Criminal Justice Bill (Eighth sitting)

Alex Cunningham Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Laura Farris]

Let me revert to the hon. Gentleman in writing on that point. I conceded that there is no guarantee that every single offender will attend their sentencing, but the Bill provides a power for a Crown court judge to order that to happen in certain circumstances. It will also ensure that serious offenders who fail to attend receive punishment. That sends the clear message that offenders are expected to attend their sentencing hearing, and that the wider public have the right to see that justice is done. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell. I assure the Minister that in the interests of a continuing atmosphere of co-operative working, I, like my hon. Friend the shadow Minister for policing, will be constructive in my comments, to enable the Government to justify their legislation by explaining how it will work. Where we have reservations or see the need to offer new ideas, we will do so to help them get it right. I am sure that they are as keen as we are to improve this Bill and ensure it is fit for purpose. Judging by the huge number of Government amendments, they have already recognised at least some of its weaknesses.

As outlined, the first part of clause 22 enables the Crown court to directly order an individual to attend their sentencing hearing by creating an express statutory power to make an attendance order. According to the Library research document, and as the Minister mentioned, any adult who refuses to attend without reasonable excuse will commit a contempt and therefore faces a maximum penalty of an additional custodial sentence of up to 24 months. Any child who refuses to attend faces a penalty of £2,500, but I wonder how a child will ever be in a position to pay such a penalty, particularly if they are given a custodial sentence.

The second part of the clause creates an express power for judges to require prisons to produce adults to court for sentencing hearings. It also makes it clear that prison officers and prisoner escort officers may use reasonable force to produce an adult to court for their sentencing hearing where that is necessary and proportionate. However, the final decision on whether to use reasonable force remains with the prison and escorting staff. Children will not be subject to use of reasonable force for this purpose, in line with domestic policy, guided by the Taylor review of 2020 and the UK’s commitments under the UN convention on the rights of the child. We can only welcome that.

There are many questions that the Minister needs to answer about how easy it will be to implement this policy. We will not oppose the clause, but would like her to spell out how practical it is, and what alternative provision she has in mind if it is impossible to compel a defendant to attend a sentencing hearing.

There is nothing in the Government’s explanatory notes about the resources needed to deliver the policy, and I hope that the Minister will address that. If it is not resourced, it simply will not happen, so we seek clarity there. Likewise, there is little if anything about how the staff who will be at the sharp end of delivering a defendant to court will be protected.

We would also like to understand what the new law would add to judges’ existing powers to compel people to attend their sentencing hearing. Above all, we would like to explore with the Minister whether this new law could actually work, and whether it is in the best interests of the victims. We do not want them to be further traumatised by the sentencing hearing.

We know why this proposal is being brought forward. The Minister talked about a number of high-profile cases in which the defendants refused to attend their sentencing hearing. There have been many: Zahid Younis, in September 2020, sentenced for the murder of Henriett Szucs and Mihrican Mustafa; Koci Selamaj, in April 2022, for the murder of Sabina Nessa; Jordan McSweeney, in December 2022, for the murder of Zara Aleena;Thomas Cashman, in July 2023, for the murder of Olivia Pratt-Korbel; and of course Lucy Letby, in August 2023, for the murder and attempted murder of 13 infants. In those cases, the families never had the chance to look the killer in the eye, or to spell out the effects of their loss.

Perhaps that is why the witnesses we questioned at the start of this Bill’s progress in Committee were supportive of the new law, though from the quotations I am about to use from their evidence, it is clear that many questions are still to be answered. Baljit Ubhey, director of strategy and policy at the Crown Prosecution Service—apologies if I mispronounce these names—described it as

“an important measure, given some of the high-profile cases we have seen and the impact they have had on victims.”

She went on:

“We will have to look very carefully at how we apply for that power—which allows the court or the prosecutor to apply for compulsory attendance—and seek victims’ views”.

Others have made that point this afternoon. She went on:

“The consideration to think about is whether that would cause extra violence. There is something in the Bill about the use of force, which prison custody officers would need to think about”.

I will address that in detail later. Baljit went on:

“I can see why it is in the Bill, but we will have to wait and see how it operates in practice.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 20, Q46.]

Baroness Newlove, the Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales, expressed concerns about victims:

“In terms of victims and their families, both personally and professionally assumptions are made about them when people do not even understand the victim’s journey. I get annoyed at that. I think this is a very important point, because victims sit there for weeks…on end, listening to evidence and having no voice at all. Part of the victims code is to have the victim impact statement, and there is the ability to read it out if there is conviction. I think it should be respected that the family have that kind of relationship, because they have listened to that evidence about their loved ones.”

She went on:

“I also think that you do not know how to judge an offender. They could say that they are coming in the dock and then not play ball. I have seen for myself—evidence shows this—that even through the court trial they will turn their backs, goad you and do everything. If it is still to the judge’s discretion and direction, I would like—I have said this previously—for the judge to own the courtroom if the offender does play in the dock and does not respect the perimeters. Victims’ families are told to respect the perimeters of the courtroom, and the judiciary needs to have that respect. If it happens that they do not want to turn up in dock, a deadline should be put on what is going on. If not, put something in their cell if they are in the court building.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 25, Q59.]

I ask the Minister to address Baroness Newlove’s concerns, which many of us in Committee share, and specifically the concern about how a defendant kicking off will be dealt with under this proposed new law.

