus on the individuals who have been most responsible for any misconduct or mismanagement. That is in line with its much mentioned duty to act proportionately, which means that it would need to consider whether it would be fair and proportionate to hold all a charity’s trustees collectively and equally responsible for any misconduct or mismanagement. Often, in practice, some trustees are more directly responsible for the misconduct or mismanagement than others who may not have been directly involved, but who may have failed to identify it or act to stop it. Each case needs to be considered on its merits, but in most cases either there would be insufficient evidence or it would not be proportionate for the commission to take action against the entire trustee board on the basis of collective responsibility.

There is a secondary, practical point. Removing all a charity’s trustees would leave it with none, which would effectively create another quite different problem of finding and appointing appropriate new trustees. Often that is no easy task. It can take months or even years to find people who are willing to become trustees of a charity whose name has been tarnished through serious misconduct or mismanagement. We should remember that it is estimated that at any one time half of all charities have at least one trustee vacancy on their board.

Trustees who are directly responsible for misconduct must be held to account, but if there are trustees who were not directly involved in it and who are willing and able to help to get the charity back on track, it would be right for the commission to take that into account. In circumstances where there is an impact on the charity’s beneficiaries, the commission has tended to appoint an interim manager under section 76 of the Charities Act 2011, to ensure that the charity continues to operate and to get it back on track before new trustees can be appointed and take over full time. However, that can be a costly solution for the charity, as the costs of the interim manager are usually paid from the charity’s own funds, so in most cases, where there are trustees who are willing and capable of putting things right and who have not been directly involved in the misconduct or mismanagement, it is right that they be supported in getting the charity back on its feet.

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[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 11, page 10, line 31, leave out

“(either generally or in relation to the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order)”

and insert,

“, as defined by the Commission in a specific document to be published after consultation and renewed every five years”.

Instead of removing this power altogether, this amendment ensures the Commission publicises its definition of “person unfit to be a charity trustee” following a consultation.

As we have discussed at length since the Committee first sat, the Bill gives a raft of new powers to the Charity Commission, on which we are placing a large burden to exercise good judgment in its decision making. I appreciate that the Minister has re-emphasised the word “proportion”, which we heard a lot during the first sitting, but again, it is a subjective word. If the Charity Commission is to be provided with discretionary powers to disqualify someone who is unsuitable, any test of unfitness should be robustly and clearly defined. Safeguards should be provided to prevent such a test from being used inappropriately.

Included in the clause is condition F, which allows the Charity Commission to disqualify a trustee on the ground

“that any other past or continuing conduct by the person, whether or not in relation to a charity, is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order.”

That is too broad and subjective. In effect it leaves the determination of who can be a charity trustee to the opinion of the Charity Commission’s board and management, rather than any due process. It opens up the possibility that the power may be used in relation to any past or continuing conduct, whether or not in relation to a charity. It seems unlikely that there is any conduct that would meet the alternative conditions A to E that would not also meet condition F. Many in the charity sector, including the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations, have asked to have condition F removed, because in the light of the other conditions in the Bill, it seems unnecessary and open to subjective interpretation.

The Charity Commission, however, has long argued for this power and welcomes its inclusion in the Bill. It says that the power will enable it to protect charities from being run by individuals who are clearly not fit to do so. We therefore believe that rather than being removed entirely, condition F should be amended so that it is subject to more rigorous definition. The amendment would ensure that the Charity Commission publicised its definition of what constitutes conduct that

“is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities”.

That could then be subject to consultation with the sector, which could help to define the kinds of scenario that could apply and play a role in exploring the word “proportion” and the decision making that we are asking the Charity Commission to undertake.

The Charity Commission has published a policy paper on how it would use the proposed disqualification power, which is a helpful guide. The commission acknowledges that this is a significant new power, and says that it is important to provide reassurance that it will use it only when there is a clear case for doing so and that it should clearly explain what it will take into account before using the power. The amendment is designed to provide that reassurance. We believe that the policy paper is a helpful draft, but it should be made a formal document, as mentioned in the Bill, published after consultation with the sector and revised every five years. For that reason, we hope the Government will accept the amendment.

[Mr Wilson]

I do not propose to repeat what I have said about the new disqualification power in clause 11, but I will focus on the specific details of amendment 5. I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s explanation of the amendment, which would give the Charity Commission the job of publishing at least every five years guidance on how it assesses unfitness. I recognise that this is an attempt to narrow the breadth of the commission’s discretion, as the hon. Lady said, but although I have some sympathy with the intention behind the amendment, I simply do not believe that it is necessary.

The Charity Commission has published details of its initial thoughts on how it would exercise the disqualification power, with positive feedback from charities and Members of the other place. It did so when the Bill was introduced in the other place. In the document, the commission recognises that this is a significant new power, provides reassurance that it will use the power only when there is a clear case for doing so, and says that it should explain clearly what it will take into account before using the power.

In the paper, the Charity Commission explains its initial thinking on how it would apply the first limb of the test—criteria A to F. It goes on to explain its initial thinking on how it would apply the second limb of the test—assessing a person’s unfitness to serve as a charity trustee. The commission’s assessment of unfitness, based on its regulatory experience, is that unfitness is likely to be a result of failure in one or more of the following broad categories: honesty and integrity, competence, and credibility. The commission goes on to set out, under each of those headings, the types of conduct that it would consider and examples of the conduct that in its view would demonstrate unfitness.

Under the heading “honesty and integrity”, the commission would consider evidence of abuse of a position of trust. That could be demonstrated by exploiting a position of trust for personal gain, misleading a public body, or other forms of dishonesty, deception or cheating that could give rise to concerns about the individual’s fitness to serve as a charity trustee. Dishonesty is well understood in charity law, and forms part of the 2011 Act, so this is not an entirely new or unfamiliar concept.

Under the competence heading, the commission would consider evidence that the person is incapable of or unwilling to fulfil the duties and responsibilities of a trustee. That could include, for example, failing to act

“in compliance with the governing document and rules of the charity”,

failing to keep proper accounting records for the charity, or showing

“a wilful disregard for management of conflicts of interests”.

Again, competence is a concept widely used by other regulators, so that is not entirely new either. By way of example, under section 61 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Financial Conduct Authority may grant an application for someone to become an authorised person only if it is satisfied that the candidate

“is a fit and proper person to perform the function”

in question.

The Act does not prescribe matters which must be taken into account by the FCA in making the determination, but details are given in the FCA handbook.

Under the credibility heading, the commission would consider conduct that impacts on the individual’s personal credibility and reputation to such an acute extent

“that it calls into question their fitness to act in the quasi-public role of trustee”.

That could include, for example,

“support for and participation in discredited tax avoidance schemes”,

or

“actions in fundraising that gave them high personal benefits to the detriment of the charity or in which they used high-pressure selling or other discredited methods”.

Reputation is a key part of a charity’s assets under charity law, and a key part of the commission’s work in furtherance of its statutory objective with regards to public trust and confidence. Again, this heading is not an entirely new concept for the commission or the charity sector.

The final limb of the test is that the commission must consider whether exercising the disqualification power is

“in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence”

in charities. The commission’s draft paper explains that under this test it would consider whether disqualification

“will protect charities from those who would not carry out the role of trustee with integrity, honesty, capability or credibility in the interests of the charity and its beneficiaries, and ultimately be trusted by the public to do so”.

The commission sets out factors it would consider under this limb of the test, including

“the nature and seriousness of the conduct…the extent of the unfitness and whether it might be temporary or time-specific”.

I hope that hon. Members have had an opportunity to consider the commission’s draft paper, and that they take reassurance from it and from the commission’s commitment to work it up into proper draft guidance, and consult publicly on that guidance before the provision is commenced. Other regulators with similar powers are also given the responsibility, without defining the exact details in statute as this amendment proposes, to work up appropriate, proportionate and detailed guidance with regards to the use of this type of power. In addition, it is important to note that the commission keeps all of its guidance under review to ensure that it remains relevant and up to date.

