Oral Answers to Questions
Debate between Alex Cunningham and David T C Davies(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
The Secretary of State for Wales (David T. C. Davies)
The Government are investing £500 million to secure the future of steelmaking in Port Talbot for generations to come. It is one of the largest UK Government support packages for steelmaking in history, and it will protect 5,000 jobs directly with Tata and many thousands more in the supply chain.
David T. C. Davies
As the hon. Gentleman knows, Tata approached the UK Government and said it was intending to pull out of the United Kingdom. If Tata had pulled out completely, that would have immediately cost 8,000 jobs and many thousands more in the supply chain. The Government therefore acted to take the only deal available, which was to build the electric arc furnace and save thousands of jobs.
Alex Cunningham
I do not think that thousands of jobs will be saved at all. The people of Teesside, who saw the Tory Government abandon them and end virgin steelmaking at Redcar, leading to the loss of 3,000 jobs, will sympathise with those in Wales. The failure of the same Government will see virgin steelmaking also ended in Wales, with the loss of another 3,000 jobs, and leave the UK even more reliant on imports, as they are surrendering the market to other countries. Why would the Government want to do that when steel is a foundation industry and, with the introduction of new technologies, could have a bright future?
David T. C. Davies
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be aware that 100% of the materials—the iron ore and coke—used to produce steel in Port Talbot are imported from abroad. At the same time, we are exporting 8 million tonnes of scrap steel, so building an arc furnace to make use of that scrap steel will make us less dependent on other countries for our steel.
As far as job losses are concerned, the UK Government have put aside a budget of £80 million, combined with £20 million from Tata, to support anyone who loses their job. Thus far, we have not had one single penny towards that from the Welsh Labour Government—who, by the way, are able to find £100 million to create a whole load of extra Senedd members in Cardiff Bay. I know where my priorities are: with the steelworkers.
Oral Answers to Questions
Debate between Alex Cunningham and David T C Davies(1 year ago)
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Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
The Secretary of State for Wales (David T. C. Davies)
I have regular discussions with Cabinet colleagues on a variety of issues, including the cost of energy bills. The Government recognise the challenges posed by cost of living pressures, which is why we are providing on average £3,700 per household from 2022-23 to 2024-25 to support households and individuals with the cost of living.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister may not be aware of the very successful Warm Wales programme in the noughties, which saw tens of thousands of homes have their cavities and lofts insulated, saving residents in Neath, Port Talbot and Wrexham hundreds of pounds every year. Do the Government recognise that concentrated schemes of that nature have a major impact on fuel poverty, and will Ministers steal our plans, which would see hundreds of thousands more households benefit?
David T. C. Davies
I am well aware that there are a number a renewable energy schemes that could have a positive benefit on householders in Wales, which is why the UK Government have been so supportive of the potential for floating offshore wind in the Celtic sea, and why, in the last round, we arranged higher strike prices for tidal energy. We are looking at a wide range of renewable energy systems that can bring benefits to people in Wales. At the same time, in recognising the cost of living pressures, the UK Government ensured that we were paying around half the average fuel bills for homeowners during the last winter period.
Energy-intensive Industries
Debate between Alex Cunningham and David T C Davies(10 years, 3 months ago)
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Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend gives a comprehensive summary of where I think we should be, and I hope to develop some of the points she made later in my speech. This is not just about the short term; it is about planning for the future as well.
Of course, the situation with regard to these energy costs is set to get much worse over the next decade. As I have said, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills forecasts that UK energy and climate change policies will add around £30 to every megawatt of electricity for energy-intensive industries by 2020—substantially more than for any other country in the world.
David T. C. Davies (Monmouth) (Con)
I have a great deal of sympathy with what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Does he agree that it is now time to scrap these ludicrous carbon taxes?
Alex Cunningham
Carbon taxes have been imposed by consecutive Governments for very good reason, but if our industries are to be competitive, the time has come to examine them carefully and to determine how we go forward. This is not just about taxation, however; we must also take into account the issues that my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Joan Walley) raised a moment ago.
Needless to say, the rise in energy costs is a huge threat to the energy-intensive sector, and it is one that the next Government must address. That brings me back to the trilemma that I mentioned. The present Government have designed policies that focus on reducing carbon emissions from industry, but those policies, influenced by regulatory activities in the EU, rely heavily on measures that seek to enhance energy efficiency while putting a price on industry’s carbon emissions. A cap-and-trade market for carbon was created through the EU’s emissions trading system, introduced in 2005. That market spans the EU and aims to reduce emissions at the lowest possible cost while incentivising low-carbon investment by making emitters financially liable for their emissions. It is intended that, from 2013 onwards, the capping level will fall by 1.74% a year for power stations and industry, so that total emissions are 21% lower in 2020 than they were in 2005.
