Arms Exports and Controls

Ann McKechin Excerpts

Thursday 30th October 2014 Westminster Hall

[Sir John Stanley]

The Committees most certainly do. As the hon. Gentleman will have seen, we included in our report specific questions to the Government about how particular items that have been approved for export to Bahrain can be regarded as compatible with the export criteria that they supposedly follow. We therefore have responded specifically to that.

I come now to our second area of disagreement with the Government on arms export policy and internal repression, which is with particular reference to exports to authoritarian regimes. In successive reports the Committees have made—again unanimously—the following recommendation:

“the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes which might be used for internal repression.”

Regrettably, in successive responses, the Government have declined to accept our recommendation.

I shall set out one of the most striking differences between what has happened under the present Government and what took place under the previous one. Under the previous Government, going right back to their election in 1997—shortly after which came the foundation of the Committees, thanks to the initiative of the late Robin Cook, who was the first Foreign Secretary to produce an annual report on arms exports—the number of revocations or suspensions of existing licences stood at a mere handful. However, during the lifetime of the present Government, there has been a massive use of some 400 revocations and suspensions. I do not think that can be attributed only to the fact that there has been a considerable amount of international turbulence and conflict during this Parliament, as there were wars and turbulence during the previous Government’s lifetime.

I make it clear to the Government and the Minister that I am in no way critical of the huge number of revocations—indeed, I believe they are entirely justified. The key question, and the issue that has been exercising the Committees, is whether export approval should have been given to all the licences in the first place. To reflect what was said by the right hon. Member for Gordon (Sir Malcolm Bruce), in broad-brush terms, the Government’s policy on the export of goods that could be used for internal repression to authoritarian regimes has been that if the situation in a particular country looks to be reasonably quiescent, there is a fairly considerable presumption that the export should be approved, with the Government no doubt saying to themselves, “Well, if things turn really nasty in that country we can always revoke the export licence.”

I suggest to hon. Members that nothing illustrates the weakness and limitations—and indeed the perils—of that policy more clearly than what has happened in Libya. Prior to the Arab spring, there was a significant arms export trade, approved by the Government, to Libya under the Gaddafi regime. Not surprisingly, when the Arab spring came and the Government announced their total list of revocations of arms export licences to Arab spring countries, the greatest single number—a total of 72 licences—was for licences for Libya.

We all know what happened when Gaddafi fell from power. Back in the UK, the Government had imposed their revocations, but they were of very limited effect, for the simple reason that they are of no use whatever for exports that have already been shipped. As I have said before, it was an exercise in shutting the stable door after the arms had bolted. What happened in Libya itself? The security arrangements around Gaddafi’s arms dumps vanished and people ransacked them, principally for financial gain, as they saw an opportunity to make quick and substantial money. As UN experts have reported, those stockpiles were then sold on and dispersed all over the middle east and north and west Africa.

I suggest that nothing better illustrates the cogency of the Committees’ recommendation for a significantly more cautious policy when dealing with arms export licence applications for arms that can be used for internal repression than what has happened in Libya. It is regrettable that, in their response to successive reports, the Government have failed to accept our recommendation for caution. I certainly hope that a future Government will take a different view.

I turn now to the Government’s export policy towards a few individual countries, starting with Russia. The publication of the Committees’ latest report happened to coincide almost exactly with the appalling shooting down of the Malaysian airliner MH17 over eastern Ukraine. That created something of a dilemma for the Government, because although, on the one hand, Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, were rightly condemning the Russian Government for being complicit in the shooting down of the airliner and the terrible loss of life, on the other, as was shown by our Committees’ report, there were no fewer than 285 extant British Government-approved arms export licences to Russia, with a value of some £131 million for the standard individual licences alone.

That led at one point to an unknown spokesman in No. 10 announcing to the media that many of the British Government’s arms exports to Russia were for the Brazilian navy, which I have to say came as news to me, as I suspect it did to a considerable number of other people. However, I thought that I should follow that one up, so I wrote to the Business Secretary to ask him for the stated end user of each of the 285 extant arms export licences to Russia. Disappointingly, he refused to give the Committees that information unless we agreed not to make it public. I see no justification for imposing that condition on the Committees. It is hardly in accordance with the Government’s supposed commitment to transparency on arms exports, and it raises a significant issue of policy for the Committees and, therefore, the House. The Government already make public the countries to which approved UK arms exports are going, but in many cases we need to know not just the names of the countries, but the end users in those countries. For example, will the end user be a Government body, a Government security authority or a civilian user? That is key information, but at the moment, the Government simply pick and choose when they will disclose the end users. They gave the Committees the end users when we wanted to know who they were in relation to the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria. They told us the end users when we wanted to know who they were for sniper rifles exported to Ukraine. However, they have refused to give us that information for Russia on the basis that it may be made public, and the Committee will want to address that policy issue further.