As I have mentioned in previous sessions, the commission recently consulted on and launched an updated version of “The essential trustee” guidance. It is also consulting on an updated version of fundraising guidance for trustees, and there are other pieces of work under review. The commission can and does ensure that its guidance is relevant and up to date, and it will do so at the appropriate time. The whole Bill will be reviewed after three years, and subsequently every five years. This power will be looked at carefully, and the guidance will no doubt be important in the effective use of the power. On that basis, I do not think that amendment 5 is necessary. I hope that the hon. Member for Redcar will accept my explanation, and decide not to press her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wilson]

That certainly has not happened to date—there has not been a conflict between the decisions of the charity tribunal and the Charity Commission—and I do not expect it to happen, because the Charity Commission works on the basis of the trust placed in it by the charitable sector. If the Charity Commission is regularly getting decisions wrong, that will have an impact on its status within the sector. The Charity Commission does all that it can to avoid a downgrade in its status. I hope that reassures my hon. Friend that the Charity Commission would always act in the sector’s best interests, in terms of proportionality and section 16 of the Charities Act 2011, which I have constantly mentioned, and that it would always try to get its decisions right, so that it does not come into regular conflict with the charity tribunal.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for a thorough and helpful explanation of the steps involved and the safeguards that will be in place. To some extent, it sounded like there would be a triple lock through the commission’s criteria and the notice period for the tribunal, which is reassuring.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff Central for her helpful contribution. She made the really important point that the criteria have to be clear, unambiguous and properly defined. We look forward to continuing to work with the Charity Commission as it develops its explanation further. As I mentioned, we recognise the helpfulness of the policy paper that the Charity Commission published on how it would use the disqualification power. I was pleased to hear from the Minister that there will be further consultation with the sector and that the paper will be refined and published in full before implementation. That is reassuring, and we will continue to contribute to that. We look forward to working with the Charity Commission to ensure that it recognises the importance of the power, and we will work actively with the sector to refine it.

I also welcome the Minister’s reminder that the Bill will be reviewed in three years and in five years. We will seek to ensure that the Charity Commission regularly updates its guidance as well, particularly in the light of its experience in using it over the coming months and years. Given the Minister’s comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 11, page 11, line 33, after “conduct” insert, “both relevant and serious”.

To ensure a more narrow and relevant definition of “conduct”.

This amendment builds on the previous one. Although I am reassured by many of the Minister’s explanations, we want to talk through the matter further and set on record our concern about the breadth of condition F. Amendment 6 would limit the definition within that condition, which allows the Charity Commission to disqualify a trustee on the grounds

“that any other past or continuing conduct by the person, whether or not in relation to a charity, is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities”.

The inclusion of the words “both relevant and serious” through this amendment is intended to put the onus on the Charity Commission to prove that it has interpreted that definition with sufficient gravity and sufficient evidence to justify the seriousness of the action, as the Minister sought to reassure me it would. We believe that the current definition is too broad and subjective, and that the amendment would help to narrow the definition and give the charity sector some reassurance.

[Mr Wilson]

Once again I find that I have a great deal of sympathy with the intention behind the amendment, but once again I do not think it is necessary, and I believe it could have unintended consequences.

Let me explain first why I do not think the amendment is necessary. I agree that the commission should only consider conduct that is “relevant and serious”; in fact, so does the commission itself. The commission has said that under clause 11, it would provide the individual involved with an explanation identifying the conduct in question and why it thought that conduct met condition F. If the commission took account of conduct that was not relevant to the person’s ability to act as a charity trustee or senior manager, I would expect that any such disqualification order would be thrown out by the charity tribunal on appeal. As I have just discussed with my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford, the Charity Commission would not want that to happen on a regular basis.

As I have said many times, the commission would need to act in line with the duty set out in section 16(4) of the 2011 Act, under which its regulatory activities

“should be proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted only at cases in which action is needed”.

As a public body, the commission would also have to consider general human rights and equality duties.

The commission’s draft paper on its initial thoughts about how it would exercise its disqualification power provides some useful guidance. The commission recognises that condition F is widely drawn, but it gives examples of the types of conduct that it could take into account. For instance, if the conduct in question was by a trustee of a charity, it could consider whether it was misconduct or mismanagement, and whether it would put the charity’s property or reputation at undue risk. It could also take into account misconduct in another position of trust and responsibility; convictions relevant to the charity’s purposes, for example a conviction for animal cruelty by a trustee of an animal welfare charity; regulatory breaches that have been penalised by another authority, for example legal breaches on tax matters; a finding of misconduct by a professional body or regulator; or an adverse finding by a charity self-regulatory body or umbrella body.

I think the Committee will agree that those examples show the sorts of conduct that the regulator should consider. Whatever the conduct, which must be both relevant and serious, the commission would also have to meet the other two limbs of the test for disqualification: first, that the person is unfit to serve as a charity trustee; and, secondly, that making the disqualification order is in the public interest to protect public trust and confidence in charities. Under the disqualification power in clause 11, the commission would already need to consider conduct that was both relevant and serious.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wilson]

I see and understand the point that my hon. Friend makes. The best way for me to deal with it, as we have a period of time before Report in which we can consider the matter further, is to write to him in detail. If people were able to conduct trawling, as he calls it, that would be a worrying scenario.

I hope the Committee will understand why I believe the amendment is not necessary and could be counterproductive. I hope that the hon. Member for Redcar will withdraw it.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for his response and other members of the Committee for their interesting and thought-provoking questions, which help us and set out the benefit of going through a Bill line by line in Committee. It allows us to set out some of the issues that still need clarification.

In light of the Minister’s answer, and particularly the reassurance that he gave at some length on the steps that the Charity Commission will undertake to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards, we will withdraw the amendment. I am reassured to some extent, but we look forward to working with the commission in the coming months to ensure that the safeguards are sufficiently clear and agreed by the sector prior to implementation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Rob Wilson

Tuesday 5th January 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Civil Society (Mr Rob Wilson)]

I welcome you to the Committee, Mr Chairman. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.

Clause 12 extends the duty of the Charity Commission to keep a publicly accessible register of people who have been removed from office by either the commission or the High Court. The register includes the name of the removed trustee, their address at the time of removal, the date when the order was made and the name of the charity concerned. It contains details of individuals who are disqualified only because they have been removed by the commission or the court; it does not contain details of those disqualified for reasons such as an unspent criminal conviction or bankruptcy.

The register can be searched by name on www.gov.uk. It is an offence to act as a trustee while disqualified, so all charities should have a vetting procedure in place to check that new and existing trustees are eligible to act, and checking the Charity Commission’s register of removed trustees is a good way to do that. It is also good practice for trustee boards to ask prospective trustees to confirm in writing that they are not disqualified. The Charity Commission provides a model declaration form that charities can download from the aforementioned website.

Under clause 12, the register of removed trustees would be extended to include details of persons who are subject to disqualification orders made under clause 11 and those disqualified trustees removed from office by the commission under clause 5.

[Anna Turley (Redcar) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hamilton. I welcome you to the Committee.

The Opposition support clause 12. We have tabled no amendments to it because it is an important measure in ensuring public scrutiny and accountability regarding the decisions taken by the commission and the court, along with the circumstances surrounding, and any learning that might come from, them. The clause provides that the commission must maintain a publicly accessible register of persons who have been removed from office by the commission or the High Court, and extends the register to include details of persons subject to a disqualification order.

My only question at this stage is whether the Minister envisages any scenarios in which it would not be appropriate to take that action. The clause states that “the register must include”, but the Minister mentioned exemptions in the case of bankruptcy and so on. Given that addresses and other details will be publicised, might he envisage a scenario in which, for reasons of public or individual protection, or any other reason, someone would not be included in the register?