Dame Vera Baird KC, the former Victims’ Commissioner, questioned the need for the clause at all:

“As I am sure the Ministers know very well, this adds absolutely nothing to the current law. A judge can order somebody to come into court. If they do not, it is a contempt of court.”

When I pointed out to her during the evidence session that the

“clause actually talks about using ‘reasonable force’”,

she responded:

“But you can already use reasonable force. As long as it is proportionate and necessary, the Prison Service is entitled to use reasonable force to fulfil the orders of the judge. If the judge says, ‘You must come’ and you do not come, it is, No. 1, a contempt of court”—

just as in the proposals before us—

“And guess what the maximum sentence is for a contempt of court? It is two years, exactly as it is in the Bill. If a person does not want to come and the officers regard it as necessary and proportionate to use force to bring them, they are entitled to do exactly that to fulfil the judge’s requirements. There is really no change here.

I well understand the sense from a victim that they want this moment—‘Right, he’s going to face what he’s done now and I’m going to get some benefit from that.’ But the reality is that you cannot capture somebody’s mind, can you? There are always risks that people who are dragged into court might be a nuisance.”

Later on, she said:

“I think it was the former Lord Chief Justice John Thomas who suggested that a better way was to make sure that if the person does not come out of the cell, he is in a cell to which the sentencing can be broadcast. He cannot get away and the victims know that he has, as it were, faced his moment.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 59-60, Q156-157.]

I hope that the Minister will take the time to outline just what her proposal adds to the law, and what alternatives there are to forcing an angry, abusive and possibly violent defendant to sit in the dock.

I will now move on to proposed new section 41B(4) of the sentencing code, which refers to using “reasonable force” to ensure that a defendant attends court. We heard evidence from Mark Fairhurst, chairman of the Prison Officers Association, on the issue. Members will recollect that he told the Committee that he saw no problem for his members in delivering their role in the policy. He told us:

“It is quite easy for prison officers to force someone to attend court; we restrain them on to a cellular vehicle and then they are taken to court. The problem arises at the other end because the courts are run by private security firms now. Have they got the staffing levels needed to take someone who has been recalcitrant off a bus and into a cell in the court? Have they got the resources to drag them into the dock if they are still displaying violent tendencies? Will that disrupt proceedings in the court? Will they be abusive to victims? Will it be distressing for the victims of crime to witness that in the dock? There are a lot of issues we need to look at.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 96, Q39.]

I have made some inquiries about how reasonable force is currently used by prison officers to deliver a defendant into the hands of the security company or court that receives them. It came as a surprise to learn that it involves three prison officers in full riot gear—including overalls, gloves, steel-toed boots, helmets and shields—approaching the prisoner, securing them and getting them into the transport vehicle. Their job is then complete, and responsibility passes to the private security firm staff to deliver the defendant to the court. Unlike the prison officers, neither private security staff nor receiving court staff are equipped with either the personal protective equipment or the training to transfer the defendant first into the court cell and then to the dock.

That level of restraint of a defendant, and risk to employees of the court or agency staff, may be required only occasionally, but what training and equipment will agency and court staff be provided with to ensure that they are as protected as our prison officers? Training is a real issue, and I would be obliged if the Minister would outline what training staff will receive to ensure their and the defendant’s safety. What financial provision has been or will be made to provide such support for staff? The Minister will be the first to recognise our duty of care to these people. If she wants the measure to succeed, she must outline to the Committee exactly how it can be implemented safely. What risk assessment of the whole policy has been conducted? Perhaps more relevantly, what risk assessments will be conducted each time the measure is applied?

I mentioned the case of Lucy Letby. She refused to attend her sentencing hearing and refused to attend via video link. She remained in the cells below Manchester Crown court as bereaved family members delivered victim personal statements, and the judge passed a whole life order in her absence. Like Letby, Thomas Cashman travelled to Manchester Crown court but declined to leave his cell for his sentencing hearing, claiming that he had been provoked by court officials.

Assuming that the Minister’s intention is that defendants such as Letby and Cashman would be forced into court, can she advise how that will be done, and whether she believes such an action is in the best interests of the victims? Perhaps she believes that sanctions can be placed on such people. However, in Letby’s case, the threat of a lengthier sentence would be entirely pointless, because the sentence of life without parole is the most severe penalty the law of England and Wales allows. What sanction can be placed on an offender who knows that the judge will pass a whole life order? Will they be refused visiting rights, or other rights enjoyed by prisoners? What are the Minister’s thoughts on Baroness Newlove’s view that, if defendants object to leaving their cell, a live link should be set up inside? That is also the view of the former Lord Chief Justice, as we heard. It is hard to see how that will be achieved when our justice system’s funding is already stretched to the limit. Perhaps the Minister can also address that.

The charity Justice is also cautious about the introduction of new powers to compel defendants’ attendance at sentencing heroes—hearings. Not heroes; there are no heroes in this business. The charity said that the new powers are unlikely to address the issue in a positive manner:

“A statutory power to require individuals facing a life sentence to attend sentencing hearings is at best unnecessary and at worst, when backed by force, dangerous.”

The briefing from Justice aligns with others in saying that this policy puts staff at risk. It goes on to say that it is questionable whether the discretion to use force in proposed new clause 41B(4) is real, or merely apparent in view of subsection (6). That subsection provides that a

“person is to be treated as having complied with an order under subsection (2) if they have done all that they reasonably can to secure that the offender is produced before the court for the sentencing hearing.”