What is the Government’s present policy on arms exports to Russia? The Prime Minister said in the House:

“On the issue of defence equipment, we already unilaterally said—as did the US—that we would not sell further arms to Russia”.—[Official Report, 21 July 2014; Vol. 584, c. 1157.]

I would be grateful if the Minister clarified two points. First, when the Prime Minister said that we would not sell further arms to Russia, was he saying that all or only some will not be sold to Russia? If he was saying just some, which will continue to be sold? Secondly, on new licence applications, will the Minister clarify whether the Prime Minister’s statement means that all new licence applications to Russia are being refused, or only some, and if only some, which? The Minister’s clarification will be helpful.

I am sure that there was great concern among hon. Members on both sides of the House about some of the measures taken by the Hong Kong security authorities against those who were exercising their right to demonstrate peacefully, and especially the fact that tear gas was used against demonstrators. I am in no doubt that if the Metropolitan police had used tear gas against those who recently demonstrated peacefully in Parliament square, there would have been considerable concern and perhaps outrage on both sides of the House.

I thought that the Committees should do their own analysis of precisely what items of lethal and non-lethal equipment that could be used for internal repression the Government had recently approved for Hong Kong. We took the information from the website of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for the last two years from January 2012. Our analysis showed that the Government had approved tear gas exports to Hong Kong in four of the past eight quarters since January 2012. If those licence approvals were given on the grounds that the security authorities in Hong Kong would never use tear gas against those demonstrating peacefully, that was a questionable assumption, given mainland China’s track record of dealing with peaceful demonstrators. Our analysis of lethal equipment approved for export to Hong Kong since January 2012 showed that it included pistols, sniper rifles and gun silencers, which were all stated to be for use by a law-enforcement agency.

I have written to the Business Secretary to ask a series of questions about the Government’s policy on arms exports to Hong Kong, including:

“Have any extant Government approved export licences to Hong Kong been revoked or suspended?”

I also asked:

“What is the Government’s present policy on approving new licences for the export of arms and equipment to Hong Kong that could be used for internal repression?”

We have just received the Business Secretary’s reply, a key paragraph of which is:

“No licences for Hong Kong have been revoked, suspended or had Hong Kong removed from a multiple destination open licence. The Foreign Secretary has advised me that the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong police was an uncharacteristic response at an early stage of the protests, the scale of which caught the police by surprise, and was not indicative of a wider pattern of behaviour that would cross the threshold of criterion 2. In his view that, since that incident, the Hong Kong police have generally approached the protests carefully and proportionately. I have accepted this advice.”

I am sure that the Committees will want to reflect on the Business Secretary’s response and then report to the House. My own view, having received that letter only a short time ago, is that the reply seems to reflect the more relaxed approach to arms exports that could be used for internal repression to which I have referred. It certainly makes me wonder whether, if the original wording in the October 2000 statement by the right hon. Member for Neath had been retained instead of dropped, those arms exports of both lethal and non-lethal equipment would have been approved in the first place.

[Ann McKechin (Glasgow North) (Lab)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that, given the political situation in Hong Kong and the concerns that have been expressed internationally, there must be a real risk of a recurrence of exactly the sort of event during which tear gas was used against civilian protestors? There has not yet been a resolution of that protest; it continues in Hong Kong today.

[Sir John Stanley]

There is certainly a risk of a recurrence of exactly what the hon. Lady describes. I hope that a lesson has been learned by the Hong Kong police that it is not acceptable to use tear gas against those who are demonstrating peacefully. It remains a matter of concern to me, and I am sure that the members of the Committees will want to look closely at the analysis that accompanied my letter to the Business Secretary. The Committees will want to scrutinise closely whether it was wise in the first instance to approve exports of the sort of equipment—lethal and non-lethal—to which I have referred.