[Mr Wilson]

I will give some thought to that question, but the commission already processes a vast amount of information in accordance with a number of legal obligations, including data protection legislation. It is important to mention that, because there might be concerns about publicly available information being in some way misused.

The commission currently maintains, in accordance with its statutory duties, including data protection considerations, a register of 164,000 charities. The commission fully accepts its responsibility to protect individuals from any unauthorised and unreasonable case for disclosure of personal information, while balancing that with legitimate considerations. The commission is overseen in its management of personal data by the Information Commissioner’s Office, as are all public bodies. I will write to the hon. Lady in answer to her question.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Participation in corporate decisions while disqualified

[Mr Wilson]

The provision is relatively straightforward and I hope to be able to provide the Committee with a quick and short explanation.

Trustees do not need to be natural persons; they can be legal persons. That means it is possible for a corporate body to be a trustee of a charity. This gives rise to a loophole relating to disqualified trustees. As the law currently stands, a disqualified trustee is not prevented from acting as an officer of a corporate body—where that corporate body is a charity trustee—and participating in decisions about the management and administration of the charity. This can potentially be used to circumvent disqualification. Clause 13 enables us to put this matter right. It prohibits disqualified individuals from participating in decisions about the administration of a charity where they are an officer of a corporate body and that corporate body is a charity trustee. It also extends the civil and criminal sanctions that apply where a disqualified individual acts as a trustee. It is a common-sense provision and I commend it to the Committee.

[Anna Turley]

I support the Minister’s view on the provision. It is technical, but important. The clause inserts into the Charities Act 2011 new section 184A, which sets out that where a person is disqualified either under section 178 or new section 181A of the Charities Act 2011, which we have discussed in some detail in Committee, and where they are an officer of a corporate body that is a charity trustee, the provision prohibits that person from participating in decisions relating to the charity’s administration. We think it is absolutely right that we abide by the decision that the Charity Commission has made and that the person is not able to continue to participate through that loophole.

It is right that new section 184A extends the existing criminal and civil sanctions to apply to officers who participate in decisions relating to a charity’s administration when they have been disqualified from being charity trustees, and we therefore support the provision.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Fund-raising

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wilson]

You have me working hard this evening, Mr Hamilton.

The clause introduces important new requirements that will greatly increase transparency in relation to a charity’s approach to fundraising. These provisions were added to the Bill in the other place following a series of media exposés of poor fundraising practices in which elderly and vulnerable people were targeted by charities or subjected to undue pressure to donate. Many of those poor practices are completely and utterly unacceptable. It is important to remember that although bad practice has been uncovered, most charities fundraise well. They need to be able to ask people to donate to raise funds, and we should not forget that many do so responsibly and in line with best practice.

The sorts of poor practices that we have seen in the media recently are mainly in the areas of mass marketing fundraising, such as direct mail or telephone fundraising. In these high volume data-driven areas, some charities have been treating donors as a means to an end, rather than focusing on the charity’s relationship with the donor as an individual. The first new requirement under subsections 7 and 8 will ensure that charities put in place explicit safeguards for potential donors when they wish to fundraise through third party contractors.

The provision prohibits a contractor from fundraising for a charity unless the written agreement between the fundraiser and the charity includes standards such as how it will protect vulnerable people from undue pressure and how the charity will monitor the contractor’s compliance. It has become clear that much of the poor practice we have seen over the past year or so occurs when there is a lack of accountability over how charity fundraising is conducted. The new requirement aims to make it absolutely clear that charities are responsible for ensuring that third parties who are paid to fundraise on the charity’s behalf act in a moral, respectful and responsible manner when asking the public for money.

The second requirement under new section 162A will introduce much greater transparency in relation to a charity’s track record in fundraising. It will require charities to publicly disclose information on how they conduct fundraising, whether they subscribe to appropriate self-regulation, and whether any good practice requirements have been breached. They will also need to publicise more details on the number of complaints that they have received, as well as what principles they follow in order to protect vulnerable donors and the wider public from poor practice. That will ensure that high-quality fundraising becomes a board-level issue and returns to the heart of a charity’s operations where it belongs. In that respect, I also warmly welcome the Charity Commission’s new guidance for trustees on their responsibilities to do with fundraising. The new guidance, which is being consulted on, should be a must-read for all trustees of charities that fundraise from the public.

To update the Committee on our progress in strengthening the self-regulation of fundraising, which sits alongside the provisions in the Bill and is arguably more important, not only did we amend the Bill in the other place, but I asked Sir Stuart Etherington to undertake a review of fundraising self-regulation over the summer. He was supported by a cross-party panel of peers. His report, published in September, recommended the establishment of a new, tougher, single self-regulator to oversee charity fundraising with universal coverage, high standards of best practice, stronger sanctions and close links to existing statutory regulators.

The review also recommended the setting up of a fundraising preference service so that people who felt inundated with charity fundraising requests would be able to reset their consent to be contacted. That has proved a popular concept with the public. Taken together, the proposals will provide a strong and comprehensive framework for the self-regulation of fundraising.

We are making good progress on implementation. I appointed Michael Grade, Lord Grade of Yarmouth, to be the interim chair of the new fundraising self-regulator. In December he appointed his interim chief executive, Stephen Dunmore. He also appointed a working party to develop plans to implement the fundraising preference service, led by George Kidd, who has vast experience in direct marketing regulation. In December the largest fundraising charities were invited to a summit, which was streamed live and at which Lord Grade set out his vision for the new self-regulator. The meeting was a success and I left with the impression that the largest charities accepted that things needed to change and were willing to throw their weight behind the new regulator.

Over the next few months Lord Grade’s vision will be turned into reality and we expect to see the new regulator up and running from spring 2016, with the fundraising preference service following shortly afterwards. Most of the largest charities have committed to fund the new self-regulator’s set-up costs and I am sure that the others will soon follow. This is an opportunity for the charity sector to demonstrate its leadership and maturity and to show that it can put its own house in order.

I have every confidence that, with charity support, the new self-regulatory system will succeed and, most importantly, consign poor fundraising practices to history. If the new self-regulatory system were to fail, however, we need a back-up plan, which is where new clause 7 on the Government’s reserve powers to regulate fundraising through statute comes in. I will explain those powers to the Committee in more detail at our next sitting.

[Anna Turley]

The Opposition welcome clause 14 and have tabled no amendments to it. However, it is important and deserves discussion, so I will take some time, with the leave of the Chair, to make a few points.

Due to the clause’s importance and, in particular, because of some of the public exposure that led to it, it is essential to explore some of the issues behind it. It amends section 59 of the Charities Act 1992 and prohibits commercial fundraisers from raising funds for a charitable institution unless the fundraising agreement between the commercial fundraiser and the charitable institution includes certain terms on fundraising standards that the commercial fundraiser undertakes to follow. That is extremely important, because many within and outside the sector have felt that what could be described as the outsourcing of a charity’s fundraising function can perhaps play a part in distancing that process from the charity’s original aims and objectives. People have also felt that the accountability of a charity itself could be somewhat loosened by the outsourcing of fundraising provisions. We therefore think the clause is an important amendment to ensure that a proper agreement is in place setting out a certain number of standards that must be followed.

Clause 14 also amends the Charities Act 2011 by inserting new section 162A, which requires charities whose accounts have to be audited in accordance with section 144(2) of the Act—currently, those with a gross annual income of more than £1 million, or those with a gross annual income of more than £250,000 and assets with an aggregate value exceeding £3.26 million—to set out in annual reports their approach to fundraising, including in particular whether they use commercial fundraisers and how they protect vulnerable people from undue pressure in their fundraising.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for setting out the views and values behind the clause, which we welcome. Social investment is an important part of the fabric of our community and voluntary sector. We have tabled no amendments to the clause, and we recognise that it will make an important contribution.

As the Minister set out, the Bill is the first attempt to define in statute social investment, which is

“the use of repayable finance to achieve a social as well as a financial return.”

