Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Alex Davies-Jones and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th July 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

We have no further comments, Chair.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 316 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 317 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Decision not to make final offer order

“(1) The CMA may decide not to make a final offer order in relation to the transaction where it has reasonable grounds to believe that there has been a material change of circumstances since the final offer initiation notice was given.

(2) For the purposes of this section and section 42(3) a material change of circumstances includes an agreement between the designated undertaking and the third party with respect to terms as to payment in relation to the transaction.

(3) Where the CMA decides not to make a final offer order, it must give a notice to that effect to the designated undertaking and the third party.

(4) The notice must include the reasonable grounds referred to in subsection (1).

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after giving a notice under subsection (3), the CMA must publish a statement summarising the contents of the notice.”—(Kevin Hollinrake.)

This new clause, together with Amendment 10, ensures that the CMA can end the final offer mechanism without making a final offer order at any time after giving a final offer initiation notice. It would appear after clause 41.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 8

Limit on secondary ticketing

“(1) The Consumer Rights Act 2015 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 91 (prohibition on cancellation or blacklisting) insert—

‘91A Limit on secondary ticketing

(1) This section applies where a person (‘the seller’) re-sells a ticket for a recreational, sporting or cultural event in the United Kingdom through a secondary ticketing facility.

(2) The operator of the facility must—

(a) identify the maximum number of tickets available for a consumer to buy from the primary market for any event for which tickets are being re-sold through their facility; and

(b) check that the seller has not bought more tickets than they are permitted to buy as set out in subsection (2)(a) with the intention to re-sell, unless the seller provides proof that they have bought more tickets than they are permitted to buy from the primary market with the consent of the event organiser.

(3) The operator of the facility must not allow the seller or any associate of the seller to list more tickets for an event than can be bought by a consumer through the primary market.

(4) If the operator breaches its duties in subsections (2) and (3), they are jointly liable with the seller for enforcement action against them as set out in section 93’”.—(Seema Malhotra.)

This new clause would amend the Consumer Rights Act 2015 to introduce provisions banning sellers on secondary ticketing sites from selling more tickets than can be bought by consumers on the primary market.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Alex Davies-Jones and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I was champing at the bit to talk about these clauses. However, I will keep my comments brief because much of Labour’s thoughts align with our thoughts on previous clauses.

Clause 70 gives the CMA the power to require any individual to attend an interview and answer questions for the purposes of a digital markets investigation. That is consistent with the amendments to section 26A of the Competition Act 1998. We welcome those, so it is only right that the powers appear in this legislation, too. These are basic powers and the clause is fairly procedural. The CMA must have the power to give notice to any individual with information relevant to a digital markets investigation, requiring them to answer relevant questions at a place or in a manner specified in the notice. That is fundamental for an empowered regulator. We support the approach, so we have not sought to amend the clause at this stage. We also support the intentions of clause 71, and we believe that the approach is fair and reasonable. The clause is important for clarity. We welcome its inclusion in the Bill and we have not sought to amend it at this stage.

Turning to clause 72, it is right and proper that the CMA must have reasonable grounds to suspect that information relevant to the breach investigation can be accessed from or on the premises. We support that common- sense approach. The provisions are in line with those for other regimes, and will be important in ensuring that if the CMA is required take action for the purposes of a breach investigation, it can do so in a timely and effective manner. We support the clause and have not sought to amend it.

We also support the intentions of clause 73, which gives the CMA the power to enter business and domestic premises under a warrant, without notice and using reasonable force, for the purposes of a breach investigation. Again, the CMA has powers of entry under a warrant through sections 28 and 28A of the Competition Act 1998. It will come as no surprise, given that we support provisions for the CMA to act without a warrant, that we agree that it should be able to act with one. We value the clarification that the CMA must prove that there are reasonable grounds to act. If it has to, it can call on individuals who have expertise that is not available in the CMA but is required if the terms of the warrant are to be fully carried out. That will allow the CMA to act rapidly, which, given the level of these breaches, is vital. We therefore support this clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 74 sets out the supplementary requirements to the CMA’s power to enter premises under a warrant. We welcome the transparency afforded by subsection (1), and the clarification that although the CMA cannot enter premises outside the United Kingdom, as outlined in subsection (6), it can access information regardless of where it is physically stored. That is an important point, given the nature of SMS firms and their global holdings. For those reasons, Labour is happy to support the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 75 makes necessary amendments to a range of sections of the Criminal and Justice and Police Act 2001 to enable the CMA to seize information and take copies of, or extracts from, information when exercising its power under clause 73 to enter business and domestic premises with a warrant. It is a practical clause that aligns with the CMA’s power to seize documents from business premises under section 28 of the Competition Act 1998. We therefore believe that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

Clause 76 requires the CMA to follow the rules of the High Court, the Court of Session or the CAT when making an application. We see it as a natural consequential clause and will therefore support it.

[Seema Malhotra]

May I make one additional comment? We received evidence from trading standards about their access to information that could be stored online in order for them to undertake some of their responsibilities. Has any consideration been given to whether the search powers that the CMA will be given could be extended to trading standards, which sometimes undertake very similar areas of work?