Given that subsection (4) provides the authority to use reasonable force, failure to use such force when it is available arguably places those responsible for securing production at risk of being held in contempt themselves for failing to comply with a court order. Prison governors and custody officers are accordingly placed in an invidious position.

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[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks. I would like to clarify immediately that attendance by video link is attendance. If the judge deems that the person would be disruptive in the courtroom, they will still be deemed to have attended if there is a live video link to the cell.

I think the hon. Gentleman asked about methods of restraint, and I will deal with that through two points. It is, of course, within the power of the Prison Service to have the person restrained in the cell, so that they are compelled to listen to the judge’s sentencing remarks. Prison officers are familiar with exercising restraint, and with moving disruptive or reluctant prisoners around the estate, and out of the estate into court.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether court security staff would have sufficient training and would be able to carry out their role. That is a fair point, but they are protected at work under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992, which would cover something like this. It would be for the employer to ensure that staff are reasonably safe in carrying out roles. I would anticipate that a judge could take this issue into consideration in making their order in the first place. I remind him that there is more than one way that a person can be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing.

[Alex Cunningham]

I gave the example of prison officers in full riot gear, and with shields, restraining a prisoner. Is the Minister really saying that the employer will be responsible for providing similar equipment to court staff, to ensure that they carry out this policy?

[Laura Farris]

Just to be clear, that is not the statutory duty that would apply. If somebody was deemed to be that level of violent, threatening or difficult, one might assume that the judge consider that very carefully and exercise their discretion. I have said that there is more than one way that attendance is deemed to have taken place, and it does not involve being dragged kicking and screaming into the courtroom. I hope that answers some of the questions. The duty on the employer is to create a reasonably safe place of work, obviously within the parameters that some court staff are engaged in a security capacity and therefore a more robust form of engagement might be reasonably anticipated. I will leave that there.

The hon. Gentleman made a good point about the sanction. If somebody faces a whole-life tariff, why does adding a couple of years matter? It is true that with a whole-life tariff, a person probably has the greatest difficulty with an increased sentence, but I remind the hon. Gentleman very gently of Jordan McSweeney, who used that argument when he said he would not attend. This was reported. He said he did not want to go to court and did not care because he was going to get a long sentence anyway. He got 37 years. But shortly afterwards he was in the Court of Appeal, appealing against his sentence. He was successful and got it reduced by four years. So he did care about the length of his sentence. I think that rather negates that point, if I may say so.

A point was made by the former Victims’ Commissioner, Vera Baird, that I want to take forward. I tried to make this point in my speech, but perhaps I was not clear enough. We accept that the judge now has discretion to make such an order, but we have found that it is not evenly or always applied. It depends who the judge is and where they are sitting. By putting the measure in the Bill, we are creating a power in statute for a judge to make an order to compel a person to attend their sentencing for any serious offence where the maximum is a life sentence, as I have said. That is a change. In proposed new section 41B, the judges can direct a prison to produce any adult offender irrespective of the offence.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, but I do not accept her explanation of how this adds to the law. Perhaps she would like to take it away and come back to the Committee to spell out exactly how it does. Her explanation, I am afraid, did not cut it.

[Laura Farris]

Let me give the hon. Gentleman a practical illustration. Lucy Letby was not compelled to attend her sentencing hearing. She was a young woman in her early 30s and not obviously a massive danger to the victims’ families or somebody who was going to be disruptive, yet the judge did not compel her attendance. We think that the provisions in the Bill alter that and make it far more likely that somebody would be required to attend their hearing.

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[The Chair]

Order. Before the hon. Member for Stockton North intervenes, I have been very flexible, but I remind Members to adhere to the regular rules of the House and speak through the Chair rather than referring to each other as “you”. I know that it is difficult because you are all sitting opposite each other, but it would be helpful, particularly for Hansard colleagues.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister’s point about the trend in high-profile criminals opting not to face the music in court was well made. That is why we certainly will not oppose, and in fact support, this provision. However, it is fair for us to ask and understand exactly how these things will happen. The Minister suggests that the provision is different from the existing powers. Does that mean that perhaps through the judiciary, the judges will be given some form of direction in relation to this piece of legislation that will say to them that if a defendant refuses to appear, they must consider whether they are going to compel them to do so? Or will we be in the same place as we are now, where it is just up to the judge whether it suits him or not?

[Laura Farris]

The statutory intention is that judges will exercise this power. It is plainly recognised and has been well publicised that there is public opprobrium towards the idea that the defendant, particularly in very serious cases, somehow has any kind of control at the end of the process. To be completely honest, the video link would not have been a viable option for a judge until very recently—probably in the life of this Parliament since the general election—but now that that exists, we would reasonably expect judges to make that order as a minimum quite frequently.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Child sex offences: grooming aggravating factor

Amendment made: 36, in clause 23, page 22, line 11, at end insert—

“(2) In section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (deciding the seriousness of an offence), after subsection (7) insert—

‘(8) In section 70A of the Sentencing Code (sexual grooming of child as aggravating factor)—

(a) the references in that section to a court are to be read as including a court dealing with an offender for a service offence, and

(b) the reference in subsection (1) to a specified child sex offence is to be read as a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified child sex offence.’”—(Laura Farris.)