Community and voluntary sector organisations are playing an increasingly large role in society. As such, demands on the sector will be higher than ever. However, the third sector faces a chronic lack of investment. Many organisations are constantly in a state of fragility and vulnerability, and many are urgently seeking the next source of funding rather than investing to create a sustainable and robust social business. The climate of cuts, particularly in local government, as well as increased pressures and demands on many of the services that community and voluntary sector organisations provide, mean that they are facing a difficult climate. Any opportunity to look at new and innovative ways of raising finance are therefore to be welcomed.

Often, when funding comes it is unsuitably packaged for the purpose. It might be aimed at short-term projects or something specific, with many strings attached. It could come with unrealistic expectations and may not always be support the core aims and objectives of the charity. Social investment is growing in response to those needs and challenges. Done well, it could not only create more capital for the sector but help to build long-term capacity and develop a movement towards early intervention and prevention, which the Opposition welcome as part of our approach to public services. That could result in a stronger third sector that is better able to play its important role in society.

The Bill’s helpful explanatory notes give examples of acts that might constitute social investments, and the definition is welcome. Such examples include a charity for the support of homeless people letting out housing at a low rent; an overseas development charity investing in fair trade tea production; a charity for the advancement of medicine making a high-risk investment in a medical research company; a diabetes charity investing in a company that is developing foods intended to reduce the impact of diabetes on sufferers; or a charity for the reduction of reoffending investing in a social impact bond to fund a project that supports individuals leaving prison. Those are all worthy and important aims and objectives, and we support efforts to put a social investment framework into statute.

Nevertheless, it is important that we continue to see the funding of the community and voluntary sector as diverse and variable. We do not want a one-size-fits-all solution to the funding crisis in the charity sector, as not all charities will be able to make social investments. Some charities need to be able to take risks and fail, which is in the nature of any charity or community organisation. Because of the kinds of people that they support and deal with, or because of their aims and objectives, some community and voluntary sector organisations will have to spend money just to manage or prevent decline or difficult scenarios. We must ensure that charities that support such social investment, which may never have a financial return, are not starved of the finance and support that they would traditionally get through a grant-based model.

The clause sets out an important framework for social enterprise, which we support and welcome as an important new means for charities to gain income and to be longer-term and more strategic in their approaches. It gives charities the reassurance that they need to feel empowered to undertake investment. Definitions will continue to change and evolve, but in the meantime, this is an important regulatory framework to encourage and support social enterprise.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Reviews of the operation of this Act

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wilson]

This is a review clause. We took on board the concerns raised in the other place that five years would be too long before the first review, and we have debated some of those concerns today. We amended the Bill so that the first review will have to start within three years of enactment and conclude within a year. Subsequent reviews will have to take place every five years. All the reviews will be reported to Parliament.

We must remember that the Charity Commission estimates that some of the new powers might only be exercised once or twice a year, so allowing time for the development and publication of guidance and, in some cases, public consultation before the provision can be commenced means that for some of the powers there may be a limited evidence base for the first review after three years. Nevertheless, this is a sensible provision that will enable us to determine whether the Bill has achieved its aims, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Anna Turley]

The Opposition support this clause because it is a simple and practical way of providing for the Minister to review the operation of the Bill. As he mentioned, we have had quite a lot of discussion and debate today about the timeframe for monitoring the Bill. We have had a lot of debate about the onus that much of the Bill puts on the Charity Commission, about many of the new powers and about many of the new expectations that will be placed on charity and community groups. It is right that we review those things.

The Minister has used the word “proportionate” many times when talking about the decision making and judgments that the Charity Commission will have to exercise in taking steps to raise standards within the charity sector. Continuing to review that will be important. We will also continue to assess the financial impact, particularly on the Charity Commission but also on the charity sector, of many of the new demands and powers.

As the Minister said, it is important that new guidance, new policy papers and new explanations, definitions and criteria for the Charity Commission will be set out, consulted on, established and reviewed consistently within three years of the enactment of the Bill. Three years, moving to five years thereafter, is a perfect timeframe to establish that, so we support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Short title, extent and commencement

[Mr Wilson]

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 17, page 20, line 34, leave out subsection (6).

A technical amendment to remove the Privilege amendment that was inserted in the House of Lords.

This is a technical and procedural amendment to remove the privilege amendment that was made on Third Reading in the other place. The privilege amendment recognises that provisions in the Bill may infringe the privilege of the House of Commons with regard to the control of public money. Amendment 9 will leave out subsection (6), thus ensuring that the imposition of any charge resulting from the Bill is properly approved. In practice, the new powers that the Bill confers on the Charity Commission are expected not to result in additional costs for the commission. The commission itself has said that the new powers will help it to regulate charities more efficiently by ensuring that more proportionate and effective action can be taken at an early stage and by limiting the opportunity for delaying tactics, which can waste the commission’s resources.

The remainder of clause 17 addresses the Bill’s territorial extent, which is England and Wales. The Bill team has submitted a memorandum to the Committee’s Chairs for the purposes of Standing Order No. 83L covering the Government amendments that have been made today. It reflects the Department’s continuing view that the Bill, as amended, extends and applies to England and Wales only. We liaise with the devolved Administrations on cross-border charity law and regulation, and the Charity Commission similarly liaises with its counterparts in Scotland and Northern Ireland on matters of mutual interest.

The final provisions relate to the commencement of provisions in the Bill. We will work with the Charity Commission to publish an implementation plan for the Bill once it is passed. As I have mentioned, there are a number of provisions of which we will need to give charities, and those working in them, sufficient notice before we commence them. The extension of automatic disqualification is an important one. Other provisions will need guidance to be published before they can be commenced. I hope that my explanation suffices.

[Anna Turley]

We support the amendment. We agree with the Minister that it is a technical, procedural amendment to ensure the passage of the Bill, and we have no comments to make at this stage.

Amendment 9 agreed to.

Clause 17, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Sarah Newton.)

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Rob Wilson

Tuesday 15th December 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Wilson]

Clearly it is not enough, because the Charity Commission has asked for the additional powers. I am sure the Charity Commission would be only too happy to answer the detailed question about the number of affected charities.

I want to return to the safeguards, because there are a number of important safeguards on which we should focus our attention. First, the Charity Commission must give notice of its intention to issue a warning to a charity and its trustees. The notice must specify a number of matters, including the grounds for issuing the warning and any action the Charity Commission considers should be taken by the charity to rectify the breach that has given rise to the warning in the first place.

The notice must specify a period for representations to be made about the proposed warning, and the Charity Commission must take account of any representations before it issues any warning. An official warning could also highlight the likely consequences of any further non-compliance, which would be likely to require a more significant intervention by the regulator, such as the opening of a statutory inquiry and subsequent use of its temporary protective powers or its permanent remedial powers.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the Minister setting out those important safeguards. However, there is little evidence about the timeframe in the Bill, which means that charities have no control over their ability to present their arguments and let their trustees know. We will continue to press on this issue unless the Minister has some analysis of what is a reasonable time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wilson]

The criteria for issuing an official warning are now clearly stated in the Bill—breach of trust or duty, or other misconduct or mismanagement. These are not as narrow as the criteria recommended by the Joint Committee, but we decided that limiting the warning power to a failure to comply with a limited range of statutory provisions, or order or direction of the Commission, would result in a power that was only half effective at best. Charity law is a mix of statute and case law, and the scope of the warning power needs to reflect that. It would be wrong to limit the warning power to just breaches of statutory provisions or commission orders or directions, as this would limit the regulator to issuing warnings on less than half the legal framework.

I recognise that a breach of duty might not always be completely clearcut, but it is right that the regulator of charities should be able to reach a view on whether a charity’s trustees have breached their duties, and should be warned about their conduct. It would be wrong to expect the Charity Commission to have to open a statutory inquiry and consider exercising its more serious compliance powers in cases where charity trustees have breached their duties but not a specific statutory provision.