In turning to Israel, I want to make it crystal clear at the outset that I condemn unreservedly Hamas’s indiscriminate rocket attacks on Israel. However, Israel has serious questions to answer about its use of lethal weapons that has resulted in the recent death of well over 2,000 Palestinians—men, women and children—in Gaza, the great majority of whom were certainly not Hamas fighters.

The Foreign Office, in its annual human rights report, includes Israel—entirely rightly in my view—in its list of the 28 countries of top human rights concern to the British Government. In our latest report, we have listed for each of those countries the extant UK Government-approved arms export licences. Our report shows that Israel has the third largest number of extant arms export licences of those 28 countries, with a total of 470—a figure exceeded only by China and Saudi Arabia. In addition, our report shows that of those 28 countries’ extant arms export licences, the largest by value is Israel’s, totalling £8 billion in value. However, I want to stress this very important point: that £8 billion is largely made up of a gigantic cryptographic equipment export order, valued at £7.7 billion, which the Defence Secretary, when he was Minister of State at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, assured the Committees was

“for purely commercial end use.”—[Official Report, 21 November 2013; Vol. 570, c. 426WH.]

Early in August, following what happened in Gaza, I wrote to the Foreign Secretary, asking him to list the controlled goods that the British Government had approved for export to Israel and that the Government had reason to believe may have been used by Israel in the recent military operations in Gaza. The Foreign Secretary gave me his reply on 19 August, saying

“officials have judged it unlikely that many of the components that were the subject of extant licences were for incorporation into systems that would be likely to be used offensively in Gaza”.

However, he went on to say, significantly in my view, that

“12 licences have been identified…where, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, and on the basis of information currently available to us, there could be a risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.”

I think that is a very significant statement by the Foreign Secretary, and it once again reinforces the Committees’ recommendation for a significantly more cautious policy when dealing with the export of arms that can be used for internal repression.

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[Ann McKechin (Glasgow North) (Lab)]

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak this afternoon, Mr Bayley. First, I want to look back to the debate last November about the work of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, in which we spent quite a bit of time discussing concerns about past and possible future exports to Syria. That was not surprising, given the recall vote that had taken place in September last year on arming opposition groups in Syria, and given the media controversy that had emerged about chemical weapons components coming from the United Kingdom.

At that debate, none of us talked or even knew about ISIL. Very few anticipated the descent into statelessness that we are now witnessing in Libya, to which the Chair of the Committees, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley), has referred. Nobody could have foreseen the devastation and loss of innocent life caused by the conflict in Gaza this summer. That is why I urge all Members of the House to consider whether we are truly comfortable with our current arms export strategy. If we cannot foresee what events will occur in the next 12 months, let alone the next five or 10 years, and as most arms exports have a considerably longer shelf-life, there has never been such a need for a principled, precautionary and risk-based approach in a world of increasing volatility.

The Committees’ work has become more important with each passing year of this Parliament. I take the opportunity to convey my thanks, and that of the other members of the Committees, to our esteemed Chair, to our excellent Clerk, Keith Neary, and to the other staff who service our Committees for their unstinting dedication, thoroughness and unparalleled expertise in the preparation of the substantial and important report that we are discussing.

As the Chair has indicated, our report contains conclusions that are both positive and negative from the Minister’s point of view. The work on the arms trade treaty is a genuinely good sign. I am looking forward to participating next week in the Inter-Parliamentary Union conference here in London with delegates from across the world on how we can use the treaty to make real differences to people who live in conflict-afflicted areas. I hope that the United Kingdom, as it has done throughout the arms trade treaty process, will continue to take a leading role in the development of the treaty. The increased direct involvement of Ministers in the examination of sensitive export applications is also welcome. As the Chair has mentioned, I think that there is a direct correlation between that involvement and the number of licences that have been suspended and revoked in the past few years. Good work has been done on ensuring that applications are dealt with in a timely way and reducing the time-lapse in appeals.

As the Committees have made clear, it is more than disappointing that the Government’s record on transparency has been worryingly regressive this year. Although there is some merit in the aim of easing unnecessary bureaucracy by transferring more of our export licences from individual to open, we must not do that at the expense of transparency on sensitive issues where there are many legitimate concerns and where the geopolitics are changing at great speed.