This amendment modifies section 70A of the Sentencing Code (inserted by clause 23), as it applies under the Armed Forces Act 2006.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

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[Jess Phillips]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Ms Bardell. I am pleased that the Minister leaned on it being a year on from the child abuse inquiry—not one of whose recommendations, I think it is fair to say, has yet come to fruition. Well, hope springs eternal for this year! There are plenty of recommendations for the Government to crack on with in this regard, and I look forward to seeing some sort of timeline from the Home Office of any progress in that particular area.

New clause 25, which I tabled, seeks to try to include adult grooming victims on the same footing as children. The grooming of adults is widely and wildly misunderstood, despite there being considerable overlaps of perpetrators and, in fact, perpetrator behaviours and tactics of those seen in cases of child sexual grooming.

At the moment, sexual grooming is a crime only when the victim is a child, but grooming can and does happen to adults as well. It is a technique used by perpetrators to ensure compliance on the part of the victim and to avoid detection, as the victim’s actions are more likely to appear consensual when they are being groomed. Grooming is a deliberate process of limiting the freedoms of a person by gaining control over them and creating a dependency.

New clause 25 would make an aggravating factor of grooming in certain adult cases, including around domestic and sexual abuse. That would both challenge the misconception that adults cannot be groomed and send a message to perpetrators of domestic and sexual abuse that the grooming of adults is being taken seriously and will not be tolerated.

The 2018 Spicer report acknowledged for the first time that not only children but women over 18 are being groomed and sexually exploited. Since 2019, STAGE, the partnership against adult sexual exploitation—I make a declaration that I am the chair—has supported over 700 adult women who have experienced grooming just in the north-east and Yorkshire. The issue is widespread and prevalent in every part of the UK, but is under-represented in UK legislation.

STAGE’s work has confirmed that grooming is a common technique used to manipulate people for sexual exploitation. It has a negative impact on people’s ability to consent and to make capacitated decisions. However, for adults who have experienced grooming, this is often reduced to making “poor life choices”, because of the belief that grooming can only happen to children.

Everything that we heard yesterday about what was said to the girls in Rochdale is being said today to somebody over the age of 18, or even to somebody of the age of 18. Adult victims of grooming are repeatedly asked victim-blaming questions such as “Why did you get back in the car?”, “Why did you stay with them?” and “Why didn’t you leave?” by professionals and services that are meant to be protecting them. This ignores the immense impact of grooming. Because of this, many victims and survivors feel unable to leave their perpetrator, or may not even recognise the abuse that they are experiencing. Until the grooming of adults is recognised in legislation, it will continue to be misunderstood by law enforcement and the criminal justice system, and victims will not be adequately protected. That is why I have tabled new clause 25.

Yesterday, in the light of the Rochdale report, I thought of a woman I had supported. I wanted to make sure, because of the media, that she was okay, because when these sorts of things happen it is pretty traumatic for women who have been exploited in childhood and adulthood. She is 27 years old, so the legislation we are debating would not include her. I needed to search through my email to find her phone number. I found among my emails a letter that I had forgotten, which she had written to the now ex-Home Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham (Suella Braverman). I will read it now:

“Following on from your statement on the 2nd of April 2023, I am writing this letter as a victim who has been let down by countless professionals and services, but worryingly the Home Office itself.

I will begin by providing a summary of my experiences. I was groomed at the age of 13 and this then led on to me experiencing sexual and criminal exploitation for over a decade, whereby I was trafficked all-round the country and sold from one gang to another. There were countless times where I was gang-raped, injected with heroin and left black and blue. I was exposed to serious and organised crime and my perpetrators would laugh at how they continued getting away with what they were doing to me and so many other girls. I did not see any of my family for years and my childhood and early adulthood was stolen away from me.

Whilst I acknowledge your statement that you vow to stamp out child grooming gangs, that is a very easy statement to make. Victims of this crime all around the country have heard it all before. Although you’ve announced new measures to tackle the issue, it makes me question how is this achievable when there are so many flaws in the systems already in place, such as The National Referral Mechanism (NRM).

The police did not refer me into the NRM, despite them full well knowing I had been trafficked. I have spoken with several police officers over the years who do not know what the NRM is, let alone know that they are first responders. It took 562 days for me to get my conclusive grounds decision and for most of that time I continued to be exploited. Nearly a year ago, I was sitting in a hotel paid for by the police, after I’d been physically and sexually assaulted. My accommodation was not safe, and I had requested a safe house. After a lot of back and forth, I was eventually told by…the Home Office’s contractor for NRM services, that a safe house was not an option as I was a British national and that there were no other appropriate housing options. I had to return to unsafe accommodation to then be raped and physically assaulted again.

As you have overseen a system that has routinely let vulnerable people down, I would like to know what action has or is going to be taken to improve this?

I spent days and days in police interviews going into as much detail as I possibly could, with the hope that I would get justice and the men who had tortured me would end up behind bars. The reality is so many victims like me must drop out of investigations because we are not safeguarded, resulting in thousands of perpetrators on the streets continuing to exploit and intimidate vulnerable children and adults. If possible, imagine you are at a police station as a victim of this crime and a stream of text messages come through your phone from your perpetrators saying that they know where you are and that if you do not leave, they will kill you and your family. That is just one example of a threat I have received.

