Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

Andrew Percy Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Offord]

If I have not convinced the hon. Gentleman so far, I hope to do so later in my speech. I am not entirely convinced by what he says.

Let me return to the Foreign Secretary’s statement on Monday. What concerned me most was what he did not say. I hope that the Minister, in summing up the debate, can answer at least three specific concerns, including, first, how Iran’s nuclear programme, which includes a military dimension, will be addressed, as the interim agreement fails to address it. Secondly, I would be interested to learn what reassurances he can give that the final agreement will address the technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, including the dismantling of all existing advanced centrifuges that accelerate breakout time; whether the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors will be granted unfettered access to all Iran’s nuclear facilities, including those that are being operated secretly; and what will happen to Iran’s existing stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium.

Thirdly, what assurances can the Government give that the interim agreement will not simply unravel the international sanctions that have been imposed and that took years to be introduced, giving rise to a perception in the country that Iran is being rewarded for coming to the negotiating table while continuing to inflame tensions in the whole middle east, specifically in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, and while procrastinating on the fundamental issue of advances in its nuclear programme?

Before we get to that point, I want to take a few moments to outline Iran’s nuclear programme and the problems I anticipate. It is widely believed that Iran’s nuclear programme has significantly advanced in the past five years. Continuing to defy international pressure and binding UN Security Council resolutions, Iran has actively enriched uranium to 20% fissile purity—a level that has no credible civilian purpose. Without any additional sanctions being imposed, Iran has been able to continue producing uranium enriched to 90% purity, which brings it closer to weapons grade. The most difficult and time-consuming part of the nuclear process is, therefore, already complete. The IAEA estimates that Iran now has 9,000 kg of low-enriched uranium, an amount that experts say could be enough for four bombs if it was refined to 90% fissile concentration.

Iran also possesses as many as 18,000 centrifuges, including more than 1,000 new models—the IR2m—which are far more efficient and can provide bomb-grade uranium two and a half times faster than the previous model. A heavy water reactor has been constructed outside the city of Arak, which offers the possibility of a new pathway to a bomb using plutonium once it goes online. That is in addition to the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, which was built in secret and discovered in 2002; the Fordow enrichment facility, which was also built illegally and confirmed to be in existence by Iran in 2009; the Parchin facility, to which the IAEA is seeking access after evidence emerged that Iran has tested nuclear triggers and high explosives that could be used in nuclear weapons; the Bushehr nuclear power station, which is operated with external assistance; and the Isfahan nuclear research facility, which has the capability to process uranium yellowcake into a gas for enrichment.

[Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. I heard the comments of the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) regarding a change in behaviour. However, my hon. Friend has just mentioned the Arak heavy water facility, which is perfect for producing weapons-grade plutonium. On 6 February, I asked a question in the House, to which the Minister responded:

“we remain concerned that Iran intends to develop the facility to provide a plutonium route to a nuclear weapon. Iran has not clarified how it would use the plutonium produced”.—[Official Report, 6 February 2014; Vol. 575, c. 356W.]

Despite the interim deal, the fact remains that Ministers are concerned. We should adopt the position of the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, who has said that

“Iran has not earned the right to have the benefit of the doubt.”

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He has asked a question, as identified by the House of Commons Library, on the effect of the P5 plus 1, Iran and the joint plan of action, and the continuing manufacture of new centrifuge devices. We know that the technology, which has many applications, continues to be used, but we do not know for what purpose. That remains a great concern, and I do not believe the joint plan of action addresses it.

On Iran’s agreement to freeze the enrichment and halt the production of uranium, Iran has halted the installation of new enrichment centrifuges and has ceased the installation of new components at the Arak reactor. It has allowed the IAEA to make inspections at Natanz, Arak and Fordow. I acknowledge that the regime has granted the international community some concessions. We must be aware, however, that in return, the P5 plus 1 agreed to provide £6 billion to £7 billion in sanctions relief, of which roughly £4.2 billion would be oil revenue frozen in foreign banks. The P5 plus 1 allow temporary relief on some sanctions, including trade in gold, precious metals, petrochemicals, auto parts and aircraft parts. The P5 plus 1 have also agreed not to impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months during the agreement.

Although the interim accord interrupts Iran’s nuclear progress for the first time in nearly a decade, it requires Iran to make only a modest draw-down payment on the central problem. Iran has benefited from disproportionate sanctions relief in exchange for cosmetic concessions that it can do away with in a matter of weeks. It has been rewarded with sanctions relief despite remaining unbowed in its demand to continue uranium enrichment, which is the root of the international community’s concern. Most importantly, the deal fails to dismantle many of the military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without the requirement to dismantle a single centrifuge, Iran will remain a threshold military nuclear power. It will retain the capability to break across that line at any time it chooses.