The Government responded to industry concerns with a compensation package of £250 million announced in Budget 2011 for the period 2013-15, boosted by a further £150 million and extended to 2016 in Budget 2013. But, by December 2013, the emissions trading system compensation scheme had paid out only £18 million to 29 companies in the energy-intensive industries sector. Part of the problem is that although member states are permitted to compensate those at risk of carbon leakage arising from the emissions trading system, there is no obligation to do so. This results in energy-intensive industries being burdened with additional costs, be it through burning fossil fuels and buying allowances to match their emissions, or indirectly through the higher electricity prices that result from generators burning fossil fuels. As we know, the costs are passed on to consumers.
However, because the weak carbon price in the emissions trading system was deemed too low to incentivise lower-carbon investment, the Government then added a further policy cost to the price of energy by introducing a UK carbon price floor to top up the carbon price to an acceptable target rate. This undoubtedly limits the competitiveness of EIIs, many of which are unable to pass those costs through to their customers.
In my role as a member of the all-party group—not to mention as an MP representing an industrial centre—I have regular contact with those in the energy-intensive sector and frequently listen to the issues that they find themselves contending with. Through those conversations, I understand that no other country has imposed a policy similar to the carbon price floor here in the UK, nor are there plans to do so. It has been widely acknowledged that the carbon price floor does not, in fact, reduce emissions from power generation; those are capped at EU level. Instead, the carbon price floor significantly increases the proportion of decarbonisation costs that is borne by UK electricity users. Those are costs that drive investment decisions and can lead to companies relocating overseas rather than developing their businesses in the UK.
To be sure, the EIIs that I have spoken to strongly support the drive for greater energy efficiency. In many cases, energy efficiency is more cost-effective than subsidising low-carbon generation. For instance, GrowHow tells me that, since 2010, it has reduced carbon emissions associated with its main fertiliser product by 40%. By reducing nitrous oxide emissions, it has made savings equivalent to more than 4 million tonnes of CO2, which means that, relative to its competitors, it is very efficient, and as much as three times as efficient as Russian producers.
Despite the fact that industry has delivered substantial energy and carbon savings over recent decades through investment and innovation, the cumulative impact of energy and climate policies is now putting extraordinary pressure on EIIs, necessitating continuous improvements in energy efficiency to remain competitive—although that is not to suggest that they are not doing that anyway.
Indeed, as industries approach the limits of what is realistically achievable with current technologies, the capacity of businesses to invest in the UK is ultimately undercut and the sustainability of the entire sector in the UK placed under threat. That, of course, brings with it the simultaneous possibility of the loss of jobs and investment to other countries with less vigorous climate change policies. That is disheartening, not just because of the obvious negative impacts for local economies and for the national economy more broadly, but because it overlooks the necessity to safeguard our existing industries and the employment they provide in order to make that all-important transition towards a low-carbon economy. Only through the continued provision of support to these industries can we hope to attract new investment.
We need look no further than Air Products in my constituency for an example of the types of investment in low-carbon industries that successful industrial clusters can attract. Shortly after committing to invest in building one of the world’s largest renewable energy plants on Teesside, the company announced investment in a second similar plant, influenced no doubt by the favourable business conditions that will see the wide availability of feedstock while allowing for local knowledge, skills and infrastructure to be used constructively and competitively. It speaks volumes that Sembcorp is developing with SITA a similar 35 MW plant on Teesside also to provide electricity from waste, further highlighting the potential for investment in the low-carbon economy that can result from the development of strong industrial clusters.
There can be no doubt that the Tees valley’s successful process industry cluster is central to the region’s position at the centre of the UK’s move towards a high-value, low-carbon economy, attracting significant investment over recent years and developing a reputation for green excellence. The area continues to work with government on a low-carbon action plan, on industrial carbon capture and storage, and on industrial heat networks as part of the city deal agreement, leading the way on bio-industries and energy from waste while increasingly being seen as a destination for green investment.