This is not going to stop until appropriate measures are put in place to protect us. In the meantime, the trauma victims experience at the hands of their exploiters is exacerbated when we are routinely let down by the so-called systems in place to protect us. I haven’t even covered in this letter, the battles we face accessing support for our mental health and the legal challenges.

I do hope that you read this letter and that it provides you with an opportunity to reflect on an example of someone who has experienced failures from the Home Office.”

I just ask that we do not fail her again and that we recognise the abuses that she suffered. For women who have been sexually exploited in adulthood—by the way, the sexual exploitation of adults is not defined in law; it has no legislation around it, but believe you me, there are some new clauses coming down the line later—I ask that we recognise that the people who groom children go on to groom the same women as they turn into adults, when they do not have the same protections. I completely agree with everything that the Minister has said; I just want it for her as well. That is all that new clause 25 seeks.

[Alex Cunningham]

As the Minister outlined, clause 23 creates a new aggravating factor to apply when a court is sentencing an adult for a specified child sex offence and that offence was facilitated by or involved the grooming of a children—that is, a person under 18. The court is required to treat the grooming as an aggravating factor, but that does not apply where the person who committed the offence was a child under 18 at the time of the offence.

Clause 23 requires the judge to state in open court that the offence had been aggravated by grooming. It could be undertaken by the offender, or a third party, and committed against the victim of the underlying offence, or a third party. Where the grooming is undertaken or facilitated by that third party, the offence will be considered to be aggravated if the offender knew or could be reasonably expected to have known about the grooming when the offence took place. The person groomed need not be the victim of the offence.

I understand from the Government’s explanatory notes that this is to allow for a case, for example, where child A is groomed to recruit child B and an offence is then committed against child B. Clause 23 also does not require that the grooming be undertaken as part of a gang.

We must not lose the context in which this clause operates, which is horrific cases of offenders preying on the most vulnerable. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile prosecutions of grooming gangs, including in Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Rochdale and Oxford. In 2014, the independent inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham between 1997 and 2013 identified that at least 1,400 children and young people in Rotherham had been sexually abused or exploited. Who knows how many children there are across the country if one area had as many as that?

Just yesterday, the report on child sexual exploitation in Rochdale was published, again illustrating and demonstrating the extent of the crime. I am sure everyone on the Committee will share my sadness in hearing my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) speaking in the media over the last 24 hours about how things have not got any better. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley also talked about how none of the recommendations has yet been implemented.

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However, failing that proper systematic review, which is not on offer to me—I imagine that there will be some more of this chatter in the Sentencing Bill, although not from me, unless I get on that Committee as well—

[Alex Cunningham]

It can be arranged.

[Jess Phillips]

A girl can dream! I will speak to a number of changes because, if we are going to make a point about the end of a relationship, we have to also think about some of the other aggravating factors to try and level the playing field regarding sentencing. I have a list of case studies here of murderers and how long they went away for: 15 years, twelve and a half years—brutally murdering women—16 years, 15 years for a man who then went on to murder somebody else on his release. So, the level of time that we give for this particular crime is woeful.

New clause 27 would make honour-based abuse an aggravating factor in murder cases. Banaz Mahmod was killed in a so-called honour killing in 2006 by her father—not somebody she was ending a relationship with—her uncle, and five other men. She was murdered for leaving her abusive husband, for desiring a divorce and for meeting a new boyfriend who those men disapproved of. She was murdered because she was accused of bringing dishonour and shame on her family and the community.

The men that killed Banaz had boasted and joked about the murder, and were supported by other members of the extended family, who made investigations and prosecution as difficult as possible. The police estimated that there were about 50 men involved in her murder and related crimes.

Before her death, Banaz suffered greatly, reporting rape and violence, threats to kill and an attempt on her life. She went to the police five times. She named the suspects who would eventually kill her. The police did not hear; they did not act. In 2008, a commissioner for the then Independent Police Complaints Commission found serious failings in the police handling of the case.

For many years, Banaz’s sister Bekhal, who I consider a friend, has campaigned alongside Southall Black Sisters for a law that recognises the horror of honour-based killing explicitly in sentencing. New clause 27 would do that. It would introduce honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in murder cases.

Such a new clause will increase confidence in the criminal justice system, sending a strong message that this violence can never be accepted, excused or ignored. As the Women and Equalities Committee stated, an explicit reference “would strengthen the understanding that honour-based abuse is taken seriously by the criminal justice system and only ever as an aggravating factor.” That would have an impact upstream, too, ensuring that agencies do not misunderstand, ignore or turn a blind eye to honour-based abuse due to ignorance or to fear of being seen as culturally insensitive or racist.

Those women must be protected. We must reach them before it is too late. That is particularly important, as honour-based abuse is a high-risk crime that involves multiple perpetrators and colluders and sometimes multiple victims, because of shared codes of honour. Too many victims are at risk for us not to act.

New clause 28 argues that strangulation should be classified as an aggravating factor in sentencing murders. From previous times that I have worked on this issue with the Minister present, I know that she cares deeply about strangulation, and the arguments for the new clause seem unquestionable. First, the nature of the violence: strangulation is a gendered form of killing. That is how men brutally and callously kill women. The 10-year femicide census showed that strangulation was the second most common method for men who kill women, and Clare Wade’s review demonstrated its prevalence.