The scaling back of the transparency initiative, which has included the reversal of previous public commitments by the Government to publish more information on the type, value and quantity of equipment transferred under open licences, sends a worrying message to the wider world that our stated principles may be only superficially adhered to. The fact that that occurred at the same time as the UK signed the arms trade treaty has exasperated many of the NGOs that supported the campaign for the treaty. The Government’s response to our recommendation to reverse that decision was grudging. They said that

“we concluded that the administrative burden would be too high.”

However, no substantive evidence from the industry was offered to justify that conclusion, and there was no such evidence in the Government’s consultation exercise. I believe that the Committees will want to probe that issue more closely in our next set of evidence sessions next month.

As well as transparency, we need consistency. The Committees’ Chair has already stated his concerns about the definition of the common criteria, and I support his views. The Government’s defence was to designate the relevant paragraph

“as a general statement that formed part of the introductory text”.

As such, apparently, it was of no importance. That is, frankly, nonsense. The text is designed to be read as a whole, and the reader is entitled to presume that it is consistent throughout. If it was not, a caveat would be added to that effect. There is no caveat in the definition of the common criteria, and it is simply unconvincing to try to present one retrospectively after our Committees have been trying to probe the matter for almost two years. That is not a mere grammatical point or a fixation on detail. In a volatile world, where many accepted wisdoms and assumptions have been torn apart and where western nations are increasingly castigated for being driven purely by self-interest, the need for the highest standards and the greatest caution about those to whom we export arms is more pronounced than ever. Much of the turmoil that we are witnessing in the middle east has developed from the impact of internal repression over prolonged periods of time, where, too often, we in the west have not given sufficient weight to the consequent risks.

Another use of language in the Government’s lexicon to ease them out of difficult dilemmas is the term “significant hostilities”. Our annual report predated the dreadful events during July and August in Gaza and Israel, which resulted in the death of more than 2,000 Palestinians, 67 Israelis and one foreign national, as well as the indiscriminate destruction of schools, hospitals and homes and the displacement of more than 470,000 people. As the Chair has done, I condemn the operation of Hamas and the indiscriminate bombing of Israel, but I also condemn the Israeli Government for the disproportionate nature of the attacks on Gaza, the consequences of which the civilian population had to take.

The UK working group on arms has stated its concern that the Government’s failure to suspend or revoke any of the existing licences is contrary to their obligations under articles 6 and 7 of the arms trade treaty, within which the Government have indicated that they are operating. The Government did not even follow their own domestic licensing criteria. As soon as hostilities commenced in July, there was a clear risk that the United Kingdom might be supplying military equipment that could be used, as the former Foreign Secretary indicated in a letter to the Committees, in the commission of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The only proper response should have been the immediate suspension, if not the revocation, of the 12 licences identified by the Government in their internal review. In the Government’s response of 19 August, however, a new criterion appears to have been added. Suspension or revocation would not occur unless there was

“a resumption of significant hostilities”.

As the UK working group pointed out, that phrase has set a new, arbitrary and subjective threshold and a dangerous precedent.

I am looking forward to the Minister’s response, and I hope that he will tell us on what basis that new test was agreed. Was there a discussion between No. 10, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Foreign Office or the Department for International Development about setting that qualification? I am sure that the document went past every single relevant ministerial desk before it was issued to our Committees. Has there been any discussion with our EU partners about a common approach on exports to Israel following the summer hostilities? Are the Government now prepared to remove that additional test and revert to their original criteria? If so, will they reconsider the licences and act to suspend them if those criteria have not been met?

As always, the Committees’ report contains a paragraph on the annual international arms fair in London. Frankly, it is time to put that embarrassing saga to an end. I fail to understand why the review has had to take 18 months so that the results are conveniently announced as the Government wind up business in time for the general election in the hope that attention is diverted elsewhere so that we do not see the report’s conclusion. Given that the organisation of such a large and substantial trade fair probably starts the day after the conclusion of the previous fair, surely the organisers, participants and Government staff tasked with enforcement need to know what may be required by the end of this year. Rather than waiting the full 18 months, is there any possibility that the Government can respond much more speedily to conclude the review and provide our Committees with the review’s conclusions so that we may comment on the conclusions in our final report before Parliament is dissolved?