[Anna Turley]

The Minister is being extremely generous with his time. Does he agree that there are things that lie between breaking a statutory definition and what we are talking about here, which is quite a low level of concern: a breach of trust or duty, or other misconduct or mismanagement? That is quite broad in scope. Should there not be further definition—not necessarily in statute, but perhaps from the Charity Commission—to identify the criteria for that?

[Mr Wilson]

The Charity Commission is always prepared to listen to representations and to consider further guidance, but as I will come on to explain, I do believe there should be further guidance as part of what we are discussing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wilson]

My daughter has just taken up knitting. She is only eight and is doing a fantastic job.

It is clear that party political activity is outside the bounds of what charities should be doing. I think everyone accepts that. Sometimes there is a grey area, and if something is reported to the Charity Commission, it would rule one way or the other. I have stated on many occasions on public platforms that it is right that charities should be able to speak up for their beneficiaries, whether the Government like it or not, and I stick to that principle.

Another issue raised was the risk that adverse publicity could result from the publication of a warning. As I have said, it is important that charities are accountable to donors, beneficiaries and the general public. Since the 2006 Act, one of the commission’s statutory objectives has been to enhance that accountability. The argument against the clause is effectively that charities should not have to be accountable for things that they have done wrong. That is not fair to donors, beneficiaries and the general public, and reduces the incentives for charities to make future improvements.

A point was made about whether the commission should be allowed to publish warnings at all. Charities exist for public benefit and depend on public support, so there should be transparency. Official warnings should be published if the regulator considers it necessary to intervene, unless there is good reason not to publish the details of an official warning. Publishing those details also encourages compliance, thereby increasing the efficacy of the power.

Any published details of warnings would have to be removed by the commission after a certain period—as I said earlier, the commission currently archives after two years. There would be an opportunity to make representations about the factual accuracy of a statutory warning before it is published. A process for representations is included in the clause, following the recommendations that came during pre-legislative scrutiny. The commission has said that it will consult on and publish guidance on how it will use the official warning power before the power commences.

The hon. Member for Hove asked about the balance between the Charity Commission as friend versus the Charity Commission as regulator. I think we all agree that the commission needed to improve its regulatory performance on compliance and enforcement—the National Audit Office made that point—but that is not to belittle its other important regulatory functions, such as registration, guidance and permissions. We agree with Stuart Etherington of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations that in the past the commission sometimes blurred the distinction between being the regulator and being a friend of the sector. Getting the balance right is not particularly easy, but I am confident that the commission’s current leadership will try. The lack of guidance would create risk for the sector, but the commission’s guidance is well regarded and much has been done to simplify it.

The hon. Member for Ilford North briefly mentioned the commission’s need for extra resources to do its job. It has said that the powers would help it to undertake its compliance and enforcement work more efficiently, which is one of the reasons why we are introducing them. Gaps and weaknesses in the commission’s existing legal powers have occasionally frustrated its efforts to tackle abuse, resulting in delays and wasted costs that the Bill will help to minimise. We are helping the commission to become more efficient and to use its resources better than in the past.

A wider point was made about the amount of money that the Charity Commission receives. Obviously, all parts of Government need to contribute toward efficiency, and that includes the Charity Commission just as much as everyone else. Nevertheless, we recognise the need for targeted additional resources. In October we announced an extra £1 million of funding for 2015-16 and a further £8 million in capital investment between now and March 2017. That will be spent on technology and front-line operations, which will allow the commission to deploy its resources more effectively to prioritise its work.

I am sorry, but I do not support amendment 2. I hope the hon. Member for Redcar will understand that in practice, in the vast majority of cases, the commission will give sufficient notice, which I would expect to be 14 days. That will be set out in guidance that will enable some flexibility for particularly urgent cases. On that basis, I hope that she will not push the amendment to a vote.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister and everyone who participated in the debate. There is a wealth of experience in this room from within the sector and on the frontline, which does credit to this place and has informed the debate. I echo colleagues’ sentiments about charities’ fantastic work in local communities, in particular their work with the most deprived in some our most challenged communities. We appreciate the work that trustees do and the value that they provide while giving up so much precious time. In the spirit of working with the Government on the Bill, we hope that it will, through better support and guidance, allow trustees and charities to develop their role and create a better regulatory environment.

I am reassured by everything the Minister has said, but we will continue to want to iron out some issues throughout the Bill’s proceedings. While the vast majority of charities abide by the regulations and work incredibly hard to fulfil the criteria, I agree that our attitude cannot be that charities can do no wrong. Equally, our attitude cannot be that charities can do no right. Charities may have felt somewhat beleaguered over the past few months as a result of some media campaigns, so it is important that we send a message that we want to support them in doing the right thing. Some concerns remains, however. The Minister said “proportionate” a lot, and we are putting a lot of trust in the Charity Commission to decide what is proportionate. While I welcome his notification that the commission will set out in guidance the timeframe for issuing warnings, I look forward to seeing the detail.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent comparison, but what happens if, at the end of that representation, the Charity Commission does not agree? Where is the right of redress or recourse after that? Judicial review is too large, bureaucratic and expensive. It is a complex, time and resource-intensive activity that is largely inaccessible without legal assistance. It is widely known as the remedy of last resort for public body decisions when all other avenues of appeal have been exhausted.

There may be a perception among the public that charities should not use their funds to pursue judicial review applications, in particular in the light of some of what we have seen in the media in the last few days about how charities spend their money, which goes against the grain of what we are trying to encourage. It has been said that if it were possible to appeal against a warning, the commission might be reluctant to issue warnings full stop, as there would be a risk that appeal after appeal would gum up the system. This implies an awareness that judicial review is not really a remedy, as it so much more costly, complex and inaccessible than an appeal to the tribunal. In any event, research suggests that of the 103 inquiries opened by the commission between April 2014 and April 2015, no more than 5% were appealed to the tribunal, which is not a significant proportion. If the warning power is meant to be only for low-level issues but could precipitate adverse publicity—we have already discussed that at some length this morning—and the exercising of the commission’s protective powers, it is illogical that it should be more difficult to challenge than the exercising of the commission’s more extensive regulatory powers, such as the power to remove trustees, which can be challenged in the tribunal.

It is also worth noting that there seems to be confusion over whether the warning power can be used for low-level or medium-level concerns. When the power was first suggested, the Cabinet Office said that it would be for medium-range abuses, for which the commission’s protective powers could be used but it is not likely to be proportionate to do so. Yet the explanatory notes to the Bill say that it will be used where the risks are relatively low. There is still a huge lack of clarity about the difference between a medium-range and a low-level concern. The possible implications of a warning, as we know, are harsh for low-level matters, so it is important that charities have a right of redress and recourse to a tribunal. Without it, they might be unable to disprove what could potentially be false allegations. We also want to ensure that the Charity Commission considers warnings extremely seriously before issuing them.

[Mr Wilson]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her explanation of this amendment. I have already explained our thinking behind the official warning power at some length, and I do not intend to repeat it now, the Committee will be relieved to hear. I will try to be brief, but I do want to explain our thinking on why we propose relying on a representations process and judicial review as the means to challenge an official warning, rather than a right of appeal to the tribunal.

To use a footballing analogy, I consider official warnings to be like a yellow card, whereas statutory inquiry and the corrective and remedial powers that follow are more of a red card. It is absolutely right that the commission’s protective and remedial powers are subject to rights of appeal to the charity tribunal, but I do not accept that the warning power is in the same category.

Clause 1 provides for the commission to give notice of its intention to issue an official warning and for a period for representations to be made, which the Charity Commission will be obliged to consider before deciding whether to proceed with issuing the official warning. There is then the option of judicial review of the commission’s decision. We consider that that is proportionate in the sort of low-level yellow-card cases in which an official warning would be issued. It is exactly the same as the current position when the commission publishes details of its operational compliance case reports into non-inquiry cases that have attracted public interest and highlight important lessons for charity trustees.