It is hard to find words to reflect the horror of killing someone by strangulation—the vulnerability of the victim, the intimacy of being eye to eye, the length of time that it would take to kill someone in that way, and the fear that the victim must experience in their final moments. Many bereaved families I work with speak to me about how that haunts them. That must be reflected in the sentencing framework.

Furthermore, new clause 28 follows new laws on non-fatal strangulation—the Minister may remember them her time on the Back Benches—which were introduced under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. How we understand the role of strangulation in domestic abuse is changing. It is now understood as a form of coercive control and an accurate red-flag predicter of homicide. If someone is strangled, they are much more likely to go on to be murdered. We must change how it is considered in sentencing.

A judge can recognise strangulation as serious or sadistic under schedule 21—I say again that that needs review—but strangulation is not being recognised. It is simply not being recognised for the horror that it is. In 59% of the strangulation cases looked at by Clare Wade’s review, the method of killing was not seen as an aggravating factor. Significantly, in 73% of the remaining cases where the offence was said to be aggravated by the nature of the killing, the strangulation was accompanied by either an assault or an attack with a weapon. That suggests that the seriousness of the violence denoted by strangulation in and of itself is not being acknowledged.

In law, we place a lot of emphasis on weapons, but as we see in many gendered murders, many male perpetrators do not need a weapon. Such a perpetrator carries his weapon everywhere he goes, and that is his strength, his arms, his physical power. He does not need a weapon, so his culpability should not be decreased because he did not use one; he did use one. That is not a point in law that has gone unrecognised in other crimes; our bodily differences are recognised. For example, for the crime of rape, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 explicitly states that it can be done only with a penis. That recognises that a man’s body can be a weapon. I am not asking for anything beyond what exists in current law.

A three-year study of 204 adult cases of non-fatal strangulation showed that one in six had been strangled to the point where the victim lost consciousness. Symptoms of such violence include strokes, depression, memory loss, seizures, motor and speech disorders, and paralysis. Studies have shown that victims of non-fatal strangulation are seven times more likely to be murdered by their partner. The true nature of strangulation must be understood, as must its relationship with misogyny. Strangulation is about silencing. It is about exerting power, fear and control. As the member of a focus group who attended for Clare Wade’s review explained:

“It is almost always about the perpetrators wanting the last word but if you work with the perpetrators, you hear this over and over again—like I wanted her to shut up I wanted her to be quiet but I wanted to win you have to have the last word. That is what the whole kind of attacking the throat and putting the hands over the mouth—it is all about silencing.”

I very much hope that the understanding of an aggravation in the use of strangulation in a killing can be considered.

On a slightly different note, new clause 29 would ensure that infidelity can never be used as a defence to murder. The Minister said earlier when commenting on perpetrators attending court that common law practice sometimes needs writing into primary legislation. I very much agree with her, which is why I am seeking for this amendment to be made. While it is still written in our legislation that someone can use infidelity as a defence for murder, it is not used in common law.

Currently, infidelity cannot be used as a defence or mitigation. However, the latter is common-law principle rather than in statute. Section 55(6)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides that sexual infidelity cannot be relied upon in a defence of a loss of control. That was passed following the wrath about “crime of passion” defences going through the criminal justice system in response to domestic murders, and it revoked previous laws on provocation. The legislative change was brought about due to the incredible work of domestic abuse campaigners.

However, the legislation did not concurrently prevent sexual infidelity being a mitigating factor in sentencing in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020—I feel like I am really attacking schedule 21 today, but I am not keen on it if I am honest—thereby creating an inconsistency in the law. The law on provocation changed, but the sentencing principle that surrounded it did not. Common-law principles on the whole prevent this inconsistency from playing out. I will spend the entirety of the Committee stage saying, “In real life, that does not really happen.” Well, in real life this does not happen. It is not something that I am mortally frightened of. It no longer happens that someone is allowed to say that because their wife cheated on them it is fine that they killed her. A million other defences are made, but not that one anymore.

The defence still exists in law; however, it is not used, on the basis that precedent allows for factual scenarios to be disregarded in mitigation where they run contrary to the policy behind existing legislation, even where there may not be a statutory bar. Despite that, it is important to regularise common-law principles in statute for the avoidance of confusion and to fill lacunas in the law. New clause 29 ensures that no judge could ever stray and use it as a mitigating factor.

New clauses 27, 28 and 29 speak to the larger issue of how we see and respond to the killing of women. How we sentence crimes reflects how seriously we take them. At the heart of these debates is how seriously we take the violent deaths of women and the stealing of their lives. I am afraid to say that at the moment, and we do not take it as seriously as we take other crimes. Several years ago, two mothers walked into my office, Carole Gould and Julie Devey. Their relentless campaigning, at personal cost, has hugely elevated the issue of how we should hold the people who kill women to account. Their daughters were both murdered in brutal, violent attacks by their ex-partners. Ellie was 17 and Poppy was 24. They had their futures stolen from them by two men who had decided, as Julie once described, that

“if they couldn’t have them no one else could either”.

Their mothers began campaigning to challenge the discrepancy in the sentences given in cases where the victim, often a woman, is killed in the home and in other homicides where the victim is killed in public spaces. The distinction commonly turns on the fact that if a perpetrator brought a weapon to the scene of a crime, the starting point for sentencing is 25 years. If, however, the weapon is not brought but found, as with a kitchen knife—my kitchen knife comes back into play from earlier—the starting point is only 15 years. That is 10 years’ difference.