Such examples confirm the UK’s potential competitiveness on the international stage, but EIIs need access to secure internationally competitive energy supplies if they are to continue locating in the UK and investing in areas such as the Tees valley. That means having a level playing field for EIIs within the single EU market, taking account of the cumulative burden of climate policies on industrial energy prices. We cannot mistake the fact that the Chancellor deserves credit for capping the carbon price floor at £18 per tonne of CO2 from 2016 to 2020 instead of allowing a linear rise to £30 per tonne by 2020, as was originally planned. Calculations indicate that such a move could save UK EIIs in the region of £4 billion over three years, but that cannot disguise the fact that industries are still exposed to an expensive unilateral tax and received no form of compensation for the first year of its operation. With the compensation being announced a few years at a time, there is no long-term certainty about business costs, which deters investment in the sector in the UK.
Estimates suggest that the carbon price floor has already added 5% to EIIs’ energy prices and budget reforms will cap the impact at 8% from 2016 to 2020. Although that is certainly an improvement on the original trajectory, which would have added 14% by 2020 and 26% by 2030, we must recognise that even after this modest reform UK industrial electricity users still face four times the carbon cost borne by EU competitors, let alone competitors outside the EU, which do not face carbon costs at all.
Similarly, EU energy and environmental state aid guidelines published earlier this year limit compensation for the impact of the Government’s carbon price floor on electricity prices, so it can be paid only to EIIs in sectors already eligible for emissions trading system compensation. The Government therefore have no legal means of compensating EIIs for the impact of the carbon price floor in sectors such as cement, glass and ceramics, even where clear evidence exists of energy intensity and risk of carbon leakage. So despite the fact that indirect emissions trading system costs to the cement sector during the period 2014 to 2020 are estimated at £82.7 million, and the cost of carbon price support over the same period is estimated at £104 million, the European Commission’s guidelines conflict with UK domestic policy to allow support against the carbon price support tax for the cement industry.
Incidentally, representatives from that industry have pointed out that cement did not make it on to annex II of the EU ETS indirect CO2 aid guidelines because the tests that were applied were based on trade intensity of cement, which is currently only moderately traded, rather than the raw product before grinding—cement clinker—which is traded much more intensely. That leads to the conclusion that unless every EII sector is deemed eligible at the EU level for emissions trading system compensation, the only equitable solutions available to address this industrial competitiveness problem are withdrawal of the carbon price floor or efforts to reform the emissions trading system itself to encourage a stronger, more robust carbon price signal.
There can be no doubt that the UK must strive to avoid meeting its carbon targets by offshoring state-of-the-art energy-efficient EIIs. The objective must be sensible and economically sustainable decarbonisation, not de-industrialisation. In that respect, the UK’s status as the least energy-intensive economy in the G7 should perhaps be treated with caution rather than celebration.
We must think outside the box and look beyond punitive taxation schemes for alternative means to decarbonise, sending a signal to the rest of the world that it is possible to retain industry and decarbonise simultaneously and leading by example. A report last year by the American Chemistry Council found that 97 chemical industry projects worth a staggering $71.7 billion have been announced as a result of the US’s shale gas boom.
As a result of shale gas extraction, the price of energy and petrochemical raw materials in the US has plummeted, allowing a boom in the chemicals industry—so much so that INEOS tells me that the majority of its profit now comes from one-third of its business sales in the US. Although I am under no illusion that the UK will be able to replicate the US’s experiences entirely, extracting shale gas is likely to reduce energy and petrochemical raw material costs significantly. I also appreciate that fracking for shale gas is a controversial process and recognise the potential risks that it brings. But the appropriate response to concerns about the safety and environmental impact of shale gas extraction is to ensure that we have the right regulatory and monitoring framework in place. Any questions are best answered on the basis of evidence gathered from carefully regulated and comprehensively monitored exploration.
Although there is little prospect of fracking in north-east England, the abundant offshore coal reserves and potential for gasification present an opportunity to secure the future of EIIs—both in the Tees valley and the wider UK—while safeguarding thousands of jobs and helping to drive a much-needed economic recovery in the area. A failure to explore such options further would be an opportunity wasted.
Similarly, with the Tees valley already producing around 50% of the UK’s hydrogen and having an established hydrogen pipe network, the application of carbon capture and storage, as detailed in the region’s city deal, along with investments such as Air Products and the potential extraction of hydrogen from industrial sources mean that there is a significant opportunity to produce green hydrogen in Tees valley, which is capable of supplying the increasing demand for hydrogen fuel cells.
Our EIIs need support through this place, with a re-examination of taxes, carbon capture development and new energy sources. As recommended in the Environmental Audit Committee report, we need to set that path for maximum feasible decarbonisation, and I hope that we will do that soon.