The problem the commission currently has is that in between 20% and 30% of those non-inquiry cases, its advice and guidance is simply ignored, or the issues are not rectified in full. We believe that a right to appeal an official warning to the charity tribunal would be disproportionate and could render the power impractical for its intended purpose, which is to enable the commission to respond proportionately to the low-level non-compliance, misconduct or mismanagement that sometimes take place. The commission has told me that the resources required to defend tribunal proceedings would be disproportionate to the issues at stake in official warning cases, rendering the official warning power unusable from the commission’s perspective. The last thing I want to do, as I have said, is to give the Charity Commission powers that it cannot use because they are too bureaucratic, and that it could be criticised for failing to exercise several years down the line.

The Joint Committee on the draft Bill looked at the issue in some detail and agreed with us, stating:

“Although we note the arguments by some that the issue of a warning should be subject to appeal to the Tribunal, we see the practical difficulty this would present to the Commission as disproportionate to the benefits of doing so. On the assumption that the Government agrees to our recommendation that the necessary details be added to the face of the Bill, we are satisfied that the issuance of a warning does not need the further safeguard of an appeal beyond the ability to seek judicial review.”

It is important to point out that if the Charity Commission sought to escalate matters when an official warning had been ignored, by opening a statutory inquiry, the opening of the statutory inquiry would itself be subject to a right of appeal to the charity tribunal. Similarly, if the commission were to exercise one of its protective or remedial powers, that would also be subject to a right of appeal to the charity tribunal, so there are already two layers of appeal rights when a statutory inquiry is involved. It would seem wrong to add another layer of appeal to the tribunal in the case of an official warning, which could be used to frustrate commission regulatory action.

The Charity Commission has a high success rate on appeal—there were no successful appeals to the tribunal against the commission’s decisions to open a statutory inquiry in 2014-15. That shows that the concerns that some have expressed about the commission’s decision making are not based on reality. The issue for the commission is the amount of work and time that each tribunal case takes, even when it does not have merit. In 2012-13 appeals were made to the tribunal in five cases, and in 2014-15 appeals were made in 32 cases. The judicial review system is much better set up for setting right genuine wrongs, while discouraging or disposing of cases that are unmeritorious or that have been brought with the calculation that delay through litigation is the best tactic for avoiding robust regulation.

The requirement in clause 16, which I urge members of the Committee to look at if they have time, for a review of the legislation to begin within three years of enactment, will provide a timely opportunity to review the commission’s exercise of the official warning power and any judicial reviews of its exercise of that power.

The hon. Member for Redcar made a couple of brief points, one of which was about judicial review being costly and inaccessible. The administrative court judicial review system is much better set up for dealing with the concerns that are expressed—for putting right genuine wrongs, as I have mentioned—because there is a filter system. The tribunal, unlike judicial review, does not have a filter system in which the court’s permission to go ahead is sought. Cage is a recent example. The High Court refused permission on two of the three grounds, avoiding the spending of significant amounts of time on complex human rights arguments that were not arguable.

As for costs, a system such as that of the High Court, where costs are usually paid by the loser to the winner, can act as a sensible deterrent, encouraging parties on both sides to act reasonably and in accordance with the overriding objective.

Another question from the hon. Lady was whether the provision amounts to a direction power. The answer is no, it does not. An official warning is not the same as a direction power. The Government agreed with the Joint Committee’s recommendation to set out more detail in the Bill about the content of an official warning, including that the commission should specify how a charity should rectify any breach.

In some cases, such as a failure to file accounts, it will be obvious how a breach can be rectified. In others it will be less clear, and it is important for the commission to be able to set out guidance on the actions it considers necessary to remedy a breach. Ultimately, however, it will be for the charity’s trustees to decide how they will remedy a breach and then to demonstrate that they have done so effectively. A warning cannot force charities to take a particular course of action.

I think I dealt earlier with why there is no appeal in relation to warnings, so I shall not do that now. I hope that the hon. Lady will be persuaded to withdraw the amendment on the basis of my response.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for his thorough and helpful response. Again, we will not press the matter to a vote, but we still have significant concerns. As a football fan I liked the Minister’s metaphor about yellow cards, but with a yellow card there is no immediate repercussion other than having to be a bit more careful about the next tackle. For a charity, there are potentially quite damaging repercussions of a warning, particularly given the public notification. There could be an impact on a charity’s ability to fundraise, its reputation and its ability to find trustees. Those are wide-ranging implications, and something of such seriousness needs to be able to be challenged.

We still have not come to a conclusion on that point. I take the Minister’s point about the lack of error making so far in the Charity Commission’s decisions, and I commend it for that, but that is not to say that it will always be perfect. The point about warnings is that they are more low-level, so the likelihood of error is going to be substantially lower. As yet, there is no means of redress, other than judicial review, if a warning has been incorrectly given or if it is subsequently found that the Charity Commission did not abide by due process. Judicial review seems hugely disproportionate, particularly in the case of smaller charities, for what seems like the small issue of a warning. There ought to be proper discussion about different means of redress and a way of allowing a charity to challenge the Charity Commission formally.

We will not press the amendment to a vote, and I appreciate the Minister’s point that the Commission will be setting out further information in its guidance. I also welcome the Minister’s acknowledgement that the Charity Commission cannot force charities to take a particular course of action on the back of a warning. That is a welcome message to the sector. Of course, people will want to rectify any errors or issues that have led to a warning being given. I am sure many will want to guard their ability to decide the future of their charity and not be directed on how to run it by the Charity Commission. I look forward to seeing more from the Charity Commission on how it intends to ensure that.

We look forward to working through further clarification away from the statute book, but on the basis of the Minister’s comments I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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[Mr Wilson]

My apologies, Mrs Main. I missed that—it was all too quick for me. I am a bear with a slow brain.

Clause 3 enables the Charity Commission to take account of a person’s other relevant conduct outside of the charity under inquiry. The provision will enable the commission to consider whether there is evidence of misconduct or mismanagement in other charities or conduct outside charities that could undermine public trust and confidence in charities and therefore ought to be taken into consideration before the commission determines how to act.

On the face of it, that appears to be a very broad power, but it is not. There are significant safeguards, which I will set out. First, there must be a statutory inquiry open into charity A of which the person is a trustee or employee and the Charity Commission must be satisfied that there is misconduct or mismanagement linked to that individual in charity A before it can consider any of their conduct outside the charity as a makeweight in its decision-making. Secondly, the commission, when exercising its powers, must provide a statement of reasons under section 86 of the Charities Act 2011, which would set out all the evidence it relied on in making the decision. This would include any evidence from outside the charity, which must, of course, be relevant evidence. Finally, there is a right of appeal to the charity tribunal in relation to the exercise of the commission’s compliance and remedial powers, ensuring judicial oversight of the exercise of the relevant power.

The Charity Commission could only take account of conduct that would be relevant to the management or administration of a charity and would have to set out in its statement of reasons, under section 86 of the Charities Act 2011 or under the new official warning power in clause 1, the conduct that it was taking into account in decisions to exercise any compliance powers. The Charity Commission would not be able to take into account any conduct that was not relevant to the management or administration of a charity.

Let me give an example of when the commission would expect to rely on this power in practice. Allegations are made against an individual who is a trustee of charity A about abuse of vulnerable beneficiaries in a charitable care home. The Charity Commission opens a statutory inquiry and determines that there has been misconduct by the trustee. During the course of the commission’s inquiry, other regulators provide the commission with evidence of past misconduct that resulted in the individual’s employment in a care home being terminated. The commission would be able to take this other evidence into account before making a decision on what action would be proportionate in the circumstances.

As things stand, the commission would be able to give no weight to this other evidence of unacceptable conduct. Another example could involve an individual who is a trustee of two charities, charity X and charity Y. He may have been involved in misconduct in charity X and the commission may have already taken action in relation to charity X. The regulator may then have concerns about similar misconduct taking place in charity Y but, as the law stands, the commission cannot take into account the individual’s track record from charity X. This provision would enable the commission to do so.