The example that is repeatedly given to demonstrate that inequality is that if someone brings a knife with them and kills their victim with a single stab, they will receive a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years; but if the victim is suffocated, strangled, beaten, or stabbed hundreds of times to the point of mutilation with a knife found at the scene, the starting point is 15 years. With the discretion of the judge and the mitigating and aggravating factors, Clare Wade’s research suggested that on average that resulted in a six-and-a-half-year difference between the two sorts of crimes. That cannot be right.

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The Clare Wade review highlights a litany of failures and an array of recommendations. So far, the Government have picked and chosen from them. All the voices in this debate are united in their criticism and their end goal. We all believe that laws that govern our sentencing currently are not working. They result in gross miscarriages of justice that diminish the lives of women killed and put the future lives of other women at risk. They do not reflect or respond to harms done by gendered violence. Frankly, the nation’s women deserve much more.

[Alex Cunningham]

Follow that!

Clause 24 would insert a new aggravating factor into paragraph 9 of schedule 21 to the sentencing code, to be considered when determining the minimum term for a life sentence imposed for murder. It would apply where the offence was connected with the end of the offender’s intimate personal relationship with the victim; the victim intending to bring about the end of that intimate personal relationship; or a belief by the offender that the intimate personal relationship had ended or that the victim intended to bring about the end of the personal relationship. The new statutory aggravating factor would apply to offences committed on or after the date the relevant provision comes into force.

We do not oppose the clause, but I hope that the Minister will clearly define what is meant by “intimate personal relationship”. We will discuss clause 30 later, but it refers to

“controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.

Does clause 24, then, refer only to that of a partner or ex-partner?

We know the context surrounding this measure. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic—that is, they are committed by the partner, ex-partner or relative of the victim. They represent an average of nearly 160 homicides per year, with almost 90 being committed by a partner or ex-partner, over the last 10 years. I join others in commending the excellent work of Clare Wade KC, who utilised her expertise in this field to conduct the independent domestic homicide sentencing review, published on 17 March 2023.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the review coincided with an ongoing campaign by the families of two women who were murdered by their male partners: Ellie Gould, who was 17 at the time of her murder by Thomas Griffiths, and Poppy Devey Waterhouse, who was 24 when she was murdered by Joe Atkinson. In her report, Clare makes the important argument that not only are women wronged by a breach of trust, which is an integral part of domestic abuse, but the harms to them often extend to further harm to secondary victims in the form of families, many of whom are the children—we have heard that before—and friends of the victim. There is also the harm to society in general, which, to date, may not have been sufficiently considered.

Clare made it clear to Committee members in her oral evidence session that the proposals in the Bill fall well short of what she set out in her report. In her evidence, Clare said, of clause 24:

“I have to say that it looks a little odd in the Bill because it is, as it were, stand-alone. The intent behind the policy is to have a coherent legislative policy that addresses all the harms, and addresses the particular harms in these cases. We now have in the secondary legislation the aggravating factor of coercive control as something that has happened in terms of the history of the relationship by a perpetrator towards a victim, and vice versa—it is a mitigating factor as well.”

Does the Minister understand why the clause looks a little odd? Perhaps she needs to do some work to make it fit for purpose and able to capture more of Clare’s recommendations.

I recognise that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has tabled new clauses 27, 28 and 29 in respect of these matters, which we will come on to. I am pleased that the Government are accepting the recommendation to make a murder that takes place at the end of a relationship a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing for murder. In 48% of murder cases looked at in the Wade report, the sentencing remarks disclosed that there were reports of either jealousy or resentment on the part of the perpetrator at the breakdown of the relationship. In the majority of cases, that appeared to be the catalyst for the murder.

The perpetrator was male in all but one of those 43 cases. A history of controlling or coercive behaviour was identified within the case sample. Clare also said in her oral evidence that

“these killings nearly always happen within the context or confines of domestic abuse and, in the cases we looked at, we found that there was frequently an escalation in domestic abuse when the victim—in the majority of cases, a woman who is killed by her male partner—wants to leave the relationship. That particular recommendation was made because not only is that a real harm, and that represents the real danger, but the policy underlying the other recommendations is one that places the concept of controlling and coercive behaviour at the forefront of the thinking.

The real harm in terms of coercive control, which the law does not yet recognise, is entrapment. It is not fear, as in being continually afraid, and it is not necessarily physical injury. It is entrapment, which is what prevents people who are being abused from leaving relationships. Putting that into legislation as an aggravating factor that can be taken into account by the courts would make it clear that that is one of the harms, but it would also, I suppose, bring to our consciousness the real harm in domestic abuse.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 114-115, Q64.]

In the Government’s response to the Wade report, they proposed four legislative measures to give domestic homicide specialist consideration in the sentencing framework for murder for the first time. Clause 24 is the final one of these measures, with three already laid before Parliament as draft statutory instruments. I will not rehearse again the issues around grooming, which have been covered previously, but does the Minister recognise that she may have lost an opportunity to bring forward more of the recommendations from Clare’s review?

Although we certainly do not oppose the clause, we must consider the practical implications at this stage. In the Government’s impact assessment, they state that the impacts of the clause

“fall beyond the 10-year period”

of measurement. However, in the longer term, the impact assessment states that the measure

“is estimated to require a further 42 additional prison places in steady state, reached around 2065, at a 40-year net present cost”

of £19.2 million. To reaffirm what I said in reference to clause 23, without the Government getting on with tackling the crisis in our prisons, any measures that impact on capacity are a cause for a degree of concern.

