Defamation Bill

Debate between Amber Rudd and Robert Buckland

Tuesday 12th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to take part in this Second Reading debate about a Bill that has been long and careful in the making, and I pay particular tribute to the pre-legislative scrutiny process that has been used. There is an increasing tendency in this Parliament to use that mechanism, which I welcome, because it gives not just parliamentarians but interested members of the public and experts outside the House ample opportunity to have the fullest input into the development of important legislation.

In Public Bill Committees there are already sessions that allow for the giving and taking of evidence, but, admirable though they are, one is always left feeling that more time was needed, far too many things were left unsaid, far too many questions were left unasked and unanswered, and, however good the sessions were, more were needed.

The pre-legislative process allows for valuable time to be allocated, for more evidence to be submitted, for freer debate and discussion and for the Government to listen maturely, to reflect and to respond. It avoids the striking of false positions, the entrenchment of unsustainable positions and the to-ing and fro-ing that is sadly all too often associated with the passage of Bills through this House.

In this Session a number of other pieces of legislation will be subject to the procedure, and that is good and welcome, particularly in areas where consensus and a striking degree of cross-party co-operation, understanding and support are needed. In this area, where we are talking about the reputation of the individual versus the right to freedom of expression, it is essential that this House speaks as much as possible with one voice.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is testament to the need for this Bill, and to the way in which it has been handled and prepared, that there is so much unity among Members and among parties on the need to do something and to address the issue urgently?

[Mr Buckland]

Very much so. As I said, the Bill has been long in the making—some would say, generations. The right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) reminded us that in the 160 years since the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 there have been only two subsequent pieces of legislation—pieces of legislation that have dealt with the law in a piecemeal way.

The Defamation Act 1996, as some who were Members when the measure was passed will recall, dealt with a particular context and a particular case. A former Member, Neil Hamilton, found that his case was stayed by the court because it was felt that the defendant newspaper could not prepare its defence adequately without infringing parliamentary privilege. That resulted in section 13 of the 1996 Act, allowing a Member of either this House or the other place to waive for the purposes of the defamation proceedings

“the protection of any enactment or rule of law which prevents proceedings in Parliament being impeached or questioned in any court or place”—

parliamentary privilege.

At the time, I was a little uncertain about the passage of that provision, which seemed to represent yet another piecemeal approach to a fundamental right that has been exercised ever since article 9 of the Bill of Rights of 1689—parliamentary privilege. Another Committee of this House has considered parliamentary privilege carefully, and there may well be legislation to deal with it. In doing so, I would urge the utmost caution. Reform and refinement of such a basic and well-understood principle could lead to further confusion and potential court interference. It is essential that all of us in this place and in the House of Lords understand that changes to parliamentary privilege, whether in the context of the 1996 Act or subsequent proposals, could lead to the erosion of that privilege, which would be a regrettable and undesirable outcome.

In my view, section 13 of the Act should be repealed, and we should consider instead a more general right of waiver that not only would apply to defamation but to a range of court actions in which Members of Parliament or Members of the House of Lords may become involved. This Bill could have taken that step, but I quite understand Ministers’ desire to get on with the job in hand and to avoid being potentially sidetracked by questions of privilege that may have to be returned to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

There is always tension in the minds of parliamentarians between wanting, quite naturally, to see as much detail as possible in primary legislation, because not only is that an accountable and democratic way of dealing with things, but it allows for full and fair debate, and the need to allow for flexibility through the use of secondary legislation. The hon. Lady’s point is an important one. Often in this place, in our enthusiasm to make primary legislation as prescriptive as possible, we fall foul of the danger that I highlighted just before her intervention.

The evolution of the law of reputational damage is interesting to note. In the 19th century, damage to reputation was seen as a very significant factor indeed. Reputation was seen as part of the property of an individual and something to be highly valued. It is interesting to note that at that time, when the privacy of the rich and powerful was easily protected—much more easily than it is now—the only windows into the private lives of the rich and influential were trials for libel. The evidence would be heard, sometimes by a shocked jury. Notable members of society would be brought to court to give evidence. The Prince of Wales gave evidence in a trial in the 1890s during the famous baccarat scandal. That arose from a libel action.

We have a somewhat romanticised view of libel, which stems to a large degree from the Oscar Wilde trials. It is important to remember that the first trial involving Oscar Wilde was the prosecution for criminal libel of the Marquess of Queensberry. It was not a civil case, but a criminal one. Through what would be regarded, on any objective analysis, as the clever advocacy of Sir Edward Carson, that criminal prosecution failed and, famously, the tables were turned on Oscar Wilde. We all have views about the injustice that was meted out upon that gifted poet and author. His words echo down the years and are a reproach to a generation that sought to criminalise the acts that were the subject of those trials. Those trials have contributed to the romance that surrounds libel trials and the involvement of juries.

That is why, although the interventions on my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor about the right to trial by jury were interesting, I believe that clause 11 is an overdue measure that reflects the reality of the modern situation when it comes to civil libel trials in England and Wales.

[Amber Rudd]

What can my hon. Friend say to reassure us that the noble and proud tradition of trial by jury, which is held so much to heart by British people, will not be lost through this proposal?

[Mr Buckland]

I am grateful for that question. I think that we can reassure ourselves and the people whom we serve by saying the following: when the liberty of the individual and the criminal law are involved, the right to trial by jury should be preserved and enhanced. That is why I was pleased by the provision in the recently enacted Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 that rolled back restrictions on the right to trial by jury in criminal fraud trials. However, we are dealing here with the civil context. If damage to reputation is so important as to merit trial by jury, why is not physical personal injury equally worthy of it? There is a utilitarian argument that demands a system using scant resources and taking scant time, which means that we should be very cautious about extending jury trials to a whole range of civil cases.

I believe that the removal of libel cases from the right to trial by jury leaves us with only malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and a limited number of other civil cases in which one can argue that there is a legitimate public interest in still involving juries in making decisions about the acts or omissions of public authorities. Malicious prosecution cases could involve an act of a prosecuting authority, and we should bear in mind the power that such an authority has vis-à-vis the individual. False imprisonment cases may involve the acts of police officers or a police force in unjustly imprisoning an individual.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

I shall not disagree, because my hon. Friend supports my point that, in many ways, privacy and defamation are inextricably linked.

I made the point about support for codification of the law on privacy because I believe in Parliament. I come from a legal background and have spent many years dealing with cases in the courts of this land, but I believe it is incumbent on legislators to take a lead and to represent the people of this country by saying, “The law needs updating. It needs to be brought into the 21st century and it needs to reflect the reality of life.” On a daily basis, individuals—famous, infamous or obscure—find that their fundamental rights to privacy are being interfered with, intruded upon and trampled over, not just by an over-mighty press, but by individuals who use social networking tools and the internet, as we have heard.

[Amber Rudd]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill will help to protect the privacy of Mrs Trellis of Acacia road, to whom he rightly referred? Does not the Bill partly cover such issues?

[Mr Buckland]

There is an element of crossover, but the Bill does not go far enough in addressing fundamental issues of privacy. Some provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 give a nod to the law on privacy, but the Act comes to a rather inelegant conclusion by allowing freedom of expression to have a greater priority over the right to privacy. I defend to the death the freedom of expression—that is why I came to Parliament, thanks to the good grace of the people of my constituency, who have given me this opportunity—but we must get the balance right. The Act does not faithfully reflect the reality of human rights: there is no hierarchy of rights, and each right must be balanced against others. Certain rights are unqualified, but most rights have qualifications. There is no hierarchy of public rights—