We made amendments to the Bill in the other place to modernise the language of this provision and others in the Charities Act 2011. These changes were suggested by Lord Hope of Craighead, who chaired the Joint Committee and is a former deputy President of the Supreme Court. He argued, rightly, that there is no place in the 21st century for the term “privy to”. It was used in the Bill and the 2011 Charities Act to identify trustees who knew about misconduct or mismanagement but turned a blind eye. We have now replaced the term “privy to” with,

“knew of the conduct and failed to take any reasonable step to prevent it”.

That is much better for the understanding of the lay reader of the legislation, which is something we must bear in mind when we consider that trustees are almost all volunteers. This clause makes sensible changes that will help the commission with its compliance casework, and I commend it the Committee.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for that thorough and detailed explanation. He will be aware that we have tabled no amendments to this clause because we fully support it. It has been through a great deal of pre-legislative scrutiny and scrutiny in the other place, so we support that the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Power to remove trustees etc following an inquiry

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wilson]

Clause 4 basically does two things. First, it amends the existing power in section 79 of the Charities Act 2011 to allow the Charity Commission, in the course of an inquiry, to establish a scheme in relation to a charity. A scheme is a legal document made by the commission which can amend, replace or extend the trusts of a charity. It can set out new objects and purposes for a charity or amend or remove a prohibition or restriction.

Under the current law, the Charity Commission can make a scheme only where there is evidence of misconduct or mismanagement and a need to protect charity property or secure its proper application. Clause 4 would change that so that the Charity Commission can make a scheme where there is either evidence of misconduct or mismanagement or a need to protect charity property or secure its proper application. The commission considers this change to be necessary to enable it to take action in some cases where only one of the limbs can be demonstrated, but where commission action is necessary. Let me give two examples.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wilson]

I know that my officials like to pack a lot into my speeches, so they have longer paragraphs. Obviously it is important that we have proportionality. This is the sort of issue that arises dozens of times a year, so it is a regular occurrence and we need to take action to try to control and eradicate it.

Another example might be where a charity trustee is disqualified by virtue of having been convicted of theft. The person refused to resign his position, which was problematic for the charity because it affected their quorum for business and decision-making purposes and there was no power to remove a trustee within the charity’s constitution. The trustee board is already at its maximum size and is unable to act further. This new power would allow the commission to remove the trustee so that the charity can continue to operate quickly and safely.

The commission has estimated that the power would be used dozens of times each year to remove people who were refusing to stand down even when they had been told they were disqualified. This indicates that there is an issue to deal with. It is important to equip the commission with powers to take steps to remove a disqualified trustee from their role quickly and effectively. The new power was welcomed by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and I commend it to the Committee.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for that full and thorough explanation. As trustees of charities—which many members of the Committee are—many of us feel it is important to fulfil our duties fully and with confidence, should a fellow trustee board member not fulfil their duties and be disqualified as a result. The Charity Commission’s standards for disqualification are high—it has set the bar at a good level. We wholeheartedly support the clause because we think it is in the best interests of trustees around the country. They want the integrity of their boards protected, and it is important that those who have been disqualified can be removed, because trustees often do not have the ability to do so themselves. The clause gives more powers to the Charity Commission, but we wholeheartedly support them and we know it will use them wisely.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Sarah Newton.)

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Rob Wilson

Tuesday 15th December 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley (Redcar) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 6, page 5, line 2, at end insert—

‘(4) An order under this section will automatically be discharged on the closure of the inquiry under section 46 which is referred to in subsection (1).’

To restrict the power to ensure that if a tribunal appeal is successful, a direction by the Commission as a result of the warning is no longer relevant.

I welcome the clause, which inserts a new provision into the Charities Act 2011 to enable the Charity Commission, after it has instituted an inquiry, to make an order directing a charity not to take or to continue certain actions that the commission considers constitute misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the charity. The order has to specify the action that must not be made or continued, and has to set out the commission’s reason for making it. The commission will have to review any order at intervals of not more than six months and there will be a right of appeal against the order.

When the Joint Committee on the Draft Protection of Charities Bill suggested that it would be helpful if the Government chose to revisit proposal 13, it set out that the provision must be tightly drawn to clarify the circumstances in which the power can be used and the safeguards that apply, in particular the right of appeal. The previous Government accepted the Joint Committee’s recommendation and said that they would revisit proposal 13 for inclusion in the Bill—that is now clause 6. I look forward to the Minister setting out some examples of the circumstances in which the power may be used and any safeguards. I am pleased to see the right of appeal.

The new power in the clause is broadly similar to a power that the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator has to direct that specific action is not taken. However, the OSCR’s power may take effect for a maximum of six months. There is no such limit under clause 6, although the Charities Commission must review the order at intervals of not more than six months.

The crucial issue, to which my amendment speaks, is that it is not clear whether the order may remain in place once a section 46 inquiry has been closed, so it could extend beyond the period of the inquiry. The amendment seeks to prevent that. The Charity Commission states:

“The purpose of an inquiry is to examine the issues in greater detail and investigate and establish the facts of the case so that the commission can ascertain the extent of any misconduct or mismanagement, establish the extent of the risk to the charity, its work, property, or beneficiaries, and decide what action is needed to resolve the concerns. If the allegations are not substantiated, the inquiry will say so. The ultimate aim is to stop abuse, ensure compliance and put a charity back on a secure footing. Where this is possible it may include restoring its reputation, protecting beneficiaries or assets and protecting and enhancing the reputation and public confidence in the charitable sector generally.”

That is all right and proper, and we agree with the Charity Commission’s view on the purpose of an inquiry. Once the inquiry has concluded, an order made under clause 6 should no longer be relevant and the findings of the inquiry, whether allegations are substantiated or not, should take precedence. Directions that have been given during the process of an inquiry, but which are not in keeping with the outcomes, should not be pursued.

The commission has recently clarified the fact that it has no power to require trustees to fetter the future exercise of their fiduciary powers under its general power to give advice and guidance, which appears in section 15 of the Charities Act 2011. That clarification followed judicial review proceedings in the High Court, where it was alleged that the commission had attempted to do exactly that. This is one of the concerns that we expressed earlier in the debate, and it could apply in particular to the commission’s powers to specify action that should be taken to rectify misconduct or mismanagement under clause 2.

There are situations in which the commission may direct trustees to act or not to act—clauses 6 and 7 introduce more such situations—but they are always carefully circumscribed. It is therefore extremely important that we are satisfied that the definition of such powers is carefully discussed, that their gravity is understood and that they do not continue beyond an exhaustive inquiry. That is why I moved the amendment.

[The Minister for Civil Society (Mr Rob Wilson)]

The clause is a sensible extension of the existing powers of the Charity Commission that are available to it when it is conducting a statutory inquiry under section 46 of the Charities Act 2011. At the moment, when a statutory inquiry is under way and the commission is satisfied that there has been either misconduct or mismanagement, or that there is risk to charity property, it may direct a charity to undertake certain actions under section 84 of the Act. The purpose of the existing section 84 power is to allow the commission to direct any action to be taken that it

“considers to be expedient in the interests of the charity.”

Legal precedent confirms that “expedient” in that context means advantageous or beneficial, so the action that the commission proposes will be of advantage or benefit to the charity’s interests, which in effect means the charity’s beneficiaries. However, the advantage or benefit must be viewed only in the context of the issues raised through the inquiry and not in the belief that it would be good for the charity in general terms. Specific examples of where the commission already uses that power include ordering a charity to undertake a governance review in a defined period; review a legal agreement; provide specified documentation by a certain date; ensure that a named individual is monitored on charity premises at all times; draw up a risk management procedure in a certain timeframe and implement that procedure; and take legal advice in connection with a matter concerning the charity and its funds.

