Asked by: Alison Thewliss (Scottish National Party - Glasgow Central)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how many communications staff are employed (a) full time, (b) part time and (c) with flexible working arrangements in HMRC.
Answered by Lucy Frazer - Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
The number of staff working in HMRC to deliver communications functions is currently 256.
217 are employed on full time contracts and 39 are employed on part time contracts. All staff are considered to have flexible working arrangements.
Asked by: Alison Thewliss (Scottish National Party - Glasgow Central)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how much HMRC spends on the employment of communications staff annually.
Answered by Lucy Frazer - Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
In the latest available financial year, 2020-21, expenditure on communications staffing was £11,456,277.48.
Asked by: Alison Thewliss (Scottish National Party - Glasgow Central)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how much his Department spends on the employment of communications staff annually.
Answered by Helen Whately - Minister of State (Department of Health and Social Care)
In 2020/21, the last full year that data is available, HM Treasury spent £2,262,976 on the employment of communications staff.
Asked by: Alison Thewliss (Scottish National Party - Glasgow Central)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how many communications staff are employed (a) full time, (b) part time and (c) with flexible working arrangements in his Department.
Answered by Helen Whately - Minister of State (Department of Health and Social Care)
HM Treasury employs the following communications staff:
- 32 full time employees
- 2 part time employees
Asked by: Alison Thewliss (Scottish National Party - Glasgow Central)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether he plans to provide financial support to charitable and faith groups for increasing energy costs.
Answered by Helen Whately - Minister of State (Department of Health and Social Care)
The Government recognises the impact rising energy prices will have on organisations of all sizes, and the contribution charitable and faith groups have provided through their work during the pandemic and beyond.
To support the sector though these challenges, we provided an unprecedented multi-billion-pound package of support for Britain's charities during the pandemic, including £750 million of dedicated funding that has helped more than 15,000 organisations across the country respond to the impact of Covid-19.
On 9 September 2021, the Government also announced the Faith New Deal Pilot Fund. Funding is available through a competitive grant programme for faith groups working on community projects in collaboration with local agencies and philanthropy.
Asked by: Alison Thewliss (Scottish National Party - Glasgow Central)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment his Department has made of the impact of erroneous registration data on its ability to recover payments from fraudulent applications to covid-19 support schemes.
Answered by John Glen - Paymaster General and Minister for the Cabinet Office
The Government has provided around £400 billion of direct support for the economy since the start of the pandemic, which has helped to safeguard jobs, businesses and public services in every region and nation of the UK.
The Government takes the issue of potential fraud relating to covid support schemes extremely seriously. Robust measures were put in place to control error and fraud in the key covid support schemes from their inception.
Departments are required to disclose details of material fraud, evasion and error within their annual report and accounts, which can be found on GOV.UK. From 2021-22, departments must provide an evidenced estimate of the level of fraud and error specifically in respect of the COVID-19 related schemes they administer and the level of debt as a result of that fraud and error.
In relation to the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS), HMRC prioritised getting money to those who needed it with the schemes designed to minimise fraud while not unnecessarily delaying payments. The schemes were designed to prevent fraud, both in the eligibility criteria and the claim process itself.
As recovering funds lost to organised criminals is especially difficult, HMRC prioritised tackling this risk before payments were made. Eligibility has been limited to employees and the self-employed who already had a tax footprint, which gives HMRC greater confidence these are not ‘bogus’ claims falsified to look like real businesses. HMRC also put in place a series of checks on claims before they are paid so that HMRC were able to block those that are highly indicative of criminal activity. In addition, HMRC is able to investigate suspect payments that did not meet the threshold for pre-payment blocks post-payment, using their full range of civil and criminal powers and tools.
In relation to the CJRS specifically, HMRC ensured that the claims service captured all the data necessary to enable post payment compliance and only accepted claims from employers known to and authenticated by HMRC. HMRC have actively prevented non-eligible employers from applying. Claimants are required to provide details of who has been furloughed and for how long, providing HMRC with clear data against which to make checks.
Regarding the SEISS, claimants had to have made a 2018/19 self-assessment tax return in order to claim grants 1 to 3 and a 2019/20 tax return to claim grants 4 and 5. The amount they claim is based on tax returns previously submitted to HMRC. In addition, compliance activity is underway in respect of those claimants who have indicated on their tax returns that their self-employment has ceased, but claimed a SEISS grant. If HMRC identify grants have been claimed when the person is not eligible, then recovery of the overpaid amounts is undertaken, with appropriate penalties being issued to those most egregious of cases. HMRC have also implemented pre-claim verification checks on those customers who have submitted 2019/20 returns as newly self-employed. The purpose of these checks is to establish that the return is from a genuine person, and they are undertaking self-employed activity.
Eat Out to Help Out ran for one month in August 2020. HMRC’s risk analysis identified customers whose claims indicated significantly supressed turnover and/or an inflated claim. HMRC launched a campaign aimed at encouraging these customers to repay excess claims (although where HMRC believe something is clearly egregious, they move straight to direct intervention). Customers who presented a risk following this campaign were triaged for further activity. HMRC also directly investigated around 800 of the highest risk cases.
Regarding Bounce Back Loans (BBLS), lenders were required to make and maintain appropriate anti-fraud, anti-money laundering and Know Your Customer checks. Specifically, lenders must use a reputable fraud bureau (such as The UK’s Fraud Prevention Community CIFAS’s fraud prevention and detection solution SIRA) to screen against potential or known fraudsters. If an application fails the lender’s fraud checks, the lender must not offer a loan.
In addition to these lender checks, further checks include the duplicate loan check, incorporation date check and the change in director check that were introduced in June 2020. These minimum standards were agreed following consultation with PWC and lenders on what would have the biggest impact on preventing fraud while still meeting the policy objectives.
Under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS), lenders were able to conduct full credit checks on borrowers in line with business as usual processes and thus verify the financial information provided by borrowers, with less reliance on information self-certified by the borrower (as is the case under BBLS). This reduces fraud risk by allowing lenders to assure themselves that borrowers are not providing false information in order to obtain funds.