Finally, I am concerned about the increasing use of surveillance equipment, including intrusion software, which I raised in last year’s debate. It is welcome that changes to controls have been reached this year via the Wassenaar agreement process, but we still await implementation. In their response to our report, the Government stated that they anticipate an amendment of the EU dual-use regulation by the end of this year. Will the Minister confirm whether the timetable will definitely be adhered to? There has been a suggestion that we may be falling behind the timetable for technical reasons. If so, will he confirm that the United Kingdom would consider unilateral measures, along the lines proposed earlier this year by our German partners? Have the Government conducted any recent review of the human rights concerns raised by a number of organisations, including Privacy International, that the current criteria may not be effectively catching exports of surveillance equipment? Privacy International mentions the UK Government’s export of such software to the Indonesian Government with an export credit guarantee this year. Any information that the Minister is able to provide today would be very helpful. If not, I suspect that we will want to probe further when we have our oral evidence session.

As I stated at the start of my speech, we live in a world of increasing volatility. Traumatic events with long-lasting impacts that require complex responses are occurring simultaneously in different regions of the world. The resources of even the most technically sophisticated Governments have been stretched as never before. Last week I heard a member of the US Administration with responsibility for defence matters state that they do not have time for routine meetings, such has been the demand on their time due to the crises across the world in recent months. We need to stop relying on old assumptions and appreciate that the risks are changing rapidly. Our response has to change, and arms exports are a key part of that policy. It can be all too easy for any Government to resort to shortcuts and sticking-plaster responses to avoid difficult choices, but that must be resisted. Clear principles, consistently adhered to with maximum transparency must be the way forward. I urge the Government to continue working with our Committees to achieve that aim.

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[Mr Ellwood]

I do not want to move into hypothetical situations. We will continue to review matters, but I have explained the situation as it stands. If events move forward and circumstances change, we will review that and react responsibly according to criterion 2.

The Export Control Organisation has continued to perform efficiently over the past year in spite of various pressures. The ECO has maintained its performance targets despite an increasing volume of licence applications, with standard individual export licences up 3% on last year, and ECO’s high priority advice service to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs on the licensability of goods stopped at ports and airports up 30% in the same period. Together with extra work caused by the Russia sanctions, that has meant increased pressures on the ECO, which has worked hard to maintain both service levels for its customers and the robustness of our export controls, as the objective of giving applicants a decision as quickly as possible cannot outweigh the need to give every application very careful consideration.

The ECO has two main targets for processing export licence applications: a primary target to process 70% of applications within 20 working days, and a secondary target of completing 99% of applications within 60 working days. Year-to-date performance to the end of September on the primary target stands at 76%. We have now had a full year of working towards meeting the new ambitious secondary target of 99%; the target previously stood at 95%. The new target was introduced to improve the efficiency of the licensing system further. As of the end of September, I am pleased to announce that we are now meeting the new target for the year to date.

My right hon. Friend the Business Secretary decided last year that it was appropriate to look at the proposal for a pre-licensing register of arms brokers; that has been mentioned in the debate. The Export Control Organisation made a public call for evidence this year to help to gather the necessary evidence to allow the Government to decide whether to introduce such a register. Our emphasis when looking at the proposal has been on the relative costs and benefits, and the likely effectiveness. The feedback from the call for evidence is being analysed and discussed. We intend to publish the results as soon as possible, most likely towards the end of the year.

The Government remain committed to greater transparency in export licensing, as demonstrated by the transparency initiative announced last year, which expanded reporting activity under certain open export licences. As has been explained to the Committees previously, in making the final preparations for the initiative, it became apparent that we may not have had the right balance between the twin objectives of increasing transparency and avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic burdens. In particular, my right hon. Friend the Business Secretary became concerned that the proposed reporting would put UK exporters at a disadvantage in relation to exporters from other countries. That is why he decided that users of certain open licences would be required to make reports on their usage of those licences on an annual basis, rather than quarterly as originally envisaged.

It is important to reiterate that we have not reduced the overall level of reporting; we will publish considerably more information about the usage of open licences than we do now. All such initiatives are subject to review, but the new reporting requirements came into place at the start of this year, and the data for this year are due to be published in 2015. It is important to allow sufficient time for the new measures to be established before we can consider whether further changes are necessary. We therefore intend to commence a review of the initiative towards the end of the year.