I turn briefly to the new clauses that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley spoke about so comprehensively. Again, I find it difficult to add value to what she had to say. New clauses 27 and 28 would introduce aggravating factors for honour-based abuse and strangulation respectively. New clause 29 would ensure that sexual infidelity can never be used as a defence for murder. I cannot add much to what my hon. Friend said in her well-illustrated speech, and I take this opportunity to thank and pay tribute to her. She has many years of working in this space. From what I have seen, heard and read, I know my hon. Friend has been not just a leading voice fighting for change, but a driving force in supporting both organisations and individuals.

We on the Opposition side recognise the importance of tightening up sentencing in this area. As outlined in my speech on clause 23, that will form a vital part of the wholesale review that Labour has committed to, so we can consider all the measures necessary to ensure that the criminal justice system works for victims. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Laura Farris]

I align myself with the shadow Minister’s comments about the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. I would like to pick up where the shadow Minister left off, in talking about sentencing more broadly. That will bring me on, quite naturally, to the new clause concerning strangulation.

I agree with the reservation about the gendered aspect of strangulation throughout domestic abuse and particularly in domestic homicide. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about the problem with the law at the moment, where if someone takes a weapon to the scene of the crime, they get longer than if they use a weapon that, for example, comes out of the kitchen drawer. It is well known that this is the Ben Kinsella amendment, which Jack Straw introduced in 2007 in response to a campaign fought very passionately by Ben’s sister, Brooke, and his family.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction) Ben was a young man killed in gang violence, and his sister campaigned very passionately for a 25-year starting point for anybody who takes a weapon to the scene of the crime. Clare Wade dealt with that issue quite extensively in her report. I am not expressing a view of the Government here; I am just reflecting what Clare Wade said. She was critical of the starting point. In fact, she was quite critical of starting points in general.

The Government are conducting a murder sentencing consultation at the moment. It is on the Government website, and it remains open until March this year. It addresses all these points, including where sentences do not look like they are quite right—where some are too low or too high; I am not saying that they are necessarily too high, but it is about whether starting points are right. If the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will forgive me, I will say no to the new cause about strangulation, but I encourage her—particularly given her background and expertise—and all Members to contribute to that consultation, because we are looking at this blend of issues at the moment.

Another important concern that Clare Wade recognised in her report was about ranking methods of murder. A well-known example is that a 25-year starting point applies to any convicted offender who has taken a weapon to the scene of the crime, but a victim of domestic abuse—what we might in the old language call “the battered wife”—is almost always going to use a weapon. That is the only way a woman is likely to kill a man, and a woman has very often taken one to the scene of the crime. We did not actually intend to capture that category of offender, but the law currently does.

We think it is important that we are not, at this point, setting one category of offence above another, and that we conduct this consultation and consider this area of the law carefully. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley effectively acknowledged, and as I think Clare Wade also did, some issues need to be looked at in the round. I hope the hon. Lady will understand why, on that basis, I will say no to her new clause, with all due deference and respect for how she made the case so powerfully put in Clare Wade’s report. All Governments should consider it carefully. That is my first point.

The second point was about honour-based abuse, which again the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley articulated well. We are clear that we will not allow political or cultural sensitivities to get in the way of tackling it. There is no specific offence for such abuse; the term is used to encompass various offences, including not only the usual range of domestic abuse, but some of the psychological pressure that the hon. Lady described. Forced marriage can fall within that, with elements of family shame. She talked about a case with a large number of participants who were part of the abusive ring.

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The 2009 Act repealed the defence of provocation, and replaced it with the partial defence of loss of control. Within that it removed an act of revenge from being any argument that could be advanced. Section 55(6) removed the possibility of advancing infidelity as a defence in a murder case. On that basis, I was satisfied that it was on the statute book. I also checked with officials whether there was any recent example of such a defence ever being advanced or being successful as such, but we could not find one. We are therefore satisfied that the law as it stands provides sufficient protection.

[Alex Cunningham]

I appreciate being able to make an intervention. During my contribution, I talked about Clare Wade and the clause being a little odd because it is a stand-alone one. I know that the Minister has addressed the new clauses of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, but will she comment on that? Is there an opportunity to adopt more of the recommendations of the Clare Wade report?

[Laura Farris]

I thank the shadow Minister for his intervention. We are thinking hard on that point.

I want to check that I have not missed anything from section 55, where anything

“done or said amounted to sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.”

That is still good law. I suggest that the issue of some defendants claiming as a defence that they had killed a victim because she had been unfaithful to them has now been resolved and it is excluded as a qualifying trigger for the loss of control defence.

Clare Wade recommended that sexual infidelity should also be prohibited from being considered as a mitigating factor when it came to sentencing. We published our response to her review in July last year, setting out why we will not take that forward. The domestic abuse sentencing guideline already expressly states that provocation is no mitigation to an offence in a domestic context, except in rare circumstances. No evidence was provided in the review that sexual infidelity was ever being taken into account inappropriately as mitigation. I am therefore satisfied—it is the only point on which I really disagree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—that the law already has sufficient protection in place. I urge the hon. Member not to move the new clauses.