Published figures in “Tackling abuse and mis- management: 2013-14” show that the commission used that power to direct charities on 38 occasions. As we have discussed, the commission has been exercising its power more often and more effectively, so we may well see that figure increase in the report for 2014-15, which will be published in the coming weeks.

The power to direct a charity to do something is long held and the commission has well-established procedures and policies in its armoury. The commission also has the power under section 76(3)(f) of the Charities Act 2011 to restrict a charity from undertaking certain financial transactions. That existing power can be exercised in a number of ways, including freezing a charity’s bank account; requiring the charity’s trustees to seek commission approval before entering certain transactions; and preventing specific transactions. That was used on 15 occasions in 2013-14.

The commission does not have the power to prevent a charity from undertaking actions or activities that would amount to misconduct or mismanagement during the course of a statutory inquiry. That is a loophole and the clause is a common-sense addition that will give it that power.

Some people have expressed concern that the commission could use that power to undermine freedom of association or freedom of speech, in particular for charities with religious purposes, but it is important to point out that it would be available to the commission only to prevent activities that would constitute misconduct or mismanagement were they to go ahead or continue. Therefore, if a charity engaged in unlawful political activity such as supporting a political party and holding partisan events, the Charity Commission could act to prevent further such activity from taking place.

It is worth pointing out, as the hon. Member for Redcar did, that the commission’s equivalent in Scotland, the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, has a similar power. Section 28 of the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 enables the OSCR to

“direct any charity, body or person with regard to which it is making inquiries…not to undertake”

specific activities for a period of six months. The OSCR may seek a court order for longer restrictions.

The Joint Committee supported the inclusion of such a power, provided that it was tightly drawn to clarify the circumstances in which it could be used, along with the safeguards that applied, particularly the right of appeal. The new power in the clause will enable the Charity Commission to intervene to prevent misconduct or mismanagement from taking place rather than having to watch powerlessly, then take remedial action once the damage has been done.

The bar for exercising the power will be high and there will be six specific protections. First, the power can be used only in the context of a statutory inquiry. Secondly, the commission will have to be satisfied of the need to prevent misconduct, mismanagement or risk to charity property. Thirdly, the commission must set out a statement of reasons for exercising the power and review any order regularly—at least every six months. Fourthly, the making and every review of the order will be subject to a right of appeal to the Charity Tribunal and, like all its other protective and remedial powers, this power is subject to the Commission’s duty to act proportionately under section 16 of the Charities Act 2011.

Let me give the Committee two examples of cases in which the powers might be used. In recent years, there have been several cases of charities involved in the abuse of charitable business rates relief. In such cases, the so-called charity enters into multiple tenancy agreements with commercial property owners at reduced rents without any real evidence that the tenancies are in the best interests of the charity or are used meaningfully for charitable purposes. Once occupied by the charity, the property benefits from a reduction of at least 80% in business rates relief, which can be a substantial sum. The saving is often shared between the charity and the property owner. Local councils and honest taxpayers end up losing out. The commission has taken action in such cases, but it can do so only after the event. The new power would enable the commission to direct the charity not to enter into, renew or continue any further tenancies, in effect preventing the misconduct from continuing.

Another example in which the power could be used would arise if a charity had made significant loans to companies connected to the trustees. The trustees would seek to become insolvent and to wind up the charity, writing off the loans and resulting in significant financial benefit to the companies connected to the trustees. In that case, the commission would be able to use the new power to direct the trustees not to wind up the charity, buying time to sort things out by, for example, removing the trustees, or appointing new trustees or even an interim manager to act in the charity’s best interests, which could involve calling in the loans.

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[Anna Turley]

I thank the Minister for his helpful response. It was extremely important to hear his clarifications, particularly about the six protections that will be in place before the power is used, and the clear and helpful examples he gave of instances in which the power will be used.

The amendment relates not to the warnings and the tribunal dealt with in clause 1 but to whether the power will continue if it is used in the course of a formal inquiry, subject to the inquiry’s final outcome. I was reassured to hear that the inquiry’s outcome and the report’s findings will take precedence in the action going forward. It is extremely important that if allegations made in the course of the inquiry are unfounded, they are quashed and no further action is taken. We also wanted to know whether, if the inquiry report showed structural issues and there was a remedy that affected those issues, that would overrule the temporary protective amendments. The Minister clarified that issue, for which I am grateful. I am reassured by his response, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Power to direct winding up

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Wilson]

We are progressing through the Bill at a rate of knots, so I will try not to delay the Committee too long. The Charity Commission’s usual practice, as many of us will know, is to try to restore a charity to health following a statutory inquiry and to ensure that funds dedicated for specific charitable purposes are used for those purposes. The commission’s current powers are based on that premise; that is as it should and, indeed, will continue to be. In practice, that may mean replacing some of the trustees, directing the charity to take certain actions or reforming its governance arrangements, but the principle is one of ensuring the continuation of the charity to deliver its charitable purposes.

There are, however, rare inquiry cases where it is more appropriate for the commission to take a different approach. In those cases, it is clear that attempting to restore the charity to health is unlikely to succeed and would not be the right strategy. A good example would be sham charities set up ostensibly for charitable purposes but really operating for private gain or some other non-charitable purpose. Such a body may never have had a genuine charitable aim in the first place and the commission is unlikely to be able to restore it to health.

In such cases, the Charity Commission can and already does act to transfer any remaining funds or assets to another legitimate charity with the same charitable purposes. It can do this under its existing inquiry powers. The commission can remove the trustees, ensuring their disqualification, provided that they do not resign before the commission can do so. What the commission cannot do under its current powers is tackle the empty shell that is left, so there is a risk that the empty shell could be reactivated at a later date to be used for further misconduct.

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[Mr Wilson]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. The clause is partly about restoring trust. It is also about making the Charity Commission work better and more efficiently and focus its funds on the areas where it can really make a difference—day in, day out. She is absolutely right.

Other barriers may make a person unable to comply with a commission direction of this type, such as restrictions in the charity’s governing document, which may prevent otherwise willing trustees or members from complying with this type of commission order because they are legally unable to do so. The Joint Committee recommended that we consider the inclusion of some form of statutory protection for a financial institution in cases where compliance with the direction from the commission in those circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with a charity. The clause seeks to remove any obstacles by allowing the commission’s direction to overcome a contractual obligation owed to a charity.

Importantly, clause 8 continues to provide the specific, statutory protection for a financial institution—or, for that matter, any person holding the charitable property—in cases where compliance with the commission’s direction in those circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with the charity. It is always important to consider the practical application of legislation and the clause will help the Charity Commission make use of the existing power more effectively.

[Anna Turley]

I echo the Minister’s concluding comments. As well as supporting the Charity Commission, the clause will support many charities that often struggle with individual trustees who may have been unable to take necessary action. This will enable the commission to step in and essentially fill a void where no one has had the power to tackle the issue.

Again, we welcome clause 8. It will amend the power in section 85 of the 2011 Act, which enables the commission to direct the application of charity property, where it is satisfied that a person is unwilling to apply it properly for the purposes of the charity and it is necessary or desirable to make an order to secure the proper application of that property.

The clause will amend section 85 in two ways. First, the commission will now have the power to direct the application of the property, if satisfied that the person is unable to apply it properly, as opposed to being unwilling. I appreciate the Minister’s examples of where that will be applicable. It is helpful to understand the case studies that will ensue.

Section 85 will be amended to ensure that compliance with the order will not result in a breach of contractual obligations to the charity. The explanatory notes and the Minister have provided an example of banks that act on client instruction. That is the most common example of the problem, where financial institutions hold a charity’s property but are unable to comply with the commission direction to transfer that property because doing so would result in a breach of their contract with the charity. That closes an important loophole and enables the Charity Commission and charities themselves to progress with securing the property.

As the Minister showed with his examples, clause 8 will continue to provide the specific statutory protection for a financial institution, in cases where compliance with a Charity Commission direction in these circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with a charity. We support the clause and welcome it as a useful addition to the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Sarah Newton.)