I want to touch on the arms trade treaty. I had the privilege of participating in a number of decisions at the UN General Assembly in September. I am delighted to say that 54 countries have now ratified the treaty, which will enter into force on 24 December—Christmas eve. The successful conclusion of the arms trade treaty was a significant achievement for the UN, but also for the UK, which has worked tirelessly with the co-authors group, and bilaterally. We are, as has been requested, encouraging other nations, in the course of regular contact with them and via the EU ATT outreach project, to sign and ratify it. The UK places a great deal of importance on as many nations signing up as possible; and I believe that we are heading in that direction.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North (Ann McKechin) spoke about the spread of conflict in Libya and Syria, and that is a massive concern for the Government—and for others. We are concerned about the flow of weapons systems, and the loss of control over what is happening spilling down to Mali, and so forth. The situation reflects the changing circumstances that we must deal with. The hon. Lady also spoke about intrusion software. The pace of the technology that we are aware of can sometimes run ahead of legislation, so the work of the Committees and the Government to keep pace with changing technology is always important.

It is worth mentioning that the controls on monitoring equipment were agreed in the 2011 Wassenaar arrangement, and implementation through the EU dual-use regulation amendment is expected by the end of 2014. There will be a publication, and a journal put forward, in due course.

[Ann McKechin]

Will the Minister confirm—or, if he cannot do so today, write to confirm—whether his Department or fellow Ministers are assured that implementation will occur by the end of this year? If not, are alternatives being considered?

[Mr Ellwood]

That was going to be my next point. I cannot give the hon. Lady an answer today, but I had written down “timetable”. I will certainly get in touch with her to provide more information.

The hon. Lady and others mentioned the Defence and Security Equipment International exhibition. I have visited it many times and find it a little bizarre that one can buy things that are illegal in this country. The Government are reviewing their response to DSEI 2013 to consider any improvements to the processes that can be made before next year’s event. Officials from across Government will continue to work closely with Clarion Events to ensure that exhibitors comply with export and trade controls and understand their obligations.

The hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)—I almost called him my hon. Friend—and I have met four times in debates or meetings over the past few days. I will be astonished if we meet tomorrow at the Conservative party away day, but he is always welcome. I join him in paying tribute to the late Robin Cook, who pioneered much of the work that we are now taking forward. That is his legacy. Members on both sides of the House remember him for that, pay tribute to the work that he did in ensuring that Britain plays a more responsible role in arms exports, and encourage other countries to do the same.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned Gaza and the cycle of destruction. The matter came up at the UN General Assembly; Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General, was almost in tears when discussing whether destruction, reconstruction, destruction, and then reconstruction is what now happens. I digress slightly, but Britain must play its part with the EU and the international community to try to break that cycle.

The hon. Gentleman also raised concerns about Bahrain. There is no evidence of UK equipment sold to Bahrain being used in breach of the EU or national consolidated criteria on export licensing, but we have refused licences to Bahrain for internal security forces, where we are not satisfied about the risks around internal repression. If he has anymore thoughts on that, he can write to me and I will be delighted to respond.

I do not have the details to respond to the hon. Gentleman on Sri Lanka, but he mentioned the Prime Minister’s visit. It was bold to go out and make a case about the Tamil people’s concerns. I will write to him regarding our position on arms exports and Sri Lanka.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman mentioned the Vienna conference, which we discussed at Foreign and Commonwealth questions. The trouble is that it is unclear what the conference wants to achieve other than the removal of all nuclear weapons. It is Britain’s long-term intention to reach that position, but if we drop our guard before other hostile countries with nuclear weapons do, we will leave ourselves vulnerable. We share the long-term ambition, but differ on how we will get there.

The shadow Minister mentioned brass-plate companies and enforcement action. Existing legislation would, in certain circumstances, allow such action to be taken against brass-plate companies and their officers. However, any action must be justified by sufficient evidence. With other relevant agencies, the Government continue to pursue the possibility of using other legislation to discontinue the UK registration of such companies on public interest grounds. As he will appreciate, the issue is complex and raises difficult questions about the nature of the evidence that might be disclosed in any proceedings. We will update the Committees and the shadow Minister when any firm conclusions have been reached.

In conclusion, I again thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling and other hon. Members for their attendance today. I reiterate my thanks to the Committees on Arms Export Controls for their report and work. The Committees’ scrutiny remains an important aid to the licensing process, and I continue to look forward to their contributions and continuing dialogue over the coming year.